Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 13.05.2012 04:38 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Evgenii,

All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.


Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian
Kent has proposed a one-universe theory which doesn't suffer the
ambiguity of the Copenhagen interpretation.

arXiv:0708.3710v3 "Real World Interpretation of Quantum Theory"

It has some problems similar to those of everything theories, namely
showing that a quasi-classical universe is stable against a chaos of
quantum white rabbits.


But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the
wave leads to many difficulties, like non local hidden variables in
physics, or solipsism in philosophy of mind. Or even just the problem
to say what exactly is the collapse, on which all believers in
collapse differ.


I think it only leads to these problems if you take the wf to be an
objective property of the system. A more instrumentalist interpretation
(c.f. Asher Peres "Quantum Theory:Concepts and Methods) which takes the
wf to be a way of predicting measurement results doesn't suffer these
problems: 'collapse' is just a change in our information.

Brent



Brent,

Could you please comment on

On the reality of the quantum state
Matthew F. Pusey, Jonathan Barrett & Terry Rudolph
Nature Physics, (2012)

http://www.nature.com/news/a-boost-for-quantum-reality-1.10602

What does it imply?

Evgenii



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Re: R: Re: R: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[meekerdb]

On 5/12/2012 11:21 PM, scerir wrote:


H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
outcome). Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind

the collapse, and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would

be followed, there was "the free-will of the human observer".

-scerir


I don't think this does justice to Born's views.

He was not a realist about the wave function

nor about its collapse.  His position was that

the classical world was *logically* prior and

necessary for shared knowledge to exist.

Without it there could be no measured

values and no records.
Brent

Brent, maybe so, but Born wrote the following:

"The question of whether the waves are something

"real" or a function to describe and predict

phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of
taste. I personally like to regard a probability

wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as a real thing,

certainly as more than a tool for mathematical
calculations ... Quite generally, how could we

rely on probability predictions if by this notion

we do not refer to something real and objective?"

(Max Born, Dover publ., 1964, "Natural Philosophy

of Cause and Chance", p. 107)




I stand corrected.

Brent

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Re: A crazy thoughts about structure of Electron.

[socra...@bezeqint.net]

What is the electron configuration ?

Is the electron a photon with toroidal topology?

http://www.cybsoc.org/electron.pdf

==.

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R: Re: R: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[scerir]

H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what 
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet). 
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement 
outcome). Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind 

the collapse, and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would 

be followed, there was "the free-will of the human observer".

-scerir


I don't think this does justice to Born's views.  
He was not a realist about the wave function 
nor about its collapse.  His position was that 
the classical world was logically prior and 
necessary for shared knowledge to exist.  
Without it there could be no measured 
values and no records.
Brent

 
 
Brent, maybe so, but Born wrote the following: 
"The question of whether the waves are something 
"real" or a function to describe and predict 
phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of 
taste. I personally like to regard a probability 
wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as a real thing, 
certainly as more than a tool for mathematical 
calculations ... Quite generally, how could we 
rely on probability predictions if by this notion 
we do not refer to something real and objective?" 
(Max Born, Dover publ., 1964, "Natural Philosophy 
of Cause and Chance", p. 107) 






 

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Re: Free will in MWI

[Pierz]

On Sunday, May 13, 2012 12:58:28 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 5/12/2012 6:48 PM, Pierz wrote: 
> > I remember a kid back in secondary school saying to me that if 
> everything was determined - as seemed inevitable to him from his 
> understanding of physics - then you might as well give up and despair, 
> since that was inevitable anyway!  I tried to explain that this was a 
> confusion of levels between the absolute and the relative, the same point 
> that Bruno is making. From an absolute perspective, we may be completely 
> determined (or partially random, it makes no difference essentially), from 
> *inside* that system, our best way of acting is *as if* free 
> will/responsibility etc were real. Obviously, if I act as if determinism 
> was not a cause for despair, my life is going to look a lot better than if 
> I did, and seeing as the absolute determinism of things does not tell me 
> which way to decide the issue, I'm forced to use my relative local wisdom 
> to decide on the former. 
> > 
> > John Clarke seems to be saying that the law is an ass, not because of 
> human-level failures of reasoning/justice etc, but because the criminal was 
> predestined to act the way s/he did, or behaved randomly, and in either 
> case no reponsibility can be assigned. 
>
> But he just recasts the problem of justice in terms of prospective 
> outcomes.  If you 
> broaden this out you can provide a justification for rule-based justice: 
> it will deter 
> future crimes prevent vendettas.  But then you don't need to know the 
> criminal's reason, 
> only what the effect on society of punishing him, or not, will be. 
>

I can see that. But consider that the notion of being able to change the 
outcome of future society - 'prevent' or 'deter' anything at all - depends 
on the possibility of variant futures. From the absolute perspective, such 
variation is impossible (or is merely random and so not subject to reason 
or 'choice'). So how does one justify any decision? Seen absolutely, it was 
inevitable and there can be no talk of a good or a bad decision. But such a 
position is clearly untenable. So if one is forced to make evaluative 
decisions *as if *the future were not determined, one can and must also 
make retrospective evaluations of decisions - as being good or bad, noble 
or reprehensible, etc. One can do this locally with the awareness that at 
an absolute level, such an evaluation may be meaningless, and not fall into 
absurdity or contradiction. In fact it is the attempt to act and evaluate 
locally as if one had access to the absolute perspective that is doomed to 
absurdity.
 

>
> > But the mistake here is the same as the one made by my high school 
> friend. The absolute perspective has nothing useful to say about the 
> local/relative one. If we were to follow this philosophy, the courage of 
> heroes such as Nelson Mandela would be no cause for Nobel Peace Prizes, and 
> the acts of villains such as Anders Breivik no cause for censure, because 
> such of their inevitability in the absolute scheme of things. 
> > 
> > The problem is that *not* censuring or *not* awarding prizes are also 
> evaluative acts, about which determinism and the absolute perspective have 
> nothing to say. 
>
> Sure it does: They are determined. 
>

Sure, but it has nothing *evaluative *to say, because from an absolute 
perspective, where all things simply 'are', there is no good or bad, either 
morally or practically. Evaluation is a human, local activity. Mandela's 
courage may have been determined from the God's eye view, but who would say 
he should not be respected, admired and rewarded for it? To deny such 
affirmation is evaluative too - this is my point - and no value statement 
of any kind can be  justified by determinism. 
 

>
> > And I believe that no-one, not even JC himself, can escape the human 
> perspective. When he loads derision and sarcasm on other contributors' 
> arguments, he is acting as if they had a choice in what they believed. 
> There can be no fools in the abolute perpective, as there can be no 
> criminals. 
>
> And we're acting as if he were interested in other's thoughts; which seems 
> doubtful. 
>

Thankfully, he's not interested in mine. Otherwise I'd have to put up with 
his condescension, arrogance and stubbornness, 'my dear Brent'.
 

>
> Brent 
>

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Re: Free will in MWI

[meekerdb]

On 5/12/2012 6:48 PM, Pierz wrote:

I remember a kid back in secondary school saying to me that if everything was 
determined - as seemed inevitable to him from his understanding of physics - 
then you might as well give up and despair, since that was inevitable anyway!  
I tried to explain that this was a confusion of levels between the absolute and 
the relative, the same point that Bruno is making. From an absolute 
perspective, we may be completely determined (or partially random, it makes no 
difference essentially), from *inside* that system, our best way of acting is 
*as if* free will/responsibility etc were real. Obviously, if I act as if 
determinism was not a cause for despair, my life is going to look a lot better 
than if I did, and seeing as the absolute determinism of things does not tell 
me which way to decide the issue, I'm forced to use my relative local wisdom to 
decide on the former.

John Clarke seems to be saying that the law is an ass, not because of 
human-level failures of reasoning/justice etc, but because the criminal was 
predestined to act the way s/he did, or behaved randomly, and in either case no 
reponsibility can be assigned.


But he just recasts the problem of justice in terms of prospective outcomes.  If you 
broaden this out you can provide a justification for rule-based justice: it will deter 
future crimes prevent vendettas.  But then you don't need to know the criminal's reason, 
only what the effect on society of punishing him, or not, will be.



But the mistake here is the same as the one made by my high school friend. The 
absolute perspective has nothing useful to say about the local/relative one. If 
we were to follow this philosophy, the courage of heroes such as Nelson Mandela 
would be no cause for Nobel Peace Prizes, and the acts of villains such as 
Anders Breivik no cause for censure, because such of their inevitability in the 
absolute scheme of things.

The problem is that *not* censuring or *not* awarding prizes are also 
evaluative acts, about which determinism and the absolute perspective have 
nothing to say.


Sure it does: They are determined.


And I believe that no-one, not even JC himself, can escape the human 
perspective. When he loads derision and sarcasm on other contributors' 
arguments, he is acting as if they had a choice in what they believed. There 
can be no fools in the abolute perpective, as there can be no criminals.


And we're acting as if he were interested in other's thoughts; which seems 
doubtful.

Brent

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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[meekerdb]

On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Evgenii,

All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory are non 
computationalist dualist theories.


Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean.  Adrian Kent has proposed 
a one-universe theory which doesn't suffer the ambiguity of the Copenhagen interpretation.


arXiv:0708.3710v3 "Real World Interpretation of Quantum Theory"

It has some problems similar to those of everything theories, namely showing that a 
quasi-classical universe is stable against a chaos of quantum white rabbits.


But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave leads to many 
difficulties, like non local hidden variables in physics, or solipsism in philosophy of 
mind. Or even just the problem to say what exactly is the collapse, on which all 
believers in collapse differ.


I think it only leads to these problems if you take the wf to be an objective property of 
the system.  A more instrumentalist interpretation (c.f. Asher Peres "Quantum 
Theory:Concepts and Methods) which takes the wf to be a way of predicting measurement 
results doesn't suffer these problems: 'collapse' is just a change in our information.


Brent



Computationalism and Everett (QM without collapse) have no problems in that respect, and 
line up well with the everything-like use of Occam.


Bruno


On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.

Evgenii

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html

In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is a nice section 
Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) where Max Velmans describes works that 
present interpretation of dualism in the framework of quantum mechanics.


Stapp, H. (2007a) ‘Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness’ in The Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness, pp. 300-312.


Stapp, H. (2007b) ‘Quantum approaches to consciousness’ in The Cambridge Handbook of 
Consciousness, pp. 881-908.


Stapp, H. (2007c) Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating 
Observer.

Interestingly enough Stapp refers to the work of von Neumann:

Von Neumann, J. (1955/1932) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics/Mathematische 
Grundlagen der Quantummechanik.


p. 19. “In various interpretations of quantum mechanics there is in any case ambiguity, 
and associated controversy, about where in the observation process a choice about what 
to observe and a subsequent observation is made. For example, according to the ‘Gopenhagen 


Convention’, the original formation of quantum theory developed by Niels Bohr, there is 
a clear separation between the process taking place in the observer (Process 1) and the 
process taking place in the system that is being observed (Process 2).”


p. 21. “To differentiate the conscious part of Process 1 (the ‘conscious ego’) from the 
physically embodied part, Stapp (2007c) refers to it as ‘Process 0′. Stapp believes 
that such quantum dualist interactionism neatly sidesteps the classical problems of 
mind-body (or consciousness-brain) interaction (see Stapp, 2007a, p. 305). According to 
the von Neumann/Stapp theory, consciousness (Process 0) chooses what question to ask; 
through the meditation of Process 1 that interacts with Process 2 (the developing 
possibilities specified by the quantum mechanics of the physical system under 
interrogation, including the brain) – and Nature supplies an answer, which in turn 
reflected in conscious experience (making the entire process a form of 
dualism-interactionism).”


p. 21. “A central claim of the von Neumann/Stapp theory, for example, is that it is the 
observer’s conscious free will (von 



Neumann’s ‘abstract ego’ or Stapp’s ‘Process 0′) that chooses how to probe 
nature.”

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Free will in MWI

[Pierz]

I remember a kid back in secondary school saying to me that if everything was 
determined - as seemed inevitable to him from his understanding of physics - 
then you might as well give up and despair, since that was inevitable anyway!  
I tried to explain that this was a confusion of levels between the absolute and 
the relative, the same point that Bruno is making. From an absolute 
perspective, we may be completely determined (or partially random, it makes no 
difference essentially), from *inside* that system, our best way of acting is 
*as if* free will/responsibility etc were real. Obviously, if I act as if 
determinism was not a cause for despair, my life is going to look a lot better 
than if I did, and seeing as the absolute determinism of things does not tell 
me which way to decide the issue, I'm forced to use my relative local wisdom to 
decide on the former. 

John Clarke seems to be saying that the law is an ass, not because of 
human-level failures of reasoning/justice etc, but because the criminal was 
predestined to act the way s/he did, or behaved randomly, and in either case no 
reponsibility can be assigned. But the mistake here is the same as the one made 
by my high school friend. The absolute perspective has nothing useful to say 
about the local/relative one. If we were to follow this philosophy, the courage 
of heroes such as Nelson Mandela would be no cause for Nobel Peace Prizes, and 
the acts of villains such as Anders Breivik no cause for censure, because such 
of their inevitability in the absolute scheme of things.

The problem is that *not* censuring or *not* awarding prizes are also 
evaluative acts, about which determinism and the absolute perspective have 
nothing to say. And I believe that no-one, not even JC himself, can escape the 
human perspective. When he loads derision and sarcasm on other contributors' 
arguments, he is acting as if they had a choice in what they believed. There 
can be no fools in the abolute perpective, as there can be no criminals.

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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Richard Ruquist]

On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

>  On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir  wrote:
>
>> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>> >Evgenii
>>
>>  H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
>> a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
>> actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves
>> packet).
>> Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
>> outcome).
>> Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind the collapse,
>> and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would be followed, there
>> was "the free-will of the human observer".
>>
>>
>>
>  Leibniz, IMO, would also claim that Nature makes the choice, but that
> his collection of monads perceive (based on their consciousness) what is
> the best possible wave function choice to obtain the best possible
> universe. What Leibniz apparently leaves out of his philosophy is that
> human free-will consciousness can make the world imperfect, perhaps even
> suicidal. String theory seems consistent with Leibniz in that the discrete
> balls of compactified dimensions have some monad properties, which is these
> days what I preach. And I wonder if this could be consistent with COMP,
> since it's all theological. Richard
>
>
>
> Hi Richard,
>
> We can strip out all the religiosity from Leibniz' ideas.
>
> Leibniz' monads where perseptions themselves, not entities that where
> conscious and perceived things. What we have previously discussed as
> "Observer Moments" are a better analogy to what Leibniz had in mind. He did
> postulate that God arranged them such that their content was always
> synchronized; this is the "pre-established harmony" (PEH) concept. I think
> that Leibniz' mistake was to assume that there exists an "absolute"
> observer" with a "view from nowhere" that defined an objective 3-p. There
> are strong mathematical inconsistencies with this idea.
> For one thing, a PEH requires the discovery and application of a
> solution to an infinite SAT complexity problem, not the mere existence of
> one.-
>
> Onward!
>
> Hi Stephan,

If what you say is true about monads, that each does not see the entire
universe, then they cannot be the balls of compactified dimensions of
string theory because Brian Greene's 2d solution indicates that each maps
the entire outside plane to its inside. Now that may not be consciousness
and Leibniz did say that his monads were not exactly conscious.  But to me
mapping the universe to the interior, a kind of inverse holography, sounds
exactly like what Leibniz says of his monads in his tract Monadology. I
have no idea what you mean by your last sentence above.
Inward,
Richard

> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Stephen P. King]

On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:



On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir > wrote:


>A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>Evgenii

H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of
waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
outcome).
Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind the collapse,
and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would be
followed, there
was "the free-will of the human observer".



Leibniz, IMO, would also claim that Nature makes the choice, but that 
his collection of monads perceive (based on their consciousness) what 
is the best possible wave function choice to obtain the best possible 
universe. What Leibniz apparently leaves out of his philosophy is that 
human free-will consciousness can make the world imperfect, perhaps 
even suicidal. String theory seems consistent with Leibniz in that the 
discrete balls of compactified dimensions have some monad properties, 
which is these days what I preach. And I wonder if this could be 
consistent with COMP, since it's all theological. Richard




Hi Richard,

We can strip out all the religiosity from Leibniz' ideas.

Leibniz' monads where perseptions themselves, not entities that 
where conscious and perceived things. What we have previously discussed 
as "Observer Moments" are a better analogy to what Leibniz had in mind. 
He did postulate that God arranged them such that their content was 
always synchronized; this is the "pre-established harmony" (PEH) 
concept. I think that Leibniz' mistake was to assume that there exists 
an "absolute" observer" with a "view from nowhere" that defined an 
objective 3-p. There are strong mathematical inconsistencies with this 
idea.
For one thing, a PEH requires the discovery and application of a 
solution to an infinite SAT complexity problem, not the mere existence 
of one.


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Free will in MWI

[Craig Weinberg]

On May 12, 4:10 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

> No you don't.  I guess I have to draw a diagram
>
>                                 Determined
>                                      |
>                                      |
>                   Coerced-Free
>                                      |
>                                      |
>                                   Random
>
> What I said was that it's, i.e. coerced/free is a variable orthogonal to
> deterministic/random, meaning that points in all quadrants of the above 
> diagram are possible.

Nice. That's part of what I am trying to get at with my diagram:
http://multisenserealism.com/about/#wpcom-carousel-370

Determined = "Sense", Random = "?",
Free = "Sensorimotive" (1p), Coerced = "Electromagnetic" (3p)

Craig

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Re: R: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[meekerdb]

On 5/12/2012 6:20 AM, scerir wrote:

A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii

H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
outcome).
Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind the collapse,
and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would be followed, there
was "the free-will of the human observer".




I don't think this does justice to Born's views.  He was not a realist about the wave 
function nor about its collapse.  His position was that the classical world was 
*logically* prior and necessary for shared knowledge to exist.  Without it there could be 
no measured values and no records.


Brent

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

[John Mikes]

Pure non-consciousness?
that would approach the 'pure(?) nothingness'  - even in my generalized
definition of Ccness:
"response to relations" leaving open he definition of a response and of
relations. Otherwise it is perfect.
RESPONSE came in as a concoction from "acknowledgement of and response to"
since you cannot respond without acknowledging to WHAT you reflect.
RELATION came in from the visualized (infinite) complexity of which we also
are part and lots of so far unknown eements are included that MAY influence
our 'world' (the model). All 'information' (hard to specify!) ends up in
relations as it 'refers' to complexity-aspects.
Sorry for using so many unfamiliar words.
John M

On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 8:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>  On 10 May 2012, at 21:09, John Mikes wrote:
>
>  Bruno and Ricardo:
>  ...unless you remove the "boundries" as well - I think.
> That would end up for "nothing" with a POINT, which is still a point and
> not nothing. (If you eliminate the point???)
> John M
>
>
>
> I think we agree John. Pure nothingness makes no sense. Pure
> non-consciousness makes no sense either.
> And besides, with the comp assumption, we have to assume the numbers and
> addition and multiplication, if not, words like "digital" have no meaning.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 10, 2012 at 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>>  On 09 May 2012, at 21:39, R AM wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 8:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>  On 09 May 2012, at 17:09, R AM wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> "nothing" could also be obtained by removing the curly brackets from the
>>> empty set {}.
>>>
>>>
>>> N... Some bit of blank remains. If it was written on hemp, you could
>>> smoke it. That's not nothing!
>>>
>>> Don't confuse the notion and the symbols used to point to the notion.
>>> Which you did, inadvertently I guess.
>>>
>>
>> I was using the analogy between items contained in sets and things
>> contained in bags. The curly brackets would represent the bags. Removing
>> things from a bag leaves it empty. Removing the bag leaves ... nothing.
>>
>>
>> Nothing in the universe of sets. But this makes not much sense. And you
>> have still an empty universe. Then you will tell me to remove all
>> universes, but you will still get an empty multiverse. Oh, you can get rid
>> of all multiverses, but you will still have an empty multi-multiverse. Oh,
>> you can reiterate this in the transfinite, ... but you need some rich
>> theory at the metalevel, then. Absolute nothingness does not make sense in
>> my opinion.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>   Sure, like 0 is some sort of nothing in Number theory, and like
>>> quantum vacuum is some sort of nothing in QM. Nothing is a theory dependent
>>> notion. (Not so for the notion of computable functions).
>>>
>>
>> Yes, these concrete nothings are well behaved, unlike the absolute
>> nothing, which we don't know what rules it obey (in case it is a meaningful
>> concept, which it might not be).
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>   Extensionally, the UD is a function from nothing (no inputs) to
>>> nothing (no outputs), but then what a worker!
>>>
>>> Extensionally it belongs to { } ^ { }. It is a function from { } to { }.
>>>
>>
>> But I guess that is because the UD generates internally all possible
>> inputs for all possible programs, isn't it.
>>
>>
>> Right.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Ricardo.
>>
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>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Free will in MWI

[meekerdb]

On 5/12/2012 10:22 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, May 12, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> You should get a 21st century dictionary

In geometry, orthogonal means "involving right angles" (from Greek ortho, 
meaning
right, and gon meaning angled). The term has been extended to general use, 
meaning
the characteristic of being independent (relative to something else).


So lets review:  you said  "It's orthogonal to deterministic/random" and I responded 
with  "Orthogonal? There is only one way "it" could not be deterministic and not random 
{independent of determinism and randomness} , there is only one way "it" was not caused 
for a reason and not not caused for a reason, and that is if "it" is gibberish". That 
clearly demonstrates two things, I knew EXACTLY what the word "orthogonal" meant and you 
my dear Brent did not.


No you don't.  I guess I have to draw a diagram

   Determined
|
|
 Coerced-Free
|
|
 Random

What I said was that it's, i.e. coerced/free is a variable orthogonal to 
deterministic/random, meaning that points in all quadrants of the above diagram are possible.


Brent

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Re: Free will in MWI

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> although machines can be said determined, they are not entirely
> determined from what they can know about themselves at the time they decide
> to act.
>

As I've said many many times, Turing proved in 1936 that in general there
is no shortcut and the only way to know what a machine will do is to watch
it and see, even the machine does not know what it will do until it does it.

> It [free will] means the ability to chose among a set of future
> possibilities
>

So free will means the ability to choose and the ability to choose means
you have free will, and round and round we go. No amount of mental
contortions can avoid the fact that you made the choice for a reason or you
did not make the choice for a reason. You're a coo coo clock or a roulette
wheel, there is no third alternative.

>
> > Situation like that abounds in the laws, jurisprudence,
>

And that's why  jurisprudence works so poorly and contains so many self
contradictions.

> although he is determined, he can't be aware of the determination.
>

That's what Turing proved and I've been saying for months. So what are we
arguing about?

> Free-will is a higher order relational notion, and it is totally
> unrelated to the determinacy question
>

Oh I'd forgotten, that's what we're arguing about.

  John K Clark

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Re: Free will in MWI

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 12, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

> You should get a 21st century dictionary
>
In geometry, orthogonal means "involving right angles" (from Greek ortho,
> meaning right, and gon meaning angled). The term has been extended to
> general use, meaning the characteristic of being independent (relative to
> something else).
>

So lets review:  you said  "It's orthogonal to deterministic/random" and I
responded with  "Orthogonal? There is only one way "it" could not be
deterministic and not random {independent of determinism and randomness} ,
there is only one way "it" was not caused for a reason and not not caused
for a reason, and that is if "it" is gibberish". That clearly demonstrates
two things, I knew EXACTLY what the word "orthogonal" meant and you my dear
Brent did not.

  John K Clark

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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Richard Ruquist]

On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir  wrote:

> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
> >Evgenii
>
> H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
> a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
> actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves
> packet).
> Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
> outcome).
> Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind the collapse,
> and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would be followed, there
> was "the free-will of the human observer".
>
>
>
Leibniz, IMO, would also claim that Nature makes the choice, but that his
collection of monads perceive (based on their consciousness) what is the
best possible wave function choice to obtain the best possible universe.
What Leibniz apparently leaves out of his philosophy is that human
free-will consciousness can make the world imperfect, perhaps even
suicidal. String theory seems consistent with Leibniz in that the discrete
balls of compactified dimensions have some monad properties, which is these
days what I preach. And I wonder if this could be consistent with COMP,
since it's all theological. Richard


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R: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[scerir]

>A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>Evgenii

H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what 
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet). 
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement 
outcome). 
Born agreed.  Heisenberg however maintained that, behind the collapse, 
and the choice of which 'branch' the wavefunction would be followed, there 
was "the free-will of the human observer".


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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:

Evgenii,

All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave
leads to many difficulties, like non local hidden variables in physics,
or solipsism in philosophy of mind. Or even just the problem to say what
exactly is the collapse, on which all believers in collapse differ.

Computationalism and Everett (QM without collapse) have no problems in
that respect, and line up well with the everything-like use of Occam.



I listen currently to Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch. Yet, I am 
not convinced that Multiverse is a good explanation.


I personally consider quantum mechanics just as a model. David Deutsch 
does not like it, he says that instrumentalism is a bad philosophy and 
that we must take physical theories literally.


In general, I am disappointed by his book. His style, "I know the truth 
as this is a good explanation" is far away from skeptical inquiry.


After all, we know that quantum mechanics and general relativity 
contradict to each other. Why then to invest too much time into 
interpretations like Multiverse? Why it is useful?


Evgenii


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Re: Free will in MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 May 2012, at 08:02, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 1:58 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


> And why did you murder your wife? the judge asked.

If I had a reason I killed my wife and the judge thought that reason  
indicated I was unlikely to do something like that again (I killed  
her because she was chasing me with a bloody ax) then the judge  
should set me free; if the reason I killed her indicates I would be  
a menace to society in the future (I killed her because I didn't  
like the twinkle in her eye) then the judge should not set me free.  
If I killed her for no reason whatsoever then I'm a extremely  
dangerous ticking time bomb and a few hundred amps of electricity  
passing through my body would improve me immeasurably in just a few  
minutes.


> You did acknowledge that between computable and non computable  
there are intermediates, but there are intermediate between  
computable and random, and between self-determinism and self- 
indeterminism.


Yes, and the technical term for the idea that events are neither  
random nor deterministic is "gibberish", although some experts  
prefer the word "bullshit".


The free-will notion is not related to the possible determinacy in the  
big picture. Events can be neither random, nor *determined* by me in  
the situation I am embedded in.


You seems to ignore (again?) the local points of view, and the fact  
that, although machines can be said determined, they are not entirely  
determined from what they can know about themselves at the time they  
decide to act.


So your argument is not against "free-will can make sense", but  
against the idea that "free-will can make sense from some absolute  
point of view".





> Coercion involves the free will, or responsibility, of other agents.

Cannot comment, don't know what  ASCII string "free will" means.


It means the ability to chose among a set of future possibilities on  
which "I" am currently ignorant. It is the ability to decide, when  
knowing you are ignorant of many parameters, or to decide in  
acknowledging absence of complete information.


It is certainly a tricky notion, like consciousness and conscience/ 
moral responsibility, but I fail to se why you are sure that it does  
not make (local) sense.


You are neglecting the particular context, or situation in which  
agents are embedded. What you say make sense for absolute free will,  
but not for relative free will of an agent in a complex situation  
where, although he is determined, he can't be aware of the  
determination. Situation like that abounds in the laws, jurisprudence,  
and is capital in the human sciences, and one day in the computer  
science too (even without comp).


Free-will is a higher order relational notion, and it is totally  
unrelated to the determinacy question, although it can be related with  
some notion of local, actual, self-indeterminacy (but NOT the comp-1- 
indeterminacy, in this case it *is* more the Turing type of partial  
indeterminacy). As I. J. Good remarked, it can be related also with  
relative speed of computation, and this can be useful to understand  
the role of consciousness in free will.


- Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Bruno Marchal]

Evgenii,

All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory  
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the  
wave leads to many difficulties, like non local hidden variables in  
physics, or solipsism in philosophy of mind. Or even just the problem  
to say what exactly is the collapse, on which all believers in  
collapse differ.


Computationalism and Everett (QM without collapse) have no problems in  
that respect, and line up well with the everything-like use of Occam.


Bruno


On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.

Evgenii

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html

In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is  
a nice section Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) where  
Max Velmans describes works that present interpretation of dualism  
in the framework of quantum mechanics.


Stapp, H. (2007a) ‘Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness’  
in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, pp. 300-312.


Stapp, H. (2007b) ‘Quantum approaches to consciousness’ in The  
Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, pp. 881-908.


Stapp, H. (2007c) Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the  
Participating Observer.


Interestingly enough Stapp refers to the work of von Neumann:

Von Neumann, J. (1955/1932) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum  
Mechanics/Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantummechanik.


p. 19. “In various interpretations of quantum mechanics there is in  
any case ambiguity, and associated controversy, about where in the  
observation process a choice about what to observe and a subsequent  
observation is made. For example, according to the ‘Gopenhagen  
Convention’, the original formation of quantum theory developed by  
Niels Bohr, there is a clear separation between the process taking  
place in the observer (Process 1) and the process taking place in  
the system that is being observed (Process 2).”


p. 21. “To differentiate the conscious part of Process 1 (the  
‘conscious ego’) from the physically embodied part, Stapp (2007c)  
refers to it as ‘Process 0′. Stapp believes that such quantum  
dualist interactionism neatly sidesteps the classical problems of  
mind-body (or consciousness-brain) interaction (see Stapp, 2007a, p.  
305). According to the von Neumann/Stapp theory, consciousness  
(Process 0) chooses what question to ask; through the meditation of  
Process 1 that interacts with Process 2 (the developing  
possibilities specified by the quantum mechanics of the physical  
system under interrogation, including the brain) – and Nature  
supplies an answer, which in turn reflected in conscious experience  
(making the entire process a form of dualism-interactionism).”


p. 21. “A central claim of the von Neumann/Stapp theory, for  
example, is that it is the observer’s conscious free will (von  
Neumann’s ‘abstract ego’ or Stapp’s ‘Process 0′) that  
chooses how to probe nature.”


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Dualism via Quantum Mechanics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.

Evgenii

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html

In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is a 
nice section Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) where Max 
Velmans describes works that present interpretation of dualism in the 
framework of quantum mechanics.


Stapp, H. (2007a) ‘Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness’ in The 
Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, pp. 300-312.


Stapp, H. (2007b) ‘Quantum approaches to consciousness’ in The Cambridge 
Handbook of Consciousness, pp. 881-908.


Stapp, H. (2007c) Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the 
Participating Observer.


Interestingly enough Stapp refers to the work of von Neumann:

Von Neumann, J. (1955/1932) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics/Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantummechanik.


p. 19. “In various interpretations of quantum mechanics there is in any 
case ambiguity, and associated controversy, about where in the 
observation process a choice about what to observe and a subsequent 
observation is made. For example, according to the ‘Gopenhagen 
Convention’, the original formation of quantum theory developed by Niels 
Bohr, there is a clear separation between the process taking place in 
the observer (Process 1) and the process taking place in the system that 
is being observed (Process 2).”


p. 21. “To differentiate the conscious part of Process 1 (the ‘conscious 
ego’) from the physically embodied part, Stapp (2007c) refers to it as 
‘Process 0′. Stapp believes that such quantum dualist interactionism 
neatly sidesteps the classical problems of mind-body (or 
consciousness-brain) interaction (see Stapp, 2007a, p. 305). According 
to the von Neumann/Stapp theory, consciousness (Process 0) chooses what 
question to ask; through the meditation of Process 1 that interacts with 
Process 2 (the developing possibilities specified by the quantum 
mechanics of the physical system under interrogation, including the 
brain) – and Nature supplies an answer, which in turn reflected in 
conscious experience (making the entire process a form of 
dualism-interactionism).”


p. 21. “A central claim of the von Neumann/Stapp theory, for example, is 
that it is the observer’s conscious free will (von Neumann’s ‘abstract 
ego’ or Stapp’s ‘Process 0′) that chooses how to probe nature.”


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Re: Free will in MWI

[meekerdb]

On 5/11/2012 11:02 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 1:58 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:


> And why did you murder your wife? the judge asked.


If I had a reason I killed my wife and the judge thought that reason indicated I was 
unlikely to do something like that again (I killed her because she was chasing me with a 
bloody ax)


So was that coercing you to run or kill her?  or could you have just chosen to 
be axed?

then the judge should set me free; if the reason I killed her indicates I would be a 
menace to society in the future (I killed her because I didn't like the twinkle in her 
eye) then the judge should not set me free.


Even if the judge thinks you are unlikely to kill anyone else he will still punish you as 
an example.  But if, for example, you killed her because someone credibly threatened to 
kill you and your children if you didn't, the judge would consider that a mitigating 
instance of coercion.


If I killed her for no reason whatsoever then I'm a extremely dangerous ticking time 
bomb and a few hundred amps of electricity passing through my body would improve me 
immeasurably in just a few minutes.


> You did acknowledge that between computable and non computable there are
intermediates, but there are intermediate between computable and random, 
and between
self-determinism and self-indeterminism.


Yes, and the technical term for the idea that events are neither random nor 
deterministic is "gibberish", although some experts prefer the word "bullshit".


> Coercion involves the free will, or responsibility, of other agents. 



Cannot comment, don't know what  ASCII string "free will" means.


Are you equally ignorant of the meaning of "responsibility"?

Brent

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