Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

OK, This post is clearer. forget my early reply.
On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal 

On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :

On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
epistemology.

However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
evolutionary epistemology.



If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.

I don't bet or believe in solipsism.

But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See  
the

quote just below.

That is what I don't understand.

Bruno


I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
is only belief based on  conjectures.

It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"


OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8  
person points in only one of them (the "feeler, probably). Only the  
feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the  
machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living  
solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist  
doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can  
feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others  
and other things.


That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted.


It does no pressuppose anything more than the computationalist  
hypothesis. If you think it does, please tell me what.




I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time  
rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness,  
being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept  
that this is a matter of faith or not.


I agree with you, so I guess I miss something.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

The quote might be wrong, as you answer statements which are not mine.
On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:49, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




2012/10/10 Alberto G. Corona 
2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :
>
> On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>> It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.
>>
>> The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is  
made of
>> zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief  
in
>> the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will  
act
>> in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic,  
after

>> that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
>> good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
>> surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
>> epistemology.
>>
>> However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
>> autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some  
psychopaths

>> too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
>> epistemology because the are not functional enough to make  
societies

>> with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
>> evolutionary epistemology.
>
>
>
> If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.
>
> I don't bet or believe in solipsism.
>
> But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul.  
See the

> quote just below.
>
> That is what I don't understand.
>
> Bruno
>

I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
is only belief based on  conjectures.

It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"

And therefore only believing I can be a social being


I did not write "It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum". Nor do  
I agree with it or not, depending of the context. Nor do I understand  
your comment, here. You might elaborate perhaps.


Bruno






>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :
>>>
>>>
>>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
>>> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I  
have.

>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>> You mean it is a zombie?
>>>
>>> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the  
universal

>>> one.
>>> So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Alberto G. Corona]

2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal 

>
> On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>  2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>>
>>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>>  It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

 The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
 zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
 the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
 in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
 that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
 good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
 surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
 epistemology.

 However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
 autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
 too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
 epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
 with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
 evolutionary epistemology.

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.
>>>
>>> I don't bet or believe in solipsism.
>>>
>>> But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See the
>>> quote just below.
>>>
>>> That is what I don't understand.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
>> existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
>> is only belief based on  conjectures.
>>
>> It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"
>>
>
>
> OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person
> points in only one of them (the "feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that
> solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all
> different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not
> mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he
> is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non
> existence of others and other things.
>
> That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to
accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and
functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or
robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter
of faith or not.


> I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>


 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :

>
>
> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>
> But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
>
>
> ?
>
> You mean it is a zombie?
>
> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the
> universal
> one.
> So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/
>
>
>
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>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Alberto.
>>
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Alberto G. Corona]

2012/10/10 Alberto G. Corona 

> 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :
> >
> > On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> >
> >> It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.
> >>
> >> The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
> >> zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
> >> the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
> >> in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
> >> that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
> >> good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
> >> surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
> >> epistemology.
> >>
> >> However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
> >> autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
> >> too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
> >> epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
> >> with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
> >> evolutionary epistemology.
> >
> >
> >
> > If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.
> >
> > I don't bet or believe in solipsism.
> >
> > But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See the
> > quote just below.
> >
> > That is what I don't understand.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
>
> I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
> existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
> is only belief based on  conjectures.
>
> It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"
>

And therefore only believing I can be a social being

>
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
> >>> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ?
> >>>
> >>> You mean it is a zombie?
> >>>
> >>> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the
> universal
> >>> one.
> >>> So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
> >>>
> >>> Bruno
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups
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> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Alberto.
> >>
> >> --
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> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> >
> >
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>
>
> --
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>



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Re: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than"is"

[John Clark]

On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 8:12 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:


> > if you could tell me how to determine if a computer has intelligence


The same way I determine if one of my fellow human beings is intelligent,
if he beats me at a intellectual task then he's intelligent, in fact he's
more intelligent than I am at least at that task. A few people are more
intelligent than me at nearly everything, some are better at only a few
very specialized tasks and some are better than me at nothing, like people
in a coma or dead people.

> free will


What a odd sequence of ASCII characters, perhaps your keyboard had a
malfunction.

> consciousness


I detect consciousness in computers the exact same way I determine it in my
fellow human beings, I guess.  I guess that if they're behaving
intelligently then they're conscious.

  John K Clark

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Re: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than"is"

[Roger Clough]

Hi John Clark 

I have no money on this issue. I'd be very happy 
if you could tell me how to determine if a computer has
intelligence, free will, consciousness or life.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: John Clark  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-11, 13:30:44 
Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather 
than"is" 



On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:50 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 


> Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of 
> whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to 
> have an experience. ?o comp's requirement is "as if" rather than "is". 


In other words exactly precisely the same procedure you have used every hour of 
every day of every year of your waking life to determine if your fellow human 
beings are behaving "as if" they are conscious or not. 

? John K Clark 


? 

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[John Clark]

On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:50 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

>
> > Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of
> whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to
> have an experience.  So comp's requirement is "as if" rather than "is".
>

In other words exactly precisely the same procedure you have used every
hour of every day of every year of your waking life to determine if your
fellow human beings are behaving "as if" they are conscious or not.

  John K Clark

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :


On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is  
made of

zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic,  
after

that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
epistemology.

However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
evolutionary epistemology.




If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.

I don't bet or believe in solipsism.

But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See  
the

quote just below.

That is what I don't understand.

Bruno



I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
is only belief based on  conjectures.

It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"



OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8  
person points in only one of them (the "feeler, probably). Only the  
feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the  
machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living  
solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine  
(he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's  
all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things.


I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul.

Bruno











2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :



On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I  
have.



?

You mean it is a zombie?

I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the  
universal

one.
So I am not sure what you mean by soul.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Alberto G. Corona]

2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal :
>
> On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>> It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.
>>
>> The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
>> zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
>> the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
>> in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
>> that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
>> good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
>> surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
>> epistemology.
>>
>> However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
>> autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
>> too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
>> epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
>> with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
>> evolutionary epistemology.
>
>
>
> If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.
>
> I don't bet or believe in solipsism.
>
> But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See the
> quote just below.
>
> That is what I don't understand.
>
> Bruno
>

I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
is only belief based on  conjectures.

It can go no further than  "cogito ergo sum"

>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :
>>>
>>>
>>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
>>> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>> You mean it is a zombie?
>>>
>>> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal
>>> one.
>>> So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Alberto.
>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
epistemology.

However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
evolutionary epistemology.



If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.

I don't bet or believe in solipsism.

But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See  
the quote just below.


That is what I don't understand.

Bruno





2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :


On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I  
have.



?

You mean it is a zombie?

I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the  
universal

one.
So I am not sure what you mean by soul.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Alberto G. Corona]

It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
epistemology.

However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
evolutionary epistemology.



2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal :
>
> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>
> But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
>
>
> ?
>
> You mean it is a zombie?
>
> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal
> one.
> So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.


?

You mean it is a zombie?

I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the  
universal one.

So I am not sure what you mean by soul.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Oct 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Alberto G. Corona  and Bruno,

Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this.
To have a mind means that one can experience.


Hmm... Not really, with "my terminology". A mind is not enough for an  
experience. You need a soul. It is a fixed point in a transformation  
of the mind to itself. I can conceive mind without soul. But OK. It is  
a detail perhaps here.






Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared,
the best one can do is share a description of the experience.


Not really. You can share the pleasure you have about a movie, by  
describing the movie and your feeling.


But, if you know your partner very well, you can share the experience  
of the movie, partially, by going together at the movie projection.

Sharing does not necessitate communication.






If one cannot actually share another's experience,
one cannot know if they actually had an experience--
that is, that they actually have a mind.


Indeed. But even in dream we have instinctive empathy, and have good  
reason (even if *sometimes* false) to bet other people have experience.






Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem
by avoiding the issue of whether the computer
actually had an experience, only that it appeared
to have an experience.  So comp's requirement
is "as if" rather than "is".



Not at all. This is BEH-MEC (behavioral mechanism). Already STRONG-AI  
(weaker than comp) makes precise that it postulates that machine can  
be conscious, even independently of behavior. Then COMP is stronger  
that STRON AI, as it postulates that YOU are a machine, and that your  
experience (which is of course assumed to exist for the rest making  
sense) is invariant for some digital transformation.



Please try to not deform the hypothesis. Comp is a postulate in a  
theory of consciousness, experience, subjective life, etc. It is an  
axiom, or an hypothesis, or a question (quasi synomym for my purpose)  
of the cognitive science.


We have COMP ===> STRONG AI > BEH-MEC,

But none of those arrows can be reversed, logically.

Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/9/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22
Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring  
ofbottom-up sensory info



Bruno:

It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else
is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination.
But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical
properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators.
This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that
something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of
this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view?


2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal :


On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal



On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Hi Roger:

... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and  
evolutionary
psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is  
true.



Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and  
psychology
still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp  
particular
mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which  
can be

shown contradictory(*).




The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is
crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of  
perceptions
and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature  
of the

laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also
dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane  
on the

planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).


OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to  
comp at

least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the
neoplatonists already did.



I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the  
ultimate

nature or reality


Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the  
comp
frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be  
enough.
Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can  
describe
completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the  
essence of
what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or  
Peano
Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it  
put only

more mess in Platonia.




Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the  
mind

along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in
category theory between topological spaces and algebraic  
structures (as

Stephen told me and he can explain you) .


Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain 

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

[Alberto G. Corona]

That is true. To pressupose an experience of self in others is a leap
on faith based on similarity. It is duck philosophy.  What seems a
Duck, must be a Duck.  Even Hume had to limit its destructive
philosophy to avoid self destructiveness. Because there are core
beliefs that  we don´t doubt, or we can not doubt seriously because we
can´t accept that this is just a belief without acting self
destructively. That is in the first place the reason why these beliefs
exist: they must have been selected and hardcoded by evolution. That
must be the ultimate meaning of truth in evolutionary epistemology.

In the same way, a self conscious robot must have beliefs about itself
and others. he believe that he is conscious. He can not conceive
otherwise. And  their sensations must be according with this belief.
His belief can not be a boolean switch in a program. He must answer
sincerely to questions about existence, perception and so on.

But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.

2012/10/9 Roger Clough :
> Hi Alberto G. Corona  and Bruno,
>
> Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this.
> To have a mind means that one can experience.
> Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared,
> the best one can do is share a description of the experience.
> If one cannot actually share another's experience,
> one cannot know if they actually had an experience--
> that is, that they actually have a mind.
>
> Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem
> by avoiding the issue of whether the computer
> actually had an experience, only that it appeared
> to have an experience.  So comp's requirement
> is "as if" rather than "is".
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/9/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Alberto G. Corona
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22
> Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring 
> ofbottom-up sensory info
>
>
> Bruno:
>
> It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else
> is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination.
> But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical
> properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators.
> This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that
> something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of
> this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view?
>
>
> 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>> On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Roger:
>>>
>>> ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
>>> psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true.
>>>
>>>
>>> Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology
>>> still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular
>>> mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be
>>> shown contradictory(*).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is
>>> crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions
>>> and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the
>>> laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also
>>> dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the
>>> planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at
>>> least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the
>>> neoplatonists already did.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate
>>> nature or reality
>>>
>>>
>>> Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp
>>> frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough.
>>> Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe
>>> completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of
>>> what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano
>>> Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only
>>> more mess in Platonia.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind
>>> along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in
>>> category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as
>>> Stephen told me and he can explain you) .
>>>
>>>
>>> Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and
>>> matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more
>>> that matter is an iceberg tip of "reality".
>>>
>> Even if matter the tip o