--- On Thu, 13/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > For honesty, then, we have to know which are the two > best candidates. This > > sounds like a proportional representation problem with > a "council" of two; > > however, such methods cannot be invulnerable to > cloning, since the Droop > > proportionality criterion and clone independence > contradict each other (by > > http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM , > "clone-no-harm"). > > I disagree, a PR method is not what you want here. If the > best > candidate is cloned, then both clones should be picked as > the top-2. I agree that the targets of proportional methods and single winner methods are different. The best single winner may not be included in the best set of proportional representatives. > PR will likely elect > candidates at the > 33% and 67% marks. Neither of those candidates is optimal. > > In fact, I think that picking one of the 2 would be give > roughly the > same result as the plurality system. One could also claim that in a typical two-party system the two main candidates often are roughly at the 45% and 55% marks. > >> 40: A1>A2>B>C > >> 08: A2>A1>B>C > >> 07: A2>B>A1>C > >> 25: B>A2>C>A1 > >> 20: C>B>A2>A1 > >> A2 would be eliminated first in IRV but here A1 > and A2 form a party > >> (with 55 first preference votes) and therefore C > will be eliminated > >> first, B next, and then A2 will win. > > > > This seems to be more of a problem with IRV, and so > I'd say that a better > > solution would be to switch to another voting system > rather than try to > > patch it up with party lists. > > Also, the A2>B>A1 voters cannot be considered members > of the A party. > This highlights a problem with the party list system, it > assumes > voters are rock solid supporters of their first > choice's party. This party list based method actually allowed the party supporters not to be rock solid supporters of the party. Those 7 A2>B>A1 voters were able to indicate that they preferred B to A1. And their favourite still won. Those voters may still be considered to be members of the A party. It is quite natural that members that are close to the border of the party like some of the candidates of the nearby B party better than the candidates of the very other end of the A party. These voters may still accept the alliance of A1 and A2 although they might be even happier if A2 and B (and maybe A1) would establish a new party together. Juho ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info