Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
What a nice little war. Technically Bruce is right, but this just shows that we have misunderstood the issue. Of course mass/energy in each branch is unaffected by the split; we just need to find another, sane way to express the idea. Here is what I understand; correct me if I am wrong. In the multiverse created by a single split, we define the space-time distribution of mass/energy in this multiverse as the weighed (Born) sum of the distributions of the branches. So, each mass in each branch doesn't change; only its contribution to the corresponding "multiverse-total" mass is weighed. What is the point of a multiverse-total mass? I suppose it is intended as the source of gravitational field for any observer outside the Schroedinger-box in which the split is contained (assuming a separate, isolated, contained environment inside the box). To make it more concrete, consider a double-slit interference experiment, using one electron at a time. Instead of a screen there are many tiny pockets to capture the electron. Outside the box, there are many ultra-sensitive gravitational detectors, aiming to locate the electron in a pocket. But if the gravitational field of the electron, outside the box, is the weighed sum of all branches (one for each pocket), then the detectors will be unable to locate the electron. The gravitational measurements will indicate, instead of a single pocket, the interference pattern (which we would expect from a large number of electrons). So the gravitational measurements will produce something like an X-ray picture of a wavefunction, without destroying it. I find this queer, but here I quit for the night, waiting for any other opinions on this issue. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18abb32e-c247-49b0-9d73-0597261fa835n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
> On 4/28/2022 10:45 AM, John Clark wrote: > > Exactly what axiom would that be? It can't be the Born rule because that > is not an axiom, that is an experimentaly derived fact. > > If I take some experimental result as granted, then it is an axiom, in my system. If you think we need to be more subtle, I propose that we adopt some qualitative principle (e.g., see below) as a practical assessment rather than as a formal assumption, and so we introduce "FAPP" (corrected as "for a practical purpose"). In my proposal I adopt "workability of QM". On Friday, April 29, 2022 at 12:07:08 AM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > It was a guess by Born. If you want a measure on Hilbert space that > satisfies Kolmogrov's axioms of probability it must be Born's rule. The > axiom could be, "QM measurement results are probabilistic." > We also need some additional assumption, For Gleason, it was "non-contextuality of measurements". I have seen others. I think that it is enough to assume "equal measures imply equal probabilities", but I do not remember seeing this claim before. (I am unsure about that.) George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f8754d32-c21c-41b2-bbf6-d2d3171a0480n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Thursday, April 28, 2022 at 11:49:03 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Bent) wrote: > In unitary evolution per the Schroedinger equation there are no "paticular > universes", there's only a ray in Hilbert space. Multiple universes is a > FAPP viewpoint. But so is wave-function collapse. > I am glad to agree with this. Now, the challenge for the MWI is to derive apparent collapse and the Born Rule (in the long run) from the approximate description "multiple universes". Also to explain, in what sense this approximation is good enough. The trouble with assuming an actual collapse-with-randomisation is the need for some mechanism for it, as I gather you too remark, in other words. I admit though that, starting with collapse-with-randomisation, it is easy to explain "FAPP". Probabilities are whatever measures satisfy Kologorov's axioms or their > logical equivalent. The information interpretation is QBism. > Formal properties are not enough to explain probabilities as a guide to life. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/055d3092-0099-43dd-b804-0734f8c29485n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: Everett and probability
On Wednesday, April 27, 2022 at 2:55:37 PM UTC+3 johnk...@gmail.com wrote: > It's not perfect, no analogy is, but classical thermodynamics can provide > a pretty good analogy.[...] but that world is *VASTLY* outnumbered by > worlds in which other things happen. > You mean, statistical mechanics. Counting worlds, then? I remember as a young student, the "equal probabilities" argument based on sheer ignorance of the microstate made me depressed. A much better explanation is based on the sort of agument known by the name "arbitrary functions", started by Jules Henri Poincaré. Here is an example of mine. Whatever the microstate is (among those compatible with what we know), let us focus on the box in which the gas is contained. It has been constructed with some procedure, of which we can obtain (with good approximation) probability density functions of errors. For example, if we aim to make the height to be 4 meters exactly, then we know that the method of construction will give us 4 meters plus some error of known distribution. Therefore the dimensions of the box are random variables -- even if we assume for the time that the surfaces are perfectly flat and it is perfectly orthogonal. Every time a gas molecule hits a wall, its future trajectory becomes randomised, as well as that of every other molecule it bounces with. Soon a probabilistic description of the gas-in-the-box is all we can do, but these probabilities are well grounded on the errors in the construction of the box. (If, instead of errors of construction, you prefer to deal with errors of measurement, we shall be mired by the controversy in the foundation of statistics. Therefore I suggest that we just consider construction.) George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e07d6e23-f92b-46e5-a141-7abcd9d9363bn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Wednesday, April 27, 2022 at 4:12:12 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > The distinctive feature of Everettian Many worlds theory is that every > possible outcome is realized on every trial. I don't think that you have > absorbed the full significance of this revolutionary idea. There is no > classical analogue of this behaviour, which is why your lottery example is > irrelevant. I make no comments on the lottery example, because I would need to understand it better, and I have too little time now. But I may suprprise you with a parallel from pre-QM philosophical work on the interpretation of probability. Cournot's Principle claims that probabilities have no interpretation, no relevance to our lives, unless they are close enough to 0 or 1, "enough" depending on the practical purpose. Before one screams "this is crazy", he had better look at the appeal of this idea among the most prominent students of these matters in the 20th century. However, what little work has been done on a decision theory conforming to this principle is patently inadequate, IMO, and this, I think, is the reason for its current obscurity. The decision theory I have started for MWI will work for Cournot's Principle, too. If one cares for references, search for "Glenn Shafer" and "Cournot's Principle", especially the papers titled - Why did Cournot’s principle disappear? - That's what all the old guys said - A Betting Interpretation for Probabilities and Dempster-Shafer Degrees of Belief [...] I spelled out the sequences that Everett implies in my earlier > response. These clearly must have equal probability -- that is what the > theory requires. It is not an assumption on my part -- it is a > consequence of Everett's basic idea. I have already expressed disagreement, as a technical matter. I am not certain where the misunderstanding lies, but I suspect it is in presuming equal probabilities derived from sheer ignorance, as at least one other contributor claims. If you really insist on this opinion, it should be discussed in a separate conversation -- appealing to your "logical and mathematical skills", as you say. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6e63d29a-902e-4c44-abd3-c27495b46396n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Wednesday, April 27, 2022 at 5:57:03 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > If one wants to persist with unitary evolution, one cannot avoid the Schrodinger equation. This has a number of consequences for the theory. One is that the theory is deterministic -- there are no probabilities, and all outcomes of an experiment are, in some real sense, equivalent. [...] Equivalent in terms of possibility, not equally probable. YOU say "there are no probabilities". On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 11:35 AM smitra https://groups.google.com/>> (Saibal) wrote: > You just presented an elaborate presentation involving N branching steps and counted all 2^N branches as equal. That's branch counting and it's known to not be compatible with QM. I agree; it is a technical matter. There are two assumptions in deriving probability 1/2^N in the binomial construction, if the argument is not branch-counting: -1- that probability-in-some-sense is derived by the theory and it depends on the measure only; and -2- that the coefficients a and b are of equal measure. But with these assumptions we can derive probability-in-some-sense with just one experiment (N=1). In previous messages, I have expressed objection to the first assumption, but this is only because some work is needed in order to combine "there are no probabilities" with "there are probabilities in some sense", else one is vague to the point of being ridiculous. One needs to specify "in what sense?" and "why?". George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45075d80-c901-4c52-9a22-1f2ccb1abc87n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Monday, April 25, 2022 at 4:09:23 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > Despite Carroll's protestations (and the similar protestations of others), > energy cannot be conserved in the multiverse -- each split must duplicate > the energy of the whole as many times as there are branches. Thanks for the citation. From the discussion so far, there seems to be no meaning in adding energy from different universes, so this is neither right not wrong (therefore, nuts). I think that this idea becomes meaningful only if we consider something like the gravitational field of an electron in a double-slit interference experiment: Caroll's idea implies that field (outside the box) would be as if generated by the electron-as wave, without decoherence. I suggest that we look at the consequences of this conclusion, to assess the plausibility of the idea. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/771587c8-9d72-4681-ba4a-8051fa52befbn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Friday, April 22, 2022 at 1:54:36 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: we now know that MWI is inconsistent with any sensible interpretation of > probability; strict MWI is inconsistent with the Born rule. Dittos!!! At least, mostly. What do you mean "we now know"? Any citations, pretty please? I gather that by "strict MWI" you mean without FAPP. I argue that since we regard QM-without-collapse as a workable theory, we have to introduce FAPP (more precisely, moral certainty regarding a given purpose) and consequently the Born Rule. In another thread I insist that we must swallow the pill of no-probability for single outcomes, and build a decision theory on that. (Yes, we can!) >From QM we obtain only the Born Rule for large enough samples. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cb92bf67-3500-476b-b73e-2916f92513c7n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Friday, April 22, 2022 at 2:13:43 PM UTC+3 johnk...@gmail.com wrote: > On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 6:04 PM George Kahrimanis > wrote: > > >> > Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability", > > > Sure, but[...] > Sorry, but if it is undefined then there is no "but". You remind me of myself a few decades ago, when I was in love with Bayesian inference and I defended the use of artificial priors. Later I understood that BI is just a heuristic method, not sound inference (unless the prior is true). A flat prior, or probabilities 1/2 in this case, are only tools in a heuristisc method, not proper descriptions of ignorance. Anyway, my point in this example was only that probability is a very tricky subject. > For the instrumentalists among us (glad to have you, BTW): the question >> of interest to me is not about which way is best to derive probability from >> QM -- that would be a pointless discussion, > > > It would be pointless because we have known from experiment for nearly a > century that the best way to obtain probability from quantum mechanics is > to take the square of the absolute value of a particle's wave-function, > a.k.a. the Born rule. > Not only I do not argue with this, but I emphasise it: this is one of the ways in which QM appears "workable". But my point was to prepare the reader for a version of the Born rule concerning large samples only, instead of single outcomes. Surely the experimental evidence is from large samples; the probability for a single case is an extrapolation which is "a matter of course" for a certain way of thinking, but not technically obligatory. > > >> >The question is whether all of them beg the question, so that we have >> to think of a rational decision theory without probability. >> > > Even in the days before quantum mechanics, as soon as physicists started > thinking about thermodynamics they knew that a rational decision theory > without probability was not viable. > In my anwer to Brent (my previous message) I gave an example. > Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants >> that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically >> certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each >> single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same, > > > I would argue that if X works the same as Y then technically X is Y. > Careful! You trimmed off the end of my sentence: "... it works the same, to trigger an instinctive impulse". Sorry for my sloppy syntax: I meant "it works the same, with regard to triggering an instinctive impulse". Noy always, not necessarily. Instead of "technically" you should have "practically", in the sense "a technical distinction without a practical difference". > > > for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted, > > > *IF* that's true *THEN* a RATIONAL man will consistently make predictions > about the outcome of an experiment that are inferior to the predictions > that an IRRATIONAL man would make. So there would be no point to > rationality or being "rational". *THEREFORE* I conclude that your above > statement is not true. > (I emphasised "rational" as opposed to an experimentally derived decision theory.) A good point, but I am an inadequate amateur in the subject you bring up. Surely it is more fun to be irrational, for a while at least, and we all do it. Besides, there is no point in being rational about taking an umbrella in the morrning, unless there are grave consequences to reckon with. Moreover, rationality is about organising certain basic irrational pursuits, typically thinkgs like security, food, sex, and entertainment; priorities are for to the agent to define. Not a black-or-white dichotomy, therefore. And I did not say that there are rational versus irrational predictions. My concern is about the interpretation of probability for a single outcome. If it is a matter of pleasure without any worrying consequences, then the irrational interpretation is fine, even from the rational point of view, At least we agree on the MWI! The other issues will be resolved, I hope. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e85c3c27-a813-4c25-a7b4-95104349e97dn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Friday, April 22, 2022 at 1:33:46 AM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > On 4/21/2022 3:03 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote: > > [...] Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability", > or "imprecise probability between 0 and 1". The reason it is commonly > mistaken as 50-50 is an implied strategy, flipping a coin in case of > ignorance, but then the odds are of the coin instead of the object of the > bet. (This strategy works only if the agent is free to choose which side of > the bet she underwrites.) > > > If the odds 50/50 can apply to the coin...because you don't know which way > it will come down...then the same concept applies to the horse race. > No, I do have information about this coin: I have tossed it many times. I am clueless about this horserace. Big difference. Concentrate! [...] we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability. > > Rational decision theory only exists because of uncertainty. If there > were no uncertainty one wouldn't need theory to inform your choice, you > would directly by value. > Now you are justified to be buffled, because I have avoided giving any example. Here is one, containing a combination of uncertainties and certainties -- the latter are "moral certainties", something like "FAPP" but well defined. Example. When I have a choice between acting recklessly and acting carefully, and my spirit of adventure overcomes my instict of survival, a rational argument IMO is to think of my insurance: they will increase the premium or drop me if they classify me as a reckless man. I need insurance because of uncertainty, to protect my future selves as well as my loved ones in future branches in which I will not exist. To keep the example short, I postpone arguing why insurance provides moral certainty (in principle). George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5f59349d-5db9-41d0-b5a7-9fabd029e205n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
In my current way of thinking, the disagreement between Alan Grayson and John K. Clark is about two subtly different concepts under the same name, "probability". For example, when I read "80% chance of rain today", I may think that in some possible futures it will not rain (so probability is meaningless), yet I feel an instinctive urge for protection from bad weather, so I take my umbrella. We are programmed to act in this way, due to Darwinian selection -- but it is a different matter to claim that QM (without collapse) issues a probability for each possible outcome so that then we are rationally obliged to apply Maximisation of Expected Utility. I grant the former but not the latter. Part of the trouble is that serious philosophical issues about probability are still debated, so that there are traps for anyone who deals with these things. Here is an example. > [...] until Alan Grayson sees the end of the race, or somebody tells Alan Grayson about it, Alan Grayson can't be certain what world Alan Grayson is in. Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse X won or Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse Y won, until Alan Grayson receives more information Alan Grayson would have to say the odds are 50-50. If you mean that on sheer ignorance the odds are 50-50, we need some clarifications. Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability", or "imprecise probability between 0 and 1". The reason it is commonly mistaken as 50-50 is an implied strategy, flipping a coin in case of ignorance, but then the odds are of the coin instead of the object of the bet. (This strategy works only if the agent is free to choose which side of the bet she underwrites.) For the instrumentalists among us (glad to have you, BTW): the question of interest to me is not about which way is best to derive probability from QM -- that would be a pointless discussion, I agree! The question is whether all of them beg the question, so that we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability. Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same, to trigger an instinctive impulse. But for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted, IMO. I can give examples of a decision theory w/o probability, but they would dilute the focus of this message. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b10325e2-03ae-4e2f-bc4b-9e144ef989d7n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Thursday, April 21, 2022 at 3:54:04 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 10:05 AM George Kahrimanis > wrote: > >> -2- The "box" (in which Scroedinger's cat is enclosed, with the lethal >> apparatus) contains also its "environment", so a quantum descrition of this >> box describes the environment also. Therefore I do not agree that >> decoherence INSIDE THE BOX will ruin the superposition ASSESSED FROM >> OUTSIDE THE BOX. So, Wigner was right. I suppose that Saibal also is right, >> though I have not checked that message (sorry). >> > > Unfortunately for this idea, decoherence does not stop at the box. In the > time that Wigner thinks about this before he opens the box, decoherence has > enveloped essentially the whole world, so Wigner himself has decohered into > either a world with a dead cat or a world with a live cat. He can't > dissociate himself from the split that occurs, so from his point of view > outside the box, the superposition is long gone, and he has to deal with a > simple classical state of either a dead cat or a live cat -- no > superposition remains. > I see we have converged on other technical issues, so maybe this works out, too. Perhaps I did not make it clear enough that the environment inside this "box" is isolated from the environment outside the box. Only then the cat is in a superposition as commonly understood. Otherwise we need the environment to define the superposition, which Saibal does in the recent messages, but I think it is pointless. So, I meant that Wigner is right but under this assumption only: of the two environments. I had always made a distinction between faster-than-light influences, which > are intrinsically local since they involve the local transfer of > information via some medium (albeit FTL), and non-local influences, which > do not involve any FTL transfers. They are instantaneous and non-local. So > that does not violate relativity. [...] > I cannot tell, from this brief comment, whether HV theories become more plausible in this way, but I will congratulate you if this is so. I am not ready though to enter this discussion now. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7141de94-4ff7-48eb-a087-f6844bfd889dn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:09 AM Brent Meeker wrote: > The only purpose of the box in Schroedinger's thought experiment was to >> put off the observers perception. Really the thought experiment is over >> when the radioactive decay occurs. That atom has transitioned to a >> different nuclear state which is entangled with and recorded in the >> environment. >> > On Tuesday, April 19, 2022 at 4:20:49 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > Yes. Schrodinger had the cat in a box to emphasize the idea that the cat > was in a macro-superposition of alive/dead. This misled Wigner to the > extent that he thought the state collapsed only when the box was opened. > All of this was made redundant when it was realized that decoherence > rendered the state definite almost instantaneously. Saibal makes the same > mistake when he claims that Alice, after her measurement, is still in a > superposition until Bob sees her result. The idea that the superposition > still exists since decoherence is only FAPP is something of a red herring > -- in MWI, Alice has branched according to her result into up and down > branches that no longer interfere. There is no macro-superposition. > -1- Decoherence (by a chaotic environment) turns an entangled superposition into a non-coherent density matrix, only if we subsequently omit the environment from the description of the system. (Not if we keep the environment in the description.) -2- The "box" (in which Scroedinger's cat is enclosed, with the lethal apparatus) contains also its "environment", so a quantum descrition of this box describes the environment also. Therefore I do not agree that decoherence INSIDE THE BOX will ruin the superposition ASSESSED FROM OUTSIDE THE BOX. So, Wigner was right. I suppose that Saibal also is right, though I have not checked that message (sorry). I rephrase my conclusion. I agree with you, on the splits being technically non-local, but this is only an artifact of describing the dynamical evolution of the wavefunction in space-like slices forming a time-like stack. Thus a split affects the whole slice in which it occurs. But seen from a moving train, it would be a different slice! Only on and inside the light cone, the split is physically meaningful. Thanks to your insistence, now I see the difference between non-local HV theories, which violate relativity, and MWI, which does not. I am writing in a hurry, because these days are hectic. I may have missed some important postings, sorry. I would welcome any hints (with the name and time of posting) sent to my G-mailbox: GeKahrim. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/37de846e-9d01-479e-b8ea-a07c519bfcc6n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Monday, April 18, 2022 at 3:35:22 PM UTC+3 agrays...@gmail.com wrote: So what, in your view, bugged AE about probability in QM? AG > I think I have come to a crisp understanding of this issue, which I want to submit to you. However, we must take into consideration that the notion of probability many scientists have these days is very different from the one implied in Einstein's comment "God doesn't play dice". Einstein seems to have a good old-fashioned understanding of probability based on rolling the dice, shuffling the deck, and so on, which has also been formalised as "Kolmogorov complexity". That is, a shuffling complicated enough to make it technically impossible to run the needed calculations in the next 15 seconds, say, in which I am obliged to play my hand. Of course I trust that no other players in this game can run such calculations in the prescribed time (I trust with "moral certainty", not with absolute certainty). This outlook of probability is incompatible with certain currently popular views of probability. For one, entropy considerations are irrelevant in general, unless when they just describe shuffling in other words. So-called Bayesian priors are also baseless strictly speaking, though they do serve in a "let us try this" approach. One more notion to shed is that of propability issuing from ANY theoretical probabilistic model, for example conventional QM. (Surely, if you are comfortable with the latter, then Einstein's comment is meaningless!) I cite an important (I think) philosophical work by Wolfgang Schwarz: "No Interpretation of Probability" Erkenntnis 83, 1195–1212 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9936-9>. He argued that such models do NOT issue probability; they issue just numbers which the users ACCEPT AS probabilities -- in whatever interpretation of probability one assumes as fundamental. This is the key to understanding Einstein's comment. So, in plain words, Einstein's comment means the following. If the interpretation of QM treats normalised measures as probabilities, we need to understand this in terms of our basic notion of probability, that is shuffling the deck or rolling the dice. So in each measurement someone must roll dice or something, in order that probability will arise. Since QM does not allow for such a mechanism, we are left to trusting that probabilities issued by QM are as good AS IF generated by a randomising mechanism (of a familiar kind). This "as if" creates a doubt whether the notion of probability from QM is equivalent to that from shuffling. This is not a silly question, because it has relevance to decision theory (in particular, on whether Maximisation of Expected Utility is a rationally justified method). George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2058484b-5b5f-4e76-9458-13c7a73892dbn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
Just clarifications. On Sunday, April 17, 2022 at 2:15:48 AM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > But the purpose of randomizing the polarizer settings using photon from > sources on opposite sides of the universe is to prevent anyone from knowing > both settings before a measurement. > The point of THIS example is to investigate the issue of non-locality of splits in a MWI; not to test the Bell inequalities. Surely, if we aim for the latter, we will randomise the polariser settings. I'm not sure I see any function for your superobserver anyway. Are you > sure you need him? > Just as in Schroedinger's famous example with the cat, you need a "box" and an observer outside, in order to make sense of the cat being in an entangled superposition. Instead of a superobserver, we can do with an impersonal quantum description (in any chosen frame of reference), if you prefer. I hope that these inadequacies in my exposition will not prevent you from focusing on the "Conclusion" about the locality of splits! George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/590cfb5d-0196-49fa-b1a0-d9fed549d81cn%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
*CHANGE OF MIND.* Not that I made any technical mistake in my previous posting, but I failed to think out the conclusion properly. I was just stupid -- am I allowed to flame myself? In brief: splits propagating on light cones seems to be the correct conclusion, properly understood. Sorry for saying the opposite in my previous posting. First, a clarification. On Saturday, April 16, 2022 at 5:48:25 AM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com wrote: > "In George's description" means George knows...what? Does he know the > setting of Alice's polarizer? Does he know that she got 1 or know that she > got 0, on only that she got a result? Some of these he can know without > being the forward light cone of Alice's measurement. Something like the superobserver of Schroedinger's cat. He knows in advance the axes of the two polarisers and the times when Alice and Bob read their records. Not the outcomes, of course. *My stupidity was* to say that when Alice reads the record then Bob splits too, without taking into account that simultaneity is relative to the system of reference. DUH! The time of Bob's first split is not covariant. However, this is not a disaster of the theory, because at first the two Bobs are identical for a while, until he is informed of Alice's record -- or otherwise affected by it, I add now. So, until the two Bobs begin to differ from each other, the split is a distinction without a difference. It functions as a technical placeholder prepared by the theory, to accommodate the difference that will occur later. *Conclusion.* As Bruce says, the split is non-local; but, since the time of Bob's first split depends on the frame of reference, it is a technicality without physical meaning. Only when the lightcone starting with Alice's measurement reaches Bob, then the split becomes "real", so to speak. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3980fd1d-1521-4b5b-8fc2-518eb58727e7n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
Bruce wrote
> [...] Since I have not been able to formulate an argument that has
convinced Saibal, there seems little point in continuing the discussion.
Not yet, because I just got an idea of what went wrong in the
communication. Part of it was the understanding (maybe it was just me!) of
"local splits" as propagating on light cones, which now makes me laugh.
> The argument that MWI is strictly local is just a mistake, and not an
argument against MWI itself.
Let me try to back this claim. In the example with Alice and Bob, the
splits arise in the description ("wavefunction") of a superobserver,
George, who only knows that, first Alice then Bob, measure entangled spins
on two pre-set axes, without him knowing the outcomes. Instead of the
superobserver, you may think of an impersonal quantum description of the
whole system, but I wonder what does it mean, to assume a quantum
description without a subject, so I will keep speaking of a superobserver.
When Alice becomes entangled with the spin, and the record becomes
practically permanent (by decoherence in her head), then in George's
description the whole system splits. Not separately Alice or Bob; the whole
system. We should not be confused by the fact that at first the two Bobs
are exactly identical, until Bob eventually learns Alice's record -- but
the split had occured earlier, in George's description (of the whole
system).
When, in turn, Bob (that is, both Bobs) measures the spin with his
equipment, George's description splits again; so George counts four Bobs
now. (If the two axes are parallel, then one of the two components of the
second split has measure zero.) This split also affects each Alice, who
becomes two IDENTICAL copies (total: four!), until she (that is: each
Alice) learns Bob's record, and then there are no more identical Alices --
but the split had ocurred earlier.
So, "local split" makes no sense: each split arises in the description of a
superobserver. Without a superobserver, it is unclear whether Alice will
regard herself as split by her measurement. Bob will tell her "Alice, now
you are split", but so what? Alice (both of them) may reply "I know that I
am counted as double by anyone who knows of my measurement without knowing
the record, but I assure you that I am only one of the two Alices you have
in mind". (No wonder that many people hate MWI!) And she may add "If I am
split then you are too!".
I could say more about needing a superobserver -- maybe in another posting.
George K.
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Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote: Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis > questions, but only part way. > As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms. Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that *my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too* -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem. Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without. *Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation!* It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible. My argument in outline is 1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable; 2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice; 3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly). So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only. If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule. Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare. Thanks for the comments so far, because they stirred my thinking and motivated fresh ideas, some of which I hope will prove helpful and worth discussing, if and when they mature. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06930c0c-5537-4fb7-bf70-fd8c7d9859b0n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
Thanks for the comments! On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote: Physics doesn't care about "rationally justified", only about empirically > justified. I admit that I have carried the subject to philosophy of physics, but only because this kind of subject cannot be addressed with just experiments. On the other hand, do you admit that your comment needs qualifications? You cannot possibly mean that we just obtain the Born Rule from experiments, and that this is all we care about. Did Einstein make any sense, complaining about who plays dice during a measurement? What was the point of attempts to introduce hidden variables, even at the cost of non-locality? What is the point of MWI, then? I suppose that you are a careful thinker, and if you object to MWI it would be on some rational grounds. Both your examples suffer from choosing the simplest case where symmetry > can be invoked. So that you would not be distracted from the basic issue: do you agree with always averaging over future selves (Deutsch) or do you take it for granted that the theory provides probability (Zurek and others)? Or none of the above? Correct me if I am wrong, but I gather that your responce is "who cares", or "po-tah-toes, pot-eight-os". Once you've assumed the Hilbert space structure of QM, then Gleason's > theorem essentially forces the Born rule (correct me if I'm wrong, but I > think the theorem has been extended to the two-dimensional case). I shall respectfully correct you, but not on the question you ask, because I cannot remember now, and I admit that I do not care to look it up (but I explain why). Gleason's theorem also requires the assumption of randomisation (God plays dice) and the assumption of non-contextuality of measurements. The reason I do not care about it any more is that I do not favour these two assumptions (especially the first one). I think the problem is that MWI (but not Everett) assume all outcomes are > equally realized. So how does a probability become assigned to them, what > does it mean. I agree, and I am glad you are critical on this point. I am intrigued, though, by the caveat "but not Everett": can you explain, please? We're told it's the probability of finding ourself in a particular > world...but that seems very much like "collapse of the wave-function". It > introduces the same problems of exactly when and where does it happen; with > only the advantage that consciousness is not understood in detail so the > mystery can be push off. I emphasise that I have no comment on the above, because I do not endorse probability strictly speaking but only on an "as-if" basis. (I agree with Deutsch on this narrow point -- Physics doesn't care, really?) Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis > questions, but only part way. > I guess you refer to the theoretical possibility of the environment occasionally failing to "decohere" the state. Here is one of the approximations that are required in the translation from objective, deterministic QM (without collapse) to the application of QM in the world of experience (with apparent collapse). Surely this approximation must be scrutinised, I agree. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/de126bb1-3528-4f0a-9c2e-9a1cb0350644n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Friday, April 8, 2022 at 3:19:08 AM UTC+3 Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> This is an appeal to some sort of imperative that demands the Born Rule
> because the counterfactual lack this certainty. This is a sort of "It must
> be true" type of argument.
Thanks for the comments! I wonder though, do you agree with my criticisms
of previous proposals for deriving the Born Rule, or are you undecided? I
will challenge you (and you all) on this matter, later in this message.
First, a correction: I have not referred to *counterfactuals* (I think that
you meant "alternatives") but now that you mention them, I may have implied
one:
"If QM were not a workable theory, *we would have no direct, experimental
clue that it is a fundamental theory in physics*".
(Not the typical use of a counterfactual, which is in an "if..." clause, as
in "*If I was a rich man*...".)
What I say is not exactly
> "It must be true"
but rather
"Although I cannot be certain, it seems to be in my interests to form this
assessment now, when I decide how to act in the present situation".
If you find this argument too loose: I have pointed out that it is the same
kind of argument that a judge uses to form a decision based on the
evidence, or an engineer uses, to trust the theory of real numbers, for her
project.
My aim has been to complete *Everett's argument,* which I outline next.
Imagine that we repeat the same trial N times, and we record the ratio
{statistical "frequency") r of one among the possible outcomes
(eigenstates). Conventional QM assigns a probability R for this outcome, so
we need an explanation why r SEEMS to approach R in the long run (though we
know that in very many worlds it will not be so!). Everett noted that, for
any positive real ε (however small), the measure of all "outlier"
sequences, that is: for which r is outside
[R-ε, R+ε],
is small, with limit zero as N increases to infinity. However, *a problem
remains:* why "small measure" or "vanishing measure" have any significance
in the interpretation of QM? *My proposal answers this question,* finding
an argument about "small measure" within the reasoned assessment that QM is
a workable theory.
*Here is my challenge to you.* I ask you if you agree with either of the
following two proposals (for deriving the Born Rule in a MWI).
First, Deutsch's (1999) proposal, here in a simplified version. Imagine a
simulated tossing of a fair coin, using a qubit instead of a coin, with
which you either win or lose one dollar. If this bet has a definite, single
value to you (presumably, by some kind of intuitive averaging over possible
futures) it will necessarily be zero, for symmetry reasons. Caveat: Deutsch
points out that we do not derive probability strictly speaking. I accept
the reasoning, but not the premise: I am uncomfortable with averaging my
future selves, and there is no direct rationale why I SHOULD do so. So, *what
do you think?*
Second (and last), proposals such as Zurek's are of the following pattern
(here I reuse the previous example): I am uncertain about the outcome, and
I expect the theory to give me some clue, which will be probability -- what
else? For symmetry reasons, the probability here must be 1/2. My objection
is that there is no randomisation in MWI (no shuffling, stirring, or God
playing dice) so that the use of probability is not rationally justified.
Again* I ask for your opinion.*
Clarification. Instead of probability proper, I derive the following. With
regard to any given application, an Everettian agent may expect "with moral
certainty" (remember the judge and the engineer!) that statistical
frequency in the long run will be as close to the Born probability as one
needs it to be (in the particular application). Some people may think
"po-tah-toes, pot-eight-os", but at some level of thinking *this* is the
crucial issue. In particular, a serious consequence for decision theory
results from failing to find any rationale for probability proper!
George K.
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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Monday, April 11, 2022 at 1:43:12 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > The point seems to be that the fact that some Alice/Bob pairings violate > QM can be known only after they pair up. For the branches that form these > problematic pairings not to form requires a non-local effect. That is the > point I am trying to get across. > > On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 3:07 AM George Kahrimanis wrote: > >> A realistic version of the scenario with Bob and Alice [...] >> >> There have always been worries about detection inefficiencies and errors > in the tests of Bell inequalities. [...] > Thanks for the hints! I too think of splits as global; I would be curious though to see a CONSISTENT formalism that treats them as propagating in light cones, and if "new physics" would be possible. My comment, as brief as possible: I do not think that "bad pairings" is a strong enough argument against a local-split theory, because they arise in examples with perfect precision only, which must be treated just as limits (we agree, I know), so "pairings of measure zero" is the right way to put it. Then I cannot blame a theory just because it predicts violation of physical laws in branches of measure zero, or practically zero. To be more descriptive: think of just one experimenter and a local experiment. The pair |1> |1> will be "of measure zero" to her when the polarisers are parallel, in the limit with decreasing imprecision; not "physically impossible", strictly speaking. (It is "impossible" only in the ideal example directly, not in the limit of vanishing imprecision.) For finding a physical difference introduced by assuming locality of splits, I would look elsewhere. First, in the EM radiation and the gravitational effect of an electron curving (up or down) in a polariser -- just a hunch. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39dc8e04-32be-48b7-b0fc-1eafeaa7ce11n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Tuesday, April 12, 2022 at 10:29:07 AM UTC+3 Bruce wrote: > If the memory is reversed (whatever that might mean) then there is no > evidence that the memory ever existed. You are back into fantasy-land. No, there is a formal proof that an entanglement can be reversed and nonetheless we still have a record indicating that, temporarily, an entanglement had been in effect! I remember David Deutsch showing this in a lecture, in 1985. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1b8b3c01-cb0f-4ae7-bdf9-8f7861b2df64n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
Bruce wrote > [...] But by the rules of MWI, there is also a copy of Alice with result |1> who meets a Bob who recorded |1> for the 10th trial. This contradicts QM, in fact it violates angular momentum conservation, so no such Alice/Bob coupling is possible. But, by following the rules of local MWI, such a pairing is inevitable. [...] The challenge for the local account of the Bell correlations in MWI is: What happens to all these incorrect couplings? [...] MWI offers no mechanism for removing these bad pairings. I find this question very interesting but I am clueless about "the local account of the Bell correlations in MWI". So, if my comments are nonsense to you, please cite a reference on that subject. And if these comments seem to favour that approach, I do not know if I will like it when I study it. I wonder, is it off-limits of this approach to give special status to any branch of a multiverse that, at some later point, violates a law of physics? (Or of measure zero?) That is, we anticipate that some of the branches will turn out to be just ghosts. A realistic version of the scenario with Bob and Alice must take into consideration unavoidable imprecision, in the polarisers not being perfectly parallel, and in the possibility of a transcription error in the recording and of the records themselves. So, such branches will not be exactly unphysical, but rather of very small measure. So there are no "Bad Pairings", strictly speaking. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0d7a80d5-74f2-450c-b301-69a09b62cb52n%40googlegroups.com.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
Saibal wrote > [...] it's not appropriate to fix up the theory by introducing notions from the macroscopic domain that should in principle follow from the fundamental dynamics at the micro-level. [...] Brent wrote > The notion of "result" and "measurement" are not introduced, they are fundamental to knowledge. They are exactly where MWI gets into trouble. [...] If there is a disagreement, we should take care to clarify what is it about. A putative reductionist view accepts a theory as fundamental, perhaps along with some constraints on initial conditions, and claims that "observer", "result", and "measurement" will emerge. Right? I think that this cannot work, because there is some unavoidable approximation in the translation from "a quantum state of a part of the world" to "this quasi-solid apparatus, observer, and environment (which may be part of the observer)". With conventional QM, we express this approximation as the very-very small probability of the apparatus quantum-tunneling through the floor, and so on. With a MWI, I do not see how we can formulate this approximation from the reductionist point of view. So there is a dualism: The supposedly fundamental theory applies to an imagined, objective world, and it also applies to the world of our experience. There is a connection of course, because if the latter were untrue then we could have no clue about the validity of the theory in the objective world. A key notion here is workability of the theory: that it tolerates the impossibility of infinite precision, so it works in both worlds. Brent continued > [...] By saying there is no result of an experiment it muddles the concept of probability. Although I have seen proposals for introducing probability in a MWI (Zurek, Vaidman, John K. Clark), they cannot refer to the notion of aleatory probability, involving randomisation, as when one shuffles a deck of cards or shakes and rolls dice. On the other hand, conventional QM does assume that dice are rolled, and so the requisite randomisation is supposedly introduced, and we can speak of probability proper. Where is the randomisation in a MWI? (A rhetorical question.) So, there is no probability (strictly speaking) in a MWI. We can only identify something-like-probability; I have posted about this subject in a recent thread. George K. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2d8ceac7-def7-4efd-a1a3-0fbe426ddd66n%40googlegroups.com.
aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
Hello Everything. I have a proposal for a common-sense justification of the Born Rule for QM. The idea was motivated with the Many-World Interpretations in mind, but it also works for QM-with-collapse, if that is ever found to be true. It would be great if you respond with any comment, objection, contribution, or question. Or you can direct me to another discussion forum. My current draft of the Introduction is at the following link (to save "bandwidth"): https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CE_qkit5PnS-rzKKmlOoDReBJVN1T0kA/view?usp=sharing To give you an idea, I paste here just the Abstract and the first subsection of the Introduction. An argument for workability of QM leads to the Born Rule, for QM without collapse and for QM with collapse George Kahrimanis [, ...] 6 April 2022, incomplete work ABSTRACT Any interpretation of QM without collapse (a.k.a. a MWI) crucially needs to produce (not assume) an Everettian analogue of the Born Rule, indispensable not only in practical decisions but also for testing a theory. Related proposals have been controversial. The proposal introduced here is based on an argument for workability of QM and on the old notion of Moral Certainty (formulated by Jean Gerson, cited by Descartes and many others). There are consequences for the foundations of decision theory because chance is undefined for any single outcome, so that Maximisation of Expected Utility is meaningless as a fundamental rational rule, therefore a different decision theory is needed. 1- INTRODUCTION 1.1- Comparison with other derivations of the Born Rule, either in MWI or with collapse The present study is based on an assessment (not an assumption, strictly speaking) regarding workability of QM (its usability and testability); that is, an argument for workability is presented and the assessment is up to the reader. It avoids a tacit assumption of certain derivations in MWI, developments of the one by [Deutsch 1999], declaring the utility of a bet as a single value, rather than a pair (corresponding to a buying value and a selling value) or an interval -- however, an Everettian agent may well be unwilling to admit a single value, in view of the diversity of outcomes in branching futures. Despite this disagreement, we share an essential common trait: we address the problem outside of pure epistemology, by studying how QM can be a guide to practical applications. Another difference is that the present study is based solely on the status of QM as a workable theory, but Deutsch's derivation also introduces claims about rational behaviour (with which I agree, except for the one mentioned above). Other derivations not assuming collapse (for example, Zurek's), nonetheless invoke the concept of probability in the interpretation, on the basis of various arguments [Vaidman 2020]. In contrast, the present study adopts a restriction: probability proper will be considered only for outcomes of a randomising process. (It is not enough to know that a black box contains just ten black and ten white balls, or that there are only four aces in a deck of fifty two cards: the cards must be shuffled and the balls stirred, with specifications tailored to the game.) In a single-world interpretation assuming collapse, randomisation is a required assumption (albeit derided as "God plays dice") so that we may legitimately speak of probability; in a MWI though, randomisation makes no sense. Therefore the present study does not invoke a ready concept of probability; it rather discovers what quantum-mechanical quasi-probability is (and what it is not). The results are relevant also to the interpretation of non-QM probability, regardless if it may be ultimately based on QM. There are derivations of the Born Rule assuming collapse with randomisation, along with some special assumption. (The first such derivation was Gleason's theorem, assuming "non-contextuality" of measurements; for references, see [Vaidman 2020] and [Masanes, Galley, Müller].) These special assumptions are deemed more plausible than assuming the Born Rule directly, because they are qualitative properties rather than quantitative ones; nonetheless any special assumption needs justification, whether on experimental grounds or by some theoretic argument. The present study shows that we can replace both randomisation and the additional special assumption by workability. So the Born Rule is derived from workability alone, whether we assume collapse or not. 1.2- About Moral Certainty [...] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAOvf70b7XgCj0MuqSWktJ3UU_rk6pUg4X_T01rSnmsEiJxZ-MQ%40mail.gmail.com.
Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
Brent, You are ignoring the fact that Dr. Katz is in a superposition of states. Bruno, one can assume that he wears a lead apron to protect him from radioactivity - but not from the explosion. But I agree with you with regards Everett, or Mechanism cannot make sense in the first person view. No 1p-diary can contain the statement “I did not survive”. In my post I am trying to lead to this question: Are the laws of physics /anthropically and independently/ determined by each observer? From Katz's point of view he is conducting a quantum Zeno experiment (well known effect that suppresses quantum transitions when measurements are performed very frequently). From the point of view of a person outside the chamber, he is conducting a Tegmark style suicide experiment. We may take for granted that /from his point of view/ the radium near the counter is not radioactive. We are faced with a counterfactual: since the radium is not radioactive, turning off the counter would not make any difference from Katz's point of view. Another question is whether /identical /radium samples far away from the counter would have the same radioactivity as the one near the counter, (even though the counter is not operative.) Why or why not? In other words are /the fundamental forces that control radioactivity/ affected throughout Katz's lab? The second part of my post had to do with the second law. What would Katz perceive if the radium source was replaced by a heat flow device designed to trigger the explosive? Would he perceive /heat quantization/ as an anthropically determined phenomenon (in analogy to the quantization of electron's orbit in our world)? George On 12/31/2019 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Dec 2019, at 05:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: On 12/30/2019 5:44 PM, George Levy wrote: On 12/29/2019 4:34 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: George, Does your interpretation of Boltzmann's view on the conservation of energy invoke any observer like Boltzmann's Brain or Wigner's Friend? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner%27s_friend You know, we need all the Friends we can get? ;-D We are all Wigner’s friends, aren’t we? Except that Wigner still had some objectivism left in him, which led him to ask a friend to act as an intermediary between him and Schrodinger’s cat when he could have stepped into Schrodinger’s chamber and conducted the experiment himself. Writing the paper “Loschmidt’s paradox, extended to CPT symmetry…” led me to question how natural laws such as forces, conservation, quantization and the second law emerge from Quantum Mechanics. The following thought experiments involve Dr. Katz, a very dear, close and nonfactual colleague of Schrodinger and Wigner. You could call him Schrodinger’s Katz. Dr. Katz has a PhD in physics. As a a pure subjectivist, he volunteers in experiments conducted in the famous Schrodinger’s chamber which contains a radium sample, near a Geiger counter, connected to a detonator set to trigger one ton of TNT (replacing, a la Tegmark, the original vial of cyanide envisaged by Schrodinger.) These experiments involve the first and second laws of thermodynamics. I do not have any firm answer to any of these experiments, but I think they are worth sharing. 1)*First Law -* These experiments aim at determining whether the forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism and the strong and weak forces) are constant from the point of view of an observer. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the radioactivity of the radium sample near the Geiger counter. Does the measurement show that radium is /not radioactive/? *b)*He then measures the radioactivity of a /second radium sample far away/ from the counter. Is it radioactive? Is there a difference between the radioactivity of the two samples? Why or why not? *c)*Dr. Katz may conclude that radium is simply not radioactive and, therefore, the radium-counter-explosive link is not operational. He turns off the inoperational counter and again measures the radioactivity of both radium samples (near and far from the counter) Is there any change in the measurements? *d)*He then measures the radioactivity of a polonium sample far from the counter. What does he find? *e)*Finally, he opens (from the inside) the door of the chamber, steps outside, and repeat radioactivity measurement on radium and polonium samples located outside. What does he find? The same as or different from the inside? How does Dr. Katz explain his findings? Are the (electromagnetic, strong, weak) forces the same inside and outside the chamber? Is energy conserved? 2)*Second Law.* (These experiments attempt to link quantization to the second law) Dr. Schrodinger replaces the radium sample and Geiger counter by a heat flow device comprised of a metal bar, hot at one end and cold at the other, and a differential thermometer that
Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
On 12/29/2019 4:34 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: George, Does your interpretation of Boltzmann's view on the conservation of energy invoke any observer like Boltzmann's Brain or Wigner's Friend? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner%27s_friend You know, we need all the Friends we can get? ;-D We are all Wigner’s friends, aren’t we? Except that Wigner still had some objectivism left in him, which led him to ask a friend to act as an intermediary between him and Schrodinger’s cat when he could have stepped into Schrodinger’s chamber and conducted the experiment himself. Writing the paper “Loschmidt’s paradox, extended to CPT symmetry…” led me to question how natural laws such as forces, conservation, quantization and the second law emerge from Quantum Mechanics. The following thought experiments involve Dr. Katz, a very dear, close and nonfactual colleague of Schrodinger and Wigner. You could call him Schrodinger’s Katz. Dr. Katz has a PhD in physics. As a a pure subjectivist, he volunteers in experiments conducted in the famous Schrodinger’s chamber which contains a radium sample, near a Geiger counter, connected to a detonator set to trigger one ton of TNT (replacing, a la Tegmark, the original vial of cyanide envisaged by Schrodinger.) These experiments involve the first and second laws of thermodynamics. I do not have any firm answer to any of these experiments, but I think they are worth sharing. 1)*First Law -* These experiments aim at determining whether the forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism and the strong and weak forces) are constant from the point of view of an observer. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the radioactivity of the radium sample near the Geiger counter. Does the measurement show that radium is /not radioactive/? *b)*He then measures the radioactivity of a /second radium sample far away/ from the counter. Is it radioactive? Is there a difference between the radioactivity of the two samples? Why or why not? *c)*Dr. Katz may conclude that radium is simply not radioactive and, therefore, the radium-counter-explosive link is not operational. He turns off the inoperational counter and again measures the radioactivity of both radium samples (near and far from the counter) Is there any change in the measurements? *d)*He then measures the radioactivity of a polonium sample far from the counter. What does he find? *e)*Finally, he opens (from the inside) the door of the chamber, steps outside, and repeat radioactivity measurement on radium and polonium samples located outside. What does he find? The same as or different from the inside? How does Dr. Katz explain his findings? Are the (electromagnetic, strong, weak) forces the same inside and outside the chamber? Is energy conserved? 2)*Second Law.* (These experiments attempt to link quantization to the second law) Dr. Schrodinger replaces the radium sample and Geiger counter by a heat flow device comprised of a metal bar, hot at one end and cold at the other, and a differential thermometer that measures the temperature difference between the two ends of the bar. When the difference falls below a predetermined value, the thermometer triggers the explosive. Dr. Katz is willing to conduct experiments in this new chamber. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the temperature difference of the bar. Again, following Tegmark’s cue, one may believe that the temperature difference never falls below the predetermined value. *b)*Dr. Katz measures heat flow in a metal bar far away from the thermometer. Does he observe the same kind of anomaly as close to the thermometer? How does Katz explain what he measures?Does his explanation involve quantization of thermal energy? *c)*What if he opens the door and steps outside the chamber? Does he observe any difference in heat flow? I do not have any firm answers to any of these thought experiments - just guesses. Do you know the answers? George -Original Message- From: George Levy To: everything-list Sent: Mon, Dec 23, 2019 10:11 pm Subject: Re: Perpetual Motion Machines Hi everyone I do not post often, but now is an opportune time to post on perpetual motion machines and the second law. John Clark posted "The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. and quoting Hawking: Disorder increases with time because we measure time in the direction in which disorder increases. — Stephen W. Hawking <https://todayinsci.com/H/Hawking
Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
Hi everyone I do not post often, but now is an opportune time to post on perpetual motion machines and the second law. John Clark posted "The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. and quoting Hawking: Disorder increases with time because we measure time in the direction in which disorder increases. — Stephen W. Hawking <https://todayinsci.com/H/Hawking_Stephen/HawkingStephen-Quotations.htm> https://todayinsci.com/QuotationsCategories/A_Cat/ArrowOfTime-Quotations.htm In other words systems are more likely to change from organized to disorganized. There is an arrow of time and the second law as currently understood supervenes on it. The problem with this approach is that relying on time asymmetry alone is narrow-focused and very much 19th century thinking. Physics of the 20th and 21st century taught us that time symmetry must be considered in combination with charge and parity. Therefore, to be accurate, one must consider the second law in the context of full-fledged CPT symmetry. I just published a paper discussing this very topic. Loschmidt’s Paradox, Extended to CPT Symmetry, Bypasses Second Law <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=97267> (The html version at the site does not render the drawings properly, you will need to download the pdf version to display the drawings) The original Loschmidt's paradox states: if all physical processes are truly microscopically time-reversible, then any entropy increasing process is as probable as a corresponding entropy decreasing process. Therefore, according to physical laws the change in entropy must be zero. However, as proven by Boltzmann in his H-Theorem, entropy must increase with time. This paper extends Loschmidt's paradox to CPT symmetry: if the laws of nature are truly CPT symmetrical and reversible, then a system could return to a previous state /even in the presence of an arrow of time,/ thereby restoring its entropy to its original value. This version of the paradox renders moot the arrow of time assumption and bypasses the H-Theorem. The paper includes a theoretical discussion, simulation and experimental data. George Levy Irvine California On 11/29/2019 6:56 AM, John Clark wrote: All this talk about energy conservation has got me thinking about Perpetual Motion Machines, there are 2 types, both are impossible but one is more impossible than the other. One type would violate the known laws of physics, or maybe not; it seems to me that in an accelerating universe it would be possible, at least in theory, to extract work (force over a distance) from nothing and keep doing so forever. The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2TGSjszwavfygMdKsqswq263PNvBKCS8b0ujeP-UZMLw%40mail.gmail.com <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2TGSjszwavfygMdKsqswq263PNvBKCS8b0ujeP-UZMLw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/dc42d570-5388-89aa-f199-763ea47eb27d%40quantics.net.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Thanks Bruno On 11/11/2015 12:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Congratulations! Best wishes for you and your amazing work. I am not convinced but that might only be due to my incompetence in the field. I will make a further look. Bruno On 10 Nov 2015, at 23:10, George Levy wrote: I would like to update the members of this list on what I have been up to recently (and revive an old thread). My latest paper "Quantum Game Beats Classical Odds - Thermodynamics Implications" has just been published by the Journal Entropy under the section "Statistical Mechanics" after a strict and thorough peer review. The implications are that it is possible to beat the laws of Classical Physics using a Quantum Mechanical effect. Given the right conditions it should be possible to produce a spontaneous temperature gradient in a thermoelectric material without any electrical input - and vice versa, to produce an electrical output without a temperature difference input. Here is the link to the paper at the Journal Entropy: http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/11/7645 I presented an earlier paper in Vancouver, Canada, which was also approved for publication by the /11th International Conference on Ceramic Materials & Components for Energy & Environmental Applications/. It is now undergoing editorial and format changes. The paper is currently available at ResearchGate at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283645102_Anomalous_Temperature_Gradient_in_Non-Maxwellian_Gases Best George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
I would like to update the members of this list on what I have been up to recently (and revive an old thread). My latest paper "Quantum Game Beats Classical Odds - Thermodynamics Implications" has just been published by the Journal Entropy under the section "Statistical Mechanics" after a strict and thorough peer review. The implications are that it is possible to beat the laws of Classical Physics using a Quantum Mechanical effect. Given the right conditions it should be possible to produce a spontaneous temperature gradient in a thermoelectric material without any electrical input - and vice versa, to produce an electrical output without a temperature difference input. Here is the link to the paper at the Journal Entropy: http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/11/7645 I presented an earlier paper in Vancouver, Canada, which was also approved for publication by the /11th International Conference on Ceramic Materials & Components for Energy & Environmental Applications/. It is now undergoing editorial and format changes. The paper is currently available at ResearchGate at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283645102_Anomalous_Temperature_Gradient_in_Non-Maxwellian_Gases Best George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Richard you are making an interesting link. If the early universe carried a BEC then the stage was set for a big entropic reset. For this to occur, you would need a force field producing a global temperature gradient or multiple local gradients, and a means (i.e., heat engine) for converting the temperature gradient(s) into low entropy energy (i.e., work) and/or low temperature matter. George On 11/30/2014 8:36 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: John, Experimental results at several high-energy colliders suggest that at some point in the big bang the universe was a quark-gluon plasma, which despite it's high energy, is a BEC where all the particles share the same wave function- so they say. It seems to me that if all particles in the universe share the same wave function, that must be a state of very low entropy. I invite discussion on whether my thinking is correct. Richard On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 11:00 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 4:29 PM, George gl...@quantics.net mailto:gl...@quantics.net wrote: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/1-4020-3016-9 As I have explained in previous posts, it is my opinion that Loschmidt was wrong in thinking that a Maxwellian gas column could power a perpetual motion machine of the Second kind which would decrease in entropy in an isolated system. Yes, Loschmidt was wrong about that. Loschmidt was wrong with respect to the direction of time. In summary: entropy can decrease but time always flows forward. Loschmidt said the link between the second law and time can explain why entropy will be higher tomorrow than today, but it can't explain why it was lower yesterday than today. And Loschmidt was quite right about that, you have to take initial conditions into consideration to explain that. In retrospect this shouldn't have been surprising, even in a Newtonian world the laws of physics alone are NEVER enough to figure out what a physical system will do tomorrow or did yesterday, you also have to know exactly what state the system was in for at least one moment in time before yesterday. Only then can you use the laws of physics to figure out how the system will evolve. His argument was that if the laws of physics are perfectly reversible, then entropy is just as likely to increase as to decrease. No, it would be far worse than 50/50. His argument was that even if the laws of physics were perfectly reversible entropy would still almost certainly increase because there are astronomical to the astronomical power more ways to be disorganized than organized, so the chances are overwhelming that yesterday, the state that produced the state that things are in today, was one of those EXTREMELY numerous states. But nobody really thinks that entropy decreased between yesterday and today; the thing that saves us from this paradox is initial conditions, the universe must have started out in a very very low entropy state and has been winding down ever since. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Hi Russel, Liz Please feel free to forward these emails to people who may shed some light on this issue. As I mentioned I consider myself more a student than an expert and I welcome anyone who could either prove or disprove these ideas. Russell, from your previous post you appear to be one of the most knowledgeable in Thermodynamics in this list. Yet your response, _guessing_ that the Second Law is not actually broken but _not knowing why_, is typical of many scientists_including myself three years ago before I began this study_. The question I am raising is difficult. Again, feel free to forward these emails to knowledgeable people. Liz, you are raising two questions: 1) Does the Second Law survive? 2) Linking the Arrow of time with entropy. 1) Does the Second Law survive? There are many Second Laws : Heat flows from hot to cold (Clausius), Entropy must always increase (Boltzmann), Perpetual Motion Machines of the 2nd kind do not exist (Kelvin) In my view, the most general formulation of the Second Law is the Fundamental Postulate of Thermodynamics which states that the microstates of an isolated system are equiprobable. more info at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_mechanics#Fundamental_postulate This formulation will survive as it is a basis for the derivation of the Fermi-Dirac, the Bose-Einstein and of course the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics. 2) Linking the Arrow of time with entropy. Loschmidt issued (at least) two Second Law challenges. In his first one he argued that a perpetual motion machine of the second kind could exploit the temperature differential in a gas column, thereby causing entropy to decrease. See: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/1-4020-3016-9 His second challenge has to do with the irreversibility of time. His argument was that if the laws of physics are perfectly reversible, then entropy is just as likely to increase as to decrease. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loschmidt%27s_paradox As I have explained in previous posts, it is my opinion that Loschmidt was wrong in thinking that a Maxwellian gas column could power a perpetual motion machine of the Second kind which would decrease in entropy in an isolated system. However, such a machine could still be built if one uses a non-Maxwellian gas. So Loschmidt was right in thinking that entropy could be made to decrease. Does that mean that time can flow backward? The answer is no. If one were to build such a machine, the direction of heat flow would be irreversible and easily identifiable. Heat would flow from cold to hot in the Fermi-Dirac gas and from hot to cold in the classical portion of the machine. Time would not flow backward. There is a lot of literature on this topic but from the narrow point of view of a non-Maxwellian perpetual motion machine, Loschmidt was wrong with respect to the direction of time. In summary: entropy can decrease but time always flows forward. Best, George Levy On 11/28/2014 3:14 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I'm with Liz - I suspect that George is using a specific version of entropy that is (say) only applicable for canonical or microcanonical ensembles, and that the second law actually survives because the system is in neither ensemble. But I could be wrong - its been far too many years since I studied such basic statistical mechanics, and I don't have the time nor energy to revisit the topic now :(. Cheers On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 11:15:18AM +1300, LizR wrote: Is this a violation of the 2nd law, or is it an outcome of the 2nd law that doesn't take the expected form? (I would expect a violation of the law to involve something anti-entropic going on, which would look to us like time running backwards). On 29 November 2014 at 10:48, George gl...@quantics.net wrote: Thank you Liz, Bruce and John for your comments. I am grateful that you are forcing me to explain myself in simple terms, and this is exactly what I need to do. I am definitely not an expert in this field. I consider myself more like a student and I am eager for constructive and informed feedback. As John pointed out, the Second Law is not like the other laws of Physics. It is more like a law of Logic or Mathematics. It appears to be as inevitable as the value of Pi ... until you realize that Pi is tied to a flat plane. And breaking the Second Law when certain conditions are met is not so bad. In fact it make the universe more interesting, not less interesting as John suggested. Maxwell-Boltzmann's distribution is closely associated with the Second Law. Let me try to explain in very simple terms how this distribution is obtained. Starting with the *uniform* distribution (microstates are evenly distributed in phase space) one can show that the velocity distribution of gas molecules along any one degree of freedom, is *Normal*. i.e., the mean velocity vx (or vy or vz) is 0 and the standard deviation is a function of temperature. From this, one can show
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Thank you Liz, Bruce and John for your comments. I am grateful that you are forcing me to explain myself in simple terms, and this is exactly what I need to do. I am definitely not an expert in this field. I consider myself more like a student and I am eager for constructive and informed feedback. As John pointed out, the Second Law is not like the other laws of Physics. It is more like a law of Logic or Mathematics. It appears to be as inevitable as the value of Pi ... until you realize that Pi is tied to a flat plane. And breaking the Second Law when certain conditions are met is not so bad. In fact it make the universe more interesting, not less interesting as John suggested. Maxwell-Boltzmann's distribution is closely associated with the Second Law. Let me try to explain in very simple terms how this distribution is obtained. Starting with the _uniform_ distribution (microstates are evenly distributed in phase space) one can show that the velocity distribution of gas molecules along any one degree of freedom, is _Normal_. i.e., the mean velocity vx (or vy or vz) is 0 and the standard deviation is a function of temperature. From this, one can show that the Velocity = Sqrt(vx^2+vy^2+vz^2) is Chi-Square and that Energy follows Maxwell's distribution. You can look up details about Maxwell at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell%E2%80%93Boltzmann_distribution. Boltzmann modified Maxwell's distribution (to produce the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution) by adding an exponential factor i.e., Maxwell * exp(E/kT) where E = potential energy, to account for the potential energy that gas molecules acquire when they rise in a gravitational field. The Boltzmann factor varies with altitude because the potential energy E varies. This brings us to why Loschmidt was wrong in suggesting that energy can be extracted from a Maxwellian gas in a gravitational field. Density also varies with altitude and the Boltzmann factor disappears when the distribution is renormalized to account for the change in density. In other words the Maxwellian term remains constant with altitude. This means that the temperature is constant with altitude. Hence a Maxwellian gas complies with the Second Law. Continuing the analogy, Pi = 3.14159 the plane is flat. Physics is Classical and Geometry is Euclidean. Fermions follow the Pauli Exclusion Principle which makes their statistics non-Maxwellian. The term describing potential energy is embedded in the Fermi-Dirac formula. It is not added as a simple factor. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermi%E2%80%93Dirac_statistics Going through the exercise of renormalization, one discovers that Fermion temperature is not constant with altitude. The analogy is Pi=/= 3.14159, the surface is curved and Physics is Quantum. This reasoning also applies to Bosons which follow Bose-Einstein statistics. Experimental data on thermoelectric materials obtained at Caltech and extensive simulations by myself and others have confirmed the above. This is a complex topic and I welcome the assistance of experts in the field of Quantum Thermodynamics to either confirm or disprove these ideas. Please do not hesitate to forward this email to anyone who you think might provide enlightenment. Best George Levy On 11/27/2014 6:33 PM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 7:09 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The 2nd law is like that - unlikely things generally failing to happen - on the molecular scale, a zillion times per second. You can't circumvent it unless you can circumvent the maths of probability. Which means that it counts as a law of physics. The second law is more fundamental than merely a law of physics. I can imagine some particular universe in the multiverse where the conservation of energy did not hold, according to Norther's theorem a universe where physics changed as a function of time would be like that; and I can imagine some universe in the multiverse where the conservation of momentum did not hold, a universe where physics changed as a function of space would be like that. But the only universe where the 2nd law didn't hold would be a universe of infinite boredom that consisted of nothing but white noise. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Hi everyone Not much of a response... answering the two questions below: Answer to question 1: If air is forcefully convected in a column having an isothermal temperature gradient, the column shifts toward an adiabatic gradient. Paradoxically, mixing does not equalize temperature, as is well known in meteorology. (air rising over a mountain gets colder) Answer to Question 2: After the fans are turned off and the air currents die down, the column slowly shifts back to its original isothermal state by diffusive heat flow. Loschmidt conjectured that the adiabatic state is inherently stable and that the column would remain in an adiabatic state. He was wrong with respect to gases such as air which have a mostly Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. Gravity needs to be accounted for by multiplying the distribution by an exponential Boltzmann factor. This factor is eliminated by renormalization and the original distribution is recovered indicated no change in temperature. Non-Maxwellian gases such as electrical carriers in a thermoelectric material follow the Fermi-Dirac distribution. This distribution does not allow the electrical field to be accounted for by means of a simple multiplicative Boltzmann factor that can be eliminated by renormalization. Therefore, the carriers can acquire a temperature gradient when subjected to an electrical field as shown by the Caltech experiments and numerous simulations by myself and others. In my opinion, the Second Law is built in, but can be circumvented by stepping outside of, classical physics. George Levy On 11/24/2014 12:24 PM, George wrote: The gas does not flow unidirectionally in the column as in a pipe. There is no net flow. Convection involves a cyclic, mostly vertical, movement of gas in the column. Here is a thought experiment you may consider. A column of gas in a gravitational field is initially assigned an isothermal temperature distribution. Fans are placed at the bottom and configured to blow air vertically, setting up a forced convection. Question 1: Will the column remain isothermal? Question 2: What happens if the fans are turned off. What will the column final state be? These are tricky questions but answering them may enlighten the Loschmidt paradox. George Levy On 11/23/2014 5:38 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 6:28 PM, George gl...@quantics.net mailto:gl...@quantics.net wrote: There is no convection current even though gas near the floor is hotter than gas near the ceiling. The reason is that gas rising in an adiabatic column expands and cools exactly at the same rate as the adiabatic temperature lapse and therefore the gas is in equilibrium. But what if the column of gas can't expand because it's in a sealed insulated pipe? Loschmidt ignored the fact that the energy of the molecules is correlated with their vertical direction of movement. For example, those molecules which are at the top of their trajectories (zero vertical kinetic energy) must always experience their next collision at a lower elevation. But there will always be some molecules at the very top of the column, does that mean there will always be a downward current starting from the very top and a corresponding upward replacement current? Obviously do to the second law we know you couldn't set up a turbine and get work out of one of those currents, but exactly where is the flaw in the idea? Perhaps the error is that the 2 currents would be so small and intermingled that the turbine would just move back and forth in a random way and so you couldn't get any work out of it, and connecting the turbine to a ratchet wouldn't help because the ratchet is at the same temperature as the gas so it will undergo Brownian motion, and the bouncing ratchet teeth will slip at random intervals and allow the ratchet to slip backwards, so the end result is no net work. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
The gas does not flow unidirectionally in the column as in a pipe. There is no net flow. Convection involves a cyclic, mostly vertical, movement of gas in the column. Here is a thought experiment you may consider. A column of gas in a gravitational field is initially assigned an isothermal temperature distribution. Fans are placed at the bottom and configured to blow air vertically, setting up a forced convection. Question 1: Will the column remain isothermal? Question 2: What happens if the fans are turned off. What will the column final state be? These are tricky questions but answering them may enlighten the Loschmidt paradox. George Levy On 11/23/2014 5:38 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 6:28 PM, George gl...@quantics.net mailto:gl...@quantics.net wrote: There is no convection current even though gas near the floor is hotter than gas near the ceiling. The reason is that gas rising in an adiabatic column expands and cools exactly at the same rate as the adiabatic temperature lapse and therefore the gas is in equilibrium. But what if the column of gas can't expand because it's in a sealed insulated pipe? Loschmidt ignored the fact that the energy of the molecules is correlated with their vertical direction of movement. For example, those molecules which are at the top of their trajectories (zero vertical kinetic energy) must always experience their next collision at a lower elevation. But there will always be some molecules at the very top of the column, does that mean there will always be a downward current starting from the very top and a corresponding upward replacement current? Obviously do to the second law we know you couldn't set up a turbine and get work out of one of those currents, but exactly where is the flaw in the idea? Perhaps the error is that the 2 currents would be so small and intermingled that the turbine would just move back and forth in a random way and so you couldn't get any work out of it, and connecting the turbine to a ratchet wouldn't help because the ratchet is at the same temperature as the gas so it will undergo Brownian motion, and the bouncing ratchet teeth will slip at random intervals and allow the ratchet to slip backwards, so the end result is no net work. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Thanks Bruno, Bruce, Brent, Liz, John for your responses. 1)Regarding convection currents in a gas column with an adiabatic temperature profile. There is no convection current even though gas near the floor is hotter than gas near the ceiling. The reason is that gas rising in an adiabatic column expands and cools exactly at the same rate as the adiabatic temperature lapse and therefore the gas is in equilibrium. All gradients ranging from isothermal to adiabatic cannot support convection. To get convection one needs a gradient steeper than the adiabatic gradient. This point is well understood by meteorologists. It should be made clearer in physics classes. 2)Regarding Liz’s comment regarding the Second Law and gravity. Yes, the Second Law is linked to gravity (and to other forces as well). See the paper by Erik Verlinde “On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton” at http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785.The violation that I am discussing is at the intersection of gravity and QM. 3)Regarding why Loschmidt was wrong. Brent is the one who got closest to the answer. Loschmidt ignored the fact that the energy of the molecules is correlated with their vertical direction of movement. For example, those molecules which are at the top of their trajectories (zero vertical kinetic energy) must always experience their next collision at a lower elevation. In general the smaller the kinetic energy of a molecule, the more likely it is to experience its next collision at a lower elevation. Gravity operates as an energy separator shifting upward molecules with higher total energy. This effect exactly counterbalances the effect Loschmidt was relying on that (i.e., molecules get cooler as they rise against gravity). The gas column remains isothermal. A more formal approach is to utilize molecular distributions. For a Maxwell gas subjected to an energy gradient the energy distribution is If the molecules are subjected to a potential energy , a Boltzmann factor needs to be added and the above equation becomes The red curve shows the distribution with V = 0 (ground) and the blue curve with V0. Notice the lowering in the density. The renormalized equation is given by (notice that renormalization eliminated the V term because it is expressed in an exponent and can be seen as a constant factor ) The resulting curve at elevation ground is identical to the original ** This shows that Loschmidt was wrong. A column of gas following Maxwell’s distribution cannot spontaneously develop a temperature gradient. It remains isothermal. Best George Levy On 11/23/2014 8:39 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 at 11:48 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: I think the answer probably lies in the fact that the situation described is not stable -- the system is not in thermal equilibrium. As stated, the gas at the top of the column tends to be cooler because of the higher gravitational potential. But again, as Brent points out, the warmer gas at the bottom tends to rise, so convection currents act to counter the gravitational potential difference. Could I use those convection currents to turn a windmill that powers a electric generator and get work out of it? the system never reaches a stable equilibrium. Does that mean that the convection currents and my generator will never stop? Obviously not although I confess it's not immediately clear to me why not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Hi Liz, Brent, John I love the quote from Arthur Eddington. Let me have the pleasure to cite it for you. If your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics, I give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation. This quote is an ad hominem threat to any researcher who dares even to think about breaking the Second Law. It is based on a quasi-religious belief that the Second Law is unbreakable and has discouraged many bright minds from engaging in a rational discussion on the subject. I know reviewers - good friends of mine - who put review papers aside the minute they spot any mention of the Second Law. I don't mind facing arguments as long as they are rational. Now in partial answer to Liz's question, the best way to explain this topic is to follow the same path that I took. 1) Understand Loschmidt' argument 2) Rebut his argument and find a better answer. 1) Understanding Loschmidt's argument (I am quoting a passage from one of my papers) Let us begin by assuming a gas column in a gravitational field is in a stable _isothermal equilibrium_ such that _no macroscopic convection current_ exists. At the /microscopic/ scale, however, molecules are still moving and colliding with each other. Between collisions, (i.e., along their mean free paths) the molecules remain adiabatic (no heat transfer between them). Consider a molecule rising against the gravitational field. It loses kinetic energy and therefore, on the average, becomes colder than its environment until it collides and exchanges energy with another molecule at a higher elevation. Similarly, a descending molecule gains energy and, on the average, becomes hotter than its environment until its next collision at a lower elevation when it can exchange energy. On the average, heat is extracted from the molecule’s environment at the top of a molecular path and deposited into the molecule’s environment at the bottom of its path. The net effect is a downward heat transfer. Since heat is actually being transferred from one elevation to another, the temperature distribution ceases to be isothermal and the entropy of the gas increases as the column /spontaneously/ shifts toward the adiabatic state. Such repeated heat transfers cause the temperature gradient to shift until the drop in temperature of the gas matches the adiabatic temperature lapse rate. The gas is then in an adiabatic state and the drop in temperature is the adiabatic lapse rate. All vertical heat transfers then stop. /This paradoxical movement of heat by diffusion from cold to hot, is accompanied by an increase in entropy. It is spontaneous and can be likened to an endothermic process. / For a while I was absolutely convinced that Loschmidt was right. However, extensive Monte Carlo simulations and more analysis clearly indicated that he was wrong. Can you spot the flaw in the above reasoning (without having to invoke the Second Law, obviously)? On a future post I will rebut Loschmidt's argument but show that some of it can still be salvaged. Best George On 11/22/2014 1:09 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 , meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Loschmidt's idea was that an isolated column of gas in a gravitational field would develop a temperature gradient, warmer at the top. I believe that would be cooler at the top not warmer,. molecules at the top of a column of gas would have more gravitational potential energy than those at the bottom and so would have had to expend kinetic energy to get up that high and become cooler as a result. Virtually everybody agrees that this is not in violation of the second law but there doesn't seem to be a consensus on exactly why it doesn't. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
If one considers an exponential distribution such as
e^(-KE-PE)
where PE is a function of elevation
then at ground level one would have
e^(-KE)
and at a given elevation h
e^(-KE-PE) = e^(-PE)e^(-KE)
Renormalizing for the lower density the distribution at elevation becomes
e^(-KE)
which is identical with the original distribution at ground level and
indicates that the gas is isothermal. This only works with exponential
distributions.
The Maxwell Boltzmann distribution can be written in several versions.
See http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.vesely/sp_english/sp/node8.html
The one that describes the velocity distribution is exponential:
\begin{displaymath} f(\vec{v}) = \left[ \frac{m}{2 \pi kT} \right]^{3/2}
e^{-mv^{2}/2 kT} \end{displaymath}
but a Boltzmann term needs to be added to describe the effect of
potential energy
\begin{displaymath} f(\vec{v}) = \left[ \frac{m}{2 \pi kT} \right]^{3/2}
e^{-mv^{2}/2 kT} \end{displaymath} e^-(PE/kT)
This density in velocity space is commonly called*Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution density*. The same name is also used for a slightly
different object, namely the distribution density of the*modulus*of the
particle velocity (the ``speed'')
\begin{displaymath} f(\vert \vec{v} \vert) = 4 \pi v^{2} f(\vec{v}) = 4
\pi \left[ \frac{m}{2 \pi k T} \right]^{3/2} v^{2}e^{-mv^{2}/2kT}
\end{displaymath}
(Similarly a Boltzmann term needs to be added. This distribution is not
exponential as it has the v^2 factor in front. )
My problem is to justify using the exponential distribution, obviously
without having to invoke the Second Law which is being challenged.
On 11/21/2014 11:19 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/20/2014 9:07 PM, George wrote:
Brent you are right.
Maxwell distribution is not exponential with energy. For the purpose
of comparing the different distributions, I was attempting to give
the same form to all distributions Maxwell, Fermi-Dirac and
Bose-Einstein independently of the scaling factor in front of the
exponential. i.e.,
The trouble is that it's not just a scaling factor in front, it's a
normalization and the normalization has to produce the right
dimensions. The functions you right below are all dimensionless, so
they can only be density functions relative to a dimensionless
variable, e.g. x=(E/kT)
Maxwell: 1/e^x
Fermi-Dirac 1/(e^x + 1)
Bose-Einstein: 1/(e^x - 1)
I may not have been correct in doing this.
I agree, Maxwell distribution is not exponential with _energy_.
If we assume that the distribution is also not exponential with
_elevation_ then the renormalized distribution after vertical
translation does not overlap the original distribution. Therefore
there is a spontaneous atmospheric temperature lapse and Loschmidt
was right after all!
There is a spontaneous atmospheric lapse rate which in the standard
atmosphere model is linear, -6.5degK/km, from sea level to 10km. And
you could run a heat engine using the temperature difference - just as
people have proposed running a heat engine between warm surface water
and cold deep ocean water. But why would that violate the 2nd law?
The atmosphere is heated by the surface where sunlight is absorbed and
it's lost by radiation to space in the upper atmosphere - so there's a
gradient and free energy which can be turned into work.
Loschmidt assumed that the temperature gradient would be self
regenerating independently of the sun and wind.
Breaking the Second Law does not require QM. All that is required is
a Maxwellian gas in a force field.
The question therefore is whether Maxwell distribution is exponential
with _elevation_.
What does it mean for the M-B distribution to be exponential with
elevation?
See my comment on top of post.
As a density function over energy it has one parameter, kT. Are you
asking whether T=T_0*exp(-h/h_0) where T_0 is the surface temperature,
h is the altitude, and h_0 is some altitude scale. If so, the answer
is no. The function is T=T_0 - 6.5h for T in degK and h in km. But
that only works up to 10km. Changes in molecular species (different
masses) become important at higher altitude.
If it is then Loschmidt falls on Maxwellian gases. If it is not, then
Loschmidt is completely vindicated for any kind of gas. I need to
think about this. Any idea?
Loschmidt considered just a gas or other substance in an isolated
column (no solar heating, no radiative cooling), so the atmosphere
isn't a good example.
This is the example he used. As good physicist do,we can always run a
thought experiment in which a column of gas in a gravitational field is
isolated from its surrounding.
Brent
George
On 11/20/2014 6:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/20/2014 6:28 PM, George wrote:
Maxwell's distribution
f = e^(-E/kT) where E = (1/2) mv^2
?? Distribution with respect to energy is:
Note the sqrt(E) factor.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell-Boltzmann_distribution
Brent
can be looked at in different ways. It is a Chi
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Thanks Bruno, Liz and Richard for your responses. The topic is extremely controversial… It took me a few months of sleepless nights to come to term with these ideas…. but let reason prevail. I am looking forward to an open and rational discussion… a background in statistical thermodynamics would be helpful. Bruno, you may not be able to download my pdf file because your Adobe Reader is not up to date. If you wish I could simply attach these files to my email. Please let me know. You asked me to summarize my post. The best way is with pictures taken from my paper#2.https://sites.google.com/a/entropicpower.com/entropicpower-com/Thermoelectric_Adiabatic_Effects_Due_to_Non-Maxwellian_Carrier_Distribution.pdf?attredirects=0d=1 (Currently under review) Figure 7 shows what happens to the energy distribution of a Maxwellian gas (e.g. air) as molecules rise from ground level (red) to a given altitude (blue). Kinetic energy is converted to potential energy and the distribution shifts to the left. However when the distribution is renormalized as shown in Figure 8, the original distribution is recovered, implying that the gas is isothermal with elevation. The Second Law is upheld and Loschmidt is proven wrong….. but only with respect to Maxwellian gases. Now see what happens when a Fermi-Dirac gas (carriers in a semiconductor) is subjected to a force field as shown in Figure 9. The distribution is shifted to the left as elevation increases. However, renormalization does not recover the original distribution because it is not exponential. The lower elevation has a higher temperature than the higher elevation. The Second Law is broken. This effect can only be observed in high quality thermoelectric materials (Caltech experiment). I have made this calculator program and a simulator publicly available at my web site. *Figure. 7.* Un-normalized Maxwell distribution at ground (red/thick) and at non-zero elevation (blue/thin) showing a shift to a lower kinetic energy, a drop in density and a drop in temperature. *Figure. 8.* Renormalized shifted Maxwell distribution at non-zero elevation (blue/thin) is identical to original non-shifted distribution at ground level (red/thick). ** *Figure. 11.* Un-normalized Fermi-Dirac distribution at ground (red/thick) and non-zero elevation (blue/thin) showing drop in density and drop in temperature. *Figure. 12.* Renormalized Fermi-Dirac distributions at ground level (red/thick) and at elevation (blue/thin) are different. Elevation lowers energy and temperature of gas. Please look on the right of the pictures for the temperatures at the ceiling and at the floor. George Levy On 11/20/2014 1:16 PM, LizR wrote: This is very interesting, if I can just get my head round it. Traditional thermodynamics basically tells us that a closed system in a macroscopically distinct state (and that is able to do so) will evolve with high probability towards a state that is macroscopically indistinguishable from most of the other states it can evolve into. However using quantum phenomena like entanglement and uncertainty could root this apparently emergent statistical phenomenon in some fundamental physics. Since the emergent version should work anyway - with virtually /any /laws of physics - we appear to have a surfeit of explanatory power! However I need to get my head around it some more. On 21 November 2014 07:26, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: statistical-mechanical ensembles arise naturally from quantum entanglement http://people.physics.anu.edu.au/~tas110/Teaching/Lectures/L5/Material/Lloyd06.pdf http://people.physics.anu.edu.au/%7Etas110/Teaching/Lectures/L5/Material/Lloyd06.pdf a lecture given by Seth Lloyd QUANTUM THERMODYNAMICS Excuse our ignorance Classically, the second law of thermodynamics implies that our knowledge about a system always decreases. A more flattering interpretation connects entropy with entanglement inherent to quantum mechanics. SETH LLOYD is in the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139-4307, USA On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Nov 2014, at 02:15, George wrote: Hi everyone This post is relevant to a few threads in this list “Reversing time = local reversal of thermodynamic arrows?” and “Two apparently different forms of entropy”. I am sorry that I haven’t posted to this list for a while. I have been very busy with my work. In my latest research I have found that Quantum Mechanics, in particular the Pauli Exclusion Principle, can be used to go around limitations of classical physics and break the Second Law. Papers describing
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Maxwell's distribution f = e^(-E/kT) where E = (1/2) mv^2 can be looked at in different ways. It is a Chi Square distribution with respect to velocity v, and exponential with respect to kinetic energy E. The _most likely (mode)_ kinetic energy is zero but the _mean_ kinetic energy is not zero . The distribution decays exponentially with higher energies. George On 11/20/2014 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote: If it were the momentum or velocity the mean would be zero, but it wouldn't be exponential. If you just considered the speed (absolute magnitude of velocity) in a particular direction you get an exponential distribution. Is that what the graph represents? Brent On 11/20/2014 5:03 PM, LizR wrote: The average kinetic energy of an air molecule is zero, I imagine, because they're all travelling in different directions and cancel out? Or doesn't it work like that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Brent you are right. Maxwell distribution is not exponential with energy. For the purpose of comparing the different distributions, I was attempting to give the same form to all distributions Maxwell, Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein independently of the scaling factor in front of the exponential. i.e., Maxwell: 1/e^x Fermi-Dirac 1/(e^x + 1) Bose-Einstein: 1/(e^x - 1) I may not have been correct in doing this. I agree, Maxwell distribution is not exponential with _energy_. If we assume that the distribution is also not exponential with _elevation_ then the renormalized distribution after vertical translation does not overlap the original distribution. Therefore there is a spontaneous atmospheric temperature lapse and Loschmidt was right after all! Breaking the Second Law does not require QM. All that is required is a Maxwellian gas in a force field. The question therefore is whether Maxwell distribution is exponential with _elevation_. If it is then Loschmidt falls on Maxwellian gases. If it is not, then Loschmidt is completely vindicated for any kind of gas. I need to think about this. Any idea? George On 11/20/2014 6:41 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/20/2014 6:28 PM, George wrote: Maxwell's distribution f = e^(-E/kT) where E = (1/2) mv^2 ?? Distribution with respect to energy is: Note the sqrt(E) factor. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell-Boltzmann_distribution Brent can be looked at in different ways. It is a Chi Square distribution with respect to velocity v, and exponential with respect to kinetic energy E. The _most likely (mode)_ kinetic energy is zero Not for a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. Brent but the _mean_ kinetic energy is not zero . The distribution decays exponentially with higher energies. George On 11/20/2014 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote: If it were the momentum or velocity the mean would be zero, but it wouldn't be exponential. If you just considered the speed (absolute magnitude of velocity) in a particular direction you get an exponential distribution. Is that what the graph represents? Brent On 11/20/2014 5:03 PM, LizR wrote: The average kinetic energy of an air molecule is zero, I imagine, because they're all travelling in different directions and cancel out? Or doesn't it work like that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Hi everyone This post is relevant to a few threads in this list “Reversing time = local reversal of thermodynamic arrows?” and “Two apparently different forms of entropy”. I am sorry that I haven’t posted to this list for a while. I have been very busy with my work. In my latest research I have found that Quantum Mechanics, in particular the Pauli Exclusion Principle, can be used to go around limitations of classical physics and break the Second Law. Papers describing the research are publicly available at http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/15/11/4700 and https://sites.google.com/a/entropicpower.com/entropicpower-com/Thermoelectric_Adiabatic_Effects_Due_to_Non-Maxwellian_Carrier_Distribution.pdf?attredirects=0d=1(Currently under review) These papers describe experimentally observed thermoelectric adiabatic effects (the existence of a voltage without any heat flow, and the existence of a temperature differential without any input current.) Here is some background: The story begins with a thermodynamicist of the nineteenth century, Josef Loschmidt, who challenged Boltzmann and Maxwell regarding the Second Law. Loschmidt argued that the temperature lapse in the atmosphere could be used to run a heat engine, thereby violating the Second Law. Loschmidt was wrong as shall be explained below but it is instructive to go through his reasoning. Loschmidt argued that the atmospheric temperature lapse occurs spontaneously, is self renewing and is due to the decrease in kinetic energy of molecules as they go up against the gravitational gradient between collisions. Therefore the atmospheric temperature decreases adiabatically with altitude and could be used to run a heat engine. However, Loschmidt ignored the fact that molecular energies are distributed over a range of values and that gravity separates the molecules according to their energy in a fashion analogous to a mass spectrometer separating particles according to mass. Molecules with greater energy can reach greater heights. If one assigns a Maxwellian distribution to the molecules (exponentially decaying function of energy), then any vertical translation of a group of molecules results in a lowering of their kinetic energy, corresponding to a left shift of their distribution. After the distribution is renormalized to account for the lower density at higher elevation, the original distribution is recovered indicating that the gas is isothermal, not adiabatic as Loschmidt conjectured. This effect is due to the exponential nature of the distribution. An addition (of potential energy) in the exponent corresponds to a multiplication of the amplitude.So Loschmidt was wrong: the Loschmidt effect (lowering of KE with altitude) is exactly canceled by the energy separation effect caused by gravity. However he was only wrong with respect to gases that follow Maxwell’s distribution. Electrical carriers in semiconductor materials are Fermions following Fermi-Dirac statistics and the above argument does not apply to them. When subjected to a voltage they do develop a temperature gradient. This temperature differential is hard to observe because it is promptly shorted by heat phonons. As experiments at Caltech have shown (see my papers), it can be observed in certain circumstances such as in high Z thermoelectric materials in which electrical carriers and heat phonons are strongly decoupled. The Onsager reciprocal of the temperature differential is a voltage differential which has also been experimentally observed. The two papers above describe these results in detail. In summary, quantum mechanics, in particular the Pauli Exclusion Principle, can be used to bypass classical mechanics in generating macroscopic effects violating the Second Law. Other relevant papers: 1)Hanggi and Wehner arXiv:1205.6894 http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.6894show that any violation to the Uncertainty Principle would result in a violation of the Second Law. This does not contradict my research which shows use of QM to violate the Second Law. The paper also suggests for future research the reverse proposition that any violation of the Second Law would result in a violation of the Uncertainty Principle. This, if true, would contradict my research. 2)Lloyd, Seth, http://people.physics.anu.edu.au/~tas110/Teaching/Lectures/L5/Material/Lloyd06.pdf http://people.physics.anu.edu.au/%7Etas110/Teaching/Lectures/L5/Material/Lloyd06.pdf. This paper discusses derivation of 2^nd Law from QM. I welcome any comment or criticism that you may have. George Levy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real
Hi List I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be interested in this article from theScience Daily http://www.sciencedaily.com/ on line magazine Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm George Levy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Algorithmic Thermodynamics
Stephen and Russell I have been following this thread with interest as it relates to some research I am currently conducting. In Algorithmic Thermodynamics Baez and Stay make the following analogies: 1) The program runtime (E) is analogous to the energy of a gas in a container. 2) The length of the program V is analogous to the volume of the container. 3) The expected value N of the program output is analogous to the number of molecules in the gas. I have a question. In your opinion, what would be the algorithmic or informatic analog of a force field? More specifically, consider the following thought experiment consisting of a gas held in a tall thermally insulated column and in a uniform gravitational field. As the gas column reaches thermal equilibrium, the gas develops an adiabatic temperature profile (sometimes called the atmospheric temperature lapse, cold at the top and hot at the bottom). I am puzzled by what the force field analog of this thought experiment would be in the algorithmic or informatic context. What informatic or algorithmic phenomenon would cause a change in the program runtime (which according to Baez and Stay is the analog to the kinetic energy of the gas molecules?) George Levy On 1/17/2013 6:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 1/17/2013 7:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: I particularly liked this statement by Baez which relates to Feynman renomalization for QED and Crammer's Transactioanal Analysis: Manin and Marcolli [20] derived similar results in a broader context and studied phase transitions in those systems. Manin [18, 19] also outlined an ambitious program to treat the infinite runtimes one finds in undecidable problems as singularities to be removed through the process of renormalization. Also: To see algorithmic entropy as a special case of the entropy of a probability measure, it is useful to follow Solomonoff [24] and take a Bayesian viewpoint. which answers Russell's concern. My overall impression from tthe Baez paper is that the Quantum Mind could use a similar analysis to predict/represent the behavior of classical systems based on computable real numbers but not quantum systems based on complex variables. Dear Richard, The the behavior of classical systems based on computable real numbers is not an improvement over quantum systems based on complex numbers. At least systems based on complex numbers can deal with phase relations and generate finite approximations in finite time. Real number based computation is ... difficult. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_computation How can you even program them? Richard On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:21 PM, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: From just the abstract alone, I can't see how this differs from the Solomonff universal prior? Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Dear Rabbi Rabbi Rabbit wrote: What is surprising about Abulafia is that he did not reach this state by suppressing his conscious mind, as most mystics do by repetition of a single formula/mantra, but by overstimulating it with letter combinations accompanied by body motions. Too much information is no information at all and a white sheet of paper carries just as much information as a black one. So overstimulating one's mind with a barrage of letters may achieve the same results as understimulating it. Abulafia may have been suppressing his conscious mind by overstimulating it. I haven't thought enough how the technique of letter combinations could be related to consciousness. Any ideas? Numbers and more generally mathematics and logic (more precisely self referential logic) is an essential requirement of consciousness. Using the same Anthropic reasoning that I used in my previous post, one could infer that mathematics and logic also co-emerged with consciousness and the world out of chaos. - Bruno is an expert in the field of self referential logical system. Who knows, self referential logical systems implemented in software may become a reality within our lifetime. George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Hi John Thanks for your appreciation. John Mikes wrote: Dear George, I was missing more of your contributions on this list lately (years?). Let me reflect to a few of your topics: *Chaos.* A decade or so ago I was named 'resident chaotician' on another list - later changed my mind when I was disenchanted by the 'physical chaologists' who picked some 'chaotic' problems that seemed to them as calculable in the original (greek mythological) chaos: the unfathomable uncalculable (pre-geometrical?) plenitude of which the Chronos-Zeus family derived our Kraxlwerk (world). Since then I put 'chaos' into the maze of scale-differences (more than just SOME orders of magnitude?) that conflate our math-based thinking. We learn to think about 'chaotic' (very slowly, but we do, indeed). Thank you for leading (me?) towards Tohu-va-Bohu (what I always wrote in one 'tohuvabohu' in ANY language and applied it for some unresolvable mixup in a conglomerate. The Tohu va Bohu is the nothingness full of potentiality. It reminds me of my son's room when he was a teenager. *And God saw the light and it was good* is translated in some other languages as And God saw THAT the light was good (Rabbit: which one is close to the original?) With my limited knowledge of Hebrew I can translate it as And God saw the light because-good (ki-tov). I will let the rabbi confirm. Interestingly it is the first mention of good therefore you can take it as a definition. Pursuing the reasoning in my previous post, Goodness is defined as the awakening consciousness coemergent with, and creating, the world. In other words creation is goodness itself. Does not underline an omniscient God. Now - your God = Consciousness is to my liking: I could not identify either of them. I consider Ccness a covering noumenon of many phenomena detected over a long cultural history and in my speculations I boiled it down to responding to information - self-recursively, or not. E.g. the response of an electron to a + charge etc. So it really covers the entire World as you connotation would imply for God = Consciousness. Yes. God=Consciousness=World kind of a trinity...(please take this as a joke) :-) From this position it is obvious that I am not much for the Anthropic Principle. It is a backwards thinking from visualizing US (as God's children?) as the main actors in the world. We are not. George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Hi Rabbi Rabbit. Welcome I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I have been reading it. Here is a possible connection between the Kabbalah and the Multiverse, which I will describe in a bulleted fashion for brevity. The initial chaos, Tohu va Bohu, (from which the French word tohu bohu) is equivalent to what is known in this list as the Plenitude. The first light Or is not a physical light at all but it is the awakening of consciousness. The separation that God performs (And God divided the light from the darkness), is mediated by what is called on this list the Anthropic Principle. In essence, the just awakened consciousness can only be aware of the part of the Tohu va Bohu that can support the consciousness's own existence. Consciousness can only see order in the world that it perceives. The sentence And God saw the light and it was good is interesting because consciousness is a self referencing phenomenon. God saw the light but consciousness also saw the light - itself. This means that God and consciousness are identical. God, consciousness and the world co-emerge out of chaos. Consciousness filters the world out of Chaos. More specifically, _any instance_ of consciousness to be what it is (in the human experience, with consistent memories and logical capabilities) requires the corresponding world to be what it is (to be ordered, with consistent histories and logical physical laws). Consciousness and the world mirror each other and therefore, they are in their own image. There can be many different consciousnesses, each one being in fact a whole world. Best Regards George Rabbi Rabbit wrote: Dear Jason, My assumption is that the Name of God, according to Abraham Abulafia, could be made of any possible combination of the 22 letters, as long as this name does not exceed 22 characters. This includes repetitions of letters and any combination between 1 and 22 characters. Thank you for your wise remark, it was indeed not clear enough as I formulated it previously. Yours truly, R. Rabbit -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
A good model of the naturalist math that Torgny is talking about is the overflow mechanism in computers. For example in a 64 bit machine you may define overflow for positive integers as 2^^64 -1. If negative integers are included then the biggest positive could be 2^^32-1. Torgny would also have to define the operations +, - x / with specific exceptions for overflow. The concept of BIGGEST needs to be tied with _the kind of operations you want to apply to_ the numbers. George Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: You have to explain why the exception is needed in the first place... The rule is true until the rule is not true anymore, ok but you have to explain for what sufficiently large N the successor function would yield next 0 and why or to add that N and that exception to the successor function as axiom, if not you can't avoid N+1. But torgny doesn't evacuate N+1, merely it allows his set to grows undefinitelly as when he has defined BIGGEST, he still argues BIGGEST+1 makes sense , is a natural number but not part of the set of natural number, this is non-sense, assuming your special successor rule BIGGEST+1 simply does not exists at all. I can understand this overflow successor function for a finite data type or a real machine registe but not for N. The successor function is simple, if you want it to have an exception at biggest you should justify it. You don't justify definitions. How would you justify Peano's axioms as being the right ones? You are just confirming my point that you are begging the question by assuming there is a set called the natural numbers that exists independently of it's definition and it satisfies Peano's axioms. Torgny is denying that and pointing out that we cannot know of infinite sets that exist independent of their definition because we cannot extensively define an infinite set, we can only know about it what we can prove from its definition. So the numbers modulo BIGGEST+1 and Peano's numbers are both mathematical objects. The first however is more definite than the second, since Godel's theorems don't apply. Which one is called the *natural* numbers is a convention which might not have any practical consequences for sufficiently large BIGGEST. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness is information?
Kelly Harmon wrote: What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer simulation of a brain? Hi Kelly Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up tables are not closed systems. They require someone to fill them up. To resolve these arguments you need to include the creator of the look up table in the argument. (Inclusion can be across widely different time periods and spacial location) George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
I agree with Anna. In addition, it all depends on where you define the boundary of the self. Just the brain? Brain + body? Brain + body + immediate surrounding (prescription glasses being worn, automobile being driven, binoculars or computer being used) ? Brain + body + Whole causally connected universe (CCU)? There are good arguable reasons for including the CCU as part of the self. Forgetting would then mean resetting the CCU to the last remembered state. In this case we have an identity relationship between the self and the universe it inhabits. Resetting the self is the same as resetting the universe. No more problem or paradox associated with forgetting! George A. Wolf wrote: Thanks! This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived. The problem I'm having with this line of reasoning is that memory isn't a fixed physical object. Memory is reconstructive, and depends upon emotional triggers both at the time when the memory was encoded and at the time when it re-examined in the conscious mind. No memories are particularly accurate. Most of the time, I'm not aware that dinosaurs existed because I'm not thinking about it, or any other part of Earth's history, for that matter...but I don't seem to have the experience that my environment is impoverished of history altogether just because I hadn't been thinking hard enough about it. As another example, people who have false recovered memories through psychotherapy invariably end up unable to confirm them when they look for facts to back up their new memories, and that happens in my universe even though I personally don't have any information to confirm or deny their memories. In other words, I don't see why forgetting something is any more likely to change events than simply being wrong about having the memory in the first place, the latter of which happens constantly. If you want to argue about what nonzero probability implies, you'd have a hard time showing that anything non-contradictory at all has a nonzero probability of being true. :) Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse the spin state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by the rest of the world. The rest of the world? What's that? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
I agree with Anna. In addition, it all depends on where you define the boundary of the self. Just the brain? Brain + body? Brain + body + immediate surrounding (prescription glasses being worn, automobile being driven, binoculars or computer being used) ? Brain + body + Whole causally connected universe (CCU)? There are good arguable reasons for including the CCU as part of the self. Forgetting would then mean resetting the CCU to the last remembered state. In this case we have an identity relationship between the self and the universe it inhabits. Resetting the self is the same as resetting the universe. No more problem or paradox associated with forgetting! George A. Wolf wrote: Thanks! This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived. The problem I'm having with this line of reasoning is that memory isn't a fixed physical object. Memory is reconstructive, and depends upon emotional triggers both at the time when the memory was encoded and at the time when it re-examined in the conscious mind. No memories are particularly accurate. Most of the time, I'm not aware that dinosaurs existed because I'm not thinking about it, or any other part of Earth's history, for that matter...but I don't seem to have the experience that my environment is impoverished of history altogether just because I hadn't been thinking hard enough about it. As another example, people who have false recovered memories through psychotherapy invariably end up unable to confirm them when they look for facts to back up their new memories, and that happens in my universe even though I personally don't have any information to confirm or deny their memories. In other words, I don't see why forgetting something is any more likely to change events than simply being wrong about having the memory in the first place, the latter of which happens constantly. If you want to argue about what nonzero probability implies, you'd have a hard time showing that anything non-contradictory at all has a nonzero probability of being true. :) Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse the spin state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by the rest of the world. The rest of the world? What's that? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: language, cloning and thought experiments
Jack, You say Q_i (which is _your_ utility per unit measure for the observer i). This is an oxymoron. How can observer i know or care what YOUR Q (Quality) is? How can this observer feel what it feels being you?. The only observer that matters in evaluating your Q is you as a self-observer. The sum is no sum at all: U = M_o Q_o where o = you as observer. George Wei Dai wrote: Jack Mallah wrote: They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a lot closer to it. Can you explain why you believe that? No. In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones that are similar to you. Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility per unit measure for the observer i) might be highly peaked around those that are similar to you, but there's no need for a precise cutoff in similarity. And it's even very likely that it will have even higher peaks around people that are not very much like you at all (these are the people that you would sacrifice yourself for). By contrast, in your proposal for U, you do need a precise cutoff, for which there is no justification. Ok, I see what you're saying, and it is a good point. But most people already have a personal identity that is sufficiently well-defined in the current environment where mind copying is not possible, so in practice deciding which i's to sum over isn't a serious problem (yet). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Hi Jack Nice to see you again. The assumption that measure decreases continuously has been accepted too easily. This is, however, really the crux of the discussion. One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. On the other hand, when you are really close to a near death event then you may argue that measure decreases. Whether the increase compensates for the decrease is debatable. In any case, measure is measured over a continuum and its value is infinite to begin with. So whether it increases or decreases may be a moot point. This being said, this issue is not easily dismissed and will impact ethics and philosophy for years to come. As I said, the increase or decrease in measure is at the crux of this problem.Your paper really did not illuminate the issue in a satisfactory manner. George Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum of the measures is N/N of the original. I still find this confusing. Your argument seems to be that you won't live to 1000 because the measure of 1000 year old versions of you in the multiverse is very small - the total consciousness across the multiverse is much less for 1000 year olds than 30 year olds. But by an analogous argument, the measure of 4 year old OM's is higher than that of 30 year old OM's, since you might die between age 4 and 30. But here you are, an adult rather than a child. You might die between 4 and 30, but the chance is fairly small, let's say 10% for the sake of argument. So, if we just consider these two ages, the effective probability of being 30 would be a little less than that of being 4 - not enough less to draw any conclusions from. The period of adulthood is longer than that of childhood so actually you are more likely to be an adult. How likely? Just look at a cross section of the population. Some children, more adults, basically no super-old folks. Should you feel your consciousness more thinly spread or something? No, measure affects how common an observation is, not what it feels like. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Jack Mallah wrote: Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again. At least I think your point here is new to the list. I have also been overwhelmed by the volume on this list. The idea is not to take more than you can chew. --- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote: One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. I guess you are basing that on some kind of branch-counting idea. If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail. Perhaps the probability rule would be more like proportionality to norm^2 exp(entropy) instead of just norm^2. If that was it, then for example unstable nuclei would be observed to decay a lot faster than the Born Rule predicts. Yes I am linking the entropy to MW branching. So if you start with a low entropy state such as the Big Bang or having $1 million after a QS your entropy is going to increase. (There are many ways I could spend that million). The number of possible states you can reach increases, hence your entropy increases. You say that the Born Rule would fail if measure *increases*. Here is a counterexample: Using your own argument I could say that the Born rule would fail if measure *decreases *according to function f(t). For example it could be norm^2 f(t) . So using your own argument since the Born rule is only norm^2 therefore measure stays constant? I do not understand why you say that the Born rule would fail. Linking entropy with measure may bring some interesting insights. Let's see how far we can go with this. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Hi
I haven't contributed to the list recently but probability is a topic
that interests me and which I discussed several years ago. I have a
relativist interpretation of the MW.
To apply Probabilities to the MW _every probability should be stated as
a conditional probability, that is conditional on the existence of the
observer:_
For example:
P{event X} is meaningless
P{ event X / observer A} is the probability that observer A sees event X.
Obviously we have:
P{ Observer A / Observer A } = 1
Things become interesting when we have two observers A and B observing
the same event X. (Recall Einstein thought experiment on simultaneity).
_Case 1: Classical case: Event X totally decoupled from the existence of
observer A and B_
When the existences of A and B are not contingent on X we have
P{X/A} = P{X/B}
and both A and B agree on the objectivity of their observation. They
call this probability P{X} even though strictly speaking P{ X} is
meaningless.
This case represents the classical case: all observers see an objective
reality in which all events have the same probabilities.
_Case 2: Tegmark case: Existence of A is 100% contingent on X._
In this case, the observed probabilities are different:
P{X/A} P{X/B}
For example let's consider Tegmark Quantum Mechanics suicide thought
experiment. Let us say that A is the observer playing the lottery event
X and B is passive.
B may observe the probability of A winning the lottery as
P{ X/B } = 0.01
Since A is contingent on X:
P{ A/B} = 0.01
Note that if B attempts to use Bayes rule to compute P{X} (or P{A})
he'll use
P{X} = P{X/B} P{B}; However B has no access to P{B}. He actually uses
P{B/B}. So for B Bayes rule becomes:
P{X} = P{X/B} P{B/B} = 0.01 x 1 = 0.01 ; B is a third person.
Most of the time he sees A dying.
Since A is 100% contingent on X and vice versa, A observes
P{X/A} = 1
If A attempts to compute P{X} using Bayes rule he'll get:
P{X} = P{X/A} P{A}; However P{A} does not make sense. A must use P{A/A}.
So for A Bayes rule becomes:
P{X} = P{X/A} P{A/A} = 1 x 1 = 1; A is the first person. He always sees
himself alive.
_Case 3. Both A and B are contingent on X in different degrees._
Assume that A is test pilot flying a very dangerous plane. B is in the
control tower. C is far away.
X is a successful flight; X1 is a plane crash on the ground killing A;
X2 is the plane crashing in the control tower killing A and B.
Let P{X/C} = 0.7; P{X1/C} = 0.2, P{X2/C} = 0.1
P{X} as seen by C = 0.7.
Calculating P{X} according to B is more tricky. The events that B sees
are the successful flight and the crash in the ground. He does not see
the crash in the control tower.
To get P{X} as seen by B we need to normalize the probability to cover
only the events seen by B:
According to B: P{X} + P{X1} = 1
Therefore: P{X} = 0.7/(0.7+0.2) = 0.77 and P{X1} = 0.23.
So according to B P{X} = 0.77.
A does not see any of the crashes. So:
P{X} as seen by A = 1.0
This last example illustrates how three different observers can see
three different probabilities.
George Levy
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Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Hi Brian As Russell said, we have been discussing this topic for at least a decade. We all respect each other. I am sure that Bruno did not mean harm when he made his comment. You bring up an interesting question: the relationship between Fuzzy logic and the MUH and you state that Fuzzy logic is a superset of deterministic logic. Isn't true that Fuzzy Logic can be implemented by means of a Turing Machine? Since a Turing Machine is purely deterministic it means that Fuzzy logic is actually a subset of logic. Hence the ad hoc introduction of Fuzzy logic may be unnecessary in the context of MUH. I don't think that the indeterminacy that we are considering here is fundamental or derives from an axiomatic approach. It is rather a consequence of living in many worlds simultaneously. When I make a measurement, a number of I's make(s) a measurements. The result of the measurement that each I perceive(s) defines the world where the I actually am (is). As you can see English is not rich enough to talk about I in the third person or in the plural. If there is a need for Fuzzy Logic, it would have to be a kind of logic adapted to deal with the MUH. I don't know enough to say if there is such a logic. George Brian Tenneson wrote: We get Tegmark on this list occasionally. He, like you, needs to acquaint himself more with the core concepts of THIS discussion. In his last post to us he admitted as much. By THIS discussion, did you mean the aspects of the connections to Fuzzy Logic and the MUH that I am discussing in THIS thread? Can we +please+ either talk about the first post on THIS thread or anything at least somewhat related or post in a different thread? I did not come here to argue about who is diverting the topic away. Please don't reply in THIS thread if you aren't going to discuss THIS topic (connections between Fuzzy Logic and the MUH). Thanks. I did not post my ideas in a random person's thread. If I did, I would be called a troll, perhaps, or at least, unnecessarily diverting the thread. It is insulting to me to be said I'm looking for attention. Why use THIS thread's bandwidth to analyze my psychological makeup? Thanks. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal Ok, there is no feeling but there is motivation. There is no feeling of motivation and there is motivation without feeling. This is totally alien or the English language is broken. George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no feeling of anything in a Something. There is only an absence of the information needed to answer meaningful questions that are asked and must is be answered. Hal Ruhl At 11:13 PM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal, Allright. You are saying that incompleteness is the (only) motivator of the members. In other words the members feel motivated by incompleteness. They do have the feeling of being incomplete that motivates their behavior. Is this correct? George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no motivator to any dynamics within the Everything other than the incompleteness of some of its members and the unavoidable necessity to progressively resolve this incompleteness. Hal Ruhl At 12:29 AM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal, Allright. You are saying that incompleteness is the (only) motivator of the members. In other words the members feel motivated by incompleteness. They do have the feeling of being incomplete that motivates their behavior. Is this correct? George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no motivator to any dynamics within the Everything other than the incompleteness of some of its members and the unavoidable necessity to progressively resolve this incompleteness. Hal Ruhl At 12:29 AM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal, I cannot follow you: one the one hand you say: Something if incomplete will have to increase its completeness to answer meaningful questions which implies volition and therefore spirit; and on the other hand you say: There is no intent to imply some sort of choice on the part of the Something. which denies spirit, and on the third hand: the quest is an ... system induced need for a ongoing influx of information in which the term need goes back to supporting a spirit-based system. George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I use the term quest because a Something if incomplete will have to increase its completeness to answer meaningful questions that get asked but it can not answer. The motivator is partly external - an answer [mostly more than one is available] is out there in the unexplored Everything and partly internal - the particular question must be answered. There is no intent to imply some sort of choice on the part of the Something. To use your last thoughts below the quest is an [Everything, Something, Nothing] system induced need for a ongoing influx of information into the particular Something from the Everything [the boundary of the particular Something with the Everything alters to include more of the Everything. The Something encompasses an ever increasing portion of the Everything but it must do so. In this case I currently see no higher level of driver for any sub component of the Something including what one might call an observer. I may need to reconsider when I get to that point in Russell's book but my time restraints force me to take considerable time doing so. Hal Ruhl At 02:21 PM 1/16/2008, you wrote: Hi Hal, This topic interests me, but I find it difficult to go past the second sentence in your post. The phrase Something is on a quest carries a lot of baggage, in particular that Something has intention, purpose and motivation. Either we have to assume that this intention is produced by a fundamental spirit or soul that you have assigned to the Something, or that the intention is emergent from a complex consciousness simulation possibly involving Quantum Mechanics. If you assume a spirit or soul you are making a quasi religious assumption. Is this what you want? How do we explain spirit or soul? If you are assuming a complex consciousness simulation, there is a whole layer that needs to be explained which no one has yet fully explained yet. Usually scientists use objective and impersonal criteria such as energy minimization to explain how a reaction is driven in one particular direction. In chemistry, for example, Le Chatelier Principle is used. George Hal Ruhl wrote: I have touched on this subject before but the following is my current view of Dark Energy In my approach a Something is on a quest for completeness within the Everything. Based on this, the following points can be made: 1) The number of current incompleteness sites for a given Something would be at least proportional to the surface area of its boundary with the rest of the Everything if not proportional to its volume. 2) Thus the larger [more information content] a Something is [has] the more such sites it has and the larger any given step in the quest can be. 3) This gives an increase in the average information influx as the quest progresses. 4) If the universe described by that Something has a maximum finite information packing density in its space then an accelerating increase in the size of that space should be observed since both the volume and surface area of a Something inside the Everything increases as the quest progresses. Hal Ruhl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Yes I am particularizing things... But the end justifies the means. I am being positivist, trying to express these rules as a function of an observer. In any case, once the specific example is worked out, we can fall back on the general case. Your feedback about exist not really being adequate to express truth is well noted. Let me change the proposed rules to express truth as a function of an axiomatic system A existing as data either in the memory of M or as a axiomatic substrate for a simulated world W. Let's try the following: In a world W simulated according to the axiomatic data system A, there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. (exist=being simulated in W according to A ) 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. Now we can make the statements reflexive ( I don't know if this is the right word) by setting data p = Machine description M. In a simulated world W following the axiomatic data system A there is a machine M=p and data q such that 1) If M has access to M then M exists in W. (reflexivity?) 2) If M has access to M, then M has access to the access point to M. (Infinite reflexivity? - description of consciousness?) 3) If M has information describing q as a consequence of M in accordance with A, then if M has access to M, it also has access to q. (This is a form of Anthropic principle) I am not sure if this is leading anywhere, but it's fun playing with it. Maybe a computer program could be written to express these staqtements. George Bruno Marchal wrote: George, you can do that indeed, but then you are particularizing things. This can be helpful from a pedagogical point of view, but the advantage of the axiomatic approach (to a knowledge theory) is that once you agree on the axioms and rules, then you agree on the consequences independently of the particular instantiation you think about. Word like machine, access, memory, world, data, are, fundamentally harder than the simple idea of knowledge the modal S4 axioms convey. Using machines, for example, could seem as a computationalist restriction, when the axioms S4 remains completely neutral, etc. Also, acceding a memory is more opinion than knowledge because we can have false memory for example. (And then what are the inference rules of your system?). S4 is a normal modal logic with natural Kripke referentials (transitive, reflexive accessibility relations). A bit more problematic is your identification of true with exist. This hangs on possible but highly debatable and complex relations between truth and reality. This is interesting per se, but imo a bit out of topics, or premature (in current thread). Perhaps we will have opportunity to debate on this, but I want make sure that what I am explaining now does not depend on those possible relations (between truth and reality). Bruno Le 24-nov.-07, à 21:23, George Levy a écrit : Bruno thank you for this elaborate reply. I would like these three statements to make use of cybernetic language, that is to be more explicit in terms of the machine or entity to which they refer. Would it be correct to rephrase the statements in the active tense, using the machine as the subject, replacing proposition p by the term data and replacing true by exist? The statements would then be: In a world W there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. I assumed that the term has access means in its memory... but it does not have to. I also assumed in statements 3 that the multiple uses of M refers to the same machine. I guess there may be cases where multiple machines can have access to the dame data. Same with statement 4 George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-nov.-07, à 20:50, George Levy a écrit : Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno thank you for this elaborate reply. I would like these three statements to make use of cybernetic language, that is to be more explicit in terms of the machine or entity to which they refer. Would it be correct to rephrase the statements in the active tense, using the machine as the subject, replacing proposition p by the term data and replacing true by exist? The statements would then be: In a world W there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. I assumed that the term has access means in its memory... but it does not have to. I also assumed in statements 3 that the multiple uses of M refers to the same machine. I guess there may be cases where multiple machines can have access to the dame data. Same with statement 4 George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-nov.-07, à 20:50, George Levy a écrit : Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). The same as in it is raining. I could have written 1. and 2. like 1) knowable(p) - p 2) knowable(p) - knowable(knowable(p)) In this way we can avoid using words like it, or even like true. p is a variable, and is implicitly universally quantified over. knowable(p) - p really means that whatever is the proposition p, if it is knowable then it is true. The false is unknowable (although it could be conceivable, believable, even provable (in inconsistent theory), etc. The p in 1. 2. and 3. is really like the x in the formula (sin(x))^2 + (cos(x))^2 = 1. knowable(p) - p really means that we cannot know something false. This is coherent with the natural language use of know, which I illustrate often by remarking that we never say Alfred knew the earth is flat, but the he realized he was wrong. We say instead Alfred believed that earth is flat, but then . The axiom 1. is the incorrigibility axiom: we can know only the truth. Of course we can believe we know something until we know better. The axiom 2. is added when we want to axiomatize a notion of knowledge from the part of sufficiently introspective subject. It means that if some proposition is knowable, then the knowability of that proposition is itself knowable. It means that when the subject knows some proposition then the subject will know that he knows that proposition. The subject can know that he knows. In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? All the point in axiomatizing some notion, consists in giving a way to reason about that notion without ever defining it. We just try to agree on some principles, like 1.,2., 3., and then derives things from those principles. Nuance can be added by adding new axioms if necessary. Of course axioms like above are not enough, we have to use deduction rules. In case of the S4 theory, which I will rewrite with modal notation (hoping you recognize it). I write Bp for B(p) to avoid heaviness in the notation, likewize, I write BBp for B(B(p)). 1) Bp - p (incorrigibility) 2) Bp - BBp (introspective knowledge) 3) B(p-q) - (Bp - Bq) (weak omniscience, = knowability of the consequences of knowable propositions). Now with such axioms you can derive no theorems (except the axiom themselves). So you need some principles which give you a way to deduce theorems from axioms. The usual deduction rule of S4 are the substitution rule, the modus ponens rule and the necessitation rule. The substitution rule say that you can substitute p by any proposition (as far as you avoid clash of variable, etc.). The modus ponens rule say that if you have already derived some formula A, and some formula A - B, then you can derive B. The necessitation rule says that if you have already derive A, then you can derive BA. Are is knowable, is true and entails
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? Are is knowable, is true and entails absolute or do they have meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these statements? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
One more question: can or should p be the observer? George George Levy wrote: Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? Are is knowable, is true and entails absolute or do they have meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these statements? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
A theory of everyting is sweeping the Physics community. The theory by Garrett Lisi is explained in this Wiki entry. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Exceptionally_Simple_Theory_of_Everything A simulation of E8 can be found a the New Scientist. http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/dn12891-is-mathematical-pattern-the-theory-of-everything.html The Wiki entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E8_%28mathematics%29 on E8 is also interesting. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: OM measure and universe size
Sorry the nice equation formats did not make it past the server. Anyone
interested in the equations can find them at the associated wiki links.
George
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Nov 02, 2007 at 12:20:35PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
Russel,
We are trying to related the expansion of the universe to decreasing
measure. You have presented the interesting equation:
H = C + S
Let's try to assign some numbers.
1) Recently an article
http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn12853-black-holes-may-harbour-their-own-universes.html
appeared in New Scientist stating that we may be living inside a black
hole, with the event horizon being located at the limit of what we can
observe ie the radius of the current observable universe.
2) Stephen Hawking
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole_thermodynamics showed that the
entropy of a black hole is proportional to its surface area.
S_{BH} = \frac{kA}{4l_{\mathrm{P}}^2}
where where k is Boltzmann's constant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann%27s_constant, and
l_{\mathrm{P}}=\sqrt{G\hbar / c^3} is the Planck length
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_length.
Thus we can say that a change in the Universe's radius corresponds to a
change in entropy dS. Therefore, dS/dt is proportional to dA/dt and to
8PR(dR/dt) R being the radius of the Universe and P = Pi. Let's assume
that dR/dt = c
Therefore
dS/dt = (k/4 L^2) 8PRc = 2kPRc/ L^2
Since Hubble constant http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubble%27s_law is
71 ± 4 (km http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilometer/s
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second)/Mpc
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megaparsec
which gives a size of the Universe
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe from the Earth to the
edge of the visible universe. Thus R = 46.5 billion light-years in any
direction; this is the comoving radius
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radius of the visible universe. (Not the
same as the age of the Universe because of Relativity considerations)
Now I have trouble relating these facts to your equation H = C + S or
maybe to the differential version dH = dC + dS. What do you think? Can
we push this further?
George
I think that the formula you have above for S_{BH} is the value that
should be taken for the H above. It is the maximum value that entropy
can take for a volume the size of the universe.
The internal observed entropy S, will of course, be much lower. I
don't have a formula for it off-hand, but it probably involves the
microwave background temperature.
Cheers
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Re: OM measure and universe size
Russel,
We are trying to related the expansion of the universe to decreasing
measure. You have presented the interesting equation:
H = C + S
Let's try to assign some numbers.
1) Recently an article
appeared in New Scientist stating that we may be living "inside" a
black hole, with the event horizon being located at the limit of what
we can observe ie the radius of the current observable universe.
2) Stephen
Hawking showed that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to
its surface area.
where where k is Boltzmann's constant, and is the Planck
length.
Thus we can say that a change in the Universe's radius corresponds to a
change in entropy dS. Therefore, dS/dt is proportional to dA/dt and to
8PR(dR/dt) R being the radius of the Universe and P = Pi. Let's assume
that dR/dt = c
Therefore
dS/dt = (k/4 L^2) 8PRc = 2kPRc/ L^2
Since Hubble
constant is 71 4 (km/s)/Mpc
which gives a size of the
Universe from the Earth to the edge of the visible universe. Thus R
= 46.5 billion light-years in any direction; this is the
comoving radius
of the visible universe. (Not the same as the age of the Universe
because of Relativity considerations)
Now I have trouble relating these facts to your equation H = C + S or
maybe to the differential version dH = dC + dS. What do you think? Can
we push this further?
George
Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2007 at 05:11:01PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
Could we relate the expansion of the universe to the decrease in
measure of a given observer? High measure corresponds to a small
universe and conversely, low measure to a large one. For the observer
the decrease in his measure would be caused by all the possible mode of
decay of all the nuclear particles necessary for his consciousness.
Corresponding to this decrease, the radius of the observable universe
increases to make the universe less likely.
This would provide an experimental way to measure absolute measure.
I am not a proponent of ASSA, rather I believe in RSSA and in a
cosmological principle for measure: that measure is independent of when
or where the observer makes an observation. However, I thought that
tying cosmic expansion to measure may be an interesting avenue of inquiry.
George Levy
There is a relationship, though perhaps not quite what you think. The
measure of an OM will be 2^{-C_O}, where C_O is the amount of
information about the universe you know at that point in time
(measured in bits). The physical complexity C of the universe at a point
in time is in some sense the limit of all that is possible to know
about the universe, ie C_O = C.
C is related to the size of the universe by the equation H = C + S,
where S is the entropy of the universe (measured in bits), and H is
the maximum possible entropy that would pertain if the universe were
in equilibrium. H is a monotonically increasing function of the size
of the universe - something like propertional to the volume (or
similar - I forget the details). S is also an increasing function (due
to the second law), but doesn't increase as fast as H. Consequently C
increases as a function of universe age, and so C_O can be larger now
than earlier in the universe, implying smaller OM measures.
However, it remains to be seen whether the anthropic reasons for
experiencing a universe 10^9 years and of large complexity we
currently see is necessary...
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Ho Bruno Sorry, I have been unclear with myself and with you. I have been lumping together the assumption of an objective physical world and an objective platonic world. So you are right, I do reject the objective physical world, but why stop there? Is there a need for an objective platonic world? Would it be possible to go one more step - the last step hopefully - and show that a the world that we perceive is solely tied to our own consciousness? So I am more extreme than you thought. I believe that the only necessary assumption is the subjective world. Just like Descartes said: Cogito... I think that the world and consciousness co-emerge together, and the rules governing one are tied to the rules governing the other. In a sense Church's thesis is tied to the Anthropic principle. Subjective reality also ties in nicely with relativity and with the relative formulation of QT. This being said, I am not denying physical reality or objective reality. However these may be derivable from purely subjective reality. Our experience of a common physical reality and a common objective reality require the existence of common physical frame of reference and a common platonic frame of reference respectively. A common platonic frame of reference implies that there are other platonic frames of references.This is unthinkable... literally. Maybe I have painted myself into a corner Yet maybe not... No one in this Universe can say... George Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, I think that we agree on the main line. Note that I never have pretended that the conjunction of comp and weak materialism (the doctrine which asserts the existence of primary matter) gives a contradiction. What the filmed-graph and/or Maudlin shows is that comp makes materialism empty of any explicative power, so that your ether image is quite appropriate. Primary matter makes, through comp, the observation of matter (physics) and of course qualia, devoied of any explanation power even about just the apparent presence of physical laws. I do think nevertheless that you could be a little quick when asserting that the mind-body problem is solved at the outset when we abandon the postulate of an objective (I guess you mean physical) world. I hope you believe in some objective world, being it number theoretical or computer science theoretical, etc. You point 3) (see below) is quite relevant sure, Bruno Le 08-oct.-07, à 05:10, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that Maudlin refers to the conjunction of the comp hyp and supervenience, where consciousness is supposed to be linked (most of the time in a sort of real-time way) to the *computational activity* of the brain, and not to the history of any of the state occurring in that computation. If you decide to attach consciousness to the whole physical history, then you can perhaps keep comp by making the substitution level very low, but once the level is chosen, I am not sure how you will make it possible for the machine to distinguish a purely arithmetical version of that history (in the arithmetical plenitude (your wording)) from a genuinely physical one (and what would that means?). Hmmm... perhaps I am quick here ... May be I also miss your point. This is vastly more complex than the seven first steps of UDA, sure. I have to think how to make this transparently clear or ... false. As you know I believe that the physical world can be derived from consciousness operating on a platonic arithmetic plenitude. Consequently, tokens describing objective instances in a physical world cease to be fundamental. Instead, platonic types become fundamentals. In the platonic world each type exists only once. Hence the whole concept of indexicals looses its functionality. Uniqueness of types leads naturally to the merging universes: If two observers together with the world that they observe (within a light cone for example) are identical then these two observers are indistinguishable from themselves and are actually one and the same. I have argued (off list) about my platonic outlook versus the more established (objective reality) Aristotelian viewpoint and I was told that I am attempting to undo more than 2000 years of philosophy going back to Plato. Dealing with types only presents formidable logical difficulties: How can types exist without tokens? I find extremely difficult to prove that the absence of an objective reality at the fundamental level. Similarly, about a century ago people were asking how can light travel without Ether. How can one prove that Ether does not exist? Of course one can't but one can show that Ether is not necessary to explain wave propagation. Similarly, I think that the best one can achieve is to show that the objective world is not necessary for consciousness to exist and to perceive or observe a world. However, some points can be made: getting rid of the objective world postulate has the following
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Oops: replace Newton's demon by Maxwell's demon. George George Levy wrote: Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The accidentally correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging. So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Are you still there on the list? I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is the answer, with a delay of about one year :( Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see the text. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. Right. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes ... Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got involved in his own experiment. ... each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any computational process (like a movie). I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. ok. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming some form of non-computationalism. With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached also to the second process. But then you can force the second process to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter trois of Conscience et Mécanisme). So
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The accidentally correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging. So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Are you still there on the list? I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is the answer, with a delay of about one year :( Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see the text. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. Right. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes ... Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got involved in his own experiment. ... each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any computational process (like a movie). I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. ok. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming some form of non-computationalism. With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached also to the second process. But then you can force the second process to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter trois of Conscience et Mécanisme). So, postulating comp, we have to associate the many possible physical brains to a type of computation
Re: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent meeker writes: It could be argued that not even God could create a world in which there are no accidents, conflicts of interest, disappointments, and so on, at least not without severely limiting his creatures' freedom. However, it would have been possible for God to limit the capacity for suffering, favouring pleasure rather than avoidance of pain as a motivating factor. A sado-masochistic world would do the trick, wouldn't it? George :-) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-oct.-06, 21:54, George Levy a crit : To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, ? This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes. The Leibniz analogy is good. In your example if one observes just the recording without observing the earlier creation of the recording and the later utilization of the recording, then one may conclude rightfully that the recording is not conscious. in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. This is unclear for me. Unless you are just saying like Leibniz that you will not "see" consciousness in a brain by examining it under a microscope. Note also that I could attribute consciousness to a recording, but this makes sense only if the recording is precise enough so that I could add the "Klaras" or anything which would make it possible to continue some conversation with the system. And then I do not attribute consciousness to the physical appearance of the system, but to some people which manifests him/it/herself through it. Adding Klaras complicate the problem but the result is the same. Klaras must be programmed. Programming is like recording, a means for inserting oneself at programming time for later playback at execution time. I have already shown that Maudlin was cheating by rearranging his tape, in effect programming the tape. So I agree with you if you agree that programming the tape sequence is just a means for connecting different pieces of a conscious processes where each piece operates at different times. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. Could you elaborate. I don't understand. As a consequence of the reasoning the observer (like the knower, the feeler) will all be very important (and indeed will correspond to the hypostases (n-person pov) in the AUDA). But in the reasoning, well either we are valid going from one step to the next or not, and I don't see the relevance of your point here. I guess I miss something. I do not understand the connection with the hypostases in the AUDA. However, it is true that the conscious machine is its own observer, no matter how split its operation is. (i.e., time sharing, at different levels... etc). However, the examples will be more striking if a separate observer is introduced. Of course the separate observer will have to track the time/space/substrate/level of the machine to observe the machine to be conscious (possibly with a Turing test). Forgive me for insisting on a separate observer, but I think that a relativity approach could bear fruits. You could even get rid of the recording and replace it with random inputs (happy rays in your paper). As you can see with random inputs, the machine is not conscious to an observer anchored in the physical. The machine just appears to follow a random series of states. But if the machine can be observed to be conscious if it is observed precisely at those times when the random inputs match the counterfactual recording. So the observer needs to "open his eyes" precisely only at those times. So the observer needs to be linked in some ways to the machine being conscious. If the observer is the (self reflecting) machine itself there is no problem, the observer will automatically be conscious at those times. If the observer is not the machine, we need to invoke a mechanism that will force him to be conscious at those times. It will have to be almost identical to the machine and will have to accept the same random data So in a sense the observer will have to be a parallel machine with some possible variations as long as these variations are not large enough to make the observer and the machine exist on different time/space/substrate/level. Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious, only that it can detect if the first machine is conscious. Now once we establish that the first machine is conscious we can infer that the second machine is also conscious simply because it is identical. The example is of course a representation of our own (many)world. (**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november. Right now I am a bit over-
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 08-oct.-06, 08:00, George Levy a crit : Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of "acceptable" implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any "correct" ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The "physical" keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of "enough" possible relative manifestations. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity. I agree with all this. I would be changing the notion of physical supervenience such that the physical substrate can be split into time intervals connected by recordings. . But why stop here. We could create an example in which the substrate is maximally split, across time, space, substrate and level. On the other hand, widening the domain of supervenience (time, space, substrate and level) does not seem to eliminate the need for the physical. Here I am arguing against myself... We may solve the problem if we make supervenience recursive, i.e.. software supervening on itself without needing a physical substrate just like photons do not need Ether. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories, although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would mean the doctor has not made the right level choice. Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the physical (like thermodynamicians do not need "invisible horses pulling cars"), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice the concept of primitive matter useless. OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**) (*) Caution: in "Conscience et Mecanisme" the movie-graph argument precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD argument for eliminat
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Stathis, Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin is fallacious. A computer program equivalent to Maudlin's construction can be written as: IF (Input = -27098217872180483080234850309823740127) THEN (Output = 78972398473024802348523948518347109) ELSE Call Conscious_Subroutine ENDIF. If the input 27098217872180483080234850309823740127 is always given then the ELSE clause is never invoked. The point is that to write the above piece of code, Maudlin must go through the trouble of calculating perhaps on his hand calculator the answer 78972398473024802348523948518347109 that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced had it been called. (Notice the conditional tense indicating the counterfactual). He then inserts the answer in the IF clause at programming time. In so doing he must instantiate in his own mind and/or calculator the function of the Conscious_Subroutine for the particular case in which input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127, If the single numeral input is replaced by a function with multiple numerical inputs, Maudlin trick could be expanded by using tables to store the output and instead of using an IF statement, Maudlin could use a CASE statement. But then, Maudlin would have to fill up the whole table with the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced. In the ultimate case you could conceive of a huge table that contains all the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would ever answer to any question. This table however must be filled up. In the process of filling up the table you must instantiate all state of consciousness of the Conscious_Subroutine. Bruno, says: BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). I did not change my mind. I just believe that Maudlin's reasoning is faulty. By calculating the output Maudlin inserts himself and possibly his calculator in the conscious process. To understand the insertion of Maudlin into the consciousness of The Conscious_Subroutine, you must agree that this consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level. This Maybe is the Moral of Maudlin's Machinations...? George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-oct.-06, 21:33, George Levy a crit : Bruno, I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper. Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is available here: http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0 I will search if some free version are available elsewhere, or put a pdf-version on my web page. So I just go by what you are saying. I still stand by the spirit of what I said but I admit to be misleading in stating that Maudlin himself is part of the machine. It is not Maudlin, but Maudlin's proxy or demon, the Klaras which is now parts of the machine. Maudlin used the same trick that Maxwell used. He used a the demon or proxy to perform his (dirty) work. It seems to me that if you trace the information flow you probably can detect that Maudlin is cheating: How are the protoolympia and the Klaras defined? Maudlin is cheating ? No more than a doctor who build an artificial brain by copying an original at some level. Remember we *assume* the comp hypothesis. To design his protoolympia and the Klaras he must start with the information about the machine and the task PI. If he changes task from PI to PIprime than he has to apply a different protoolympia and different Klaras, and he has to intervene in the process! Yes but only once. Changing PI to PIprime would be another thought experiment. I don't see the relevance. I know you got the paper now. It will help in this debate. Maudlin's argument is far from convincing. BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Oops. Read: IF (Input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127) George George Levy wrote: Bruno, Stathis, Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin is fallacious. A computer program equivalent to Maudlin's construction can be written as: IF (Input = -27098217872180483080234850309823740127) THEN (Output = 78972398473024802348523948518347109) ELSE Call Conscious_Subroutine ENDIF. If the input 27098217872180483080234850309823740127 is always given then the ELSE clause is never invoked. The point is that to write the above piece of code, Maudlin must go through the trouble of calculating perhaps on his hand calculator the answer 78972398473024802348523948518347109 that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced had it been called. (Notice the conditional tense indicating the counterfactual). He then inserts the answer in the IF clause at programming time. In so doing he must instantiate in his own mind and/or calculator the function of the Conscious_Subroutine for the particular case in which input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127, If the single numeral input is replaced by a function with multiple numerical inputs, Maudlin trick could be expanded by using tables to store the output and instead of using an IF statement, Maudlin could use a CASE statement. But then, Maudlin would have to fill up the whole table with the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced. In the ultimate case you could conceive of a huge table that contains all the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would ever answer to any question. This table however must be filled up. In the process of filling up the table you must instantiate all state of consciousness of the Conscious_Subroutine. Bruno, says: BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). I did not change my mind. I just believe that Maudlin's reasoning is faulty. By calculating the output Maudlin inserts himself and possibly his calculator in the conscious process. To understand the insertion of Maudlin into the consciousness of The Conscious_Subroutine, you must agree that this consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level. This Maybe is the Moral of Maudlin's Machinations...? George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-oct.-06, 21:33, George Levy a crit : Bruno, I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper. Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is available here: http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0 I will search if some free version are available elsewhere, or put a pdf-version on my web page. So I just go by what you are saying. I still stand by the spirit of what I said but I admit to be misleading in stating that Maudlin himself is part of the machine. It is not Maudlin, but Maudlin's proxy or demon, the Klaras which is now parts of the machine. Maudlin used the same trick that Maxwell used. He used a the demon or proxy to perform his (dirty) work. It seems to me that if you trace the information flow you probably can detect that Maudlin is cheating: How are the protoolympia and the Klaras defined? Maudlin is cheating ? No more than a doctor who build an artificial brain by copying an original at some level. Remember we *assume* the comp hypothesis. To design his protoolympia and the Klaras he must start with the information about the machine and the task PI. If he changes task from PI to PIprime than he has to apply a different protoolympia and different Klaras, and he has to intervene in the process! Yes but only once. Changing PI to PIprime would be another thought experiment. I don't see the relevance. I know you got the paper now. It will help in this debate. Maudlin's argument is far from convincing. BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
List members I scanned Maudlin's paper. Thank you Russell. As I suspected I found a few questionable passages: Page417: line 14: "So the spatial sequence of the troughs need not reflect their 'computational sequence'. We may so contrive that any sequence of address lie next to each other spatially." Page 418 line 5: "The first step in our construction is to rearrange Klara's tape so that address T[0] to T[N] lie spatially in sequence, T[0] next to T[1] next to T[2], etc... How does Maudlin know how to arrange the order of the tape locations? He must run his task Pi in his head or on a calculator. Maudlin's reaches a quasi religious conclusion when he states: "Olympia has shown us a least that some other level beside the computational must be sought. But until we have found that level and until we have explicated the relationship between it and the computational structure, the belief that ...of pure computationalism will ever lead to the creation of artificial minds or the the understanding of natural ones, remains only a pious hope." Let me try to summarize: Maudlin is wrong in concluding that there must be something non-computational necessary for consciouness. Maudlin himself was the unwitting missing consciousness piece inserted in his machine at programming time i.e., the machine's consciouness spanned execution time and programming time. He himself was the unwitting missing piece when he design his tape. The correct conclusion IMHO is that consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level and in fact can span all of these just as Maudlin partially demonstrated - but you still need an implementation -- so what is left? Like the Cheshire cat, nothing except the software itself: Consistent logical links operating in a bootstrapping reflexive emergent manner. Bruno is right in applying math/logic to solve the consciousness/physical world (Mind/Body) riddle. Physics can be derived from machine psychology. George Russell Standish wrote: If I can sumarise George's summary as this: In order to generate a recording, one must physically instantiate the conscious computation. Consciousness supervenes on this, presumably. Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new machine is physically equivalent to a recording, how could consciousness supervene on it. If we want to keep supervenience, there must be something noncomputational that means the first machine is conscious, and the second not. Marchal says consciousness supervenes on neither of the physical machines, but on the abstract computation, and there is only one consciousness involved (not two). Of course, this all applies to dreaming machines, or machines hooked up to recordings of the real world. This is where I concentrate my attack on the Maudlin argument (the Multiverse argument). Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. I believe the argument is erroneous. Maudlin's argument reminds me of the fallacy in Maxwell's demon. To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task, keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself in the mechanism. so now, we don't have just the machine but we have the machine plus Maudlin. The machine is not simpler or not existent. The machine is now Maudlin! In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno is fallacious. "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism." Maudlin's argument cannot be used to state that "any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity." Thus it is not necessarily true that comp and materialism are incompatible. I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows and Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like Maxwell's demon is affecting entropy. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Solipsism unplugged
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the principle of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no reason. If something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself) with no reason for him to be in that particular way, then all other alternatives of him must also exist (the Plenitude). Hence he is not alone. Solipsism is dead. George Colin Hales wrote: This is an extract from the full work on solipsism. It is one special section written in the first person, for what else could a solipsist scientist do? I'd be interested in any comments... it paints a rather bizarre picture of science. - I, Solipsist Scientist Copyright(c) 2006. Colin Hales. All rights reserved. - I am a solipsist scientist in that I accept that my mind, which is producing the dialogue you now read, is the one and only conclusively proven mind and possibly the only mind. My mind is an image in a kind of mirror; a phenomenal mirror. The image I see and feel and smell and taste is all I have to enact my craft, my science. Modern neuroscience shows me my brain in the act of being a mirror for me. The image is what philosophy calls my phenomenal consciousness or my phenomenality. I can experiment on my own phenomenality say, by closing my eyes, which I note has a dramatic effect on my ability to do science. When I sleep dreamlessly my phenomenality is absent and when I awake the apparent external world in my mirror is consistently behaving as if it recently had me asleep in it. Yet, as a solipsist I am forced to question the actual existence of what is depicted in my mirror. It is only an image, after all, and images can be fabricated. As a solipsist I attribute this apparent external world depicted within my mirror to be the work of the 'magical fabricator'. At the same time I must find it remarkable that my phenomenality somehow, via the mysterious solution to the 'hard problem', appears to intimately connect me to an external world. I know that my sensory data (nerve signals from the peripheral nervous system that have no innate phenomenality) are used by my apparent brain to create my phenomenality. As a scientist my job is to extract and depict regularity in the appearances within my phenomenal mirror's image as scientifically justified beliefs in the form of useful, predictive generalisations. I know that when I do science what I am doing is correlating the appearances of the contents of my phenomenality. The most obvious evidence of this in any of my scientific papers is that of the 'test' subject in contrast to the 'control' subject. In the case of Newtonian dynamics I would be correlating the behaviour of a mass and the space it inhabits. All of this makes very good sense to me. Yet I am troubled. Within my mirror's image are what appear to be other scientists with brains that look the same as mine. These scientists are merely fabrications in my own mirror's image. Yet despite being mere fabrications they appear, to me, to do science on exquisitely novel things just as well as I do using my real mind. At the same time I cannot see the image in their mirror and vice versa. All report seeing only brain material. I take this as lending support to my solipsism in that I can claim their minds not to exist, which is consistent with my conviction that the external world does not exist. If I am right, and my image(mind) is the only image(mind), then their science is done without any image of their own. The 'magical fabricator' of my image goes to an amazing amount of trouble to make it appear 'as-if' the external world shown to me in my mirror does exist. The scientists within it behave 'as-if' they had the kind of mind I know I must have to do science. To be a solipsist scientist in this circumstance is to live in cooperation with this extravagant fabrication including apparent scientists as adept as myself. As a solipsist scientist, inwardly and silently I deny (remain scientifically unable to confirm) that an external world exists. But as a scientist within this apparent world I am fundamentally conflicted. To be consistent with the behaviour of all the other scientists, outwardly I am forced to act 'as-if' there was an external reality. Also, inwardly I know my mind is the only proven reality, yet to my scientist colleagues, to remain consistent I must deny my own mind as much as I deny theirs. I live in this situation of denial that I have something more than my colleagues have. I am thus doubly conflicted, for I must also act 'as-if' I have no mind, for to declare otherwise is to be inconsistent with my claims about my scientist colleagues, to whom I am identical. Yet despite this odd personal situation the system works, in a way. My scientist colleagues continue to act as-if they had minds. Their scientific lives - our lives - of appearance correlation go on as usual. The whole system
It's a mad mad mad world (was computationalism and supervenience)
If you're not sure that you are sane, then you must be crazy to say "Yes Doctor.".. ...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine. Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology. George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-aot-06, 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a crit : It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or wrong? This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of faith, in the final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement brain or not (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice). Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of comp. Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely powerful). So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital relation only. The other sticking point is, given computationalism is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have been arguments that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, Searle, Moravec) and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like me) that we have: NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. The discussion about Platonism and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular, relates to this second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and also alludes to his "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its entirety is only available in French. That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world. Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie graph. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
It's a mad mad mad world (was computationalism and supervenience)]
Slight correction: If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane, then you would have to be crazy to say "Yes Doctor.".. ...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine. Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology. George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-aot-06, 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a crit : It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or wrong? This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of faith, in the final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement brain or not (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice). Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of comp. Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely powerful). So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital relation only. The other sticking point is, given computationalism is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have been arguments that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, Searle, Moravec) and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like me) that we have: NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. The discussion about Platonism and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular, relates to this second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and also alludes to his "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its entirety is only available in French. That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world. Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie graph. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: I think, was Difficulties in communication. . .
Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell pointed out was an unsupported inference. IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I think" MUST BE THE STARTING POINT - for any conscious observer THERE IS NO OTHER OBSERVABLE STARTING POINT! Are you disputing Russell's point that "I" is a construct and "thinking" is all you have without inference? Yes. I am disputing what Russell said: "I think" IS THE ONE AND ONLY STARTING POINT for any conscious thought process. It is both an observation and an axiom. Developing the concept of "I think" in a formal mathematical fashion as Bruno is attempting to do is IMO the right way to proceed. I also believe that "I think" leads to a relative (or relativistic) TOE - probably a very extreme view. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: I think, was Difficulties in communication. . .
Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell pointed out was an unsupported inference. IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I think" MUST BE THE STARTING POINT - for any conscious observer THERE IS NO OTHER OBSERVABLE STARTING POINT! Are you disputing Russell's point that "I" is a construct and "thinking" is all you have without inference? Yes. I am disputing what Russell said: "I think" IS THE ONE AND ONLY STARTING POINT for any conscious thought process. It is both an observation and an axiom. Developing the concept of "I think" in a formal mathematical fashion as Bruno is attempting to do is IMO the right way to proceed. I also believe that "I think" leads to a relative (or relativistic) TOE - probably a very extreme view. George As I understand him, Bruno agrees with Russell that "I" is a construct or inference. I think you are right. Bruno is not as extreme as I am but I am not sure exactly where he stands. He may be non-committed or he may not know how to reconcile my viewpoint with his math. It would be nice if we could reconcile the two viewpoints!!! That's why there can be 1st-person indeterminancy. No. This is not why. In fact, first person indeterminacy probably reinforces my point. First person indeterminacy comes about because there are several links from one observer moment (could be called "I" state) to the next logical (or historically consistent) logical moment. As you can see everything hinges on the "I" states. You can view I states either as nodes or as branches depending how you define the network. Of course those logical links are emergent as figment of imagination of the "I" in an anthropy kind of way. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime? - time
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno, I spent some (!) time on speculating on 'timelessness' - Let me tell up front: I did not solve it. Hi John For example, we can conceive of a consciousness generated by a computer operating in a time share mode where the time share occur every thousand years. The important thing is that there should be a logical flow in the computation, and it really does not matter what is the time scale, the sampling, in which dimension you operate or the level of computation. (you could be operating across several levels) The only thing that matters is that each point of the computation be connected to the next one by a valid logical link, as in a network. This logical network in fact frees you from having to specify a dimension such as time or a level of computation. The logical connections (or consistent histories as Bruno calls them) in the network are in fact emergent according to the Anthropic principle. The logical links (or consistencies) exist because you are there to observe them. Just as a Rorschach test . You are making the links as you go along. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse. What you are saying above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy and the nature of 3-person. Any comments on those? I am sorry David, I have not been following all threads very closely - It would take a full time commitment to do so. Perhaps each post, especially the long ones, should be preceded by an abstract. ;-) Could you point me in the right direction? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: George Levy wrote: Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then our perceptions will be different. I understand this way of putting it. Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse. What you are saying above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy and the nature of 3-person. Any comments on those? David Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference consists of identical contingencies on their existence. I have a little bit of trouble understanding your terms: "shared knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse. One way to force your nomenclature and mine to be identical is to say that "share knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse" are completely dependent on physical laws which are completely dependent of the shared contingencies. Thus our basic thinking process is rooted in the physical objects comprising our brain. These physical objects owe their existence to our shared contingencies. Here we are developing an equivalence between mental processes and physical processes. In other words I can imagine any process that the universe is capable of supporting, and it is possible to simulate in the universe any thought process that I am capable of imagining. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: I don't even know what you mean by "first person". David Nyman wrote: Peter It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes a lot of confusion: 1) First person 1 (FP1) - the point-of-view that is directly claimed by an individual (FP1i) such as David or Peter, or what is generally meant when the word 'I' is directly uttered by such a person. 2) First person 2 (FP2) - representations of an FP1 point-of-view as modelled within members of the FP1 community. The usage of 'David' or 'Peter' in point 1) exemplifies one type of such representation, whose presumed referent is an FP1i person. Here is an explanation more grounded in Physics: The concept of "first person" comes directly from the Everett manyworlds, Schoedinger cat experiment and the quantum suicide (thought) experiment. In a quantum suicide the subject of the experiment does not see himself dying. He can only see himself continuing living along a branch of the manyworld in which his experiment went awry. His perception is first person. Witnesses to the experiment are likely to see the subject die and their point of view is third person. Thus first person and third person imply some kind of "relativity" contingent on the observer's own existence. More generally, one can assume that the laws of physics themselves are contingent on the observer -ie. the world is being destroyed every nanoseconds or faster when it diverges into MW branches not supporting life. - the only worlds we can observe are those worlds upholding those physical laws supporting life. According to this hypothesis our primary perception of the world is first person. Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own existence is contingent on our observation. Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence is not contingent on our observation. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: George Levy wrote: Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own existence is contingent on our observation. Hi George I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as: First person perception of the world comes about when our own observation and existence are mutually contingent Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then our perceptions will be different. Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence is not contingent on our observation. Now here I'm not so clear. In sum, I'm not clear what sort of observation is *not* contingent on our existence, except someone else's observation, and so far as I can see this is always first person by your definition. Do you simply mean to define any observation not involving ourselves as 'third person' from our point-of-view? Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: George Levy wrote: A conscious entity is also information. I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially "software." George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ... See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by " "exist" is true". Then we have: 1 If p thinks then p exists; This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it means that a proposition exists. I dont' really see any problem if we think of a conscious entity just like a proposition as information. Proposition p is information which can be either true or false. A conscious entity is also information. In this case, if the information is true then the entity exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two thinks. The English language is treacherous. we have to be careful when we use the word "exist." I think there are several kinds of existence. In any case to assert that the square root of two exists is assigning to the square root of two an existence independent of any observer, thereby negating the primacy of first person. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches. 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; All right with the interpretation that "p" is some entity, not a proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions? This can be done with the Fi and Wi , and it needs many cautions. Yes I am saying that machines, propositions, databases, programs, and conscious minds are different words for the same thing: information. Thus information can be true, false or unknown. 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. One of the problem lies with the "it" word as in: "if 'it' is knowable" or "If 'it' is thinkable". What or who is "it?" Here again the English or French languages can be treacherous. 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself :) The first two statements are relatively easy to understand. The first one is more or less what Descartes said. The second one is a reflective form probably necessary for consciousness. The third statement taken seriously is intringing. If entity p thinks that entity q is necessary for p's existence, then if p thinks then q thinks. In other words all necessary conditions for my own existence form a conscious entity. This is weird. It is as if I had my own personal Personal God or guardian angel. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, I like where this may be leading This may be the first step to your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it: I think therefore I am (Descartes) I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle) The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized) Let me make these statements more precise: I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my thought process) I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the burning bush in Exodus) The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is. Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." Then we have: If p thinks then p exists; If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. The phrase "it is thinkable" is undefined possibly because of third person (it?) inferencing. If we make it squarely first person then we have: If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: K the Master Set (+ partial answer to Tom's Diagonalization)
Hi Bruno Each one of us like to do what we do best and we apply our preferred techniques to the problem at hand. Thus a mechanic may solve the pollution problem by building electric cars, and the cook may solve the same problem by preparing vegetarian meals. As a mathematician you are trying to compose a theory of everything using mathematics, this is understandable, and you came up with COMP which is strongly rooted in mathematics and logic. I came up independently with my own concept involving a generalization of relativity to information theory ( my background is engineering/physics) and somehow we seem to agree on many points. Unfortunately I do not have the background and the time to give my ideas a formal background. It is just an engineering product and it feels right. I believe that what you are saying is right, however I am having some trouble following you, just like Norman Samish said. It would help if you outlined a roadmap. Then we would be able to follow the roadmap without having to stop and admire the mathematical scenery at every turn even though it is very beautiful to the initiated, I am sure. For example you could use several levels of explanation: a first level would be as if your were talking to your grandmother; a second level, talking to your kids (if they listen); a last level, talking to your colleagues. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Symmetry, Invarance and Conservation
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
Could it be that Consciousness is more
related and identifiable with the "processing" of Information than with
Information itself?
I agree that consciousness is not just information. As you say,
consciousness seems to be associated with processing of information.
However, even "processing of information" is not sufficient. For
example a computer processes information but is not conscious. There is
also a need for self referentiality.
Consider the example often raised (I do not know
the original source) of a Book that contained a "complete description"
of Einstein's Brain. It was claimed that this book was in fact
equivalent to Einstein himself even to the degree that one could "have
a conversation with Einstein" by referencing the book. (Never mind the
fact that QM's non-cummutativity of canonical conjugate observables
make it impossible for *any* classical object to be completely
specified in a way that is independent of observational frame, but I
digress...)
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/intro/notes/einstein.html
I am questioning the idea that there can be a book containing a
"complete description" of Einstein's Brain that can be "read"
independently of your frame of reference. Is the book containing a
snapshot of the brain at a particular microsecond in Einstein's life?
In this case I doubt whether this book can be called conscious.
Or is it a video book containing the whole life history of Einstein's
brain? In which case, you'll have trouble "reading" the book unless
you change your frame of reference. If you push the "play" button on
the video player all you will see is a movie of Einstein brain
INTERACTING WITH ITS ENVIRONMENT - NOT YOUR ENVIRONMENT. (This is like
a hologram. Did you know that an object seen in a hologram casts a
shadow in the environment where the hologram is created but not in the
viewing environment?) Changing your frame of reference to Einstein's
environment would be extremely difficult - you'll need a time machine.
The only "practical?" way to get a good rendition of Einstein's brain
THAT INTERACTS WITH YOUR ENVIRONMENT is to simulate it on a computer.
Then you can call it conscious.
[snip]
Could it be that the "hard Problem" of
consciousness follows inevitably from our hard-headed insistence that
the Universe is Classical ("object have definite properties in
themselves") in spite of the massive pile of unassailable evidence
otherwise? If we treat Consciousness as "what a quantum
computer(brain!)does", i.e. process qubits, instead of a classical
object, maybe, just maybe we might find the "problem" not to be so
intractably "hard"after all! ;-)
You remind me of Penrose with whom I disagree. Using the quantum
computer paradigm is like shoving the mind-body and consciousness
problem under the quantum carpet. We must first get a good
understanding of self referential systems, classical or quantum. Bruno
seems to be on the right track but I think we are still waiting for the
linkage between diagonalization and self referentiality and
consciousness... (forgive me if I have missed something in his
argument)
"The message needs no medium!" Marshall McLuhan got it all wrong! :-)
George Levy
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely unverifiable. It is unverifiable from the 3rd person perspective. From the first person perspective it is perfectly verifiable. I will not observe any changes in myself after the (brain) substitution. This is a fundamental invariance and it is another argument why the first person perspective should be the primary one and the 3rd one should be the derived one. And here again specifying the frame of reference is important to avoid confusion. George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Symmetry, Invarance and Conservation (Was Number and function for non-mathematician)
In the July 1-7 2006 edition of New Scientist there is a review of the book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by Victor Stenger. You can see here a power point presentation on symmetry by Stenger. Stenger discusses the idea of symmetry, in particular the work of Emmy Noether who proved that the conservation of energy is a direct consequence of time translation symmetry: the same result is obtained if an experiment is performed now or at a different time. Other natural laws can be traced to other symmetries: i.e., conservation of momentum to space translation symmetry etc... I think it may be valuable to express some of our ideas as symmetries/invariances/conservation/equivalence. For example the invariance/conservation of information with regard to the recording substrate is obvious. Information does not change if you transfer it from your hard drive to your floppy (ie., hardware translation symmetry.) This fact, however, may be of far reaching consequence. If one assumes that consciousness is a type of information then consciousness become independent of its physical basis: "The message is independent of the medium!" Or even better: "The message needs no medium!" Marshall McLuhan got it all wrong! :-) George Levy Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-juil.-06, 20:36, George Levy a crit : My background is more engineering and physics than mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does not carry any information. One of my old name for it was "digital mechanism hypothesis" Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an invariance, equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical) substrate?" It is more the assumption that there is a level of description of myself such that my consciousness is indeed invariant for functional digital substitution made at that level. You can invoke "physical" but then you must make the proof a bit longer. This is due to the fact that the UDA put doubt on the very meaning of the word physical, so you need to justify that the use of "physical" is harmless in the definition of comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Number and function for non-mathematician
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Norman, Le 20-juin-06, 04:04, Norman Samish a crit : I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I can understand! My background is more engineering and physics than mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does not carry any information. Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an invariance, equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical) substrate?" George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-juin-06, 07:29, George Levy a crit : In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post) Logicians, traditionally, are interested in deduction invariant with respect of the interpretation. A typical piece of logic is that: from "p q" you can infer "p". And the intended meaning of this, is that that deduction is always valid: it does not depend of the interpretations of "p" and "q". Those who remember the Kripke semantics of the modal logical systems remember perhaps that a logical theory is an invariant for the trip from world to world when accessible, making the theorems true in all (locally and currently perhaps) accessible worlds. I suggest the following invariances which are possibly identical to the above statement about Kripke semantic, but have a more "physical" point of view. They may also be related to Church's thesis: 1) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with changes in the substrate implementation : "Yes doctor" I agree that a prosthesis of part of my brain will not affect my consciousness. 2) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with the MW branching: Bruno in Washington will feel just like Bruno in Moscow except for his perception of the environment. 3) Invariance in the laws of physics with substrate implementation: simulation performed on different computers are indistinguishable if they perform the same algorithms or functions. (Note that Invariance in the laws of physics is a general relativity postulate.) 4) Invariance in the laws of physics with MW branching: This invariance may be grounded in the requirement that consciousness must require physics with consistent histories and the absence of white rabbits Notice the parallel between consciousness and the laws of physics. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. [SPK] I agree! What is an Observer? If we are to use an axiomatic formulation of a TOE then the observer should be an axiom or even "The Axiom": ala Descartes "I think" and possibly more precisely and reflexively "I think what I think" with all the implied logical meaning and/or axiomatic system: This should cut through the Gordian Knot of the mind-body problem. We'll have to refer to Bruno's work to flesh out this idea in a formal fashion. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Lee Corbin wrote: I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective, actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary differences of opinion. Interestingly the geocentric Aristotelian system was replaced by the heliocentric Copernican system. Then Relativity and Quantum Theory came along and restored the centrality of the observer with a vengence. Now the frame of reference that defines what is to be observed is not the Earth anymore but the observer himself or herself. Different observers make different observations, however the important thing is to find the invariances. In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post) In history, the 1st person experience (e.g. the stars revolve around the Earth) are always upstaged sooner or later by actual, objective data. Objective data can only be deduced after all invariances are taken into account. Until then all data is subjective. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
