Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit
>> dualist
>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow
>> morning,
>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
>> and
>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
>> because
>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
>> separate
>> >> persons."
>> >>
>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent
>> and
>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>> >>
>> >> Bruce
>> >>
>> >
>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>> > states of the copies.
>>
>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
>> certainly
>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
>> invented
>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>
>
>
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question
> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you
> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and
> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of
> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
> theory for some undefined reason.
>

 You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a
 continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any
 time, implies dualism.

>>>
>>>
>>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
>>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
>>> the closest. Dualism is not required.
>>>
>>
>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person
>> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference
>> for it?
>>
>
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
> as satisfactory.
>

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of
identity, it is just a psychological construct.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
> and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
> because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> > states of the copies.
>
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
> certainly
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
> invented
> to deal with reality, not define it.
>


 You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
 the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
 dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
 These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
 night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
 scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
 theory for some undefined reason.

>>>
>>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
>>> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
>>> dualism.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
>> the closest. Dualism is not required.
>>
>
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person
> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference
> for it?
>

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
as satisfactory.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
 On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
 > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
 >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
 >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
 >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
 and
 >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
 because
 >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
 >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
 >> persons."
 >>
 >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
 >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
 >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
 >>
 >> Bruce
 >>
 >
 > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
 > states of the copies.

 Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
 soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
 Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
 bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
 $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
 certainly
 creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
 invented
 to deal with reality, not define it.

>>>
>>>
>>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
>>> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
>>> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
>>> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
>>> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
>>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
>>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>>
>>
>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
>> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
>> dualism.
>>
>
>
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the
> closest. Dualism is not required.
>

But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather
than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
>>> >> persons."
>>> >>
>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>>> > states of the copies.
>>>
>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
>>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
>>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
>> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
>> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
>> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
>> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>
>
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
> dualism.
>


Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique
closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the
closest. Dualism is not required.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
>> >> persons."
>> >>
>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>> >>
>> >> Bruce
>> >>
>> >
>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>> > states of the copies.
>>
>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>
>
>
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
> theory for some undefined reason.
>

You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of
the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
dualism.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 9/8/2020 6:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit
dualist
>> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow
morning,
>> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to
exist and
>> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
because
>> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
separate
>> persons."
>>
>> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly
coherent and
>> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> states of the copies.

Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
$100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
certainly
creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
invented
to deal with reality, not define it.



You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question 
of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless 
you assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, 
BK2,... and so on. These are different persons who share some memories 
with the BK of the night before. Closest continuer theory works well 
in these duplication scenarios, despite the fact that people on this 
list seem averse to that theory for some undefined reason.


But ex hypothesi the Bruce Kellet's are all equally close continuers by 
most standards.  Of course the law could make some arbitrary distinction 
if that's useful, e.g. the first one to step out of his room is THE 
Bruce Kellet.


Brent

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> > states of the copies.
>
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
> to deal with reality, not define it.
>


You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the
person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
theory for some undefined reason.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:

On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
wrote:

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

_> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.


___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the

100,_

But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

_> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
particular one will see a prime number? _

I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.


I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
the first place.

I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
"You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
make the dualist assumption.

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime
number". Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into
one, and only one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as
they are wrong about a magical soul persisting in a single John Clark
waking up in his bed normally, ensuring that it is him and not someone
who merely believes he is him.

I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:14 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
> >  wrote:
> >
> >> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
> >>  wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
> >>  wrote:
> >>
> >> _> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
> >> will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
> >> number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
> >> probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
> >> not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
> >> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
> >> Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
> >> the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
> >> identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
> >> to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
> >> and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
> >> personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
> >> be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
> >> rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
> >> your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
> >> stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
> >> terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
> >> when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
> >> First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.
> >>
> >>> ___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the
> >> 100,_
> >>
> >> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
> >> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
> >> because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
> >> about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
> >> so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
> >>
> >> _> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
> >> particular one will see a prime number? _
> >>
> >> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> >> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
> >> and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
> >> that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
> >> that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
> >> what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
> >> has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
> >
> > I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
> > dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
> > of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
> > duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
> > and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
> > night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
> > your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
> > body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
> > survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
> > probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
> > This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
> > the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
> > cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
> > the first place.
> >
> > I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
> > response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
> > probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
> > wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
> > individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
> > question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
> > you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
> > inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
> > referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
> > asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
> > avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
> > "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
> > morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
> > make the dualist assumption.
> >
> > I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
> > is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
> > is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will 

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[smitra]

On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
wrote:

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

_> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.


___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the

100,_

But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

_> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
particular one will see a prime number? _

I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.


I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
the first place.

I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
"You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
make the dualist assumption.

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime
number". Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into
one, and only one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as
they are wrong about a magical soul persisting in a single John Clark
waking up in his bed normally, ensuring that it is him and not someone
who merely believes he is him.

I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to 

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 10:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
>> see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
>> gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that 
>> one
>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>
>
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
> Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the
> person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity 
> of
> Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he
> made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won
> and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and
> refuses to stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical
> contradictions and absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful
> if the towering logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of
> sand. The only way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of
> Bruno's patented peepee terminology and start talking about *THE*
> First Person Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no
> such thing as *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First
> Person Perspective.
>
> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>
>
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
> about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so
> the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>
> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
>> particular one will see a prime number? *
>
>
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
> and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
> that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was
> asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>

 I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
 dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
 probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
 this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
 applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
 means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
 tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
 there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
 all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
 chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
 interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
 prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
 thing never existed in the first place.

>>>
>>>
>>> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
>>> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
>>> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
>>> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
>>> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
>>> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
>>> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
>>> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
>>> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
>>> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
>>> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
>>> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
>>> the dualist assumption.
>>>
>>
>> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
>> the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
>> 

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

 *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
> see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
> gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that 
> one
> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>

 BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
 Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the
 person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of
 Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he
 made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won
 and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and
 refuses to stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical
 contradictions and absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful
 if the towering logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of
 sand. The only way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of
 Bruno's patented peepee terminology and start talking about *THE*
 First Person Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no
 such thing as *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First
 Person Perspective.

 > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*


 But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
 BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
 there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
 about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so
 the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

 *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
> particular one will see a prime number? *


 I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
 duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
 looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that
 is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
 BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
 probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
 because it is not a question, it's gibberish.

>>>
>>> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
>>> dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
>>> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
>>> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
>>> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
>>> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
>>> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
>>> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
>>> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
>>> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
>>> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
>>> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
>>> thing never existed in the first place.
>>>
>>
>>
>> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
>> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
>> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
>> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
>> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
>> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
>> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
>> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
>> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
>> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
>> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
>> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
>> the dualist assumption.
>>
>
> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
> the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
> probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number".
> Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into one, and only
> one, of 

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
 see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
 gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
 particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
 some gambler will buy the winning ticket*

>>>
>>> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
>>> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
>>> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
>>> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
>>> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
>>> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
>>> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
>>> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
>>> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
>>> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
>>> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
>>> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
>>> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
>>> Perspective.
>>>
>>> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>>>
>>>
>>> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
>>> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
>>> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what
>>> "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the
>>> gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>>>
>>> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
 particular one will see a prime number? *
>>>
>>>
>>> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
>>> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
>>> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is
>>> a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
>>> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
>>> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
>>> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>>>
>>
>> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
>> dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
>> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
>> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
>> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
>> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
>> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
>> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
>> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
>> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
>> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
>> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
>> thing never existed in the first place.
>>
>
>
> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
> the dualist assumption.
>

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number".
Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into one, and only
one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as they are wrong about a
magical soul persisting in a single John Clark waking up in his bed
normally, ensuring that it is 

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
>>> a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
>>> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
>>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>>
>>
>> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
>> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
>> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
>> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
>> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
>> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
>> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
>> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
>> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
>> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
>> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
>> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
>> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
>> Perspective.
>>
>> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>>
>>
>> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
>> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
>> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what
>> "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the
>> gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>>
>> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
>>> particular one will see a prime number? *
>>
>>
>> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
>> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
>> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is
>> a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
>> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
>> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
>> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>>
>
> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist
> idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
> thing never existed in the first place.
>


I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
the dualist assumption.

I agree with you that such dualist assumptions are unacceptable, so I
conclude that your initial question has no answer. When you ask JC on the
night before duplication: "What is the probability that you will see a
prime number in the morning?" that question has no answer, because there is
no unique referent of "You" tomorrow morning after duplication.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
>> a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
>> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>
>
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
> Perspective.
>
> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>
>
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE
> the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is
> only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can
> expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also
> duplicated 100 times.
>
> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular
>> one will see a prime number? *
>
>
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a
> very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>

I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist
idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
thing never existed in the first place.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


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Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QM gets personal

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 9/8/2020 5:55 AM, John Clark wrote:



On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:33 PM Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:


>> Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is
untrue, it's specifically engineered in such a way to make
sure that could never happen, but it is certainly possible to
prove that superdeterminism is silly. It says that in order
for the world to be the way it appears to be now the initial
conditions of the universe 13.8 billion years ago MUST have
been in one and only one SUPER specific starting condition,


/> Isn’t that just determinism?/


No. There are an astronomically huge number of random initial 
conditions the Big Bang could've started out in and the world would be 
very much as it is now, but super determinism says only one of those 
initial conditions will do, because only one of them will cause human 
experimenters to ALWAYS make the wrong choice when they decide how to 
orientate their polarizing filters or Stern–Gerlach magnets leading 
them to ALWAYS incorrectly conclude that things were either not 
realistic or not local. Out of the huge, possibly infinite, number of 
initial conditions the universe could have started out in 
superdeterminism insists it could not have started out in just any old 
random way, it had to start out in the one and only one way that would 
make fools out of human beings 13.8 billion years later.


As I said before nobody will ever be able to prove that super 
determinism is untrue, perhaps the universe really is a put-up job, 
just a big practical joke with human beings being the butt of the 
joke, but one can't help but ask what caused the universe to start out 
in such an extremely non-random way? Maybe there really is a God but 
He is a slapstick comedian with a very sick sense of humor.


It's determinism with time-reversible dynamics...just like Newtonian 
mechanics.  It's determinism both ways...with no mystic "free will" that 
violates it.


Brent

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Re: QM gets personal

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:33 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>> Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is untrue, it's
>> specifically engineered in such a way to make sure that could never happen,
>> but it is certainly possible to prove that superdeterminism is silly. It
>> says that in order for the world to be the way it appears to be now the
>> initial conditions of the universe 13.8 billion years ago MUST have been in
>> one and only one SUPER specific starting condition,
>>
>
> *> Isn’t that just determinism?*
>

No. There are an astronomically huge number of random initial conditions
the Big Bang could've started out in and the world would be very much as it
is now, but super determinism says only one of those initial conditions
will do, because only one of them will cause human experimenters to ALWAYS
make the wrong choice when they decide how to orientate their polarizing
filters or Stern–Gerlach magnets leading them to ALWAYS incorrectly
conclude that things were either not realistic or not local. Out of the
huge, possibly infinite, number of initial conditions the universe could
have started out in superdeterminism insists it could not have started out
in just any old random way, it had to start out in the one and only one way
that would make fools out of human beings 13.8 billion years later.

As I said before nobody will ever be able to prove that super determinism
is untrue, perhaps the universe really is a put-up job, just a big
practical joke with human beings being the butt of the joke, but one can't
help but ask what caused the universe to start out in such an extremely
non-random way? Maybe there really is a God but He is a slapstick comedian
with a very sick sense of humor.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
> prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>

BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as *THE* First
Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person Perspective.

> *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*


But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE
the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is
only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can
expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also
duplicated 100 times.

*> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular
> one will see a prime number? *


I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when
the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and looks at the number
on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a very VERY long way
from the original ambiguous question that was asked BEFORE the duplication,
namely "AFTER the duplication what is the probability "you" will see a
prime number?".  And that has no answer because it is not a question, it's
gibberish.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 4:13 pm, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:44 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of
>>> a possible subjectivity”.
>>
>>
>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in
>> 100 different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the 
>> room
>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they 
>> stay
>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open 
>> the
>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>
>
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not.
> So there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and 
> a
> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
> Clark's ignorance.
>

 The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
 a prime number,

>>>
>>>
>>> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
>>> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>>>
>>
>> Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
>> question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
>> see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
>> that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
>> question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?
>>
>
>
> The question of dualism arises more acutely from the 1p perspective: "if I
> am duplicated in the 100 rooms, what is the probability that I will see a
> prime number?" Take a random selection from the 100: will that one be me?
> If, for any possible selection, the answer is "yes, that will be me" (all
> the copies are "me"), then the probability that "I" will see a prime is
> one, since 25 of the "mes" will see primes. If only one selection will give
> me, then you have dualism, and a 25% chance that I will see a prime. In
> your account above, the selection is equivalent to just asking "if I select
> a room at random, what is the probability that the door will have a prime
> number?" The fact that there is a copy of JC in the room becomes irrelevant
> to the probability, which is simply determined by the ratio of the number
> of primes to the number of doors.
>

Dualism is the idea that there is a spirit separate from the body. If I am
duplicated, there will be many versions of me. If I ask, “am I a version
that sees a prime number?” that does not entail that I am a spirit separate
from the body. If I ask “what is the probability that after duplication I
will be a version that sees a prime number?” that also does not entail that
I am a spirit separate from the body. As you say, the fact that there is a
person who identifies as being me in the room does not make any difference
to the calculation, and that is the probability I am interested in. I may
be interested in this number, for example, if I am going to bet on whether
I will see a prime number after duplication. If I have the opportunity to
bet $20 for a $100 reward if I see a prime number I will accept the bet,
whereas if I have to bet $30 for a $100 reward I will not.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:44 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
>> possible subjectivity”.
>
>
> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open 
> the
> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>

 In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
 John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
 there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
 will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
 the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
 this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.

 However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
 those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
 prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
 legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
 are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
 subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
 is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
 Clark's ignorance.

>>>
>>> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
>>> prime number,
>>>
>>
>>
>> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
>> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>>
>
> Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
> question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
> see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
> that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
> question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?
>


The question of dualism arises more acutely from the 1p perspective: "if I
am duplicated in the 100 rooms, what is the probability that I will see a
prime number?" Take a random selection from the 100: will that one be me?
If, for any possible selection, the answer is "yes, that will be me" (all
the copies are "me"), then the probability that "I" will see a prime is
one, since 25 of the "mes" will see primes. If only one selection will give
me, then you have dualism, and a 25% chance that I will see a prime. In
your account above, the selection is equivalent to just asking "if I select
a room at random, what is the probability that the door will have a prime
number?" The fact that there is a copy of JC in the room becomes irrelevant
to the probability, which is simply determined by the ratio of the number
of primes to the number of doors.

Bruce

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