2010/1/14 Brent Meeker :
> Is this different from your idea that "experiencing Friday" only comes after
> "experinicing Thursday" because "Friday" contains some memory of "Thursday"?
> You seem to be assuming an extrinsic order in the above.
I think it would be the same regardless of when the da
2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
> I agree, there is no subjective difference. But I think there is a logical
> difference, if you are only your current OM why go to work when some other
> OM will enjoy the fruits of that labor? But by attaching every OM to the
> same observer then there is a reason to m
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker :
> Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you
> mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would
> not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous
> state on signals which were traveling b
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 4:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 10:17 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>> 2010/1/14 Stathis Papaioannou :
>>
>> > Interesting so far:
>> > - people are about evenly divided on the question of whether computers
>> > can be conscious
>> > - no-one re
On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 10:17 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/14 Stathis Papaioannou :
>
> > Interesting so far:
> > - people are about evenly divided on the question of whether computers
> > can be conscious
> > - no-one really knows what to make of OM's
> > - more people believe cats are
2010/1/14 Stathis Papaioannou :
> Interesting so far:
> - people are about evenly divided on the question of whether computers
> can be conscious
> - no-one really knows what to make of OM's
> - more people believe cats are conscious than dogs
Oh, and one person does not believe that they are con
2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
> There have been 9 responses so far, I've attached a preview of the results
> to this e-mail. Unfortunately there does not seem to be a way to make the
> results publicly viewable. With this free service, the survey will remain
> live until 10 days pass or until there are
There have been 9 responses so far, I've attached a preview of the results
to this e-mail. Unfortunately there does not seem to be a way to make the
results publicly viewable. With this free service, the survey will remain
live until 10 days pass or until there are 50 responses.
Jason
On Wed, J
Stathis,
I feel both ASSA and RSSA are variations WITHIN human thinking with a
minuscule difference of handling. When I TRY to think about 'everything' I
feel I have to step out from the restrictions of the human 'mind'(?)
capabilities and (at least) imagine to grasp totality (i.e. the wholeness)
On Jan 13, 6:21 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > ...
> > The ASSA/RSSA distinction on this list came, as I understand it, from
> > debate on the validity of the idea of "quantum immortality". This is
> > the theory that in a multiverse you can never die, because at every
>If I'm not already embedded in the multiverse then I could be anyone,
>and I am therefore more likely to be someone from a high probability
>group or era. So I am more likely to be a modern human than an early
>human, for example, because there are more modern humans. I think
>that's what Russell
>The ASSA proponents say that even though there are
>thousand year old versions of you in the multiverse they are of very
>low measure and you are therefore very unlikely to find yourself one
>of them.
How do they know this though? If the probability distribution was
uniform then versions of me
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker :
You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the "appropriate level" to
make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient
(though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular
algorithm; one more
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
The ASSA/RSSA distinction on this list came, as I understand it, from
debate on the validity of the idea of "quantum immortality". This is
the theory that in a multiverse you can never die, because at every
juncture where you could die there is always a version of y
All,
I've created a basic survey regarding common topics of discussion on the
everything list. I think the results would be quite interesting. It is
available here:
http://freeonlinesurveys.com/rendersurvey.asp?sid=n32533346wr4fp0694426
If others come forward with a lot of suggestions for othe
On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
>
> > Given the ways ASSA has been defined, I think there are two possible
> camps
> > within ASSA. One that believes there is a next moment for you to
> > experience, chosen randomly from among all, and another
2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
> Given the ways ASSA has been defined, I think there are two possible camps
> within ASSA. One that believes there is a next moment for you to
> experience, chosen randomly from among all, and another which believes there
> is no next moment, the observer is the observer
Given the ways ASSA has been defined, I think there are two possible camps
within ASSA. One that believes there is a next moment for you to
experience, chosen randomly from among all, and another which believes there
is no next moment, the observer is the observer moment, an eternal thought.
In t
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker :
> You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the "appropriate level" to
> make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient
> (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular
> algorithm; one more specific than the Platoni
2010/1/13 Nick Prince :
>
> I’ve read through a good deal of previous posts on the ASSA/RSSA
> debate but I keep reaching a stumbling block regarding how successive
> observer moments (OM) are to be expected in terms of their
> continuity. I think Youness Ayaita queried the same thing as I am
> h
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