On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
W.Schudy:
Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote
strategically
(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.
If range voters max and min the two pe
At 05:03 PM 8/10/2007, Juho wrote:
>In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the "sincere"
>votes are derived or where they come from. Any method and logic is
>ok. It could be based on terms "sincere" and "utilities", or not. The
>only criterion is technical by nature, i.e. that the voter
On Aug 10, 2007, at 6:08 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:09 PM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their
>> personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't
>> like the word "utility" then we can just talk about putting
>> candid
At 04:09 PM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote:
>In this discussion I'm quite sensitive to different wordings that are
>used when describing Range.
>
>[...]
>
>I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their
>personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't
>like the word "utility
On Aug 9, 2007, at 20:14 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> I've been over and over this point, there is little in this post
> that is new. I'd suggest reading it carefully.
In this discussion I'm quite sensitive to different wordings that are
used when describing Range.
> And if you wish to con
I've been over and over this point, there is little in this post that
is new. I'd suggest reading it carefully. And if you wish to continue
asserting that Range can "cause a mess" when voters vote a mixture of
"sincere" voting and Approval-style voting, please define "sincere"
in a manner that
On Aug 9, 2007, at 6:41 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
In any case, simple Range N is exactly like having N votes to cast,
in an Approval election, and the one with the most votes wins.
There is nothing in this about "utilities" or "ratings."
It happens, however, that you can think about Rang
At 06:13 PM 8/8/2007, Juho wrote:
I'm just saying that the voters should know what they are doing in
>order not to lose their vote (partly). Maybe the official
>descriptions of the method are not that important since probably we
>can trust the media to do their job and explain the methods to the
>v
On Aug 8, 2007, at 20:52 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> The description should inform the voter how the voter's marks will
> be used. One of the descriptions that has been suggested (by me?)
> is precisely that "You have 10 votes, and you may cast as many of
> them as you like for a given candid
At 12:11 AM 8/8/2007, Juho wrote:
> > But that is what Range is!
> >
> > Does the method change based on how we describe it?
>
>In some sense yes. In practice the situation is much more complex but
>in theory one could say that: 1) Strategic voters will study the
>method in detail and they will fin
>In other words: yes, correlation between degree of
>strategizing and political stance makes Bayesian regret
>bigger. But we don't have reason to be afraid of big
>correlations of that kind.
Still thinking that, I feel like addig something:
If I don't vote and at the end a bad candidate wins, I
w
On Aug 8, 2007, at 3:42 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is
>> > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range
>> > gives so
At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is
> > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range
> > gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does
> >
>*2. So for example, if
>49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and
>49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and
>2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0
>then Nader would win.
>
>This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts
>the assertion RV
>"gives power to the candidate who
On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is
> like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range
> gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does
> Approval, to blocks of same. It is an
At 02:01 AM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote:
[I wrote:]
>>Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period.
>>Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best
>>winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore
>>and Bush.
That was a typo. I meant Gore and Nader, o
On Aug 6, 2007, at 1:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
of approval voting, while still allowin
At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
>>If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
>>candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
>>of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot
>>of honesty concerning other candida
Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
>W.Schudy:
>Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically
>(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
>have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.
--WDS replies:
This criticism of range vo
>W.Schudy:
>Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically
>(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
>have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.
--WDS replies:
This criticism of range voting has been heard several times
before, but S
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