Re: [Fwd: Reminder - SSL Certificate for *.startcom.org expires in 10 Days]

2008-12-22 Thread Ian G

On 22/12/08 04:16, Eddy Nigg wrote:

Not sure if this is a reason to disable a root, but it's certainly
illegal business practice. Hopefully we can settle this with Comodo
directly in appropriate manner.



Seems like the business is in Denmark, and claims Danish law and courts. 
 Which law are you claiming is breached?  Just curious...



iang
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Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread ps_mitrofanov
Hi. I'm asking for help :) When I  try to build NSS on Windows Vista,
I've go build_coreconf error 1. Is it possible to build NSS on Vista ?
If it is possible, then please tell me how?
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RE: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread David Stutzman
Unless you're intimate with the NSS build system and know enough to trim things 
down...then this set of instructions is the best thing.  I've built NSS on 
Vista using this wiki page:
https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Windows_Build_Prerequisites

-Original Message-
From: dev-tech-crypto-bounces+dstutzman=dsci@lists.mozilla.org 
[mailto:dev-tech-crypto-bounces+dstutzman=dsci@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf 
Of ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 6:34 AM
To: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Building NSS on Vista

Hi. I'm asking for help :) When I  try to build NSS on Windows Vista,
I've go build_coreconf error 1. Is it possible to build NSS on Vista ?
If it is possible, then please tell me how?
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Re: [Fwd: Reminder - SSL Certificate for *.startcom.org expires in 10 Days]

2008-12-22 Thread Eddy Nigg

On 12/22/2008 11:11 AM, Ian G:

On 22/12/08 04:16, Eddy Nigg wrote:

Not sure if this is a reason to disable a root, but it's certainly
illegal business practice. Hopefully we can settle this with Comodo
directly in appropriate manner.



Seems like the business is in Denmark, and claims Danish law and courts.
Which law are you claiming is breached? Just curious...



Unfortunately I can't comment any further on this matter what legal 
issues concerns...


--
Regards

Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
Jabber: start...@startcom.org
Blog:   https://blog.startcom.org
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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread ps_mitrofanov
Thank you, David Stutzman. I hope this information will help me.
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delta crl support

2008-12-22 Thread sg4all
Dear all,

does the current version of nss already support delta crls? I can only find
old information about this. Where can I find up to date info about such
information?

thanks
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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 03:33:
 Hi. I'm asking for help :) When I  try to build NSS on Windows Vista,
 I've go build_coreconf error 1. Is it possible to build NSS on Vista ?
 If it is possible, then please tell me how?

Sounds like you might have had one or more of these issues:
- Used the wrong make program. (Must use gmake, not nmake, on Windows.)
- Don't have the right set of build tools. (Don't have one of Mozilla's
packages of build tools for Windows that includes the nsinstall program.)
- Don't have all of the necessary sources in your source tree. (Did you
have mozilla/security/coreconf as well as mozilla/security nss?)

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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread ps_mitrofanov
On 22 дек, 19:14, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
 ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 03:33:

  Hi. I'm asking for help :) When I  try to build NSS on Windows Vista,
  I've go build_coreconf error 1. Is it possible to build NSS on Vista ?
  If it is possible, then please tell me how?

 Sounds like you might have had one or more of these issues:
 - Used the wrong make program. (Must use gmake, not nmake, on Windows.)
 - Don't have the right set of build tools. (Don't have one of Mozilla's
 packages of build tools for Windows that includes the nsinstall program.)
 - Don't have all of the necessary sources in your source tree. (Did you
 have mozilla/security/coreconf as well as mozilla/security nss?)


I have all mozilla-tools mentioned in  NSS Building FAQ: gmake.exe,
nsinstall.exe, shmsdos,.exe uname.exe, glib-1.2_s.lib,
libIDL-0.6_s.lib, include-fles. Also, I have all of the necessary
sources(coreconf, nss...). I've set all environment variables. I'm
using gmake nss_build_ all.
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Re: Can't unwrap key into NSS in FIPS mode

2008-12-22 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
alex.agra...@gmail.com wrote, On 2008-12-21 08:02:

 I'm working with NSS from JAVA (via JAVA 6 PKCS11 provider on RHEL 5).
 My NSS database is  configured for FIPS-140 mode. And I try to wrap/
 unwrap AES key with RSA public/private key pair as follows:
 
 // open NSS keystore
 char[] nssDBPassword = {'f', 'i', 'p', 's', '1', '4', '0', '-', '2'};
 KeyStore ks = KeyStore.getInstance(PKCS11);
 ks.load(null, nssDBPassword);
 Provider p = ks.getProvider();
 
 // generate RSA key pair
 KeyPairGenerator keyPairGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(RSA, p);
 KeyPair keyPair = keyPairGen.generateKeyPair();
 
 // generate AES key
 KeyGenerator keyGen = KeyGenerator.getInstance(AES, p);
 keyGen.init(128);
 Key rawKey = keyGen.generateKey();
 System.out.println(raw Key :  + rawKey);
 
 // wrap key
 Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance(RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding, p);
 cipher.init(Cipher.WRAP_MODE, keyPair.getPublic());
 byte[] wrappedData = cipher.wrap(rawKey);
 
 // unwrap key
 cipher = Cipher.getInstance(RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding, p);
 cipher.init(Cipher.UNWRAP_MODE, keyPair.getPrivate());
 unwrappedKey = cipher.unwrap(wrappedData, AES, Cipher.SECRET_KEY);
 
 // encode data
 cipher = Cipher.getInstance(AES/CBC/NoPadding, p);
 cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, unwrappedKey);
 
 The wrap/unwrap code seems to work fine. But when I attempt to perform
 encoding with the unwrapped key - I get the following exception
 (which, as far as I understand, seems to suggest that key doesn't
 reside inside NSS crypto token):
 
   raw Key : SunPKCS11-NSScrypto AES secret key, 128 bits (id 12, session 
 object, sensitive, extractable)
   java.security.InvalidKeyException: Could not create key
   at sun.security.pkcs11.P11SecretKeyFactory.createKey 
 (P11SecretKeyFactory.java:226)
   at sun.security.pkcs11.P11SecretKeyFactory.convertKey 
 (P11SecretKeyFactory.java:131)
   at sun.security.pkcs11.P11Cipher.engineGetKeySize(P11Cipher.java:582)
   at javax.crypto.Cipher.b(DashoA13*..)
   at javax.crypto.Cipher.a(DashoA13*..)
   at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(DashoA13*..)
   at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(DashoA13*..)
   at EncryptionTest.main(EncryptionTest.java:88)

Are you sure this is not coming from the cipher.unwrap call?
If you add a line of code to print info about the unwrapped key,
does it show that key to be in the NSS token?

 Can anybody tell me what am I doing wrong? Or, may be, point me to
 some working JAVA code that performs wrap/unwrap of the key in NSS
 token?

Maybe one of our seasoned Java veterans can help with those questions.
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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 08:45:
 On 22 дек, 19:14, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
 ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 03:33:

 Hi. I'm asking for help :) When I  try to build NSS on Windows Vista,
 I've go build_coreconf error 1. Is it possible to build NSS on Vista ?
 If it is possible, then please tell me how?
 Sounds like you might have had one or more of these issues:
 - Used the wrong make program. (Must use gmake, not nmake, on Windows.)
 - Don't have the right set of build tools. (Don't have one of Mozilla's
 packages of build tools for Windows that includes the nsinstall program.)
 - Don't have all of the necessary sources in your source tree. (Did you
 have mozilla/security/coreconf as well as mozilla/security nss?)
 
 
 I have all mozilla-tools mentioned in  NSS Building FAQ: gmake.exe,
 nsinstall.exe, shmsdos,.exe uname.exe, glib-1.2_s.lib,
 libIDL-0.6_s.lib, include-fles. Also, I have all of the necessary
 sources(coreconf, nss...). I've set all environment variables. I'm
 using gmake nss_build_ all.

Please supply more output from the gmake run, like (say) the last 20
lines of output.
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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread ps_mitrofanov
On 22 дек, 20:08, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
 ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 08:45:
 Please supply more output from the gmake run, like (say) the last 20
 lines of output

There is building log(but there are only 5  lines of output):
gmake nss_build_all
process_begin:CreateProcess((null),pwd,..) failed.
process_begin:CreateProcess((null),pwd,..) failed.
cd ../coreconf ; gmake
System could not find mentioned path.
gmake: *** [build_coreconf] Error 1


Sorry for bad translation. As you can see it isn't working from the
start. And as I said, I have coreconf directory.
 I'll be appreciated for any help.

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Re: Building NSS on Vista

2008-12-22 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 09:30:
 On 22 дек, 20:08, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
 ps_mitrofa...@mail.ru wrote, On 2008-12-22 08:45:
 Please supply more output from the gmake run, like (say) the last 20
 lines of output
 
 There is building log(but there are only 5  lines of output):
 gmake nss_build_all
 process_begin:CreateProcess((null),pwd,..) failed.
 process_begin:CreateProcess((null),pwd,..) failed.

So, that's the real problem.  I believe It means that gmake tried to
run the pwd program, but that program was not in any of the directories
listed in your PATH environment variable.  You must ensure that all the
build tools are found in directories named in PATH.  One way to do that
is to change the PATH variable to include additional directories.
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Re: Can't unwrap key into NSS in FIPS mode

2008-12-22 Thread alex . agranov
 Are you sure this is not coming from the cipher.unwrap call?
 If you add a line of code to print info about the unwrapped key,
 does it show that key to be in the NSS token?

Actually, the cipher.unwrap call passes fine, but when I print the
unwrappedKey - it looks like a secretKeySpec rather than a key that
resides in NSS token. But I can't figure out what am I doing wrong -
'cause I explicitly pass provider to all my cipher initializations...
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Unbelievable!

2008-12-22 Thread Eddy Nigg

https://blog.startcom.org/?p=145

--
Regards

Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
Jabber: start...@startcom.org
Blog:   https://blog.startcom.org
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RE: Unbelievable!

2008-12-22 Thread Robin Alden
Eddy,
That reseller's ability to sell Comodo certificates has been
suspended while we investigate why they are apparently not fulfilling their
contractual obligations to us.
We revoked your certificate for mozilla.com.

Regards
Robin Alden
Comodo

 -Original Message-
 From: dev-tech-crypto-bounces+robin=comodo@lists.mozilla.org
 [mailto:dev-tech-crypto-bounces+robin=comodo@lists.mozilla.org] On
 Behalf Of Eddy Nigg
 Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 10:25 PM
 To: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
 Subject: Unbelievable!
 
 https://blog.startcom.org/?p=145
 
 --
 Regards
 
 Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
 Jabber: start...@startcom.org
 Blog: https://blog.startcom.org
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RE: Unbelievable!

2008-12-22 Thread Robin Alden
Eddy, 

As I noted in my prior correspondence, Comodo has undertaken an internal
review of the Certstar reseller account.  We have informed CertStar that
their email violates their contractual obligation to refrain from sending
unsolicited emails and that their email could be interpreted as misleading
and confusing to the customer.  During our review, we discovered that
Certstar had apparently issued a certificate to mozilla.com without
validating control of the domain.  We immediately revoked the certificate
(prior to your posting) and have suspended Certstar's reseller activities
until our investigation has been completed.  Please let me know if you have
any further problems.  

Regards
Robin Alden
Comodo

 -Original Message-
 From: dev-tech-crypto-bounces+robin=comodo@lists.mozilla.org
 [mailto:dev-tech-crypto-bounces+robin=comodo@lists.mozilla.org] On
 Behalf Of Eddy Nigg
 Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 1:34 AM
 To: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
 Subject: Re: Unbelievable!
 
 On 12/23/2008 03:15 AM, Robin Alden:
  Eddy,
  That reseller's ability to sell Comodo certificates has been
  suspended while we investigate why they are apparently not fulfilling
 their
  contractual obligations to us.
 
 How can you outsource such a critical part as domain control validation
 to a reseller is a complete mystery to me! Your controls (if any) have
 completly failed.
 
 And apparently if the fish stinks at the tail, chances that the head is
 rotten too are pretty high.
 
  We revoked your certificate for mozilla.com.
 
 
 I suggest to revoke ALL certificates from this reseller and perform an
 urgent review of your policies and implementations in relation to
 resellers at all. Other steps might be needed as well, you know better
 than me.
 
 
 --
 Regards
 
 Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
 Jabber: start...@startcom.org
 Blog: https://blog.startcom.org
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Re: Unbelievable!

2008-12-22 Thread Frank Hecker

Kyle Hamilton wrote:

I advocate at least temporarily removing the trust bits from Comodo
until a new external audit can be completed, with an eye toward
ensuring that Comodo, not the reseller, perform the domain
validations.


There are two general reasons for pulling a root, to address a clear and 
present danger to Mozilla users, and to punish a CA and deter others. My 
concern right now is with the former. I see at least three issues in 
relation to that:


1. Issuance of further non-validated certs by this reseller. Comodo 
seems to have addressed this by suspending the reseller's ability to get 
certs issued. (I can testify that this is the case, as I tried to 
duplicate Eddy's feat earlier today and got my uploaded CSR rejected.)


2. Potential problems with certs already sold through this reseller. 
Comodo should investigate this and take action if needed. (This need not 
necessarily require revoking all certificates associated with the 
reseller; for example, the existing certs and their associated domains 
could be re-validated, the registered domain owners could be notified of 
the potential for bogus certs floating around, etc.)


3. Potential problems with other Comodo resellers. I'm not going to tell 
Comodo how to operate its reseller network, but they certainly should 
take a look at whether and where this might be a problem with other 
resellers, and how they could revamp their systems to reduce potential 
problems with resellers.


Pulling a Comodo root will knock out Firefox, etc., access to thousands 
of SSL sites, maybe tens of thousands. Given the disruption that would 
cause, the final decision on this IMO should be made in conjunction with 
the Firefox security folks. From my point of view I'd wait on more 
information regarding items 2 and 3 above before making a recommendation.


Frank

--
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hec...@mozillafoundation.org
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Re: Unbelievable!

2008-12-22 Thread Kyle Hamilton
I agree with all three of these issues -- it's not *just* this
reseller, it's potentially the entire reseller network, and it's
entirely possible that the problem exists across multiples.
(Especially if Comodo delegates full Registration Authority capability
without verification, which seems to be the case -- though they could
have simply issued a sub-CA certificate.)

It occurs to me that there is no facility in Firefox or other Mozilla
products to provide an explanatory dialog that there's an issue, and
such a facility would be extremely useful at this point.  Being able
to print a message to the user like The Mozilla Foundation has
identified issues with the trusted root that issued this certificate
which prevent Firefox from being able to guarantee that this is truly
the site to which you intended to go.  While it is unlikely that this
is a widespread problem, and an attack would rely on more technical
intrusions into the network, the nature of these issues requires that
you be warned of this circumstance so that you can exercise
appropriate levels of caution.  The Mozilla Foundation is working with
the trusted root to resolve these issues. would help a lot.

(I word it like that because in order for an attacker to succeed he
would need to also hijack DNS, or place a entry in the user's hosts
file.)

Of course, this would be an NSS change (the addition of a 'trust
suspended' bit, in addition to the trust flags), a Firefox/Thunderbird
code change (to look for that bit), and a chrome change (to explain
what's going on).  Or even a check for the name in the hosts file to
see if it's overridden from DNS.  Placing an entry in a user's hosts
file is easier than hijacking DNS, or at least it's supposed to be.
I'm pretty sure we're all aware of the fairly recent cache poisoning
attack, but the people who write BIND pushed out a change to protect
against it very rapidly.

The addition of a 'trust suspended' bit is primarily unlikely to
happen, though, because there's too much inertia in the way things are
to do what needs to be done to fix the authentication system to allow
a root to stay in while the user is potentially at risk.

-Kyle H

On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 9:09 PM, Frank Hecker
hec...@mozillafoundation.org wrote:
 Kyle Hamilton wrote:

 I advocate at least temporarily removing the trust bits from Comodo
 until a new external audit can be completed, with an eye toward
 ensuring that Comodo, not the reseller, perform the domain
 validations.

 There are two general reasons for pulling a root, to address a clear and
 present danger to Mozilla users, and to punish a CA and deter others. My
 concern right now is with the former. I see at least three issues in
 relation to that:

 1. Issuance of further non-validated certs by this reseller. Comodo seems to
 have addressed this by suspending the reseller's ability to get certs
 issued. (I can testify that this is the case, as I tried to duplicate Eddy's
 feat earlier today and got my uploaded CSR rejected.)

 2. Potential problems with certs already sold through this reseller. Comodo
 should investigate this and take action if needed. (This need not
 necessarily require revoking all certificates associated with the reseller;
 for example, the existing certs and their associated domains could be
 re-validated, the registered domain owners could be notified of the
 potential for bogus certs floating around, etc.)

 3. Potential problems with other Comodo resellers. I'm not going to tell
 Comodo how to operate its reseller network, but they certainly should take a
 look at whether and where this might be a problem with other resellers, and
 how they could revamp their systems to reduce potential problems with
 resellers.

 Pulling a Comodo root will knock out Firefox, etc., access to thousands of
 SSL sites, maybe tens of thousands. Given the disruption that would cause,
 the final decision on this IMO should be made in conjunction with the
 Firefox security folks. From my point of view I'd wait on more information
 regarding items 2 and 3 above before making a recommendation.

 Frank

 --
 Frank Hecker
 hec...@mozillafoundation.org
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