Re: Losing Control
Well, then make a testable prediction about something in the mind that is not otherwise known. On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote: Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to science before hand. I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious metaphysics but not accepted as knowledge. Why? Here we have a theory of how the mind work. Then we show that it has empirical and testable consequence. In fact there is no theories more scientific than comp, I mean more testable. It says that the physical world is entirely in the head of the universal machine, in a precise and constructive sense, so we can compare that deducible physics with the observed one. Bruno On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the theory is correct or responsible, not that it is true. In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can progress. Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true. Bruno On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the big truth (about consciousness and matter) is in your head. With you = any universal machine. So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its theory of consciousness and matter. To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in her head with the empirical facts. This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well up to now. That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? ? Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.). Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine. What comes to my mind is consciousness. Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can know in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine. Bruno Richard On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received
Re: Losing Control
On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the theory is correct or responsible, not that it is true. In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can progress. Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true. Bruno On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the big truth (about consciousness and matter) is in your head. With you = any universal machine. So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its theory of consciousness and matter. To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in her head with the empirical facts. This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well up to now. That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? ? Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.). Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine. What comes to my mind is consciousness. Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can know in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine. Bruno Richard On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to science before hand. I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious metaphysics but not accepted as knowledge. On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the theory is correct or responsible, not that it is true. In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can progress. Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true. Bruno On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the big truth (about consciousness and matter) is in your head. With you = any universal machine. So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its theory of consciousness and matter. To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in her head with the empirical facts. This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well up to now. That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? ? Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.). Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine. What comes to my mind is consciousness. Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can know in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine. Bruno Richard On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Losing Control
On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the big truth (about consciousness and matter) is in your head. With you = any universal machine. So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its theory of consciousness and matter. To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in her head with the empirical facts. This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well up to now. That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? ? Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.). Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine. What comes to my mind is consciousness. Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can know in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine. Bruno Richard On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
Bruno, Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? What comes to my mind is consciousness. Richard On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 8:47:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be right every time? The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process, since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness or not. You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no statistical regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that can or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that time will be. A random or deterministic being can also be intentional. Why would some collection of unintentional activities be associated with an intentional feeling? You assert that it cannot and somewhat arrogantly proclaim that this is self-evident. Can you find any philosopher or scientist who agrees with you in this? I don't concern myself with who agrees with me. A lot of my ideas and perspectives seem to be new. I don't make assertions out of thin air as you accuse, I reason that if you follow determinism through from the prospective rather than retrospective view, then any hint of intentionality would be clearly implausible. It's a s clear as saying that in a two dimensional universe, feelings of 'volume' would be implausible. This is not a proclamation, it is recognition of an airtight condition from the outset which precludes any contrary developments. If you have no possibility of free will, then you have no possibility of dreaming of or conceiving of any possibility other than determinism - determinism itself would be inconceivable as white on white is indiscernible. So you can stop claiming that I am asserting this position arrogantly or arbitrarily, I am not asserting anything that isn't clearly required by ordinary reason. Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY MAGICALLY. Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to begin with. If this is so then it is undetectable to science. It is like saying that Gravity is due to God pushing objects together, but done in such a way that we can never know it other than through faith. It doesn't matter what gravity is due to if you yourself have voluntary control over it. Our ordinary interaction is all the evidence needed and all the evidence that could ever be possible for a universe which seems intentional/participatory on the inside and seems automatic/unintentional on the outside. They are two orthogonal aspects of the same relativistic primal condition. Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since cells would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't ever gather into a larger whole. Why couldn't cells gather into a larger whole? What about all the research on cell-cell interaction? They do, but not in the universe of your worldview. Cells could not operate as cells because they would just be dumb collections of molecules - different molecules being replaced all of the time. They could only do what is required to maintain chemical equilibrium, which would not allow the molecules in the cell to work together as a cell. To do that would require genuinely biological intention over and above molecular physics alone. It eliminates the possibility of powered flight, since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in assembling airplanes. The molecules or cells do not have a low level impulse. Your problem is that you cannot see that the whole can have properties not evident in its parts. Your problem is that you cannot see that the whole can never have properties which are not supported by its parts. If it did, it would not really be a whole, but an assembly; a machine. I repeat. If you think that my view requires non-physical magic, then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That isn't an opinion, it is a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of the universe from the start as the reflected consequences of experiences. Experience doesn't need to squeeze into some form or function, it is form and function which are
Re: Losing Control
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they were, that would be a spasm. Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. And after that they would predict the lottery numbers. Your intentions are the result of the activity in your brain. Your intentions do not cause any magical top-down effects. The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about anything other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, fingertips, and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain doesn't dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped by it. A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level seemingly magically. If it is all consistent with physics then it isn't a top-down effect. Again and again I bring this up and you say that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words. But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious somewhere after centuries of biological research? I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I have addressed your straw man many times already. I am trying to explain to you that you are contradicting yourself. If you agree that the brain functions consistently with physical laws then you have to to agree that consciousness does not directly affect brain behaviour, since there is no place for consciousness in chemical equations. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or is not important, just that it is not directly or separately or top-down causally efficacious. I think that the current scientific position is likely a kind of delusional convulsion. a post traumatic nostalgic compensation for the revelations of the 20th century. There is no such thing as probability in physics, only an appearance of such from a partially informed perspective. There is nothing any more classical about biology than there is anything else, as photosynthesis already shows quantum effects. http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/09/quantum-coherence-in-photosynthesis/ Hey, look what else has quantum effects in biology: http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/10/quantum-effects-in-ion-channels/ You do realise that quantum level effect are crucially important in the operation of the semiconductors in computers? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:57:39 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they were, that would be a spasm. Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. And after that they would predict the lottery numbers. So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be right every time? Your intentions are the result of the activity in your brain. Your intentions do not cause any magical top-down effects. The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about anything other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, fingertips, and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain doesn't dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped by it. A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level seemingly magically. You only think that because your world view is panmechanistic instead of panpsychic. Since we observe the ordinary top-down control of our own voluntary muscles and some mental capacities, the challenge is not to explain away this fact to preserve an arbitrary attachment to a particular cosmology, but to see that in fact, all that we see as being low and high level are defined by relativistic perception. Low and high are aesthetic perspectives, not objective realities. In reality, low and high can be discerned as separate in some sense and they are united in another sense. Of the two, Top-down is more important, since all bottom up processes are meaningless if a person is in a coma. If it is all consistent with physics then it isn't a top-down effect. It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way around. Again and again I bring this up and you say that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words. Seriously, that is your best argument? That I must not know what my own words mean since they don't make sense to you? It may not be your fault. I have yet to see someone with the strong panmechanistic view successfully question their own own belief, so it is entirely possible that you won't be able to do that, barring a life-changing neurological or psychological event. Rest assured that I understand precisely my own words and your words, and it is you who have not seen more than one side of the argument. But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious somewhere after centuries of biological research? I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I have addressed your straw man many times already. I am trying to explain to you that you are contradicting yourself. If you agree that the brain functions consistently with physical laws then you have to to agree that consciousness does not directly affect brain behaviour, since there is no place for consciousness in chemical equations. There doesn't need to be any place for consciousness in chemical equations, just as there doesn't need to be any place for images in the pixels or flicker rate on a video screen. When we watch TV, we watch TV programs, not pixels turning off and on. This is what the universe is made of - perceptual relativity. Existence is a false concept - relevance of sense is the universal truth. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or is not important, just that it is not directly or separately or top-down causally efficacious. Then in what sense do you claim consciousness exists? As a metaphysical ephiphenomenon which appears magically in never-never land for no conceivable
Losing Control
On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 10:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comjavascript:; wrote: Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. And after that they would predict the lottery numbers. So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be right every time? The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process, since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness or not. A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level seemingly magically. You only think that because your world view is panmechanistic instead of panpsychic. Since we observe the ordinary top-down control of our own voluntary muscles and some mental capacities, the challenge is not to explain away this fact to preserve an arbitrary attachment to a particular cosmology, but to see that in fact, all that we see as being low and high level are defined by relativistic perception. Low and high are aesthetic perspectives, not objective realities. In reality, low and high can be discerned as separate in some sense and they are united in another sense. Of the two, Top-down is more important, since all bottom up processes are meaningless if a person is in a coma. Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY MAGICALLY. If it is all consistent with physics then it isn't a top-down effect. It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way around. In the above sentence I am not claiming that physics is right, I am not claiming there is no top-down effect, I am just pointing out that IF IT IS ALL CONSISTENT WITH PHYSICS THEN IT ISN'T A TOP-DOWN EFFECT. If you disagree with this then explain how you think the brain could consistently follow the mechanistic rules of physics while at the same time breaking these mechanistic rules due to the top-down action of free will, because that is what you are saying, over and over and over. Again and again I bring this up and you say that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words. Seriously, that is your best argument? That I must not know what my own words mean since they don't make sense to you? It may not be your fault. I have yet to see someone with the strong panmechanistic view successfully question their own own belief, so it is entirely possible that you won't be able to do that, barring a life-changing neurological or psychological event. Rest assured that I understand precisely my own words and your words, and it is you who have not seen more than one side of the argument. You repeatedly contradict yourself, and when this is pointed out your response is a non sequitur, as above. I am trying to explain to you that you are contradicting yourself. If you agree that the brain functions consistently with physical laws then you have to to agree that consciousness does not directly affect brain behaviour, since there is no place for consciousness in chemical equations. There doesn't need to be any place for consciousness in chemical equations, just as there doesn't need to be any place for images in the pixels or flicker rate on a video screen. When we watch TV, we watch TV programs, not pixels turning off and on. This is what the universe is made of - perceptual relativity. Existence is a false concept - relevance of sense is the universal truth. See, non sequitur. I point out that if you are right chemistry is wrong, you respond with this. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or is not important, just that it is not directly or separately or top-down causally efficacious. Then in what sense do you claim consciousness exists? As a metaphysical ephiphenomenon which appears magically in never-never land for no conceivable purpose? Most interesting and important things in the world are epiphenomenal. There is no shame in this. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:23:06 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 10:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. And after that they would predict the lottery numbers. So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be right every time? The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process, since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness or not. You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no statistical regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that can or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that time will be. A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level seemingly magically. You only think that because your world view is panmechanistic instead of panpsychic. Since we observe the ordinary top-down control of our own voluntary muscles and some mental capacities, the challenge is not to explain away this fact to preserve an arbitrary attachment to a particular cosmology, but to see that in fact, all that we see as being low and high level are defined by relativistic perception. Low and high are aesthetic perspectives, not objective realities. In reality, low and high can be discerned as separate in some sense and they are united in another sense. Of the two, Top-down is more important, since all bottom up processes are meaningless if a person is in a coma. Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY MAGICALLY. Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to begin with. Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since cells would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't ever gather into a larger whole. It eliminates the possibility of powered flight, since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in assembling airplanes. I repeat. If you think that my view requires non-physical magic, then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That isn't an opinion, it is a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of the universe from the start as the reflected consequences of experiences. Experience doesn't need to squeeze into some form or function, it is form and function which are nothing but public categories of experience. If it is all consistent with physics then it isn't a top-down effect. It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way around. In the above sentence I am not claiming that physics is right, I am not claiming there is no top-down effect, I am just pointing out that IF IT IS ALL CONSISTENT WITH PHYSICS THEN IT ISN'T A TOP-DOWN EFFECT. If you disagree with this then explain how you think the brain could consistently follow the mechanistic rules of physics while at the same time breaking these mechanistic rules due to the top-down action of free will, because that is what you are saying, over and over and over. The same way that the keyboard allows me to send my thoughts to you, matter allows me to publicly extend my private intentions. Does the keyboard break the laws of physics? No. Does the video screen, computer, or internet break the laws of physics? No. Do I break the laws of physics? No, my public and private presence are seamless and fluidly interactive ends of the same physical-experiential process. The keyboard and screen, like the voluntary muscles of our body, exist for no other reason than to provide us with direct, voluntary access to our public environment - to control it, not just for survival, but for aesthetic preference. Again and again I bring this up and you say that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words. Seriously, that is your best argument? That I must not know what my own words mean since they don't
Re: Losing Control
On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be right every time? The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process, since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness or not. You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no statistical regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that can or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that time will be. A random or deterministic being can also be intentional. You assert that it cannot and somewhat arrogantly proclaim that this is self-evident. Can you find any philosopher or scientist who agrees with you in this? Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY MAGICALLY. Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to begin with. If this is so then it is undetectable to science. It is like saying that Gravity is due to God pushing objects together, but done in such a way that we can never know it other than through faith. Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since cells would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't ever gather into a larger whole. Why couldn't cells gather into a larger whole? What about all the research on cell-cell interaction? It eliminates the possibility of powered flight, since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in assembling airplanes. The molecules or cells do not have a low level impulse. Your problem is that you cannot see that the whole can have properties not evident in its parts. I repeat. If you think that my view requires non-physical magic, then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That isn't an opinion, it is a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of the universe from the start as the reflected consequences of experiences. Experience doesn't need to squeeze into some form or function, it is form and function which are nothing but public categories of experience. You can hold this view but it is still the case that if no apparently magical effects are observable in experiment that means there is no top-down effect from consciousness. If it is all consistent with physics then it isn't a top-down effect. It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way around. In the above sentence I am not claiming that physics is right, I am not claiming there is no top-down effect, I am just pointing out that IF IT IS ALL CONSISTENT WITH PHYSICS THEN IT ISN'T A TOP-DOWN EFFECT. If you disagree with this then explain how you think the brain could consistently follow the mechanistic rules of physics while at the same time breaking these mechanistic rules due to the top-down action of free will, because that is what you are saying, over and over and over. The same way that the keyboard allows me to send my thoughts to you, matter allows me to publicly extend my private intentions. Does the keyboard break the laws of physics? No. Does the video screen, computer, or internet break the laws of physics? No. Do I break the laws of physics? No, my public and private presence are seamless and fluidly interactive ends of the same physical-experiential process. The keyboard and screen, like the voluntary muscles of our body, exist for no other reason than to provide us with direct, voluntary access to our public environment - to control it, not just for survival, but for aesthetic preference. You are missing or deliberately avoiding the point. The keyboard would be breaking the laws of physics if the keys started moving by themselves. Similarly with the screen, computer and Internet: there is always a chain of causation behind their activity, and if this chain were broken it would appear as if the laws of physics were violated. And similarly for the brain and any biological system: there is a chain causality and if this is broken it would look like magic. See, non sequitur. I point out that if you are right chemistry is wrong, you respond with this. It appears that your new strategy is going to be to ignore all arguments and assert that you are right and I make no sense. Chemistry does not have to be wrong in order for a living
Re: Losing Control
On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they were, that would be a spasm. Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. Your intentions are the result of the activity in your brain. Your intentions do not cause any magical top-down effects. However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must be neurological events which are spontaneous according to your definition - outside the normal causal chain. Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire body and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is dead or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is intentional self-modification of causality itself. But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious somewhere after centuries of biological research? Absent this, you return to the default scientific position. The default scientific position is that particles decay after a random duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate view from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole universal principle. The current scientific position is indeed that reality is not deterministic but probabilistic, with true random events. The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics restores determinism, but from the first person perspective reality is still probabilistic. Nevertheless, events at a biological scale appear as classical. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they were, that would be a spasm. Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. Your intentions are the result of the activity in your brain. Your intentions do not cause any magical top-down effects. The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about anything other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, fingertips, and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain doesn't dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped by it. However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must be neurological events which are spontaneous according to your definition - outside the normal causal chain. Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire body and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is dead or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is intentional self-modification of causality itself. But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious somewhere after centuries of biological research? I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I have addressed your straw man many times already. All chains of causality are normalized in retrospect. Whatever changes are associated with voluntary action are the only changes necessary. It's very simple, but I can't make you see it. If you arbitrarily draw a line at physics, then biology is impossible. If you rule out technology, then human flight is impossible. These rules and partitions are fictional. Absent this, you return to the default scientific position. The default scientific position is that particles decay after a random duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate view from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole universal principle. The current scientific position is indeed that reality is not deterministic but probabilistic, with true random events. The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics restores determinism, but from the first person perspective reality is still probabilistic. Nevertheless, events at a biological scale appear as classical. I think that the current scientific position is likely a kind of delusional convulsion. a post traumatic nostalgic compensation for the revelations of the 20th century. There is no such thing as probability in physics, only an appearance of such from a partially informed perspective. There is nothing any more classical about biology than there is anything else, as photosynthesis already shows quantum effects. http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/09/quantum-coherence-in-photosynthesis/ Hey, look what else has quantum effects in biology: http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/10/quantum-effects-in-ion-channels/ Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:55:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, but spontaneously, due to my will. UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical, physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience. The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man. If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they were, that would be a spasm. However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must be neurological events which are spontaneous according to your definition - outside the normal causal chain. Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire body and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is dead or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is intentional self-modification of causality itself. Absent this, you return to the default scientific position. The default scientific position is that particles decay after a random duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate view from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole universal principle. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Yes, these posts are probably getting a bit too long. Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. As Brent pointed out, there is no way to differentiate between atoms of the same kind to tell which one, for example, will decay. But even if we could, it is a fact that the atoms in a person can come from anywhere and the person is still the same; whereas changing the configuration of the existing atoms in a person can cause drastic changes in the person. This is obvious with no more than casual observation. The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, but spontaneously, due to my will. He cites as evidence for this the fact that on a fMRI parts of the brain light up spontaneously when the subject thinks about something. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not freezes!!). No two things are identical, but they can be close enough to identical for a particular purpose. If a part in your car breaks you do not junk the whole car on the grounds that you will not be able to obtain an *identical* part. Rather, you obtain a part that is close enough - within engineering tolerance. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 10:59:35 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed. Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments. Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of particles is not conserved. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that they are identical. Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical? It does if the number of states that count toward the entropy doesn't increase when you consider interchanges. Cars obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics, elementary particles don't. If two things have exactly the same, then they are interchangeable in the sense of using it for ballast in a ship, but it doesn't make the things interchangeable in every way that can be measured, it doesn't make them interchangeable in every way that is imaginable, and it certainly does not make them identical. Just because microcosmic observations are precisely consistent does not mean that all phenomena can be explained in those terms. Identical is a myth. There is no identical. A does not = A. The A that follows the = can be distinguished from the previous A, both in the order in which they were typed and in their relation to the rest of the text. The assumption that A = A is an important idea for logic, but it does not follow that the cosmos is made of phenomena which follow that narrow expectation. If I am driving in traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on the road and be observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is that the car which I am driving is very different from every other car in the universe. If we close our eyes to the reality of subjectivity, then we can't be very surprised when we fail to see how reality could be subjective. Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that requires that the two fermions be identical. Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but experiment shows they don't. I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes. No generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated. Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as such and not mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature. You mean any generalization at all? Or any generalization that passes all empirical tests. Any generalization that makes enough sense to be useful or appreciated. Something can be true
Re: Losing Control
On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:04:50 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes jam...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Yes, these posts are probably getting a bit too long. Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. As Brent pointed out, there is no way to differentiate between atoms of the same kind to tell which one, for example, will decay. But even if we could, it is a fact that the atoms in a person can come from anywhere and the person is still the same; whereas changing the configuration of the existing atoms in a person can cause drastic changes in the person. This is obvious with no more than casual observation. You aren't an atom so you have no idea if it 'knows where its been'. They certainly seem to know a lot about where they are when they are bunched up all together. You know where you've been though, and where you've been has a profound influence on who you are, so that is a property of some part of the universe. Which part is that do you think? The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, but spontaneously, due to my will. UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical, physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience. The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man. He cites as evidence for this the fact that on a fMRI parts of the brain light up spontaneously when the subject thinks about something. That and also the fact that when I move my fingers to type, they move and letters are typed. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not freezes!!). No two things are identical, but they can be close enough to identical for a particular purpose. Exactly! That's my point. Since consciousness can have no particular purpose however, it is that which lends all purposes and cannot be simulated. If a part in your car breaks you do not junk the whole car on the grounds that you will not be able to obtain an *identical* part. Rather, you obtain a part that is close enough - within engineering tolerance. Right, but that analogy fails when you consider replacing yourself with someone who is just like you, but you won't be alive anymore. If the part is life itself, identity, awareness,
Re: Losing Control
On 4/3/2013 7:33 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Not only is the function of the artificial peptides the same, the patient also feels the same. Wouldn't you expect them to feel a bit different? How do you know? Maybe they became zombies. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, but spontaneously, due to my will. UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical, physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience. The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man. If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow deterministic or probabilistic rules. However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must be neurological events which are spontaneous according to your definition - outside the normal causal chain. Absent this, you return to the default scientific position. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed. Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments. Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of particles is not conserved. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that they are identical. Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that requires that the two fermions be identical. Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but experiment shows they don't. I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes. No generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated. Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence that there are regularities in nature and not every event is unique, replication is possible. Brent This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not freezes!!). John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed. Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments. Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of particles is not conserved. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that they are identical. Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical? If I am driving in traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on the road and be observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is that the car which I am driving is very different from every other car in the universe. If we close our eyes to the reality of subjectivity, then we can't be very surprised when we fail to see how reality could be subjective. Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that requires that the two fermions be identical. Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but experiment shows they don't. I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes. No generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated. Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as such and not mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature. If your generalization makes consciousness undetectable, then that generalization is no good for addressing consciousness, but it may very well work for all kinds of precision engineering purposes. Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence that there are regularities in nature and not every event is unique, replication is possible. But the failures of empiricism and science to bring about a sane and sustainable way of life for our species are evidence that we cannot afford to assume that regularity is the ultimate truth. Craig Brent This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not freezes!!). John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stathis, your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so here is a condensed opinion: Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means. You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just think about the fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a next one. That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed. Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments. Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of particles is not conserved. We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been covered. I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being predictably identical to its similars. The (so far) known facts are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of. We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up tomorrow - beyond our control. I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post): ...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that they are identical. Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical? It does if the number of states that count toward the entropy doesn't increase when you consider interchanges. Cars obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics, elementary particles don't. If I am driving in traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on the road and be observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is that the car which I am driving is very different from every other car in the universe. If we close our eyes to the reality of subjectivity, then we can't be very surprised when we fail to see how reality could be subjective. Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that requires that the two fermions be identical. Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but experiment shows they don't. I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes. No generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated. Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as such and not mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature. You mean any generalization at all? Or any generalization that passes all empirical tests. No generalization every needs to be nor is likely to be an exhaustive description of nature, the whole point of generalizing is to abstract away particulars. If your generalization makes consciousness undetectable, You've never provided any way to detect consciousness. I and others have proposed that the way to detect consciousness is by observing behavior - but you have rejected this saying that one would have to observe that the conscious being was produced organically by growing from a cell - which is just invoking magic. then that generalization is no good for addressing consciousness, but it may very well work for all kinds of precision engineering purposes. Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence that there are regularities in nature and not every event is unique, replication is possible. But the failures of empiricism and science to bring about a sane and
Re: Losing Control
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 5:04 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out. Because a duck's life is made of the lives of billions of duck cells, and it is a fragment of the lives of all ducks. You are looking along the wrong axis if you want to understand consciousness and feeling - it longitudinal through time, not latitudinal across space. You are expecting any set of atoms to have access to the emergent properties of all of biology, but that is not necessarily the case at all. An experience can't be built out of unconscious Legos, even if they are moving in some complex configuration. If they could, don't you think that we might see some organism evolved to exploit that? Wouldn't it be an obvious survival advantage for an organism to carve it's genetic instructions into the sea floor where any future creature could be impregnated just be scanning a their gastropod over a rock? Organisms do exploit the ability to repair and build parts, including brain parts, from inanimate components, since that is a large part of what metabolism involves. It took billions of years to evolve this mechanism. Other mechanisms that might have been useful, such as rifles to kill predators or prey from a distance, did not evolve. However, intelligent creatures evolved with the ability to make tools to do this. Intelligent creatures have also recently started making tools that synthesise the components of life, such as an arbitrary nucleotide or peptide sequence. It doesn't work that way at all though, does it? Biology only ever uses biological vehicles to carry its instruction set - literal pieces of itself as a physically present zygote - no 'information', 'configurations', of generic atoms seem to be capable of coming to life or gaining consciousness ab initio. Biological vehicles are machines that create replacement parts and copies of themselves. You are begging the question if you say they are not. For if I didn't miss anything anything out it would be a duck, right? No, I don't think it would in reality. I understand exactly why in theory most people think that it obviously would, but if I'm right about the relation of life, consciousness, and matter, trying to build a living organism from scratch with atoms will likely fail. The molecules need to have been parts of a living cell, in the same way that you can't turn an Amazon tribesman into a civil engineer without having some contact with someone who has participated in Western civilization. There has to be a willing integration of sense and motive. If you tell an Amazon tribesman that you are going to put matter together in the exact form of a jaguar he may well say that you will get a jaguar, but a tribesman from a neighbouring tribe may say no, because it will lack the jaguar spirit. You would go with the second tribesman. So perhaps the atoms in the duck I made lack the capacity of awareness. No, all atoms have the capacity for awareness...they *are* the capacity of awareness on the atomic scale. On the human level they appear atomic but natively there is only experience. The question if not whether atoms have awareness or not is a Red Herring and a straw man. The better question is why can't all atoms generate animal quality experiences. The answer to that, I think, is that it is the quality of the experience which drives the appropriate reflection as a public form. The cell is the footprint of the cellular experience through time. The animal body is the corresponding home for the animal experience. Didn't you agree at one point that all atoms of a certain kind are identical? Just as these words are the home of my intent to communicate, their arrangement is composed directly by my intention (filtered through the typos, errors, and constraints of language, grammar, keyboards and fingers, brain, etc). These words are not appearing as letters on the screen as a result of some biochemical process that happens to enjoy generating letters. There is a whole elaborate network and history of inventions which have been intentionally designed by people for this very purpose of expressing ideas. The words and letters aren't just inert vehicles, they reflect sense back to us in a different way - as the other..and that's what you are mistaking for consciousness, IMO. You're answering a different question to the one I posed. Not only is it common sense, it is also an empirical fact in biology that if you put the same matter in the same configuration you get something that functions identically, regardless of the history of the matter, and regardless of how it is put together. For example, artificial peptides function the same as natural peptides. Given that their synthesis is completely different, wouldn't you
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or consciousness occurs. You don't know that, you just assume it. It's like saying that if the right cars are placed in the right configuration around the right buildings, then New York City occurs. It may not work that way at all. You act as if we have made living organisms from scratch already. Your theory does not really add anything: what would it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property unchanged? If by essential ingredient you mean the capacity for awareness, then atoms could not 'look like' anything at all. They couldn't seem like anything, they couldn't be defined by any property that can be observed in any way. Unless I'm missing something...what do you think that things look like if nothing can possibly ever see them? I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out. For if I didn't miss anything anything out it would be a duck, right? So perhaps the atoms in the duck I made lack the capacity of awareness. How is that possible, given that all atoms ultimately came from the same source? What if I made my duck from atoms sourced from steak, which I know had the capacity for life at one point? How could I tell the difference between life-affirming atoms and other atoms? Why is there no difference in activity between natural and synthetic peptides such as insulin when used medically if the synthetic one lacks something? You make detailed pronouncements about sense and intention but you fail to propose obvious experimental tests for your ideas. A scientist tries to test his hypothesis by thinking of ways to falsify it. The person would function identically by any test but you would claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced with these unfortunate creatures? Lets say you get a call from a lawyer that your rich uncle has died and there is a video will. When you go to the reading of the will, there is a TV monitor and your relatives and behind you is a large mirror. As you watch the video of your uncle reading his will, you begin to wonder if he is actually still alive and watching everyone from behind the mirror. Maybe he looks at you and says your name, and looks at others as he reads off their ten names. He could have had a computer generate different video variations of where he looks which are played according to how the attorney fills out a seating chart on the computer. He could still be dead. Either way though, it doesn't matter whether you think he is dead or not. The reality is that he actually is dead or alive and it makes no difference whether his video convinces you one way or another. Why do you keep raising this example of videos? You interact with the image in the video, for example by asking it to raise its hand in the air. The whole zombie argument is bogus because you don't know what our actual sensitivities tell us subconsciously about other creatures. We can be fooled, but that doesn't mean that our only way of feeling that we are in the presence of another animal-level consciousness is by some kind of logical testing process. You underestimate consciousness. Logic is a much weaker epistemology than aesthetics, feeling, and intuition - even though all three of them can be misleading. Can you tell for sure if someone other than yourself is a zombie? It seems you do believe zombies are possible, since you think that passing the Turing test is no guarantee that the entity is conscious. A zombie is an entity that passes the Turing test but is not conscious. So I ask you again, how can you be sure that people other than you are not zombies? so the atoms in this artificial cell, being the same type in the same configuration, would follow the same laws of physics and behave in a similar manner. It probably will just be a dead cell. Which means you must have left something out in making the cell the way you did, which brings to mind a whole lot of experimental tests to verify this. Unless there is some essential non-physical ingredient which is missing how could it be otherwise? It's not a non-physical ingredient, it is experience through time. Experience is physical. Which brings to mind a whole lot of experimental tests to verify this. Rome itself would not have played the same role if a dust mote had got into Julius Caesar's eye, so obviously a copy of Rome would not play out the same role. You can't hold the copy to higher standards than the original. Then if a nanoscopic dust mote gets into your artificial cell then it
Losing Control
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comjavascript:; wrote: If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is important for life and consciousness. Sure. If the wrong atoms were replaced in the right arrangement the person could still have the same shaped body but they would be dead. That's beside the point though. The composition and arrangement of atoms are both important for life and consciousness, but nowhere near as important as the a priori possibility of life and consciousness in the universe. Yes, particular private experiences correspond to particular public machines, but that does not mean that public machines are themselves anything more than an experience. Unexperienced machines however, are indistinguishable from nothingness so that does not seem like a plausible source for experience. If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or consciousness occurs. Your theory does not really add anything: what would it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property unchanged? The person would function identically by any test but you would claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced with these unfortunate creatures? Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in the same configuration as an X and not get something that behaves as an X? Could you give an example of such an experiment to make this clear? Until we create a living organism from scratch, we have no reason to assume that any cell can be created externally just by expected chemical means. It may not work that way. I'm not proposing a technology, I'm proposing that as a thought experiment the atoms are configured in the form of a cell. You have said that atoms in cells follow the laws of physics, so the atoms in this artificial cell, being the same type in the same configuration, would follow the same laws of physics and behave in a similar manner. Unless there is some essential non-physical ingredient which is missing how could it be otherwise? If you built a city that is materially identical to Rome of 100AD, it will not behave as Rome of 400AD. If you put modern people who are genetically identical to the population of Rome in 100AD, that city will not replay its role in the history of the world. Rome itself would not have played the same role if a dust mote had got into Julius Caesar's eye, so obviously a copy of Rome would not play out the same role. You can't hold the copy to higher standards than the original. Two identical cars come off the assembly line, yet they cannot drive to the same exact places at the same exact time. If you start seeing the universe as a directly experienced process rather than fixed bodies in space, you might begin to see how forms and functions can only be subordinate to that which appreciates them. But if I buy a particular model of car I don't want it to drive to the same place as the prototype, I want it to have the same power, fuel efficiency, steering etc. as the prototype. That is also what would be required of a copy of a person: not that he live out exactly the same life, but that he respond to similar situations in the same way as the original. As with the car, you don't need an exhaustive list of all the situations the person will encounter in order to program this in. We are tied to a particular type of matter but all the matter is all made of the same subatomic particles and it doesn't matter which supernova the atoms were formed in. That is, the matter's history is of no significance whatsoever. The only thing of significance is the matter's type and configuration. Yet we are all made of the same nucleic acids, proteins, etc but our personal history is of tremendous significance. How do you explain this discrepancy? It's not a discrepancy. Even people who are genetically identical, or machines which are physically identical from the factory, end up different due to different personal histories. What is of no significance whatsoever is the history of the matter that went into the construction of the person or machine. Consciousness is not detectable, only the physical processes associated with consciousness are detectable. If I say move your arm, and you move it, then consciousness has been detected every bit as much as the arm's movement has been detected. No it hasn't, because you can be sure I've moved my arm but you can't see the associated consciousness no matter how much you examine me. If a machine moves its arm when you ask it to you assume it isn't conscious but in this case also you can't be sure. If the door opens due to the physical processes associated with consciousness no-one is
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:37:43 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote: *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: [mailto: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:] *On Behalf Of *Stathis Papaioannou *Sent:* Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: *Subject:* Losing Control On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is important for life and consciousness. Sure. If the wrong atoms were replaced in the right arrangement the person could still have the same shaped body but they would be dead. That's beside the point though. The composition and arrangement of atoms are both important for life and consciousness, but nowhere near as important as the a priori possibility of life and consciousness in the universe. Yes, particular private experiences correspond to particular public machines, but that does not mean that public machines are themselves anything more than an experience. Unexperienced machines however, are indistinguishable from nothingness so that does not seem like a plausible source for experience. That an environment supports living systems is certainly more important that the living systems that occur; without the former the latter does not exist. I don't see it so much as a question of living systems vs non-living systems but a biological quality of experience vs a pre-biological quality of experience. Presumably there were billions of years in the universe in which no biological processes existed, and in most of the universe overwhelmingly biology is absent. In those times and places I do not think that there was no presentation of events. I don't think that is even physically possible because for atoms to fuse and molecules to interact, there must be some capacity for those events to be defined and executed. It would be bizarre and unparsimonious if the ways that events are defined for biological organisms, through sensory-motor presentation, were not directly descended from whatever faculties were used in the pre-biotic universe for molecules to find each other, to bond, to grow crystal lattices, etc. It is easy to say that gravity and electromagnetism exist because it is a Law of Physics but ultimately that is a name for ignorance. Sightless, numb, unconscious objects have no more chance of interacting with each other than a bowling pin has of starting a family. Even the obvious sense of matter that we have of not being able to occupy the same location at the same time, or to follow a narrative continuity through time are not plausible in a dark, silent, intangible universeand if they somehow were, there could certainly be no possibility for sensation, which would be unnecessary and superfluous in this hypothetical unconscious universe, to ever even have the possibility to appear arise. So, what are the necessary and sufficient characters of an environment that it should consequently support living systems? From the local perspective, the characteristics are the anthropic ecological conditions which we expect - water, air, etc. From the absolute perspective, the environment may not be so much a matter of ideal conditions as it is of an appropriate opportunity in time. Life is about amplifying significance and enriching qualities of privacy. When the time is right for life, then the place which is most hospitable reflects that. If we wanted to get more supernatural about it, the signature of life may have to do more with a concentration of improbable conditions. Life is improbable because life is improbability itself. Consciousness and life insist on their own agenda - they intentionally control and cheat probability, so coincidences might be a good indication of escalating teleology. Folk epistemology has always maintained that kind of correlation instinctively. All science and philosophy is preceded by shamanic divination... interest in pattern recognition of coincidence and synchronicity. Watching the cycles of nature looking for signs led to all of it - agriculture, medicine, astronomy, etc. Craig If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or consciousness occurs. Your theory does not really add anything: what would it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property unchanged? The person would function identically by any test but you would claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced with these unfortunate creatures? Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in the same configuration as an X
Re: Losing Control
On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, since that is what actually happened. It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was inherently present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a page for it at t=1. Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way. Why do you think organising the matter is the thing that makes a difference? If you claim that protons, neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed from an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in the universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and 'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along with it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and ecstasy, powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory aperture ranges, etc. The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and transplants it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation of human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, sense, significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit in the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a billion years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization of primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful tool to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens. We are indeed at risk from intelligent machines smarter than us, even if they have originally been programmed to help us. As for the rest of what you said, I don't see how it answers the question of why biological but not electronic or mechanical beings can be conscious given that they are made of the same stuff with the same capacity of consciousness. If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would disagree with that. Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a human brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia' is. There are cells, molecules, folded tissues, coordinated activity on every level of description, but no Georgia, and no clue on Wednesday of where it planned Tuesday to go on Thursday. The alien would not be able to tell what your concept of Georgia was but he would be able to tell what you were actually intending to do, i.e. to drive in a southerly direction until you had reached a particular landmark. I can't fathom how you think all the cells in your body will mobilise when you decide to move your arm without this being either a chain of causation or a seemingly magical event. I know, that's the problem. You can't fathom it. Just witness it. Behold, it is happening. You type your comments as sentenceswordsletters/keystrokes, not as assemblies of twitches, grammar, and disconnected syllables. What I can't fathom is how you think that just because there is a lot of complex movement doors open without being pushed, and then say this isn't magic. You've tried to explain it but all I get is it just happens spontaneously, and it isn't magic. That does not seem an adequate explanation. It happens spontaneously because you are physically real, except not a body in public space, but as a private time in life/consciousness. The relation is like an LCD display, twisted into perpendicular polarization dynamically. It doesn't matter which end of it you twist, the result is the same. If you feel excited from an experience or thought by your choice, you produce epinephrine, if someone shoots you up with epinepherine, you feel excited and whatever experience you are having becomes an exciting experience. I'm not sure what that means, but you still haven't explained how you think doors open without following any physical law and claim this is not magic. The brain must have a certain tolerance to physical change or it wouldn't be able to work properly. Thousands of neurons can die, for example, with
Re: Losing Control
On Saturday, March 23, 2013 7:05:59 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, since that is what actually happened. It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was inherently present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a page for it at t=1. Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way. Why would it be? What does arranging have to do with the possibility of experiencing? Why do you think organising the matter is the thing that makes a difference? I don't think that. Sense organizes itself as matter in order to keep track of different experiences. If you claim that protons, neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed from an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in the universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and 'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along with it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and ecstasy, powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory aperture ranges, etc. The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and transplants it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation of human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, sense, significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit in the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a billion years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization of primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful tool to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens. We are indeed at risk from intelligent machines smarter than us, even if they have originally been programmed to help us. As for the rest of what you said, I don't see how it answers the question of why biological but not electronic or mechanical beings can be conscious given that they are made of the same stuff with the same capacity of consciousness. Consciousness is not a mechanism, it is a story of stories. Not every story is of the same quality. Matter reflects this, as we are tied to very specific kinds of matter to support our lives. The Earth is not made of food for us and almost all of the rest of the universe is not made of anything that will allow our lives to continue. This is the actual condition of our existence, and I think it deserves more consideration than any theory about what should or should not develop a human quality of consciousness. The other factor is how completely unlike living beings machines actually are. They are unlike in ways which have not diminished at all in the history of their development. The two of these clues together, combined with my understanding of consciousness as an unbroken story ruled by themes of superlative/heroic singularity, leads me to guess that there is actually a very good reason why consciousness can't come out of a can - even a monumentally sophisticated can. It has to do with symbols vs reality, and map vs territory. I have explained this over and over, but just because a stuffed animal looks like a bear to you, doesn't mean that it isn't just a nylon bag filled with styrofoam. Once you understand that the premise of consciousness as function or form is faulty, then you can see why a collection of forms is not going to tap into the history of some organism that you happen to be familiar with. If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would disagree with that. Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a human brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia' is. There are cells, molecules, folded tissues, coordinated activity on every level of
Re: Losing Control
On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If there was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there would be no logical possibility for anything like life. There isn't even a way to assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define any of the qualities of life. The universe did start with only non-living substances, which then became living. Therefore, the non-living had potential to become living. But this is a trivial statement. It is also possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you disputed. It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to say that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life unless you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that you can get real estate from a cartoon too. It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, since that is what actually happened. If you claim that protons, neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? At one level it is correct to say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience influencing the behaviour. They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in my brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to Georgia tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology, unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as well. If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would disagree with that. If this is not so and some behaviours are directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of physical causation then the observer would see something magical happening. This is the usual physical causation, but it is not a chain. It is one physical thing. My will to move my arm is the mobilization of every process, every cell, every tissue and organ that we see moving and changing. It's not magical, it's ordinary. What is magical is the idea of cells that need some physical mechanism satisfied by making my body drive to Georgia. I can't fathom how you think all the cells in your body will mobilise when you decide to move your arm without this being either a chain of causation or a seemingly magical event. You've tried to explain it but all I get is it just happens spontaneously, and it isn't magic. That does not seem an adequate explanation. Yes, although of course evolution cannot directly program a response to a joke. Evolution programs the potential for a brain, which then grows in fantastically complex ways in response to the environment. Except, in, you know, every other species on Earth, where it doesn't do much fantastic complex evolving in response to the same environment. What do you mean by this? The process is the same for every species, although different species have brains with different capabilities which will grow and respond differently. What we have as an empirical fact is that certain physical processes A, B, C are associated with experiences a, b, c. Yes. There can be no change in a without a change in A, although there can be a change in A without a change in a. No. There can be no change in A without a change in a also. The experiences may be not be personal experiences which we can be conscious of whenever we want, but they are associated with some kind of experience on some level that can be related back to our life. No, there can be a change in A without a change in a. The brain must have a certain tolerance to physical change or it wouldn't be able to work properly. Thousands of neurons can die, for example, with seemingly little or no change in cognition. On the other hand, your mind cannot change without your brain changing unless you believe in a non-physical mind which can work independently of the brain. But the desires, plans and capacities all supervene on dumb physical processes. Why do you assume so? What you think of as physical processes are linear moments added together in time. Plans and desires can spawn any number of dumb physical processes to satisfy an agenda which dumb but intentional, teleological, and sourced beyond moments of time. Plans shape time. They control the brain, which
Re: Losing Control
On Friday, March 22, 2013 4:08:10 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If there was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there would be no logical possibility for anything like life. There isn't even a way to assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define any of the qualities of life. The universe did start with only non-living substances, which then became living. Therefore, the non-living had potential to become living. But this is a trivial statement. It's not a trivial statement. It means that the non-living is only temporarily so, and that our physical model of matter is incomplete. We don't find the valence shell for the flavor of meat or the color of grass in a Carbon atom. It is also possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you disputed. It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to say that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life unless you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that you can get real estate from a cartoon too. It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, since that is what actually happened. It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was inherently present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a page for it at t=1. If you claim that protons, neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed from an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in the universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and 'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along with it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and ecstasy, powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory aperture ranges, etc. The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and transplants it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation of human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, sense, significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit in the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a billion years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization of primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful tool to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens. At one level it is correct to say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience influencing the behaviour. They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in my brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to Georgia tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology, unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as well. If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would disagree with that. Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a human brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia' is. There are cells, molecules, folded tissues, coordinated activity on every level of description, but no Georgia, and no clue on Wednesday of where it planned Tuesday to go on Thursday. If this is not so and some behaviours are directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of physical causation then the observer would see something magical happening. This is the usual physical causation, but it is not a chain. It is one physical
Re: Losing Control
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How could something non-living lead to something living? Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively saturated temporary perceptual frame. How could something non-computational could lead to something computational? Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. That is what computation is. A system for organizing experience. I'm not sure what you mean with your distinction between living and non-living, but it seems that you can get living from living, computational from non-computational and intentional from non-intentional. If you want to say that the non-living, non-computational and non-intentional already had a dormant form of the quality they were lacking then you could say that but I don't see what it adds. Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to point to complex behaviour and say in there somewhere. Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything except the brain. The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. A door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying radioisotope in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 11:42:38 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, only have the will of the programmer? What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China Brain? Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? That wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way. No, I meant if a person did the replacing of the atoms in my body. I would then have been created and programmed by that person. Would I still have free will? Would I think I had free will? No, it doesn't matter who does the programming/creating. I think what makes the difference is only whether the development is self-directed or not. Only something which discovers its own way of growing and learning would be able to recover the higher qualities of human-like free will. We can even see this in human society - heavy indoctrination and 'schooling' tends to shape individuals away from discovering their capacities for freedom. If someone has the capacity for free will inherently, then you might be able to encourage that institutionally, but it seems unlikely to be very successful in that aim overall. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 2:44:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: How could something non-living lead to something living? Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively saturated temporary perceptual frame. How could something non-computational could lead to something computational? Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. That is what computation is. A system for organizing experience. I'm not sure what you mean with your distinction between living and non-living, but it seems that you can get living from living, computational from non-computational and intentional from non-intentional. If you want to say that the non-living, non-computational and non-intentional already had a dormant form of the quality they were lacking then you could say that but I don't see what it adds. I think that the distinction is qualitative. To the inorganic world, everything is inorganic. The entire molecular level is likely blind to meta-molecular (bio-cellular) levels of simplicity. Certain molecules, through their own discovery or fate/destiny promoted themselves to a genetic sense and motive - or they were promoted--- on the lower levels, I suggest that free-will and determinism are not yet very different. Part of the promotion is the push toward differentiation. Each level of qualitative promotion more privacy more temporal caching = broader range of sensitivity frequencies higher quality of sense more strategic foresight higher quality motive = more degrees of freedom, initiative, and creativity. The key is the idea of higher octaves of simplicity - not just a sleeker design but a legitimately higher order based on larger primitives. The cell is not a collection of molecules. Molecules don't know what role they play in the cell necessarily, but the cell's experiences can now operate through molecular experiences. A new top-down conversation has begun - at least existentially new...the origin of this conversation is outside of time. It runs retro and teleo from eternity. To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of a nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with the cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 'leveled up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range of sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the half of the universe that can have a purpose). Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to point to complex behaviour and say in there somewhere. Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything except the brain. The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. That doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic transactions alone. A door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying radioisotope in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and self-entangling. If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter. I understand exactly what you think that I don't understand, but you're wasting your time. I understand your position
Re: Losing Control
On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of a nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with the cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 'leveled up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range of sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the half of the universe that can have a purpose). There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. It is also possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you disputed. Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything except the brain. The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. That doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic transactions alone. Physics will not explain to an observer your experience since only you know your experience, but it will completely explain your behaviour, since everyone can see your behaviour. At one level it is correct to say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience influencing the behaviour. If this is not so and some behaviours are directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of physical causation then the observer would see something magical happening. A door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying radioisotope in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and self-entangling. And describable by physics. Radioactive decay is a good example. It is thought to be truly random when an atom will decay, in that there is no deterministic formula that can predict this even if we know everything about the atom and its environment. It could happen in the next second, it could happen in a billion years. However, it is easy to calculate accurately what proportion a large collection of such atoms will decay; much easier than many processes that are deterministic. Deterministic does not necessarily mean predictable and random does not necessarily mean unpredictable. If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter. I understand exactly what you think that I don't understand, but you're wasting your time. I understand your position completely. Your view is that the joke is merely the decoded set of neurological patterns associated with whatever processed vibrations or collisions of the sense organs that have introduced the encoded patterns to your body. You think that, like a computer, there is a code input and an evolutionarily programmed response which generates an output. Yes, although of course evolution cannot directly program a response to a joke. Evolution programs the potential for a brain, which then grows in fantastically complex ways in response to the environment. What I am saying is that model could work in theory, but in reality, that is not at all what is happening with the nervous system or our awareness. What is happening is both simpler and more complex but you have to begin by throwing out the assumption that anything is ever decoded by the brain into an experience. There is no decoder, and none is possible. That would be like installing a flat screen TV inside an abacus, and then building eyes in the abacus to see the TV. The abacus would then have to go through this meaningless exercise of converting some of its calculations to the screen in one part of the abacus in order to receive them in another,
Re: Losing Control
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 9:06:51 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of a nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with the cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 'leveled up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range of sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the half of the universe that can have a purpose). There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If there was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there would be no logical possibility for anything like life. There isn't even a way to assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define any of the qualities of life. It is also possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you disputed. It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to say that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life unless you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that you can get real estate from a cartoon too. Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything except the brain. The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. That doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic transactions alone. Physics will not explain to an observer your experience since only you know your experience, but it will completely explain your behaviour, since everyone can see your behaviour. Only things with eyes can see my behavior. Of things that have eyes, only those things who are sized roughly larger than a cockroach and smaller than an office building are going to be able to parse my behavior as detectable. There is no such thing as everyone can see X. Likewise, our physics can only see those things which our instruments can examine, which is only things very much like the instruments themselves. Radiotelescopes don't get jokes, they don't comfort the sick, etc. At one level it is correct to say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience influencing the behaviour. They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in my brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to Georgia tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology, unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as well. If this is not so and some behaviours are directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of physical causation then the observer would see something magical happening. This is the usual physical causation, but it is not a chain. It is one physical thing. My will to move my arm is the mobilization of every process, every cell, every tissue and organ that we see moving and changing. It's not magical, it's ordinary. What is magical is the idea of cells that need some physical mechanism satisfied by making my body drive to Georgia. A door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying radioisotope in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and self-entangling. And describable by physics. Radioactive decay is a good example. It is thought to be truly random when an atom will decay, in that there is
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion through argument. If I intend to do something I do it because I want to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into the definition. I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make is that while it could be locally true that a given person could theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a dog could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the universe as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In an unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way. You say it doesn't make sense that intentional could come from unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to have an insight that other people don't have. We are talking about third person observable determinism only. Who is? We are, because this is the normal sense of determinism and I thought this is how you have been using it all along. It's possible that you don't disagree with me at all if you were not actually talking about this. The brain could be third person observable deterministic and still conscious. The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random). That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see intentions from third person. That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual sense? So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for experience. So their history is irrelevant: all the atoms in my body could be replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I would feel just the same. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 20 Mar 2013, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote: On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. You should start with the normal definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, actions that are both Intentional and unintentional. As I said there's no point in arguing with someone who contradicts himself. I would say that is the method of the scientist. To make one people contradicting himself. Then the one contradicted will change its mind and learn something ... unless it is a literary philosopher, which will repeat again and again the contradictory statements. In that case, there is no point in continuing the discussion indeed. Bruno Brent So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory- motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same, though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. -- You received this message because
Re: Losing Control
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 4:03:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion through argument. If I intend to do something I do it because I want to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into the definition. I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make is that while it could be locally true that a given person could theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a dog could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the universe as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In an unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way. You say it doesn't make sense that intentional could come from unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to have an insight that other people don't have. Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could come from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you to that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop intentions? We are talking about third person observable determinism only. Who is? We are, because this is the normal sense of determinism and I thought this is how you have been using it all along. It's possible that you don't disagree with me at all if you were not actually talking about this. Third person always appears unintentional, but it is no more of a reality than the first person experience of intention. That's what I am saying about the symmetry of private and public perceptual relativity. The universe seems intentional on the inside, unintentional on the outside. From a cosmic perspective, they are two sides of the same coin. The brain could be third person observable deterministic and still conscious. The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random). That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see intentions from third person. That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual sense? No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness which we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous change in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it would look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to those patterns. So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for experience. So their history is irrelevant: No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every atom. all the atoms in my body could be replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I would feel just the same. Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You say it doesn't make sense that intentional could come from unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to have an insight that other people don't have. Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could come from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you to that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop intentions? How could something non-living lead to something living? How could something non-computational could lead to something computational? That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual sense? No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness which we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous change in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it would look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to those patterns. Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to point to complex behaviour and say in there somewhere. So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for experience. So their history is irrelevant: No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every atom. Could you explain this? all the atoms in my body could be replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I would feel just the same. Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen. At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, only have the will of the programmer? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 7:32:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You say it doesn't make sense that intentional could come from unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to have an insight that other people don't have. Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could come from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you to that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop intentions? How could something non-living lead to something living? Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively saturated temporary perceptual frame. How could something non-computational could lead to something computational? Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. That is what computation is. A system for organizing experience. That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual sense? No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness which we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous change in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it would look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to those patterns. Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to point to complex behaviour and say in there somewhere. Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything except the brain. So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for experience. So their history is irrelevant: No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every atom. Could you explain this? It means that it isn't enough that hydrogen is shaped like we think hydrogen should be shaped, or that it reacts the way we think that it should react. What matters is that it knows how to be hydrogen - that it has a continuous history dating back to the creation of hydrogen. The atom is just one presentation of hydrogen, the deeper reality is a collection of capacities to interact with the universe - possibly to generate spacetime. all the atoms in my body could be replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I would feel just the same. Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen. At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, only have the will of the programmer? What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China Brain? Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? That wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, only have the will of the programmer? What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China Brain? Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? That wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way. No, I meant if a person did the replacing of the atoms in my body. I would then have been created and programmed by that person. Would I still have free will? Would I think I had free will? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 19.03.2013 02:05 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil. We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an alien is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! Recently I have listened to a nice talk about the search of extraterrestrial intelligence http://embryogenesisexplained.com/2013/03/the-starivore-hypothesis.html The author has mentioned two fallacies (slides 6 and 7) Artificiality-of-the-gaps and Naturality-of-the-gaps Yet, I was unable to understand his difference between artificial and natural. This is another example when there is a long discussion without an agreement on the terminology. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Monday, March 18, 2013 9:05:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil. We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an alien is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both agree, not that I agree to your terms. It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this then there is not much point in further debate. Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third person perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing. So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an alien is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both agree, not that I agree to your terms. I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 5:37:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an alien is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both agree, not that I agree to your terms. I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. You should start with the normal definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same, though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough diagram is less than a 'definition'? You should start with the normal definition Fuck that, and fuck normal. then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is the only consideration that I intend to recognize. So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient in every way. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more
Re: Losing Control
On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. You should start with the normal definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, actions that are both Intentional and unintentional. As I said there's no point in arguing with someone who contradicts himself. Brent So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same, though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 7:14:14 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. You should start with the normal definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, actions that are both Intentional and unintentional. As I said there's no point in arguing with someone who contradicts himself. All actions that we take are both intentional and unintentional to different degrees. Obviously. We can have a instinct which is highly intentional but influenced by physiological conditions which are unintentional. We can have a personal preference which is intentional but rooted in an arbitrary whim. Human intention is a multilayered, multi-level quality, not a binary distinction. Craig Brent So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension. I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could be deterministic and still be conscious. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is between a brain, a cloud and a computer. A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public representation of microbiological experiences. A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows. A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all they can do. The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. I don't see the relevance of history
Re: Losing Control
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough diagram is less than a 'definition'? You should start with the normal definition Fuck that, and fuck normal. then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is the only consideration that I intend to recognize. All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion through argument. If I intend to do something I do it because I want to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into the definition. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. We are talking about third person observable determinism only. The brain could be third person observable deterministic and still conscious. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient in every way. Perhaps they are as a matter of fact, but not as a theoretical requirement, that is the point. I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a fantastically improbably whirlwind? Because the atoms are only tokens of a history. It's like if you dropped a bunch of infants into New York City. Even if they had adult bodies, without the history of their experience, they have no way to integrate their perceptions. I'd still feel basically the same, though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. That's because you think that the universe is a place filled with objects, but I don't think that is possible. Objects are amputated experiences. So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 8:09:47 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. My terms are: Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) | | | unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional (random) | | | Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) The x axis = Impersonal I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition of intentional in the common sense does not normally include neither determined nor random. Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough diagram is less than a 'definition'? You should start with the normal definition Fuck that, and fuck normal. then show that it could be neither determined nor random. It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts their conclusion into the definition of the terms. It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is the only consideration that I intend to recognize. All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion through argument. If I intend to do something I do it because I want to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into the definition. I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make is that while it could be locally true that a given person could theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a dog could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the universe as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In an unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way. What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. We are talking about third person observable determinism only. Who is? The brain could be third person observable deterministic and still conscious. The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random). That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see intentions from third person. A computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also say without fear of contradiction that it is not actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient in every way. Perhaps they are as a matter of fact, but not as a theoretical requirement, that is the point. But the fact has to be understood before a theory can be worthwhile. I have a theory which explains the fact and it leads me to say that no assembled machine can ever have an experience which is more than the sum of its parts. I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a fantastically improbably whirlwind? Because the atoms are only tokens of a history. It's like if you dropped a bunch
Re: Losing Control
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: As I said, a common definition of control is the ability to determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the definition of free will. What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes, what determines which ones we promote to effort? There are a number of factors, including which wish is in mind due to current circumstances, the nature of competing wishes, how strong the wish is, how difficult it would be to act on the wish, what the costs and consequences of acting on the wish are, and so on. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible I would not say that free will/self-controlcontrol is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? I know exactly what I mean by free will and control but if you define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the accused works according to deterministic or random processes. I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always proposed that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which are both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an intentional process which explicitly opposes both external determination and randomness. Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be described as the polarity of randomness and determination, intentional phenomena might similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity and reactive preference. But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass judgment over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all such acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own capacity for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are random or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do feel this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their beliefs seriously. And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with theirs? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Monday, March 18, 2013 2:28:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: As I said, a common definition of control is the ability to determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the definition of free will. What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes, what determines which ones we promote to effort? There are a number of factors, including which wish is in mind due to current circumstances, the nature of competing wishes, how strong the wish is, how difficult it would be to act on the wish, what the costs and consequences of acting on the wish are, and so on. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible I would not say that free will/self-controlcontrol is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? I know exactly what I mean by free will and control but if you define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the accused works according to deterministic or random processes. I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always proposed that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which are both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an intentional process which explicitly opposes both external determination and randomness. Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be described as the polarity of randomness and determination, intentional phenomena might similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity and reactive preference. But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms of categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand and there can never be any definition beyond that experience. As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass judgment over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all such acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own capacity for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are random or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do feel this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their beliefs seriously. And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with theirs? I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, everyone will have the definition which has been determined for them by circumstance. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms of categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand and there can never be any definition beyond that experience. If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with theirs? I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, everyone will have the definition which has been determined for them by circumstance. It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this then there is not much point in further debate. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Monday, March 18, 2013 7:34:59 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms of categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand and there can never be any definition beyond that experience. If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil. And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with theirs? I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, everyone will have the definition which has been determined for them by circumstance. It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this then there is not much point in further debate. Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third person perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil. We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an alien is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this then there is not much point in further debate. Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third person perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing. So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third person perspective could not possibly be conscious? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You insist that free will is incompatible with determinism or randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. Control can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if free will is impossible. I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to control is abundantly clear. As I said, a common definition of control is the ability to determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the definition of free will. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible I would not say that free will/self-controlcontrol is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? I know exactly what I mean by free will and control but if you define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the accused works according to deterministic or random processes. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sunday, March 17, 2013 3:16:15 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You insist that free will is incompatible with determinism or randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. Control can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if free will is impossible. I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to control is abundantly clear. As I said, a common definition of control is the ability to determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the definition of free will. What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes, what determines which ones we promote to effort? Craig However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible I would not say that free will/self-controlcontrol is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? I know exactly what I mean by free will and control but if you define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the accused works according to deterministic or random processes. I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always proposed that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which are both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an intentional process which explicitly opposes both external determination and randomness. Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be described as the polarity of randomness and determination, intentional phenomena might similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity and reactive preference. As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass judgment over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all such acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own capacity for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are random or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do feel this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their beliefs seriously. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? Control can be defined less controversially than free will. I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On 16 Mar 2013, at 08:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? Control can be defined less controversially than free will. Nice! We might define free-will by self-control, perhaps. Bruno I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? Control can be defined less controversially than free will. I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Control can be defined less controversially than free will. I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? You insist that free will is incompatible with determinism or randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. Control can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if free will is impossible. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 8:54:35 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Control can be defined less controversially than free will. I control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my wishes. What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? You insist that free will is incompatible with determinism or randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. Control can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if free will is impossible. I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to control is abundantly clear. However, if you define control as incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible I would not say that free will/self-controlcontrol is incompatible from unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our discussions. Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Losing Control
What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
Apparently the legacy view negates free will. On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Friday, March 15, 2013 4:11:28 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. You persist in saying that if the components of the system are mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the way the phrase is normally used. What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Apparently the legacy view negates free will. I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their own beliefs seriously. Craig On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational beings: I think that the notion of lost control of something in an intelligent being -who think about future events in order to plan adequate actions in advance- means that he can no longer preview what will happen next, so he has no advanced plans, se has no control of the situation. Serious consequences : The mind uses analogies and semantic to compress information storage and communication. Serious means hard, severe, important, not to be dismissed. Applied to consequences, it means that it will be important to make plans to avoid them 2013/3/15 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Apparently the legacy view negates free will. I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their own beliefs seriously. Craig On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Losing Control
On Friday, March 15, 2013 8:16:37 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational beings: I think that the notion of lost control of something in an intelligent being -who think about future events in order to plan adequate actions in advance- means that he can no longer preview what will happen next, so he has no advanced plans, se has no control of the situation. I think that's a big part of it. There is still a tangible reality that I think is beneath the planning of adequate actions which has to do with an expectation of maintaining effectiveness as a participant. To have attention deficit disorder or poor impulse control are like private and public versions of the same thing - an unwillingness or inability to engage one's will and ability. We say things like 'get a grip' or 'I can handle it' - the metaphor points to manual control, the hand as means for directing our influence over nature. Of course, this is all completely over the head of reductionist physics. Control, huh? influence over nature, wha? Craig Serious consequences : The mind uses analogies and semantic to compress information storage and communication. Serious means hard, severe, important, not to be dismissed. Applied to consequences, it means that it will be important to make plans to avoid them 2013/3/15 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Apparently the legacy view negates free will. I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their own beliefs seriously. Craig On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences considered to be 'serious'? It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in particular to begin with. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
