FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the presidential elections. Since
1994 a typical direct two round method has been used. Before that (in most
elections) the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then voted in
three rounds (two candidates at the last round).
Reasons behind movi
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM
> On Mon, Nov 1
do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor?
> It:
> Normally is defined as not doing runoffs.
> Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity
> of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting.
>
> DWK
>
> On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 +00
Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 2:47 AM
> If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV
> and not Condorcet.
>
> DWK
>
> On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 + (GMT) Juh
the ballots in multiple locations this is fine - create an
> NxN array at
> each location and sum them together in one final location
> for analysis.
>
> DWK
>
> On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 06:39:53 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
> > Yes, IRV is a good example. Most Cond
"Raph Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 8:50 PM
> Raph Frank wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> One could e.g. fo
oved candidate".)
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 1:21 PM
&
How far is this method from a method that simply allows the voters to rank
different yes/no combinations of the initiatives and then decide the winning
combination using Condorcet?
>From this point of view the ratings are a tool that makes it easier for the
>individual voters to rank the (numer
--- On Wed, 12/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Wednesday, 12 November, 2008, 3:01 AM
--- On Thu, 13/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think that in order to get anywhere on this path, we
> would have to know what it is we actually want from a
> runoff.
First I want to note that I don't want to promote runoffs, just to study them.
> There are two reason
--- On Thu, 13/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > For honesty, then, we have to know which are the two
> best candidates. This
> > sounds like a proportional representation problem with
> a "counc
--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Friday, 14 November, 2008, 12:26 AM
> On Thu, Nov 13
--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Raph Frank wrote:
> > In a condorcet election, the top 2 candidates would be
> at the 50% mark
> > in the 1d policy space.
> >
> > The runoff would held the voters decide from 2 pretty
> good candidates.
>
> This does mea
--- On Sun, 16/11/08, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What I want with this method is a maximally simple
> multi-winner method that does not rely on lists but is
> focussed on individual candidates and that makes sure that
> all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not
> impor
#1
- If your target is to elect Condorcet winners methods that meet Condorcet
criterion could be considered.
#2
- There are also simple Condorcet methods like "elect the one that needs least
additional votes to win all others".
- It is also a fact that in many countries few voters actually know
Here's one IRV example with three strong candidates and where voters do have
some incentive to compromise.
45: A>B>C
10: B>A>C
15: B>C>A
30: C>B>A
We have one centrist candidate (B) between two others.
According to this poll it seems that B will be eliminated first, and then A
would win since
t; think will
> strike the average voter as counter-intuitive. In these
> respects, this
> scenario is quite unlike the standard spoiler scenario,
> where the
> incentive is to intuitively switch one's vote from the
> smaller to the
> bigger campaign. Nevertheless, I would a
irrational use of strategies. Recommending sincere
voting may be a good approach. (Maybe people will
learn after spoiling some election and electing
some clearly unwanted candidate as a result of
burying all the reasonable competitors :-) .)
Juho
>
> Greg
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 22,
IL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: polls and manipulation
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com, "Greg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Saturday, 22 November, 2008, 8:01 PM
> On Nov 21, 2008, at 11:00 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > Here's one IR
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Say that the runoff method is "pick first and second
> place winners of the base method". Then any strategy
> that boosts your preferred candidate to either first or
> second place can be used
One could also promote a candidate that is likely to
lose to one's favou
--- On Sun, 23/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist.
> Borda-elimination (Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax
> is quite simple, and everybody who's dealt with sports
> knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll parti
Condorcet
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Tuesday, 25 November, 2008, 1:37 PM
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > --- On Sun, 23/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Regarding number two, simple Condor
--- On Tue, 25/11/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I agree that resistance to Burying is atractive and IRV's big selling
> point versus Condorcet methods.
Yes, this may be the strongest selling argument of IRV
against Condorcet. But I think this doesn't yet mean
that Condorcet met
In general I tend to agree that IRV and TTR do elect
reasonable candidates most of the time. Condorcet has
a problem since there have been only few major real
life elections and therefore there is no good data
available.
A good alternative to actual election data is always
also credible real-life
One approach to sincerity is to compare voter behaviour to the requested
behaviour. In Approval if the request is to mark all candidates that one
approves then placing the cutoff between two main candidates is often
insincere.. Approval is a special method from this point of view since it is
of
o,
>
> --- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Juho Laatu
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
> behaviour to
> > the requested behaviour. In Approval if the request is
> to
> > mark all candidates that one approves
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> There's nothing
> *wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
> strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
> their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
> context.
I think it would be better n
- Yes, I agree with most of this
- Voters should be made aware of the different approaches so that they can use
the intended one (or the one that suits them better)
- Computerized methods could add something (e.g. more sincere input data,
possibility of loops in the strategy changes) to the appro
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Wednesday, 26 November, 2008, 7:53 PM
> Kevin Venzke wr
e concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 1:17 AM
> On Nov 26, 2008, at 1:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > --- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> w
o,
>
> --- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > It is also far from obvious to me that Approval
> > > uniquely
> > > requires a strategic decision.
> >
> > In the EM discussions people seem to assume
> >
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Note that the minmax philosophy is to study paths of
> > length one. Minmax philosophy says that voter interest
> > to replace the elected candidate with another is more
> > relevant than their interest to replace the cand
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Thursday, 27 Nove
irwise comparison
matrix only.
Juho
--- On Fri, 28/11/08, Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Friday, 28 November, 2008, 2:41 AM
> Ha
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
> behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
> request is to mark all candidates that one approves then
> placing the cutoff between two main candidates is often
> in
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > There are different kind of criteria.
> > If one decides the winner based on one single
> > vote a method that would elect the least
> > preferred candidate would be bad. Things get
> > however more complex with group opini
This is in a way a positive message. It says
also that people tend to make independent
decisions, and that many such strategic threats
that require coordinated and systematic
behaviour are not dangerous in this kind of
environments.
One reason behind the "non-mathematical" answers
is of course als
--- On Tue, 2/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I think it depends on the society and its rules (and
> the method and election in question) if insincere voting is
> considered to be "wrong" or not. In many cases the
> society will benefit if insincere voting is generally no
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
> that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure if it
> would withstand strategy (there's that "hard to
> estimate the amount of strategy that will happen"
> again), and the Minm
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > One approach to sincerity is to compare
> voter
> > > behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval
> if the
> > > request is to mark all candidates that one
> approves then
> > > placing the cutoff between two main ca
--- On Tue, 9/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > The problem here, Juho, is that "sincere
> opinion"
> > > is not the basis for voting,..
> >
> >What is the alternative basis?
>
> The basis is choice. I can drop a marble in this bucket, or
> that
> bucket. Maybe I can dr
In the Yee/B.Olson diagrams Condorcet
methods give quite ideal results. I
proposed ages ago that one might
study also voter distributions that
give cyclic preferences. That would
show also some differences between
different Condocet methods. I'll try
to draft some simulation scenarios.
In a typica
--- On Sun, 14/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > --- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> wrote:
> >
> >> Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
> >> that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure
>
Here's one explanation to why LNH might be more
important to voters than monotonicity.
Most voters are used to election methods where
they bullet vote one of the candidates. It is a
quite natural thought that if one votes multiple
candidates on a single ballot then the vote that
the second favouri
--- On Mon, 22/12/08, James Gilmour wrote:
> The two situations I had in mind were:
> Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R;
> "centrist" candidate M
>
> Election 1
> 35% D>M; 33% R>M; 32% M
>
> Election 2
> 48% D>M; 47% R>M; 5% M
>
> M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, b
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour wrote:
> I do not think you have to be anywhere near the zero
> first-preferences Condorcet winner scenario to be in the
> sphere of "politically
> unacceptable". I am quite certain that the 5% FP CW
> would also be politically unacceptable, and that there wou
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour wrote:
> As I have said many times before, it is my firmly held view
> that single-winner voting systems should NEVER be used for
> the general
> election of the members of any assembly (city council,
> state legislature, state or federal parliament, House of
>
--- On Thu, 25/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> That a 5% first-preference support candidate could be the
> Condorcet winner is radically improbable under anything like
> current conditions. For it to happen would probably take
> very different conditions, which would probably mean that we
> d
One more approach is to allow "ranked
ranking preferences", e.g. A>B>>C>D>>>E>F.
Juho
--- On Fri, 26/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
> To: eutychus_sl...@yahoo.com
> Cc: election-methods@list
One approach that is used in practice and
that to some extent avoids the problems of
- "few random votes to random people"
- difficulty to identify to whom the votes actually are meant
- votes to people that do not want to be candidates
- having too many candidates
is to require people to collect
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour wrote:
> IRV has been
> used for public elections for many decades in several
> countries. In contrast, despite having been around for
> about 220 years, the
> Condorcet voting system has not been used in any public
> elections anywhere, so far as I am aware.
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour wrote:
> The myth that single-member-district voting systems
> "work well" for assembly elections when there are
> only two parties in very
> persistent. We must all work together and do everything we
> can to kill it off because it is just a big, big lie
> pr
--- On Fri, 2/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Reverse Condorcet: If the election is (n-1, n) and
> there's a Condorcet loser, all but the Condorcet loser
> should be elected.
Example:
- 10 Republican candidates, one Democrat candidate
- 55% support to Republicans
- 45% support to Democrats
The ballots were quite sensible.
The biggest category was the 5 candidates
category. Good.
The second category was the 2 candidates
category. When looking at these votes one
can see that they focused on the strongest
candidates (C02, C03, C04). Good.
The third category was the 1 candidate
catego
One comment on concerns related to IRV's
decision between the last two candidates
on if that decision is a majority decision.
Many ballots may have exhausted before the
last round. As a result one may claim that
the last round decision was not a majority
decision.
The point is that in all electio
--- On Tue, 6/1/09, James Gilmour wrote:
> > At 07:04 PM 1/2/2009, James Gilmour wrote:
> > >So let's try again, with little bit of
> additional information that
> > >was (more or less) implied first time.
> > >
> > >At a meeting we need to elect one office-bearer
> (single-office,
> > >single-wi
--- On Tue, 6/1/09, James Gilmour wrote:
> "If the vote for any one candidate equals or exceeds
> the votes of all the other candidates combined, that
> candidate shall be
> declared elected."
> Here you will see there is no reference to "a
> quota", nor is there any reference to "a
> majori
--- On Tue, 6/1/09, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> > From: Juho Laatu
>
> > How should we see other methods like Range
> > and Condorcet in this light?
>
> That is not a valid comparison because, unlike IRV/STV,
> both Range and
> Condorcet methods consider *all* rankin
This is a reply to an old mail. (I didn't cover this well enough earlier)
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> > One
> > could say that any placement of the approval
> > cutoff is sincere as long as it respects the
> > sincere preference order of the voter. But one
> > could also r
--- On Fri, 9/1/09, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> The whole concept of strategic voting is flawed when
> applied to Range. Voters place vote strength where they
> think it will do the most good -- if they think.
Words "where they think it will do the most
good" sound like strategic thinking to me
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> Arrr. Explain, someone, anyone, how MM can change an (A
> B) to an (A B C)
> possible winner set by adding voters for A.
One way to say this is that since in the
first example there was a set of voters
(26 A>B, 25 B>A) that had a mutual majority
op
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Let's consider the first election first, with
> truncation extended to full preference:
>
> 26: A > B > C
> 25: B > A > C
> 49: C > A = B
> A B C: 100 prefer {A B C} to the empty set
This case is interesting (not that it
would have any
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Regarding mutual majority:
> The problem is that the B>A voters cannot be counted as
> solidly committed
> to {A}. They can only be counted to {B} and {A,B}.
> It's certainly possible to criticize that the B>A
> voters should be
> allowed to help {A} so
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Morning, Kristofer
>
> re: (with regard to whether we have the stomach to require
> that
> legislators be maintained at a government
> installation,
> protected from direct access by lobbyists, to prevent
> the
> subornation of those
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > --- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> wrote:
> >
> >> Let's consider the first election first, with
> >> truncation extended to full preference:
> >>
> &
Here's one comment. The topmost thoughts in
my mind when thinking about this approach
is that 1) the principles are good and 2)
making the votes public limits the usability
of the method. Traditionally secret votes
have been a building block of democracies.
Public votes work somewhere but not
every
atpath GMC" compliance a mistaken standard? JL
> To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Date: Monday, 12 January, 2009, 12:20 AM
> Hi Juho,
>
> --- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu
> a écrit :
> > If there is a set of voters that form a
> > majority and they all pr
--- On Mon, 12/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > ... The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking
> about this
> > approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2)
> making the votes
> > public limits the usability of the method.
> Traditionall
--- On Tue, 13/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the
> kind of feedback that enables coercion or vote-buying. In
> order to verify that a certain voter "votes" a
> certain way, the candidate or party in question can tell the
> voter to conn
--- On Tue, 13/1/09, Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Afternoon, Juho
>
> re: "The first thing in my mind would not be to limit
> contacts
> between legislators and lobbyists but to limit too
> heavy
> bindings, maybe most notably monetary dependencies.
> One
> could limit e.g. second j
Two observations.
1) Most countries of the world have
decided to base their democratic
processes on secret votes. It would
be difficult to change their current
principles.
2) The biggest problems may not be in
large coercion/buying campaigns and
explicit coercion/buying but in small
scale and vot
--- On Sat, 17/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > 1) Most countries of the world have
> > decided to base their democratic
> > processes on secret votes. It would
> > be difficult to change their current
> > principles.
>
> It's
--- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated
> or does it depend on what I think how others will vote?
>
> Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to
> determine from my preferences and independent of the other
> voters?
>
>
The mail contained quite good
definitions.
I didn't however agree with the
referenced part below. I think "sincere"
and "zero-knowledge best strategic"
ballot need not be the same. For example
in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot could
be A=50 B=51 but my best strategic vote
would be A=0 B=99. Also ot
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > The mail contained quite good
> > definitions.
> >
> > I didn't however agree with the
> > referenced part below. I think "sincere"
> > a
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> > I believe the practice/principle of having
> > secret votes also often implies interest
> > in allowing people to vote as they
> > privately think. Difference between public
> > and private opinions is thus often seen to
> > mean some sort of unwanted
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Morning, Juho
>
> re: "If there is a common understanding that this (or
> some other
> plan) should be implemented then you can do it."
>
> That's wishful thinking. Every perversion extant,
> political or otherwise, runs counter to the 'commo
ballot propositions
> when asking the voters to change from the status quo using
> Yes/No Approval. I expect this kind of manipulability to be
> a big problem given Approval or Range Voting or plain
> Instant Runoff or Borda, but not given a good Condorcet
> method.
> The reason
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Jan 17, 2009, at 10:38 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > --- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
> wrote:
> >
> >> On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> >>
> >>> The mail contained
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > Are you looking for the English language
> > meaning of sincerity or some technical
> > definition of it (e.g. some voting related
> > criterion)? What is the problem with
> > sinceri
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> > - Why was the first set of definitions
> > not good enough for Approval? (I read
> > "rank" as referring to the sincere
> > personal opinions, not to the ballot.)
>
> "vi ranks", and vi is by definition the ballot.
> That's why the second
> defi
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > > If private and public opinions differ, then which
> is the
> > > manipulated one?
> >
> > If they deviate it is hard to imagine
> > that the private opinion would not be
>
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Jan 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > --- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
> wrote:
> >
> >>> - Why was the first set of definitions
> >>> not good enough for Approval? (I
ns are not important
but their stability and usefulness is.
Juho
--- On Tue, 20/1/09, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:38 AM 1/18/2009, Juho Laatu wrote:
> > I don't quite see why ranking based
> > methods (Range, Approval) would not
> > follow the same principles/definiti
OK. I interpret this to mean that "sincerity"
referred to the sincere opinion that might
not even exist. And that this makes it a
difficult term to define (for all methods).
Or maybe it in this case would be just a
difficult term to use (not necessarily to
define).
For a voter that doesn't have a
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > I see two valid ways to form opinions.
> > - opinion formation based on mass media
> > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion
> >
> > Individuals may use one or both
>
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > I don't see any big conflict. They are
> > free to speak even if the society does
> > not provide them with tools to prove
> > to others how they voted. (And they
> > can still tell othe
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Juho Laatu wrote:
> > c) open ballot
>
> What was the reason why you consider
> open vote to be a requirement? (or a
> "counter-feature")
I need to clarify my own question.
In the top layers open votes are the
default way of doing things. S
--- On Thu, 22/1/09, Raph Frank wrote:
> Anyway maybe a non-manipulable method requires
>
> 1) a simple method to convert honest preferences into valid
> votes
> 2) this method may not use info about other voters
> 3) If everyone else uses this method, then it is in your
> interests to
> also us
OK. Then the model is one where the
voters may have various opinions on
various matters but that doesn't
necessarily mean that they would
have a complete ordering of the
candidates.
I can imagine that I could have e.g.
cyclic opinions on food when there
are three alternatives and three
properties
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> > I think current systems rely on
> > private voting and public discussion
> > (although different than the proxy
> > based discussion). It may be possible
> > to enrich this with better mutual
> > discussion / delegable voting rights
> > without sacrif
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> > > with these counter-features:
> > >
> > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes
> >
> > Maybe mostly positive, but also
> > something negative.
>
> Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy
> with the
> government's voting s
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > I try to summarize my comments in the
> > form of some rough definitions.
> >
> > A "simple" method requires
> > 1) a 'simple' method to convert honest
> > p
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> >> d) voting on laws, too
> >
> > I read this as allowing individual
> > voters to vote directly too, without
> > any proxies between them and the
> > decisions (on laws and
rule out this option. (The
ballot format is not defined.)
(Are there good examples where
these more flexible approaches
would provide some definite
improvements?)
Juho
--- On Sun, 25/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > OK. Then the model is one where the
>
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > What I mean is that it may quite OK
> > to assume that people are able to
> > find some preference order when
> > voting. And therefore we can force
> >
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour wrote:
> > On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> > > What I mean is that it may quite OK
> > > to assume that people are able to
> > > find some preference order when
> > > voting. And therefore we can f
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour wrote:
> Juho Laatu > Sent: Monday, January 26, 2009 12:29 AM
> > What I mean is that decision making
> > is such a natural part of everyday
> > life that people are very used to
> > that. Often they even enjoy making
> &g
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Raph Frank wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Juho Laatu
> wrote:
> > Another approach to offering more
> > flexibility (maybe not needed) and
> > more strategy options (maybe not
> > wanted) is to allow the voter to
> > fil
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Morning, Juho
>
> Let me start by apologizing for my tardy response.
> Although it was not the only cause, there was an extenuating
> circumstance: We were invaded ... by our offspring. My
> wife and I celebrated our 57th wedding anniversary and,
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