RE: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Hector, I skimmed your paper linked to in the post below. From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a brain might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue values --- such as synaptic weights, or variable time intervals between spikes (and presumably since those analogue values would be determined by so many factors, each of which might modify their values slightly) --- the brain would be capable of computing many values each of which could arguably have infinite gradation in value. So arguably its computations would be infinitely complex, in terms of the number of bits that would be required to describe them exactly. If course, it is not clear the universe itself supports infinitely fine gradation in values, which your paper admits is a questions. But even if the universe and the brain did support infinitely fine gradations in value, it is not clear computing with weights or signals capable of such infinitely fine gradations, necessarily yields computing that is meaningfully much more powerful, in terms of the sense of experience it can provide --- unless it has mechanisms that can meaningfully encode and decode much more information in such infinite variability. You can only communicate over a very broad bandwidth communication medium as much as your transmitting and receiving mechanisms can encode and decode. For example, it is not clear a high definition TV capable of providing an infinite degree of variation in its colors, rather than only say 8, 16, 32, or 64 bits for each primary color, would provide any significantly greater degree of visual experience, even though one could claim the TV was sending out a signal of infinite complexity. I have read and been told by neural net designers that typical neural nets operate by dividing a high dimensional space into subspaces. If this is true, then it is not clear that merely increasing the resolution at which such neural nets were computed, say beyond 64 bits, would change the number of subspaces that could be represented with a given number, say 100 billion, of nodes --- or that the minute changes in boundaries, or the occasional difference in tipping points that might result from infinite precision math, if it were possible, would be of that great a significance with regard to the overall capabilities of the system. Thus, it is not clear that infinite resolution in neural weights and spike timing would greatly increase the meaningful (i.e., having grounding), rememberable, and actionable number of states the brain could represent. My belief --- and it is only a belief at this point in time --- is that the complexity a finite human brain could deliver is so great --- arguably equal to 1000 millions simultaneous DVD signals that interact with each other and memories --- that such a finite computation is enough to create the sense of experiential awareness we humans call consciousness. I am not aware of anything that modern science says with authority about external reality --- or that I have sensed from my own experiences of my own consciousness --- that would seem to require infinite resources. Something can have a complexity far beyond human comprehension, far beyond even the most hyperspeed altered imaginings of a drugged mind, arguably far beyond the complexity of the observable universe, without requiring for its representation more than an infinitesimal fraction of anything that could be accurately called infinite. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Hector Zenil [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2008 10:42 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Dec 2, 2008, at 8:31 AM, Ed Porter wrote: From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a brain might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue values --- such as synaptic weights, or variable time intervals between spikes (and presumably since those analogue values would be determined by so many factors, each of which might modify their values slightly) --- the brain would be capable of computing many values each of which could arguably have infinite gradation in value. So arguably its computations would be infinitely complex, in terms of the number of bits that would be required to describe them exactly. If course, it is not clear the universe itself supports infinitely fine gradation in values, which your paper admits is a questions. The universe has a noise floor (see: Boltzmann, Planck, et al), from which it follows that all analog values are equivalent to some trivial number of bits. Since digital deals with the case of analog at the low end of signal to noise ratios, digital usually denotes a proper subset of analog, making the equivalence unsurprising. The obvious argument against infinite values is that the laws of thermodynamics would no longer apply if that were the case. Given the weight of the evidence for thermodynamics being valid, it is probably prudent to stick with models that work when restricted to a finite dynamic range for values. The fundamental non-equivalence of digital and analog is one of those hard-to-kill memes that needs to die, along with the fundamental non- equivalence of parallel and serial computation. Persistent buggers, even among people who should know better. Cheers, J. Andrew Rogers --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
J., Your arguments seem to support my intuitive beliefs, so my instinctual response is to be thankful for them. But I have to sheepishly admit I don't totally understand them. Could you please give me a simple explanation for why it is an obvious argument against infinite values ... that the laws of thermodynamics would no longer apply if that were the case. I am not disagreeing, just not understanding. For example, I am not knowledgeable enough about the subject to understand why the laws of thermodynamics could not apply in a classical model of the world in which atoms and molecules have positions and velocities defined with infinite precision, which I think many people who believed in them for years thought before the rise of quantum mechanics. I addition --- although I do understand how noise provides a limit to what can be encoded and decoded as intended communication between an encoding and decoding entity even on a hypothetical infinite bandwidth medium --- it is not clear to me that, at least, that at some physical level, the noise itself might be considered information, and might play a role in the computations of reality. That is not an argument that proves infinite variability, but it might be viewed as an arguments that limits the range of applicability of your noise-floor argument. As anybody who has listened to noisy radio, or watched noisy TV reception can, hear or see, noise can be perceived as signal, even if not an intended one. To the extent that I am wrong in this devil's advocacy, please enlighten me. (Despite his obvious deficiencies, the devil is a most interesting client, and I am sure I have offended many people --- but, I hope, not you --- by arguing his cause too strenuously out of intellectual curiosity.) Ed Porter -Original Message- From: J. Andrew Rogers [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2008 4:15 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness On Dec 2, 2008, at 8:31 AM, Ed Porter wrote: From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a brain might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue values --- such as synaptic weights, or variable time intervals between spikes (and presumably since those analogue values would be determined by so many factors, each of which might modify their values slightly) --- the brain would be capable of computing many values each of which could arguably have infinite gradation in value. So arguably its computations would be infinitely complex, in terms of the number of bits that would be required to describe them exactly. If course, it is not clear the universe itself supports infinitely fine gradation in values, which your paper admits is a questions. The universe has a noise floor (see: Boltzmann, Planck, et al), from which it follows that all analog values are equivalent to some trivial number of bits. Since digital deals with the case of analog at the low end of signal to noise ratios, digital usually denotes a proper subset of analog, making the equivalence unsurprising. The obvious argument against infinite values is that the laws of thermodynamics would no longer apply if that were the case. Given the weight of the evidence for thermodynamics being valid, it is probably prudent to stick with models that work when restricted to a finite dynamic range for values. The fundamental non-equivalence of digital and analog is one of those hard-to-kill memes that needs to die, along with the fundamental non- equivalence of parallel and serial computation. Persistent buggers, even among people who should know better. Cheers, J. Andrew Rogers --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Hi Ed, I am glad you have read the paper with such detail. You have summarized quite well what it is about. I have no objection to the points you make. It is only important to bear in mind that the paper is about studying the possible computational power of the mind by using the model of an artificial neural network. The question of whether the mind is something else was not in the scope of that paper. Assuming that the brain is a neural network we wanted to see what features may take the neural network to achieve certain computational power. We found, effectively, that either an encoding at the level of the neuron (space, e.g. a natural encoding of a real number) or at the neuron firing time. In both cases, to reach any computational power beyond the Turing limit one would need either infinite or infinitesimal space or time, assuming finite brain resources (number of neurons and connections). My personal opinion (perhaps not reflected in the paper itself) is that such super capabilities does not really hold, but the idea was to explore all the possibilities. It is also very important to highlight, that such a power beyond the computational power of Turing machines, does not require to communicate, encode or decode any infinite value in order to compute a non-computable function. It suffices to posit a natural encoding either in the space or time in which the neurons work, and then make questions in the form of characteristic functions encoding a non-computable function. A characteristic function is one of the type yes or no, so it only needs to transmit a finite amount of information even if the answer required an infinite amount. So a set of neurons may be capable of taking advantage of infinitesimals, and answer yes or no to a non-computable function, even if I think that is not the case it might be. That seems perhaps compatible with your ideas about consciousness. - Hector On Tue, Dec 2, 2008 at 5:31 PM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hector, I skimmed your paper linked to in the post below. From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a brain might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue values --- such as synaptic weights, or variable time intervals between spikes (and presumably since those analogue values would be determined by so many factors, each of which might modify their values slightly) --- the brain would be capable of computing many values each of which could arguably have infinite gradation in value. So arguably its computations would be infinitely complex, in terms of the number of bits that would be required to describe them exactly. If course, it is not clear the universe itself supports infinitely fine gradation in values, which your paper admits is a questions. But even if the universe and the brain did support infinitely fine gradations in value, it is not clear computing with weights or signals capable of such infinitely fine gradations, necessarily yields computing that is meaningfully much more powerful, in terms of the sense of experience it can provide --- unless it has mechanisms that can meaningfully encode and decode much more information in such infinite variability. You can only communicate over a very broad bandwidth communication medium as much as your transmitting and receiving mechanisms can encode and decode. For example, it is not clear a high definition TV capable of providing an infinite degree of variation in its colors, rather than only say 8, 16, 32, or 64 bits for each primary color, would provide any significantly greater degree of visual experience, even though one could claim the TV was sending out a signal of infinite complexity. I have read and been told by neural net designers that typical neural nets operate by dividing a high dimensional space into subspaces. If this is true, then it is not clear that merely increasing the resolution at which such neural nets were computed, say beyond 64 bits, would change the number of subspaces that could be represented with a given number, say 100 billion, of nodes --- or that the minute changes in boundaries, or the occasional difference in tipping points that might result from infinite precision math, if it were possible, would be of that great a significance with regard to the overall capabilities of the system. Thus, it is not clear that infinite resolution in neural weights and spike timing would greatly increase the meaningful (i.e., having grounding), rememberable, and actionable number of states the brain could represent. My belief --- and it is only a belief at this point in time --- is that the complexity a finite human brain could deliver is so great --- arguably equal to 1000 millions simultaneous DVD signals that interact with each other and memories --- that such a finite computation is enough to create the sense of experiential awareness we humans call consciousness. I am not aware of
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Suppose that the gravitational constant is a non-computable number (it might be, we don't know because as you say, we can only measure with finite precision). Planets compute G as part of the law of gravitation that rules their movement (you can of course object, that G is part of a model that has been replaced by a another theory --General Relativity-- and that neither one nor the other can be taken as full and ultimate descriptions, but then I can change my argument to whichever theory turns out to be the ultimate and true, even if we never have access to it). Planets don't necessarily have to encode and decode G, because it is given by granted, it is already naturally encoded, they just follow the law in which it is given. The same, if a non-computable number is already encoded in the brain, to compute with such a real number the neuron would not need necessarily to encode or decode the number. The neuron could then carry out a non-computable computation (no measurement involved) and then give a no/yes answer, just as a planet would hit or not another a planet by following a non-computable gravitational constant. But even in the case of need of measurement, it is only the most significant part relevant to the computation that is performing that is actually needed, since we are not interested in infinitely long computations, that's also why, even when noise is of course a practical problem, it is not an infrangible one. Now you can argue that if only a finite (the most significant part) of the real number is necessary to perform the computation, it would have sufficed to store only a rational (computable) number since the beginning, rather than a non-computable number. However, it is this potential access to an infinite number that makes the system more powerful and not the fact of be able to infinite precision measurements. For more about these results you can take a look at Hava Siegelman's work on Recurrent Analogical Neural Networks, which more than a work on hypercomputation, I consider it a work on computational complexity with pretty nice scientific results. On the other hand, I would say that I may have many objections, mainly those pointed out by Davis in his paper The Myth of Hypercomputation, which I also recommend you in case you haven't read it. The only thing that from my point of view Davis is trivializing is that whether there are non-computable numbers in nature, taking advantage of their computational power, is an open question, so it is still plausible. On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 12:17 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hector, Thank you for your reply saying my description of your paper was much better than clueless. I am, however, clueless about how to interpret the second paragraph of your reply (all of which is copied below). For example, I am confused by your statements that: such a power beyond the computational power of Turing machines, does not require to communicate, encode or decode any infinite value in order to compute a non-computable function. considering that you then state: A characteristic function is one of the type yes or no, so it only needs to transmit a finite amount of information even if the answer required an infinite amount. What I don't understand is how a system does not require to communicate, encode or decode any infinite value in order to compute a non-computable function if its answer required an infinite amount [of information]. It seems like the computing of an infinite amount of information was required somewhere, even if not in communicating the answer, so how does such a system not¸ as you said require to communicate, encode or decode any infinite value in order to compute a non-computable function even if only internally? Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Hector Zenil [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2008 5:14 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness Hi Ed, I am glad you have read the paper with such detail. You have summarized quite well what it is about. I have no objection to the points you make. It is only important to bear in mind that the paper is about studying the possible computational power of the mind by using the model of an artificial neural network. The question of whether the mind is something else was not in the scope of that paper. Assuming that the brain is a neural network we wanted to see what features may take the neural network to achieve certain computational power. We found, effectively, that either an encoding at the level of the neuron (space, e.g. a natural encoding of a real number) or at the neuron firing time. In both cases, to reach any computational power beyond the Turing limit one would need either infinite or infinitesimal space or time, assuming finite brain resources (number of neurons and
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Hector, Yes, it's possible that the brain uses uncomputable neurons to predict uncomputable physical dynamics in the observed world However, even if this is the case, **there is no possible way to verify or falsify this hypothesis using science**, if science is construed to involve evaluation of theories based on finite sets of finite-precision data ... So, this hypothesis has much the same status as the hypothesis that the brain has an ineffable soul inside it, which can never be measured. This is certainly possible too, but we have no way to verify or falsify it using science. You may say the hypothesis of neural hypercomputing valid in the sense that it helps guide you to interesting, falsifiable theories. That's fine. But, then you must admit that the hypothesis of souls could be valid in the same sense, right? It could guide some other people to interesting, falsifiable theories -- even though, in itself, it stands outside the domain of scientific validation/falsification. It is possible that the essence of intelligence lies in something that can't be scientifically addressed. If so, no matter how many finite-precision measurements of the brain we record and analyze, we'll never get at the core of intelligence that way. So, in that hypothesis, if we succeed at making AGI, it will be due to some non-scientific, non-computable force somehow guiding us. However, I doubt this is the case. I strongly suspect the essence of intelligence lies in properties of systems that can be measured, and therefore *not* in hypercomputing. Consciousness is another issue -- I do happen to think there is an aspect of consciousness that, like hypercomputing, lies outside the realm of science. However, I don't fall for the argument that X and Y must be equal just because they're both outside the realm of science... -- Ben G On Tue, Dec 2, 2008 at 6:54 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Suppose that the gravitational constant is a non-computable number (it might be, we don't know because as you say, we can only measure with finite precision). Planets compute G as part of the law of gravitation that rules their movement (you can of course object, that G is part of a model that has been replaced by a another theory --General Relativity-- and that neither one nor the other can be taken as full and ultimate descriptions, but then I can change my argument to whichever theory turns out to be the ultimate and true, even if we never have access to it). Planets don't necessarily have to encode and decode G, because it is given by granted, it is already naturally encoded, they just follow the law in which it is given. The same, if a non-computable number is already encoded in the brain, to compute with such a real number the neuron would not need necessarily to encode or decode the number. The neuron could then carry out a non-computable computation (no measurement involved) and then give a no/yes answer, just as a planet would hit or not another a planet by following a non-computable gravitational constant. But even in the case of need of measurement, it is only the most significant part relevant to the computation that is performing that is actually needed, since we are not interested in infinitely long computations, that's also why, even when noise is of course a practical problem, it is not an infrangible one. Now you can argue that if only a finite (the most significant part) of the real number is necessary to perform the computation, it would have sufficed to store only a rational (computable) number since the beginning, rather than a non-computable number. However, it is this potential access to an infinite number that makes the system more powerful and not the fact of be able to infinite precision measurements. For more about these results you can take a look at Hava Siegelman's work on Recurrent Analogical Neural Networks, which more than a work on hypercomputation, I consider it a work on computational complexity with pretty nice scientific results. On the other hand, I would say that I may have many objections, mainly those pointed out by Davis in his paper The Myth of Hypercomputation, which I also recommend you in case you haven't read it. The only thing that from my point of view Davis is trivializing is that whether there are non-computable numbers in nature, taking advantage of their computational power, is an open question, so it is still plausible. On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 12:17 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hector, Thank you for your reply saying my description of your paper was much better than clueless. I am, however, clueless about how to interpret the second paragraph of your reply (all of which is copied below). For example, I am confused by your statements that: such a power beyond the computational power of Turing machines, does not require to communicate, encode or decode any infinite value in order to compute a
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 1:51 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hector, Yes, it's possible that the brain uses uncomputable neurons to predict uncomputable physical dynamics in the observed world However, even if this is the case, **there is no possible way to verify or falsify this hypothesis using science**, if science is construed to involve evaluation of theories based on finite sets of finite-precision data ... So, this hypothesis has much the same status as the hypothesis that the brain has an ineffable soul inside it, which can never be measured. This is certainly possible too, but we have no way to verify or falsify it using science. You may say the hypothesis of neural hypercomputing valid in the sense that it helps guide you to interesting, falsifiable theories. That's fine. But, then you must admit that the hypothesis of souls could be valid in the same sense, right? It could guide some other people to interesting, falsifiable theories -- even though, in itself, it stands outside the domain of scientific validation/falsification. I understand the point, but I insist that it is not that trivial. You could apply the same argument against the automated proof of the four-color theorem. Since there is no human capable of verifying it in a lifetime (and even if a group of people try to verify it, no single mind would ever have the intellectual capacity to get convinced by its own), then the four-color proof is not science... and me, I am pretty convinced that it is, including computer science and proof theory. Actually I think that that kind of proofs and approaches to science will happen more and more often, as we can already witness. Just as the four-color theorem was proved and then verified by another computer program, the outcome of a hypercomputer could be verified by another hypercomputer. And just as for the finite case of the four-color theorem, you would not be able to verify it but by trusting on another system. I am not hypercomputationalist, all the opposite! but closed definitions about what is science and people trying to have the good definition of science, look to me pretty narrow. However, if I were director of a computer science department, I wouldn't probably put any money into hypercomputationism research. But even if it is just philosophy, that doesn't make it less valid or less plausible. On the other hand, the scientific arguments against it often sound very weak, perhaps just as weak as the arguments in favor, but sometimes even weaker. What if a hypercomputer provides you, each time you ask, the answer to whether a Turing machine halts. You effectively cannot verify that it works for all cases (it is of course a problem of induction very spread in science in general), but I am pretty sure you would believe that it is what it says it is, if for any Turing machine, as complicated as you may want, it tells you whether it halts and when (you could argue for example that it is just simulating the Turing machine extremely fast, but let's suppose it does it instantaneously). How this prediction power would make it less science than, let's say, quantum mechanics? To me, that would be much more scientific than people doing string theory... The same about noise. People use to think about it as a constraint, but some of recent results in computational complexity and serious interpretations suggest that actually, as I was telling before, if it nature is indeterministic, noise is actually a computation carried out by something more powerful (even if it seems meaningful) than a universal Turing machine, so by itself, rather than subtracting computational power, it might add up! One would need of course to conciliate this with thermodynamics, but there are actually some interpretations that would easily allow this interpretation of noise. However I don't think I will take that thread of discussion. Together with the bibliography I've provided before, I recommend also a very recent paper by Karl Svozil in the Complex Systems journal about whether hypercomputation is falsifiable. It is possible that the essence of intelligence lies in something that can't be scientifically addressed. If so, no matter how many finite-precision measurements of the brain we record and analyze, we'll never get at the core of intelligence that way. So, in that hypothesis, if we succeed at making AGI, it will be due to some non-scientific, non-computable force somehow guiding us. However, I doubt this is the case. I strongly suspect the essence of intelligence lies in properties of systems that can be measured, and therefore *not* in hypercomputing. Consciousness is another issue -- I do happen to think there is an aspect of consciousness that, like hypercomputing, lies outside the realm of science. However, I don't fall for the argument that X and Y must be equal just because they're both outside the realm of science... -- Ben G On Tue, Dec 2,
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Hi Hector, You may say the hypothesis of neural hypercomputing valid in the sense that it helps guide you to interesting, falsifiable theories. That's fine. But, then you must admit that the hypothesis of souls could be valid in the same sense, right? It could guide some other people to interesting, falsifiable theories -- even though, in itself, it stands outside the domain of scientific validation/falsification. I understand the point, but I insist that it is not that trivial. You could apply the same argument against the automated proof of the four-color theorem. Since there is no human capable of verifying it in a lifetime (and even if a group of people try to verify it, no single mind would ever have the intellectual capacity to get convinced by its own), then the four-color proof is not science... So, the distinction here is that -- in one case, **no possible finite set of observations** can verify or falsify the hypothesis at hand [hypercomputing] -- in the other case, some finite set of observations could verify or falsify the hypothesis at hand ... but this observation set wouldn't fit into the mind of a certain observer O [four color theorem] So, to simplify a bit, do I define X has direct scientific meaning as I can personally falsify X or as Some being could potentially falsify X; and I can use science to distinguish those being capable of falsifying X from those that are incapable ?? If the former, then the four color theorem isn't human science If the latter, it is... I choose the latter... ben --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
We cannot ask Feynman, but I actually asked Deutsch. He does not only think QM is our most basic physical reality (he thinks math and computer science lie in quantum mechanics), but he even takes quite seriously his theory of parallel universes! and he is not alone. Speaking by myself, I would agree with you, but I think we would need to relativize the concept of agreement. I don't think QM is just another model of merely mathematical value to make finite predictions. I think physical models say something about our physical reality. If you deny QM as part of our physical reality then I guess you deny any other physical model. I wonder then what is left to you. You perhaps would embrace total skepticism, perhaps even solipsism. Current trends have moved from there to a more relativized positions, where models are considered so, models, but still with some value as part of our actual physical reality (just as Newtonian physics is not just completely wrong after General Relativity since it still describes a huge part of our physical reality). Well, I don't embrace solipsism, but that is really a philosophic and personal rather than scientific matter ... and, I'm not going talk here about what is, which IMO is not a matter for science ... but merely about what science can tell us. And, science cannot tell us whether QM or some empirically-equivalent, wholly randomness-free theory is the right one... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
2008/12/1 Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED]: And, science cannot tell us whether QM or some empirically-equivalent, wholly randomness-free theory is the right one... If two theories give identical predictions under all circumstances about how the real world behaves, then they are not two separate theories, they are merely rewordings of the same theory. And choosing between them is arbitrary; you may prefer one to the other because human minds can visualise it more easily, or it's easier to calculate, or you have an aethetic preference for it. -- Philip Hunt, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. See http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
If two theories give identical predictions under all circumstances about how the real world behaves, then they are not two separate theories, they are merely rewordings of the same theory. And choosing between them is arbitrary; you may prefer one to the other because human minds can visualise it more easily, or it's easier to calculate, or you have an aethetic preference for it. -- Philip Hunt, [EMAIL PROTECTED] However, the two theories may still have very different consequences **within the minds of the community of scientists** ... Even though T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent in their predictions, T1 might have a tendency to lead a certain community of scientists in better directions, in terms of creating new theories later on However, empirically validating this property of T1 is another question ... which leads one to the topic of scientific theories about the sociological consequences of scientific theories ;-) ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Ed, they used to combine ritalin with lsd for psychotherapy. It assists in absorbing insights achieved from psycholitic doses, which is a term for doses that are not fully psychedelic. Those are edifying on their own but are less organized. I don't know if you can get this in a clinical setting today. But these molecules are gradually being apprehended as tools On 11/30/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ed, Unfortunately to reply to your message in detail would absorb a lot of time, because there are two issues mixed up 1) you don't know much about computability theory, and educating you on it would take a lot of time (and is not best done on an email list) 2) I may not have expressed some of my weird philosophical ideas about computability and mind and reality clearly ... though Abram, at least, seemed to get them ;) [but he has a lot of background in the area] Just to clarify some simple things though: Pi is a computable number, because there's a program that would generate it if allowed to run long enough Also, pi has been proved irrational; and, quantum theory really has nothing directly to do with uncomputability... About How can several pounds of matter that is the human brain model the true complexity of an infinity of infinitely complexity things? it is certainly thinkable that the brain is infinite not finite in its information content, or that it's a sort of antenna that receives information from some infinite-information-content source. I'm not saying I believe this, just saying it's a logical possibility, and not really ruled out by available data... Your reply seems to assume that the brain is a finite computational system and that other alternatives don't make sense. I think this is an OK working assumption for AGI engineers but it's not proved by any means. My main point in that post was, simply, that science and language seem intrinsically unable to distinguish computable from uncomputable realities. That doesn't necessarily mean the latter don't exist but it means they're not really scientifically useful entities. But, my detailed argument in favor of this point requires some basic understanding of computability math to appreciate, and I can't review those basics in an email, it's too much... ben g On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 4:20 PM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ben, On November 19, 2008 5:39 you wrote the following under the above titled thread: -- Ed, I'd be curious for your reaction to http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-uncomputable-entities-useless-forhtml which explores the limits of scientific and linguistic explanation, in a different but possibly related way to Richard's argument. -- In the below email I asked you some questions about your article, which capture my major problem in understanding it, and I don't think I ever receive a reply The questions were at the bottom of such a long post you may well never have even seen them. I know you are busy, but if you have time I would be interested in hearing your answers to the following questions about the following five quoted parts (shown in red if you are seeing this in rich text) from you article. If you are too busy to respond just say so, either on or off list. - (1) In the simplest case, A2 may represent U directly in the language, using a single expression How, can U be directly represented in the language if it is uncomputable? I assume you consider any irational number, such as pi to be uncomputable (although, at least pi has a forumula that with enough computation can approach it as a limit –I assume that for most real numbers if there is such a formula, we do not know it.) (By the way, do we know for a fact that pi is irational, and if so how do we know other than that we have caluclated it to millions of places and not yet found an exact solution?) Merely communicating the symbol pi only represents the number if the agent receiving the communication has a more detailed definition, but any definition, such as a formula for iteratively approaching pi, which presumably is what you mean by R_U would only be an approximation. So U could never by fully represented unless one had infinite time --- and I generally consider it a waste of time to think about infinate time unless there is something valuable about such considerations that has a use in much more human-sized chunks of time. In fact, it seems the major message of quantum mechanics is that even physical reality doesn't have the time or machinery to compute uncomputable things, like a space constructed of dimensions each correspond to all the real numbers within some astronomical range . So the real number line is not really real. It is at best a construct of the human mind that can at best only be approximated in part.
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Ed, Unfortunately to reply to your message in detail would absorb a lot of time, because there are two issues mixed up 1) you don't know much about computability theory, and educating you on it would take a lot of time (and is not best done on an email list) 2) I may not have expressed some of my weird philosophical ideas about computability and mind and reality clearly ... though Abram, at least, seemed to get them ;) [but he has a lot of background in the area] Just to clarify some simple things though: Pi is a computable number, because there's a program that would generate it if allowed to run long enough Also, pi has been proved irrational; and, quantum theory really has nothing directly to do with uncomputability... About How can several pounds of matter that is the human brain model the true complexity of an infinity of infinitely complexity things? it is certainly thinkable that the brain is infinite not finite in its information content, or that it's a sort of antenna that receives information from some infinite-information-content source. I'm not saying I believe this, just saying it's a logical possibility, and not really ruled out by available data... Your reply seems to assume that the brain is a finite computational system and that other alternatives don't make sense. I think this is an OK working assumption for AGI engineers but it's not proved by any means. My main point in that post was, simply, that science and language seem intrinsically unable to distinguish computable from uncomputable realities. That doesn't necessarily mean the latter don't exist but it means they're not really scientifically useful entities. But, my detailed argument in favor of this point requires some basic understanding of computability math to appreciate, and I can't review those basics in an email, it's too much... ben g On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 4:20 PM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ben, On November 19, 2008 5:39 you wrote the following under the above titled thread: -- Ed, I'd be curious for your reaction to http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-uncomputable-entities-useless-forhtml which explores the limits of scientific and linguistic explanation, in a different but possibly related way to Richard's argument. -- In the below email I asked you some questions about your article, which capture my major problem in understanding it, and I don't think I ever receive a reply The questions were at the bottom of such a long post you may well never have even seen them. I know you are busy, but if you have time I would be interested in hearing your answers to the following questions about the following five quoted parts (shown in red if you are seeing this in rich text) from you article. If you are too busy to respond just say so, either on or off list. - (1) In the simplest case, A2 may represent U directly in the language, using a single expression How, can U be directly represented in the language if it is uncomputable? I assume you consider any irational number, such as pi to be uncomputable (although, at least pi has a forumula that with enough computation can approach it as a limit –I assume that for most real numbers if there is such a formula, we do not know it.) (By the way, do we know for a fact that pi is irational, and if so how do we know other than that we have caluclated it to millions of places and not yet found an exact solution?) Merely communicating the symbol pi only represents the number if the agent receiving the communication has a more detailed definition, but any definition, such as a formula for iteratively approaching pi, which presumably is what you mean by R_U would only be an approximation. So U could never by fully represented unless one had infinite time --- and I generally consider it a waste of time to think about infinate time unless there is something valuable about such considerations that has a use in much more human-sized chunks of time. In fact, it seems the major message of quantum mechanics is that even physical reality doesn't have the time or machinery to compute uncomputable things, like a space constructed of dimensions each correspond to all the real numbers within some astronomical range . So the real number line is not really real. It is at best a construct of the human mind that can at best only be approximated in part. (2) complexity(U) complexity(R_U) Because I did not understand how U could be represented, and how R_U could be anything other than an approximation for any practical purposes, I didn't understand the meaning of the above line from your article? If U and R_U have the meaning I guessed in my discussion of quote (1), then U could not be meaningfully representable in the language, other than by a symbol that references some definition
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 11:19 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You said QUANTUM THEORY REALLY HAS NOTHING DIRECTLY TO DO WITH UNCOMPUTABILITY. Please don't quote people using this style, it hurts my eyes. But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. I don't even know what you're saying here. Maybe you're trying to say that it takes a really big computer to compute a very small box of physical reality.. which is true.. I just don't know why you would be saying that. You said IT IS CERTAINLY THINKABLE THAT THE BRAIN IS INFINITE NOT FINITE IN ITS INFORMATION CONTENT, OR THAT IT'S A SORT OF ANTENNA THAT RECEIVES INFORMATION FROM SOME INFINITE-INFORMATION-CONTENT SOURCE This certainly is thinkable. And that is a non-trivial statement. We should never forget that our concepts of reality could be nothing but illusions, and that our understanding of science and physical reality may be much more partial and flawed than we think. It's also completely unscientific. You might as well say that magic pixies deliver your thoughts from big invisible bucket made of gold. But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. So why are you entertaining notions of magic antennas to God? If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. I wouldn't. It's untestable non-sense. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Regarding the uncertainty principal, Wikipedia says: In quantum physics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the values of certain pairs of conjugate variables (position and momentum, for instance) cannot both be known with arbitrary precision. That is, the more precisely one variable is known, the less precisely the other is known. THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS OF A RESEARCHER'S ABILITY TO MEASURE PARTICULAR QUANTITIES OF A SYSTEM, BUT RATHER ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF. (emphasis added.) I am sure you know more about quantum mechanics than I do. But I have heard many say the uncertainty controls limits not just on scientific measurement, but the amount of information different parts of reality can have about each other when computing in response to each other. Perhaps such theories are wrong, but they are not without support in the field. With regard to the statement science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms I though you were saying there was no way the human mind could fully represent or fully understand an infinite mechanism --- which I agree with. You were correct in thinking that I did not grok that you were implying this means if an infinite mechanism exited there could be no evidence in favor of it infinity. In fact, it is not clear that this is the case, if you use provide evidence considerably more loosely than provide proof for. Until the advent of quantum mechanics and/or the theory of the expanding universe, based in part on observations and in part intuitions derived from them, many people felt the universe was infinitely continuous and/or of infinite extent in space and time. I agree you would probably never be able to prove infinite realities, but the mind is capable of conceiving of them, and of seeing evidence that might suggest to some their existence, such as was suggested to Einstein, who for many years I have been told believed in a universe that was infinite in time. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Ben Goertzel [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2008 9:09 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
HI, In quantum physics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the values of certain pairs of conjugate variables (position and momentum, for instance) cannot both be known with arbitrary precision. That is, the more precisely one variable is known, the less precisely the other is known. THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS OF A RESEARCHER'S ABILITY TO MEASURE PARTICULAR QUANTITIES OF A SYSTEM, BUT RATHER ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF. (emphasis added.) I am sure you know more about quantum mechanics than I do. But I have heard many say the uncertainty controls limits not just on scientific measurement, but the amount of information different parts of reality can have about each other when computing in response to each other. Perhaps such theories are wrong, but they are not without support in the field. Yeah, the interpretation of quantum theory is certainly contentious and there are multiple conflicting views... However, regarding quantum computing, it is universally agreed that the class of quantum computable functions is identical to the class of classically Turing computable functions. With regard to the statement science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms I though you were saying there was no way the human mind could fully represent or fully understand an infinite mechanism --- which I agree with. No, I was not saying that there was no way the human mind could fully represent or fully understand an infinite mechanism What I argued is that **scientific data** can never convincingly be used to argue in favor of an infinite mechanism, due to the intrinsically finite nature of scientific data. This says **nothing** about any intrinsic limitations on the human mind ... unless one adds the axiom that the human mind must be entirely comprehensible via science ... which seems an unnecessary assumption to make In fact, it is not clear that this is the case, if you use provide evidence considerably more loosely than provide proof for. Until the advent of quantum mechanics and/or the theory of the expanding universe, based in part on observations and in part intuitions derived from them, many people felt the universe was infinitely continuous and/or of infinite extent in space and time. I agree you would probably never be able to prove infinite realities, but the mind is capable of conceiving of them, and of seeing evidence that might suggest to some their existence, such as was suggested to Einstein, who for many years I have been told believed in a universe that was infinite in time. well, my argument implies that you can never use science to prove that the mind is capable of conceiving of infinite realities This may be true in some other sense, but I argue, not in a scientific sense... -- Ben G --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some time ago on the possible computational power of the human mind and the way to encode infinite information in the brain: http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0605065 the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] I intend to live forever, or die trying. -- Groucho Marx --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some time ago on the possible computational power of the human mind and the way to encode infinite information in the brain: http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0605065 the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that quantum mechanics actually predicts to be intrinsically capable of non-deterministic randomness, while for a Turing machine that is impossible by definition. I find quite convincing and interesting the way in which the mathematical proof of the standard model of quantum computation as Turing computable has been put in jeopardy by physical reality. So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some time ago on the possible computational power of the human mind and the way to encode infinite information in the brain: http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0605065 the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] I intend to live forever, or die trying. -- Groucho Marx --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53 AM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that quantum mechanics actually predicts to be intrinsically capable of non-deterministic randomness, while for a Turing machine that is impossible by definition. I find quite convincing and interesting the way in which the mathematical proof of the standard model of quantum computation as Turing computable has been put in jeopardy by physical reality. or at least by a model of physical reality... =) (a reality by the way, that the authors of the mathematical proof believe in as the most basic) So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some time ago on the possible computational power of the human mind and the way to encode infinite information in the brain: http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0605065 the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] I intend to live forever, or die trying. -- Groucho Marx --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed:
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical reality... true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can never be existed, and any finite series of observations can be modeled equally well as the first N bits of an uncomputable series or of a computable one... ben g On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:53 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that quantum mechanics actually predicts to be intrinsically capable of non-deterministic randomness, while for a Turing machine that is impossible by definition. I find quite convincing and interesting the way in which the mathematical proof of the standard model of quantum computation as Turing computable has been put in jeopardy by physical reality. So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some time ago on the possible computational power of the human mind and the way to encode infinite information in the brain: http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0605065 the key point of the blog post you didn't fully grok, was a careful argument that (under certain, seemingly reasonable assumptions) science can never provide evidence in favor of infinite mechanisms... ben g --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] I
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical reality... It has all to do when it is about quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is non-deterministic by nature. A quantum computer, even within the standard model of quantum computation, could then take advantage of this intrinsic property of the physical (quantum) reality (assuming the model correct, as most physicists would). true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can never be existed, and any finite series of observations can be modeled equally well as the first N bits of an uncomputable series or of a computable one... That's the point, that's what the classical theory of computability would say (also making some assumptions, namely Church's thesis), but again quantum mechanics says something else : The fact that quantum computers are able of non-deterministic randomness by definition and Turing machines are unable of non-deterministic randomness also by definition seems incompatible with the claim (or mathematical proof) that standard quantum computers compute exactly the same functions than Turing machines, and that's only when dealing with standard quantum computation, because non-standard quantum computation is far from being proved to be reduced to Turing-computable (modulo their speed-up). Concerning the observations, you don't need to do an infinite number of them to get a non-computable answer from an Oracle (although you would need in case you want to finitely verify it). And even if you can model equally well the first N bits of a non-deterministic random sequence, the fact that a random sequence is ontologically of a non-deterministic nature, makes it a priori a different one in essence from a pseudo random sequence. The point is not epistemological. In any case, whether we agree on the philosophical matter, my point is that it is not the case that there is a mathematical proof about quantum systems computing exactly the same functions than Turing machines. There is a mathematical proof that the standard model of quantum computation computes the same set of functions than Turing machines. ben g On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:53 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that quantum mechanics actually predicts to be intrinsically capable of non-deterministic randomness, while for a Turing machine that is impossible by definition. I find quite convincing and interesting the way in which the mathematical proof of the standard model of quantum computation as Turing computable has been put in jeopardy by physical reality. So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical reality... I don't get it. You don't think that quantum mechanics is part of our physical reality (if it is not all of it)? true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can never be existed, you can say that either they don't exist or they do exist but that we don't have access to them. That's a rather philosophical matter. But scientifically QM says the latter. Even more, since bits from a non-deterministic random source are truly independent from each other, something that does not happen when produced by a Turing machine, then any sequence (even finite) is of different nature from one produced by a Turing machine. In practice, if your claim is that you will not be able to distinguish the difference, you actually would if you let the machine run for a longer period of time, once finished its physical resources it will either halt or start over (making the random string periodic), while QM says that resources don't matter, a quantum computer will always continue producing non-deterministic (e.g. never periodic) strings of any length independently of any constraint of time or space! and any finite series of observations can be modeled equally well as the first N bits of an uncomputable series or of a computable one... ben g On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:53 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random sequence I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that quantum mechanics actually predicts to be intrinsically capable of non-deterministic randomness, while for a Turing machine that is impossible by definition. I find quite convincing and interesting the way in which the mathematical proof of the standard model of quantum computation as Turing computable has been put in jeopardy by physical reality. So I don't find this argument very convincing... On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by physical reality. Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of physical reality can be simultaneously made. Quantum systems can compute *exactly* the class of Turing computable functions ... this has been proved according to standard quantum mechanics math. however, there are some things they can compute faster than any Turing machine, in the average case but not the worst case. Sorry, I am not really following the discussion but I just read that there is some misinterpretation here. It is the standard model of quantum computation that effectively computes exactly the Turing computable functions, but that was almost hand tailored to do so, perhaps because adding to the theory an assumption of continuum measurability was already too much (i.e. distinguishing infinitely close quantum states). But that is far from the claim that quantum systems can compute exactly the class of Turing computable functions. Actually the Hilbert space and the superposition of particles in an infinite number of states would suggest exactly the opposite. While the standard model of quantum computation only considers a superposition of 2 states (the so-called qubit, capable of entanglement in 0 and 1). But even if you stick to the standard model of quantum computation, the proof that it computes exactly the set of recursive functions [Feynman, Deutsch] can be put in jeopardy very easy : Turing machines are unable to produce non-deterministic randomness, something that quantum computers do as an intrinsic property of quantum mechanics (not only because of measure limitations of the kind of the Heisenberg principle but by quantum non-locality, i.e. the violation of Bell's theorem). I just exhibited a non-Turing computable function that standard quantum computers compute... [Calude, Casti] But, I am old fashioned enough to be more interested in things about the brain and AGI that are supported by what would traditionally be considered scientific evidence or by what can be reasoned or designed from such evidence. If there is any thing that would fit under those headings to support the notion of the brain either being infinite, or being an antenna that receives decodable information from some infinite-information-content source, I would love to hear it. You and/or other people might be interested in a paper of mine published some
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical reality... I don't get it. You don't think that quantum mechanics is part of our physical reality (if it is not all of it)? Of course it isn't -- quantum mechanics is a mathematical and conceptual model that we use in order to predict certain finite sets of finite-precision observations, based on other such sets true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can never be existed, you can say that either they don't exist or they do exist but that we don't have access to them. That's a rather philosophical matter. But scientifically QM says the latter. Sure it does: but there is an equivalent mathematical theory that explains all observations identically to QM, yet doesn't posit any uncomputable entities So, choosing to posit that these uncomputable entities exist in reality, is just a matter of aesthetic or philosophical taste ... so you can't really say they exist in reality, because they contribute nothing to the predictive power of QM ... -- Ben G --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 6:20 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical reality... I don't get it. You don't think that quantum mechanics is part of our physical reality (if it is not all of it)? Of course it isn't -- quantum mechanics is a mathematical and conceptual model that we use in order to predict certain finite sets of finite-precision observations, based on other such sets Oh I see! I think that's of philosophical taste as well. I don't think everybody would agree with you. Specially if you poll physicists like those that constructed the standard model of computation! We cannot ask Feynman, but I actually asked Deutsch. He does not only think QM is our most basic physical reality (he thinks math and computer science lie in quantum mechanics), but he even takes quite seriously his theory of parallel universes! and he is not alone. Speaking by myself, I would agree with you, but I think we would need to relativize the concept of agreement. I don't think QM is just another model of merely mathematical value to make finite predictions. I think physical models say something about our physical reality. If you deny QM as part of our physical reality then I guess you deny any other physical model. I wonder then what is left to you. You perhaps would embrace total skepticism, perhaps even solipsism. Current trends have moved from there to a more relativized positions, where models are considered so, models, but still with some value as part of our actual physical reality (just as Newtonian physics is not just completely wrong after General Relativity since it still describes a huge part of our physical reality). At the end, even if you claim a Platonic physical reality to which we have no access at all, not even through our best explanations in the way of models, the world is either quantum or not (as we have defined the theory), and as long as it remains as our best explanation of a the phenomena that characterizes one has to face it to other models describing other aspects or models of our best known physical reality. It is not clear to me how you would deny the physical reality of QM but defend the theory of computability or algorithmic information theory as if they were more basic than QM. If we take as equally basic QM and AIT, even in a practical sense, there are incompatibilities in essence. QM cannot be said as Turing computable, and AIT cannot posit the in-existence of non-deterministic randomness specially when QM says something else. I am more in the side of AIT but I think the question is open, is interesting (both philosophically and scientific) and not trivial at all. true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can never be existed, you can say that either they don't exist or they do exist but that we don't have access to them. That's a rather philosophical matter. But scientifically QM says the latter. Sure it does: but there is an equivalent mathematical theory that explains all observations identically to QM, yet doesn't posit any uncomputable entities So, choosing to posit that these uncomputable entities exist in reality, is just a matter of aesthetic or philosophical taste ... so you can't really say they exist in reality, because they contribute nothing to the predictive power of QM ... There are people that think that quantum randomness is actually the source of the complexity we see in the universe [Bennett, Lloyd]. Even when I do not agree with them (since AIT does not require non-deterministic randomness) I think it is not that trivial since even researchers think they contribute in some fundamental (not only philosophical) way. -- Ben G --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- Hector Zenilhttp://www.mathrix.org --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
Hector Zenil wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 6:20 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of ... ... Oh I see! I think that's of philosophical taste as well. I don't think everybody would agree with you. Specially if you poll physicists like those that constructed the standard model of computation! We cannot ask Feynman, but I actually asked Deutsch. He does not only think QM is our most basic physical reality (he thinks math and computer science lie in quantum mechanics), but he even takes quite seriously his theory of parallel universes! and he is not alone. Speaking by... when I do not agree with them (since AIT does not require non-deterministic randomness) I think it is not that trivial since even researchers think they contribute in some fundamental (not only philosophical) way. -- Ben G Still, one must remember that there is Quantum Theory, and then there are the interpretations of Quantum Theory. As I understand things there are still several models of the universe which yield the same observables, and choosing between them is a matter of taste. They are all totally consistent with standard Quantum Theory...but ...well, which do you prefer? Multi-world? Action at a distance? No objective universe? (I'm not sure what that means.) The present is created by the future as well as the past? As I understand things, these cannot be chosen between on the basis of Quantum Theory. And somewhere in that mix is Wholeness and the Implicate Order. When math gets translated into Language, interpretations add things. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
Matt Mahoney wrote: Autobliss... Imagine that there is another human language which is the same as English, just the pain/pleasure related words have the opposite meaning. Then consider what would that mean for your Autobliss. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. IMO, pain is more like a data with the potential to cause disorder in hard-wired algorithms. I'm not saying this fully covers it but it's IMO already out of the Autobliss scope. Trent Waddington wrote: Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to your grandmother then you don't understand it. That was Richard Feynman Regards, Jiri Jelinek PS: Sorry if I'm missing anything. Being busy, I don't read all posts. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 6:20 PM, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Trent Waddington wrote: Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to your grandmother then you don't understand it. That was Richard Feynman When? I don't really know who said it.. but everyone else on teh internets seems to attribute it to Einstein. I've seen at least one site attribute it to the bible (but of course they give no reference). As such, I think there's two nuggets of wisdom here: If you can't provide references, then your opinion is just as good as mine, and if you can provide references, that doesn't excuse you from explaining what you're talking about so that everyone can understand. Two points that many members of this list would do well to heed now and then. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
--- On Wed, 11/19/08, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. IMO, pain is more like a data with the potential to cause disorder in hard-wired algorithms. I'm not saying this fully covers it but it's IMO already out of the Autobliss scope. You might be thinking of continuous or uncontrollable pain. Like when a rat is shocked and can stop the shock by turning a paddle wheel, and a second rat receives identical shocks to the first but its paddle wheel has no effect. Only the second rat develops stomach ulcers. When autobliss is run with two negative arguments so that it is punished no matter what it does, the neural network weights take on random values and it never learns a function. It also dies, but only because I programmed it that way. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
Trent, Feynman's page on wikipedia has it as: If you can't explain something to a first year student, then you haven't really understood it. but Feynman reportedly said it in a number of ways, including the grandmother variant. I learned about it when taking physics classes a while ago so I don't have a very useful source info, but I remember one of my professors saying that Feynman also says it in his books. But yes, I did a quick search and noticed that many attribute the grandmother variant to Einstein (which I didn't know - sorry). Some attribute it to Ernest Rutherford, some talk about Kurt Vonnegut, and yes, some about Bible... Well, I guess it's not that important. But one of my related thoughts is that when teaching AGIs, we should start with very high-level basic concepts/explanations/world_model and not dive into great granularity before the high-level concepts are relatively well understood [/correctly used when generating solutions]. I oppose the idea of throwing tons of raw data (from very different granularity levels [and possibly different contexts]) at the AGI and expecting that it will somehow sort everything [or most of it] out correctly. Jiri On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 3:39 AM, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 6:20 PM, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Trent Waddington wrote: Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to your grandmother then you don't understand it. That was Richard Feynman When? I don't really know who said it.. but everyone else on teh internets seems to attribute it to Einstein. I've seen at least one site attribute it to the bible (but of course they give no reference). As such, I think there's two nuggets of wisdom here: If you can't provide references, then your opinion is just as good as mine, and if you can provide references, that doesn't excuse you from explaining what you're talking about so that everyone can understand. Two points that many members of this list would do well to heed now and then. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
From: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. I'm sure you're not meaning to suggest that scientists commonly rationalize in this way, nor that they are all Nazi war criminals for experimenting on animals. I feel the need to remind people that animal rights is a fringe movement that does not represent the views of the majority. We experiment on animals because the benefits, to humans, are considered worthwhile. I like animals. And I like the idea of coming up with cures to diseases and testing them on animals first. In college my biologist roommate protested the torture of fruit flies. My son has starting playing video games where you shoot, zapp and chemically immolate the opponent, so I need to explain to him that those bad guys are not conscious...yet. I don't know if there are guidelines. Humans, being the rulers of planet, appear as godlike beings to other conscious inhabitants. That brings responsibility. So when we start coming up with AI stuff in the lab that attains certain levels of consciousness we have to know what consciousness is in order to govern our behavior. And naturally if some superintelligent space alien or rogue interstellar AI encounters us and decides that we are a culinary delicacy and wants to grow us enmass economically, we hope that some respect is given eh? Reminds me of hearing that some farms are experimenting with growing chickens w/o heads. Animal rights may be more than just a fringe movement. Kind of like Mike - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_the_Headless_Chicken John --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my Do not bother debating with list. You can decide anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true. - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:44 PM Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my Do not bother debating with list. You can decide anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true. Aren't you the one who decided that autobliss feels pain? Or did you decide that it doesn't? -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) and prove that these criteria are valid? And just to avoid confusion, my question has nothing to do with ethics. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:26 PM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would not a productive use of time and prove that these criteria are valid? That is a different issue, as it depends on the criteria of validity, of course... I think one can argue that these properties are necessary for a finite-resources AI system to display intense systemic patterns correlated with its goal-achieving behavior in the context of diverse goals and situations. So, one can argue that these properties are necessary for **the sort of consciousness associated with general intelligence** ... but that's a bit weaker than saying they are necessary for consciousness (and I don't think they are) ben --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 9:29 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would not a productive use of time Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to your grandmother then you don't understand it. Of course, he never had to argue on the Internet. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. I made up no rules. I merely asked a question. You are the one who makes a definition like this and then says that it is up to people to decide whether other humans feel pain or not. That is hypocritical to an extreme. I also believe that your definition is a total crock that was developed for no purpose other than to support your BS. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) and prove that these criteria are valid? I stated that *SOME* future machines will be able to feel pain. I can define grounding, internal feedback and volition but feel no need to do so as properties of a Turing machine and decline to attempt to prove anything to you since you're so full of it that your mother couldn't prove to you that you were born. - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 6:26 PM Subject: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) and prove that these criteria are valid? And just to avoid confusion, my question has nothing to do with ethics. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)
I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines Huh? That's what you're trying to do? Normally people do that by pointing to two different statements and arguing that they contradict each other. Not by creating new, really silly definitions and then trying to posit a universe where blue equals red so everybody is confused. But to be fair, such criticism is unwarranted. So exactly why are you persisting? Ethical beliefs are emotional, not rational, Ethical beliefs are subconscious and deliberately obscured from the conscious mind so that defections can be explained away without triggering other primate's lie-detecting senses. However, contrary to your antiquated beliefs, they are *purely* a survival trait with a very solid grounding. Ethical beliefs are also algorithmically complex Absolutely not. Ethical beliefs are actually pretty darn simple as far as the subconscious is concerned. It's only when the conscious rational mind gets involved that ethics are twisted beyond recognition (just like all your arguments). so the result of this argument could only result in increasingly complex rules to fit his model Again, absolutely not. You have no clue as to what my argument is yet you fantasize that you can predict it's results. BAH! For the record, I do have ethical beliefs like most other people Yet you persist in arguing otherwise. *Most* people would call that dishonest, deceitful, and time-wasting. The question is not how should we interact with machines, but how will we? No, it isn't. Study the results on ethical behavior when people are convinced that they don't have free will. = = = = = BAH! I should have quit answering you long ago. No more. - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 7:58 PM Subject: Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) Just to clarify, I'm not really interested in whether machines feel pain. I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines. But to be fair, such criticism is unwarented. Mark is arguing about ethics. Everyone has ethical beliefs. Ethical beliefs are emotional, not rational, although we often forget this. Ethical beliefs are also algorithmically complex, so the result of this argument could only result in increasingly complex rules to fit his model. It would be unfair to bore the rest of this list with such a discussion. For the record, I do have ethical beliefs like most other people, but they are irrelevant to the design of AGI. The question is not how should we interact with machines, but how will we? For example, when we develop the technology to simulate human minds in general, or to simulate specific humans who have died, common ethical models among humans will probably result in the granting of legal and property rights to these simulations. Since these simulations could reproduce, evolve, and acquire computing resources much faster than humans, the likely result will be human extinction, or viewed another way, our evolution into a non-DNA based life form. I won't offer an opinion on whether this is desirable or not, because my opinion would be based on my ethical beliefs. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction) To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Tuesday, November 18, 2008, 6:29 PM On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:26 PM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. You stated that machines can feel pain, and you stated that we don't get to decide which ones. So can you precisely define grounding, internal feedback and volition (as properties of Turing machines) Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would not a productive use of time and prove that these criteria are valid? That is a different issue, as it depends on the criteria of validity, of course... I think one can argue that these properties are necessary for a
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: For example, in fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not, and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of animal, such as chimpanzee, dog, bird, reptile, fly, or amoeba . No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real. The question is not resolved for simple systems which are completely understood, for example, the 302 neuron nervous system of C. elegans. If it can be trained by reinforcement learning, it that real pain? What about autobliss? It learns to avoid negative reinforcement and it says ouch. Do you really think that if we build AGI in the likeness of a human mind, and stick it with a pin and it says ouch, that we will finally have an answer to the question of whether machines have a consciousness? And there is no reason to believe the question will be easier in the future. 100 years ago there was little controversy over animal rights, euthanasia, abortion, or capital punishment. Do you think that the addition of intelligent robots will make the boundary between human and non-human any sharper? -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real. What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our decisions of how we wish to behave. Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely. Please explain how this is different from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one is human and the other is a simple program, because... Do you think that the addition of intelligent robots will make the boundary between human and non-human any sharper? No, I think that it will make it much fuzzier . . . . but since the boundary is just a strawman for lazy thinkers, removing it will actually make our ethics much sharper. So either pain is real to both, or to neither, or there is some other criteria which you haven't specified, in which case I would like to know what that is. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Matt, First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. If I zap you will a horrible electric shock of the type Sadam Hussein might have used when he was the chief interrogator/torturer of Iraq's Baathist party, it is not clear exactly how much freedom you would to decide how subjectively real the resulting pain would seem to you --- that is, unless you had a level of mental control far beyond that of most humans. You indicate we currently don't know the degree of consciousness or pain that would be suffered by a certain organism with 302 neurons. I agree. Our understanding of the physical correlates of consciousness is still relatively limited, but it is rapidly increasing. I think it is probable that consciousness comes in various decrees, and it is possible that all of physical reality has a form of consciousness, just one that lacks many of he attributes of a human consciousness. A 302 neuron nervous system may have a type of consciousness, but it is my belief it would be one so much less rich and complex than that supported by the 100,000,000,000 neurons of a human brain that it is not only different in degree but also extremely different in kind. I understand I am making a statement based on belief when I predict we will make great strides in understanding the physical correlates of consciousness in the coming fifty years. But there are already a number of studies shedding light on that subject. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well --- so well, in fact, that we should have pretty good, although not necessarily complete, explanations for the various facets of the Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness. That is, we will come to understand that consciousness is created largely or entirely by computations in physical reality, and we will develop a fairly broad understanding of what type of physical computations yield what types of subjective conscious experience. With this knowledge we would be better able to understand the physical correlates of conscious pain, and, thus, better estimate the probability that various humans, animals, or machines will suffer something like pain under what circumstance. The hard problem of consciousness is based on the assumption --- or at least the question whether --- consciousness has aspects that are separate from the physical world. As we increasingly learn more about the physical correlates of consciousness, I think the scope of the hard problem will increasingly diminish. Yes, there are things about consciousness that we cannot clearly define in terms of physical computations at this point in time, but it is not clear that will always be the case. Just as life is created to various degrees of complexity out of bio-chemical computations, I think human consciousness will be shown to be created to various degrees of complexity out of neurological computations. It is conceivable that the properties of other levels or reality will be required so explain some physical correlates of consciousness, such as such as quantum entanglement or quantum weirdness. I think future study will probably tell us if this is necessary. But ultimately there will always be limits to our knowledge. We have no ultimate way of knowing with total certainty that our perceptions of reality are anything other than an illusion. I agree with Richard's paper when it points out the often repeated statement that our subjective experiences are the most real things we have. But just because they are subjective to us now, does not necessarily mean that they are largely beyond the scope of human and AGI assisted science. Ed Porter 1. Kurzweil has claimed we will be able to so accurately scan and model an individual human mind that we will be able to create a virtually exact duplicate of it, including is consciousness, its memories, its passions, etc. I personally think that is unlikely within 50 years. But I think that the combination of brain science and AGI will allow us to understand the mysteries of the hard problem of consciousness much better in fifty years than we do today. -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 12:44 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: For example, in fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not, and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of animal, such as chimpanzee, dog, bird, reptile, fly, or amoeba . No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real. The
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. I'm sure you're not meaning to suggest that scientists commonly rationalize in this way, nor that they are all Nazi war criminals for experimenting on animals. I feel the need to remind people that animal rights is a fringe movement that does not represent the views of the majority. We experiment on animals because the benefits, to humans, are considered worthwhile. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be simulated soon On 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. I'm sure you're not meaning to suggest that scientists commonly rationalize in this way, nor that they are all Nazi war criminals for experimenting on animals. I feel the need to remind people that animal rights is a fringe movement that does not represent the views of the majority. We experiment on animals because the benefits, to humans, are considered worthwhile. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely. Please explain how this is different from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one is human and the other is a simple program, because... Why don't you resend the link to this new autobliss that responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely and clearly explain why what you refer to as pain for autobliss isn't just some ungrounded label that has absolutely nothing to do with pain in any real sense of the word. As far as I have seen, your autobliss argument is akin to claiming that a rock feels pain and runs away to avoid pain when I kick it So either pain is real to both, or to neither, or there is some other criteria which you haven't specified, in which case I would like to know what that is. Absolutely. Pain is real for both. autobliss: http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt By pain I mean any signal that has the effect of negative reinforcement, such that a system that learns will modify its behavior to reduce the expected accumulated sum of the signal according to its model. In the AIXI model, pain is the negative of the reward signal. Kicking a rock or cutting down a tree does not inflict pain because rocks and trees don't learn. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Matt, With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however, qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing terrible pain, unless we have a sufficient hatred toward them to compensate for our natural tendency to feel sympathy for them. Some people attribute this to mirror neurons, and the fact that we evolved to be tribal social animals. With regard to the second point, your statement does not refute my point, although my point is admittedly based on belief that is far from certain. Our understanding of the physical (such as neural) correlates of conscious is currently sufficiently limited that it does not yet let us say much about the consciousness or lack thereof of the systems you describe, even if one assumes they are totally understood in terms of things other than the knowledge of the physical correlates of consciousness that we currently don't have, but will have within fifty years. But from what little we do understand about the neural correlates of consciousness, it does not seem that either system you describe would have anything approaching a human consciousness, and thus a human experience of pain, since they lack the type of computation normally associated with reports by humans of conscious experience. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:45 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. I'm sure you're not meaning to suggest that scientists commonly rationalize in this way, nor that they are all Nazi war criminals for experimenting on animals. I feel the need to remind people that animal rights is a fringe movement that does not represent the views of the majority. We experiment on animals because the benefits, to humans, are considered worthwhile. I am not taking a position on whether inflicting pain on animals (or people or machines) is right or wrong. That is an ethical question. Ethics is a system of beliefs that varies from one person to another. There is no such thing as a correct model, although everyone believe so. All we can say is that some models work better than others as measured by individual or group survival. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Eric Burton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be simulated soon When we start simulating people, there will be ethical debates about that. And there are no procedures in place. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe precisely what you are looking for. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Monday, November 17, 2008, 5:15 PM Matt, With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however, qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing terrible pain, unless we have a sufficient hatred toward them to compensate for our natural tendency to feel sympathy for them. Some people attribute this to mirror neurons, and the fact that we evolved to be tribal social animals. With regard to the second point, your statement does not refute my point, although my point is admittedly based on belief that is far from certain. Our understanding of the physical (such as neural) correlates of conscious is currently sufficiently limited that it does not yet let us say much about the consciousness or lack thereof of the systems you describe, even if one assumes they are totally understood in terms of things other than the knowledge of the physical correlates of consciousness that we currently don't have, but will have within fifty years. But from what little we do understand about the neural correlates of consciousness, it does not seem that either system you describe would have anything approaching a human consciousness, and thus a human experience of pain, since they lack the type of computation normally associated with reports by humans of conscious experience. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:45 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Matt, Matt, Although different people (or even the same people at different times) define consciousness differently, there as a considerable degree of overlap. I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what Richard was discussing in his paper.) Much of scientific discovery searches for things of which it has only partial descriptions, often ones much less complete than that which I have just given. But others on this list might have meaningful additions to the definition of what it is that we should be looking for when we search to understand consciousness. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 5:39 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe precisely what you are looking for. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction To: agi@v2.listbox.com Date: Monday, November 17, 2008, 5:15 PM Matt, With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however, qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing terrible pain, unless we have a sufficient hatred toward them to compensate for our natural tendency to feel sympathy for them. Some people attribute this to mirror neurons, and the fact that we evolved to be tribal social animals. With regard to the second point, your statement does not refute my point, although my point is admittedly based on belief that is far from certain. Our understanding of the physical (such as neural) correlates of conscious is currently sufficiently limited that it does not yet let us say much about the consciousness or lack thereof of the systems you describe, even if one assumes they are totally understood in terms of things other than the knowledge of the physical correlates of consciousness that we currently don't have, but will have within fifty years. But from what little we do understand about the neural correlates of consciousness, it does not seem that either system you describe would have anything approaching a human consciousness, and thus a human experience of pain, since they lack the type of computation normally associated with reports by humans of conscious experience. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 4:45 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it squirms just like a human would. It is surprisingly easy to modify one's ethics to feel this way, as proven by the Milgram experiments and Nazi war crime trials. If we have anything close to the advances in brain scanning and brain science that Kurzweil predicts 1, we should come to understand the correlates of consciousness quite well No. I used examples like autobliss ( http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt ) and the roundworm c. elegans as examples of simple systems whose functions are completely understood, yet the question of whether such systems experience pain remains a philosophical question that cannot be answered by experiment. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives:
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 9:03 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what Richard was discussing in his paper.) Much of scientific discovery searches for things of which it has only partial descriptions, often ones much less complete than that which I have just given. So basically you're just saying that consciousness is what the programming language people call reflection. Sounds pretty easy to implement. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
[so who's near Berkeley to report back?]: UC Berkeley Cognitive Science Students Association presents: Pain and the Brain Wednesday, November 19th 5101 Tolman Hall 6 pm - 8 pm UCSF neuroscienctist Dr. Howard Fields and Berkeley philosopher John Searle represent some of the most knowledgeable minds in their respective fields, and they will be answering questions about the relationship between pain, pleasure, addiction, and consciousness from their intellectual perspectives. This pairing is sure to make for an extremely intriguing forum, so please come out and attend if you are interested in an interesting discussion! This event is free, and light refreshments will be served afterward. All are welcome! for more information, contact: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
Trent, No, it is not easy to implement. I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we are conscious of something. Some of the studies we have on the neural correlates of consciousness indicate humans only report being consciously aware of things that receive considerable coordinated attention from the brain, and, thus, which receive an extremely complex level of computation. And this coordinated complexity is occurring as controlled spreading activation in a self organized hierarchical memory of patterns learned from sensed and felt experience, in such a manner as to provide not only attention to, but also extensive contextually relevant grounding for, the concepts involved. This grounding provides a sense of meaning and depth to our awareness. A reasonably high level of awareness of a single concept involves the sending and receiving and potential summing of many billions or trillions of messages. At any instant, the short term dynamic state of the brain would probably require many terabytes to represent in current computer hardware. Creating such a massively parallel, contextually grounded, self-focusing, dynamic, state remembering, self-aware complex is not a trivial task, and would not take place in any current software that I know of, to the extent required for a human level of conscious awareness. I think such a human-level sense of awareness could be created out of Novemente-like components, if running on a machine with massive memory (say roughly 100TBytes) , massive opps/sec (say 1000Topp/sec) , and massive interconnect (say an effective whole machine x-sectional bandwidth of 1T 64byte payload msgs/sec, a total x-sectional bandwidth across regions 1/1000 the size of the system of 30T Msg/sec, and the ability to access cache lines within a distance of 1/100,000th of the machine about 300T times a second). Such a machine could probably be profitable built and sold for under $3M in 10 years (and perhaps much less than that), if they were sold in a quantity of, say, 1000 machines per year. But as I have said, it is conceivable, much more or much less hardware would be required, or even that a different type of computing would be required such as some type of quantum computing, in order to produce human-like consciousness. I doubt it quantum computing will be required, but it is certainly possible. In fifty years, humankind will probably know for sure. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 6:19 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 9:03 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what Richard was discussing in his paper.) Much of scientific discovery searches for things of which it has only partial descriptions, often ones much less complete than that which I have just given. So basically you're just saying that consciousness is what the programming language people call reflection. Sounds pretty easy to implement. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 10:21 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we are conscious of something. You must talk to different humans to me. I've not had anyone use the word conscious around me in decades.. and usually they're either high or talking about AI (or both). Can you give some examples of their usage? Cause if you're going to talk about consciousness in terms of you know, that thing then I'd really like to be sure that we're both talking about the same thing. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. You are describing episodic memory, the ability to recall a sequence of events. These events include recalling other events; we are aware of our own thoughts. Reading from the higher levels of the brain also writes into it. That's easy enough to implement, for example, a database that logs transactions. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
This is a subject on which I have done a lot of talking to myself, since as Richard's paper implies, our own subjective experiences are among the most real things to us. And we have the most direct access to our own consciousness, and is since of richness, simultaneity, and meaning. I am also aware that much of what we feel we are aware of is an illusion, such as the example of the man in the gorilla suite walking unobserved in plain through a scene in which you are asked to count how many times a team passes a basketball back and forth, as mentioned recently under this thread by Mark Waser. But if you read papers about the neural correlates of consciousness, you will find that some of them are based on reports from human subjects about whether or not that were aware of something or not, such as images, or sounds, or an answer to a question.pp -Original Message- From: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 7:36 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 10:21 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we are conscious of something. You must talk to different humans to me. I've not had anyone use the word conscious around me in decades.. and usually they're either high or talking about AI (or both). Can you give some examples of their usage? Cause if you're going to talk about consciousness in terms of you know, that thing then I'd really like to be sure that we're both talking about the same thing. Trent --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction
See the post I just sent to Matt Mahoney. You have a much greater access to your own memory than just high level episodic memory. Although your memories of such experience are more limited than their actual experience, you can remember qualities about them, that include their sense of richness, simultaneity, and meaning. -Original Message- From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2008 8:46 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. You are describing episodic memory, the ability to recall a sequence of events. These events include recalling other events; we are aware of our own thoughts. Reading from the higher levels of the brain also writes into it. That's easy enough to implement, for example, a database that logs transactions. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=120640061-aded06 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
