Re: Copenhagen result
Wil, you raise a lot of issues here, we could end up with a long (and interesting debate). A few reactions, following your numbering. 1. we did know that it was highly likely that we¹d only get a political agreement, although it is worth noting there was always an (outside) chance that enough KP parties might say it was worth inserting new numbers into a second KP commitment period, alongside this political declartation including non-KP countries, notably the US. But this declaration is a hell of a lot weaker than many observers expected, and I¹d say was absolutely possible before the start of the Copenhagen talks. The numbers in terms of emissions reductions already on the table were (while obviously inadequate to deal with Tuvalu¹s problems or to get to a 2C overall goal) were broadly consistent enough that you could imagine a deal aroudn them even those weren¹t in the final version, although they say they¹re going to put numbers in by Feb. The US-China monitoring spat seems incomprehensible from the outside, since the US itself wants a relatively light multilateral monitoring of emissions reporting (consequently it¹s not certain that your point 4a is correct). And so on on every issue a deal seemed possible, they¹ve come up with the weakest version. 2. on legally binding. You¹re right of course that international law is weak in terms of enforcement. But you¹re wrong that many¹ Annex B countries will fail to meet their Kyoto targets the EU will get there easily enough, as will (for hot air reasons) most ex-soviet countries. NZ still has some to do but has set up a system which will mean it will buy hot air in effect. Australia and Japan aren¹t too far off. Only really Canada is way off, and I despair at the idiots in charge of the country I moved to. So the q to my mind is not about enforcement, but rather about (a) the set of expectations that the term legally binding¹ sets up amongst states that they tend to behave differently in the context of such a status to an agreement here I¹d claim that if Kyoto had just been a political declaration¹ then I can¹t see the EU having set about achieving its targets so thoroughly without the legal status (although that¹s a judgement call of course), and (b) you can¹t set up any sort of institutional arrangements such as the CDM without the legal¹ status of an agreement. And Kyoto compliance overall for the Annex B countries (they will get there collectively, canadian rubbishness being outweighed by russian hot air) has been driven by the Kyoto-CDM-EU ETS relationship, which couldn¹t have existed without a legal agreement. 3. I tend to agree on this realist¹ point, although one thing this misses is that the multilateral process has become much more focused on adapation in recent years, and there those countries (not venezuela, but the AOSIS and african states) are crucial. 4. I¹ll just raise two points here one is that the money is totally unclear on details whether it¹s additional money from states, whether its expectations of flows from offset markets (CDM or otherwise), wheher its additional to existing aid, etc. And while forest people love REDD, if it¹s included in an offset mechanism like the CDM, which it looks like it will be, this could be a disaster, taking away incentives for actual emissions reductions in the Annex I/B countries. An interesting aside here is that while in the negotiations much was being heralded for REDD, in the carbon market meetings IETA was running, there were workshops on how the hell you might make money out of a REDD project they are of the view it¹s probalby not a very cheap option. That might save us in fact. Enough for now. Mat -- Matthew Paterson École d'études politiques, Université d'Ottawa Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5 tel: +1 613 562-5800 x1716 Web site: http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/pol/eng/profdetails.asp?ID=123 And http://matpaterson.wordpress.com/ Co-editor, Global Environmental Politics: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/glep Latest books Climate capitalism: global warming and the transformation of the global economy (with Peter Newell) http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521194857 And Cultural Political Economy (edited, with Jacqueline Best) http://www.routledgepolitics.com/books/Cultural-Political-Economy-isbn978041 5489324 From: Wil Burns williamcgbu...@comcast.net Reply-To: williamcgbu...@comcast.net Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2009 07:42:53 -0800 To: 'Radoslav Dimitrov' radoslav.dimit...@uwo.ca, 'Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe' gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu Subject: RE: Copenhagen result I think amidst all of the (legitimate) gloom about the results at Copenhagen, we should emphasize a couple of things: 1. It was known well before the meeting that we were likely to only get a political declaration from Copenhagen; in many ways, I think the media hyped the final stages of the meeting as some kind of unraveling of consensus, when
RE: Copenhagen result
Hey Mat, OK, lets not bore the list too much, so Ill just briefly respond to some of these points below: Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org http://www.jiwlp.com/ http://www.jiwlp.com SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348 http://ssrn.com/author=240348 Skype ID: Wil.Burns From: Matthew Paterson [mailto:mpate...@uottawa.ca] Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 8:33 AM To: williamcgbu...@comcast.net; 'Radoslav Dimitrov'; 'Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe' Subject: Re: Copenhagen result Wil, you raise a lot of issues here, we could end up with a long (and interesting debate). A few reactions, following your numbering. 1. we did know that it was highly likely that wed only get a political agreement, although it is worth noting there was always an (outside) chance that enough KP parties might say it was worth inserting new numbers into a second KP commitment period, alongside this political declartation including non-KP countries, notably the US. But this declaration is a hell of a lot weaker than many observers expected, and Id say was absolutely possible before the start of the Copenhagen talks. The numbers in terms of emissions reductions already on the table were (while obviously inadequate to deal with Tuvalus problems or to get to a 2C overall goal) were broadly consistent enough that you could imagine a deal aroudn them even those werent in the final version, although they say theyre going to put numbers in by Feb. The US-China monitoring spat seems incomprehensible from the outside, since the US itself wants a relatively light multilateral monitoring of emissions reporting (consequently its not certain that your point 4a is correct). And so on on every issue a deal seemed possible, theyve come up with the weakest version. · I would suggest many observers were a bit pie in the sky. One of the reasons that I decided to set out Copenhagen is that there were a tremendous number of signs from the U.S., China, and India in the month heading into Copenhagen that the process was going to generate a fairly weak agreement. As to the emissions pledges, theres a big difference between folks making pledges and being willing at this point to lock into them in a legal framework. 2. on legally binding. Youre right of course that international law is weak in terms of enforcement. But youre wrong that many Annex B countries will fail to meet their Kyoto targets the EU will get there easily enough, as will (for hot air reasons) most ex-soviet countries. NZ still has some to do but has set up a system which will mean it will buy hot air in effect. Australia and Japan arent too far off. Only really Canada is way off, and I despair at the idiots in charge of the country I moved to. So the q to my mind is not about enforcement, but rather about (a) the set of expectations that the term legally binding sets up amongst states that they tend to behave differently in the context of such a status to an agreement here Id claim that if Kyoto had just been a political declaration then I cant see the EU having set about achieving its targets so thoroughly without the legal status (although thats a judgement call of course), and (b) you cant set up any sort of institutional arrangements such as the CDM without the legal status of an agreement. And Kyoto compliance overall for the Annex B countries (they will get there collectively, canadian rubbishness being outweighed by russian hot air) has been driven by the Kyoto-CDM-EU ETS relationship, which couldnt have existed without a legal agreement. · The EU is only meeting its targets because the expansion, which brought in a lot of former Soviet entities whose economies (and thus emissions) collapsed in the 1990s and early twenty first century. Peel them away and you have a large number of EU states (Italy, Austria, Ireland) who arent going to make it (some by very large margins), and even purported stalwarts in the process e.g. the UK largely will meet their commitments because of exogenous factors, like shutting down large swaths of the coal industry. Until the recession, UK emissions, for example, were rising at levels clearly not in line with the KP; · You could certainly set up mechanisms like the CDM (which, incidentally, has produced almost nothing in terms of emissions reductions, and has wrought things like the HCFC scandals in China that may have resulted in a net negative impact on the environment) without KP, through bilateral agreements, so at least in terms of multilateral agreements, I dont think so. And again, the flexible mechanisms may be a poor rationale for binding international agreements; · If we get to the KP target through hot air,
RE: Copenhagen result
I take Wil's "exogenous" comment to mean that the bulk of UK emissions reductions would have occured in the absence of Kyoto. From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu on behalf of Henrik SelinSent: Sun 12/20/2009 1:11 PMTo: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.eduSubject: RE: Copenhagen result 2. on legally binding. Youre right of course that international law is weak in terms of enforcement. But youre wrong that many Annex B countries will fail to meet their Kyoto targets the EU will get there easily enough, as will (for hot air reasons) most ex-soviet countries. NZ still has some to do but has set up a system which will mean it will buy hot air in effect. Australia and Japan arent too far off. Only really Canada is way off, and I despair at the idiots in charge of the country I moved to. So the q to my mind is not about enforcement, but rather about (a) the set of expectations that the term legally binding sets up amongst states that they tend to behave differently in the context of such a status to an agreement here Id claim that if Kyoto had just been a political declaration then I cant see the EU having set about achieving its targets so thoroughly without the legal status (although thats a judgement call of course), and (b) you cant set up any sort of institutional arrangements such as the CDM without the legal status of an agreement. And Kyoto compliance overall for the Annex B countries (they will get there collectively, canadian rubbishness being outweighed by russian hot air) has been driven by the Kyoto-CDM-EU ETS relationship, which couldnt have existed without a legal agreement. · The EU is only meeting its targets because the expansion, which brought in a lot of former Soviet entities whose economies (and thus emissions) collapsed in the 1990s and early twenty first century. Peel them away and you have a large number of EU states (Italy, Austria, Ireland) who arent going to make it (some by very large margins), and even purported stalwarts in the process e.g. the UK largely will meet their commitments because of exogenous factors, like shutting down large swaths of the coal industry. Until the recession, UK emissions, for example, were rising at levels clearly not in line with the KP;· You could certainly set up mechanisms like the CDM (which, incidentally, has produced almost nothing in terms of emissions reductions, and has wrought things like the HCFC scandals in China that may have resulted in a net negative impact on the environment) without KP, through bilateral agreements, so at least in terms of multilateral agreements, I dont think so. And again, the flexible mechanisms may be a poor rationale for binding international agreements;· If we get to the KP target through hot air, the agreement is indeed a chimera, and while you might be able to fool the public, you cant fool the atmosphere.I dont want to come across as an EU apologist here, but I think a few things should be pointed out. First, the EU Kyoto target is EU-15 and that has not changed with any subsequent enlargement. The EU-15 is still the EU-15. As such, the EU Kyoto target is separate from any gains that the EU-27 may have made since 1990 as a result of bringing in countries going through economic and industrial reconstruction. The fact that the EU-15 member states are on track collectively to meet their Kyoto target is not a result of enlargement (but you are absolutely right in your criticism of some individual EU-15 countries not doing their fair share). Second, so what if the UK is meeting its target in large part to switching away from coal; is that not something we want to see on a larger scale globally? How is that an "exogenous factor"?Cheers,Henrik
Re: Climategate Impacts
entists surveyed conclude that..." will be a trump card in political debates. Related to this issue, I was wondering what the listserv folks think of this recent editorial: http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-sarewitzthernstrom16-2009dec16,0,952168,print.story From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu on behalf of Susanne Moser Sent: Sun 12/20/2009 2:22 PM To: Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe Subject: Re: Climategate Impacts This strikes me as an interesting thing to pursue a bit. So, let's take quick stock: For years, scientists were the most trusted regarding climate change, although overall shrinking, especially among some audiences. There always has been and is more so now a deep partisan divide over trust in scientists (I actually think there is also a class divide here, but that's for another day). By comparison anyway, the media, NGOs, industry or government have all had lower ratings of trust. Second, scientists have been widely criticized for their slow response to the hacked email (I really think it's wrong that we perpetuate the misguided allusion to Watergate, so I don't), which has given this entire affair a double whammy: exposure of emails that could easily be and have, of course, been terribly, savagely misinterpreted (though NO wrong-doing has actually been found, let's recall!) AND the completely lame, politically naive response of the wider scientific community. Consequently drum roll please... the curtain rises for rightwing media publicly slaughtering scientists and the science of global warming (which was, let's recall, already prior to the hacked emails on the downturn for a variety of reasons), and now this unsurprising polling result. Duh! What - is my question here - can be done? Who is left to be trusted as messengers for climate change? Do we now depend on Mother Nature as the most immediate, un-media-ted "witness" to tell us her truth? Or is there someone else to fill the gaping hole? As we know from hazards and other studies, trust, once lost, is VERY hard to rebuild. If we lose the weakly, but still (relatively) most trusted messenger, and only untrusted ones remain - who is left to speak for climate change? Thanks for indulging me. Susi Wallace, Richard wrote: Lovely. The poll is a blunt instrument to be sure, but let’s hope public disaffection with the climate debate and resulting distrust of “scientists on the environment” doesn’t bleed into other areas, like biodiversity, deforestation, transboundary pollution, etc. Worth watching, anyway. Rich -- Richard L. Wallace, Ph.D. Associate Professor Environmental Studies Program Ursinus College P.O. Box 1000 Collegeville, PA 19426 (610) 409-3730 (610) 409-3660 fax rwall...@ursinus.edu mailto:rwall...@ursinus.edu *From:* owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] *On Behalf Of *Wil Burns *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2009 12:48 PM *To:* envlawprofess...@lists.uoregon.edu; 'Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe' *Subject:* Climategate Impacts Ooops… scientists getting hit…a new Washington Post-ABC News poll after “climategate.” Scientists “significantly” losing credibility with the public: “Scientists themselves also come in for more negative assessments in the poll, with four in 10 Americans now saying that they place little or no trust in what scientists have to say about the environment. That’s up significantly in recent years. About 58 percent of Republicans now put little or no faith in scientists on the subject, double the number saying so in April 2007. Over this time frame, distrust among independents bumped up from 24 to 40 percent, while Democrats changed only marginally. Among seniors, the number of skeptics more than doubled, to 51 percent.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR200912182.html * * * * * * *Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief*** */Journal of International Wildlife Law Policy/*** *1702 Arlington Blvd.*** *El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA* *Ph: 650.281.9126* *Fax: 510.779.5361* *ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org*** *http://www.jiwlp.com http://www.jiwlp.com/* *SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348* *Skype ID: Wil.Burns* __ Information from ESET Smart Security, version of virus signature database 4704 (20091220) __ The message was checked by ESET Smart Security. http://www.eset.com -- ~~ Susanne C. Moser, Ph.D. Director, Principal Scientist Research Associate Susanne Moser Research Consulting Institute
RE: Copenhagen result
Hi Henrik, You're quite right that I was pretty inarticulate in using the term exogenous. What I meant to say was that the shutdown of the UK coal industry was largely related to non-energy policy considerations, so not really driven by considerations of its legal obligations under the UNFCCC or the KP (which I believe was the locus of my discussion with Mat) and at this point, the UK is not performing that well, so I have some serious questions about the viability of the legally binding KP in terms of how much it is driving domestic decision-making. wil Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org http://www.jiwlp.com/ http://www.jiwlp.com SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348 http://ssrn.com/author=240348 Skype ID: Wil.Burns From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Henrik Selin Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 10:11 AM To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu Subject: RE: Copenhagen result 2. on legally binding. You're right of course that international law is weak in terms of enforcement. But you're wrong that 'many' Annex B countries will fail to meet their Kyoto targets - the EU will get there easily enough, as will (for hot air reasons) most ex-soviet countries. NZ still has some to do but has set up a system which will mean it will buy hot air in effect. Australia and Japan aren't too far off. Only really Canada is way off, and I despair at the idiots in charge of the country I moved to. So the q to my mind is not about enforcement, but rather about (a) the set of expectations that the term 'legally binding' sets up amongst states - that they tend to behave differently in the context of such a status to an agreement - here I'd claim that if Kyoto had just been a 'political declaration' then I can't see the EU having set about achieving its targets so thoroughly without the legal status (although that's a judgement call of course), and (b) you can't set up any sort of institutional arrangements such as the CDM without the 'legal' status of an agreement. And Kyoto compliance overall for the Annex B countries (they will get there collectively, canadian rubbishness being outweighed by russian hot air) has been driven by the Kyoto-CDM-EU ETS relationship, which couldn't have existed without a legal agreement. . The EU is only meeting its targets because the expansion, which brought in a lot of former Soviet entities whose economies (and thus emissions) collapsed in the 1990s and early twenty first century. Peel them away and you have a large number of EU states (Italy, Austria, Ireland) who aren't going to make it (some by very large margins), and even purported stalwarts in the process e.g. the UK largely will meet their commitments because of exogenous factors, like shutting down large swaths of the coal industry. Until the recession, UK emissions, for example, were rising at levels clearly not in line with the KP; . You could certainly set up mechanisms like the CDM (which, incidentally, has produced almost nothing in terms of emissions reductions, and has wrought things like the HCFC scandals in China that may have resulted in a net negative impact on the environment) without KP, through bilateral agreements, so at least in terms of multilateral agreements, I don't think so. And again, the flexible mechanisms may be a poor rationale for binding international agreements; . If we get to the KP target through hot air, the agreement is indeed a chimera, and while you might be able to fool the public, you can't fool the atmosphere. I don't want to come across as an EU apologist here, but I think a few things should be pointed out. First, the EU Kyoto target is EU-15 and that has not changed with any subsequent enlargement. The EU-15 is still the EU-15. As such, the EU Kyoto target is separate from any gains that the EU-27 may have made since 1990 as a result of bringing in countries going through economic and industrial reconstruction. The fact that the EU-15 member states are on track collectively to meet their Kyoto target is not a result of enlargement (but you are absolutely right in your criticism of some individual EU-15 countries not doing their fair share). Second, so what if the UK is meeting its target in large part to switching away from coal; is that not something we want to see on a larger scale globally? How is that an exogenous factor? Cheers, Henrik
RE: Climategate Impacts
And isn't it fascinating that the skeptics can publish petitions of scientists (virtually none of whom are climatologists) that also includes the names of some of the Spice Girls and the public's faith in science doesn't budge, but this incident .. But I guess the skeptics couldn't lose even if their often unethical actions resulted in less faith in science, because the default would be to not act . Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org http://www.jiwlp.com/ http://www.jiwlp.com SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348 http://ssrn.com/author=240348 Skype ID: Wil.Burns From: Wallace, Richard [mailto:rwall...@ursinus.edu] Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 10:13 AM To: williamcgbu...@comcast.net; Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe Subject: RE: Climategate Impacts Lovely. The poll is a blunt instrument to be sure, but let's hope public disaffection with the climate debate and resulting distrust of scientists on the environment doesn't bleed into other areas, like biodiversity, deforestation, transboundary pollution, etc. Worth watching, anyway. Rich -- Richard L. Wallace, Ph.D. Associate Professor Environmental Studies Program Ursinus College P.O. Box 1000 Collegeville, PA 19426 (610) 409-3730 (610) 409-3660 fax rwall...@ursinus.edu From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Wil Burns Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 12:48 PM To: envlawprofess...@lists.uoregon.edu; 'Global Environmental Politics Education ListServe' Subject: Climategate Impacts Ooops. scientists getting hit.a new Washington Post-ABC News poll after climategate. Scientists significantly losing credibility with the public: Scientists themselves also come in for more negative assessments in the poll, with four in 10 Americans now saying that they place little or no trust in what scientists have to say about the environment. That's up significantly in recent years. About 58 percent of Republicans now put little or no faith in scientists on the subject, double the number saying so in April 2007. Over this time frame, distrust among independents bumped up from 24 to 40 percent, while Democrats changed only marginally. Among seniors, the number of skeptics more than doubled, to 51 percent. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121800 002.html Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 mailto:ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org ji...@internationalwildlifelaw.org http://www.jiwlp.com/ http://www.jiwlp.com SSRN site (selected publications): http://ssrn.com/author=240348 Skype ID: Wil.Burns
RE: Copenhagen result
I'm in the middle of editing the ENB summary on this crazy meeting, but I'll take a minute to respond. See my comments below. Pam Pamela S. Chasek, Ph.D. Executive Editor, Earth Negotiations Bulletin IISD Reporting Services 300 East 56th Street #11A New York, NY 10022 USA Tel: +1 212-888-2737- Fax: +1 646 219 0955 E-mail: p...@iisd.org International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) www.iisd.org IISD Reporting Services - Earth Negotiations Bulletin www.iisd.ca Subscribe for free to our publications http://www.iisd.ca/email/subscribe.htm -Original Message- From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Lorraine Elliott Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 9:01 PM To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu Subject: Re: Copenhagen result Hi all A few quick questions in finding one's way through the Accord - surely some of the most garbled syntax adopted at an international negotiation? While the 2 degrees celsius number is mentioned at least twice, as I read it there isn't actually a /formal /commitment to that as a stabilization target. PAM: No, as I understand it, there is no formal commitment. Furthermore, since countries will be able to indicate whether they want to be associated with this or not, it has even less meaning. And it was only taken note of by the COP -- not adopted. Article 5 is rather confusing but it seems to say that mitigation actions by non-Annex I parties will be subject to their own MRV processes unless they are seeking 'international support' in which case they will be subject to the same international MRV as for Annex I parties. Have I read this correctly? PAM: As I understand it, if they receive international support for their mitigation actions, they will be subject to international MRV. If no support is provided (think China), then they will do their own domestic MRV. Clarification on article 8 - $100 billion by 2020 of which $30 billion should be forthcoming in the period 2010-12, yes? PAM: Actually it says $100 billion a year by 2020. Appendix I - on emissions targets for Annex I parties by 2020, also includes a column for base year. Does this mean that countries can set their own base year rather than being tied to the 1990 levels in the KP? PAM: Yes, Annex I parties can set their own, as I understand it. Cheers (or not as the case may be) Lorraine -- Dr Lorraine Elliott Senior Fellow in International Relations Department of International Relations Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA t: +61 2 6125 0589 f: +61 2 6125 8010 e: lorraine.elli...@anu.edu.au http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/admin/elliott.php http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/tec
Re: Copenhagen result
Pam Thanks for this ... and particularly for pointing out my error in not seeing the 'a year' for the USD100 billion by 2020. Much appreciated. L Chasek wrote: I'm in the middle of editing the ENB summary on this crazy meeting, but I'll take a minute to respond. See my comments below. Pam Pamela S. Chasek, Ph.D. Executive Editor, Earth Negotiations Bulletin IISD Reporting Services 300 East 56th Street #11A New York, NY 10022 USA Tel: +1 212-888-2737- Fax: +1 646 219 0955 E-mail: p...@iisd.org International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) www.iisd.org IISD Reporting Services - Earth Negotiations Bulletin www.iisd.ca Subscribe for free to our publications http://www.iisd.ca/email/subscribe.htm -Original Message- From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto:owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Lorraine Elliott Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 9:01 PM To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu Subject: Re: Copenhagen result Hi all A few quick questions in finding one's way through the Accord - surely some of the most garbled syntax adopted at an international negotiation? While the 2 degrees celsius number is mentioned at least twice, as I read it there isn't actually a /formal /commitment to that as a stabilization target. PAM: No, as I understand it, there is no formal commitment. Furthermore, since countries will be able to indicate whether they want to be associated with this or not, it has even less meaning. And it was only taken note of by the COP -- not adopted. Article 5 is rather confusing but it seems to say that mitigation actions by non-Annex I parties will be subject to their own MRV processes unless they are seeking 'international support' in which case they will be subject to the same international MRV as for Annex I parties. Have I read this correctly? PAM: As I understand it, if they receive international support for their mitigation actions, they will be subject to international MRV. If no support is provided (think China), then they will do their own domestic MRV. Clarification on article 8 - $100 billion by 2020 of which $30 billion should be forthcoming in the period 2010-12, yes? PAM: Actually it says $100 billion a year by 2020. Appendix I - on emissions targets for Annex I parties by 2020, also includes a column for base year. Does this mean that countries can set their own base year rather than being tied to the 1990 levels in the KP? PAM: Yes, Annex I parties can set their own, as I understand it. Cheers (or not as the case may be) Lorraine -- Dr Lorraine Elliott Senior Fellow in International Relations Department of International Relations Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA t: +61 2 6125 0589 f: +61 2 6125 8010 e: lorraine.elli...@anu.edu.au http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/admin/elliott.php http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/tec
Re: Copenhagen result
Pam, Lorraine and others, Just one clarification. Article 5 does indeed say that supported actions by non Annex 1 parties alone are subject to international MRV, but it is important to note the additional sentence: Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. This sentence implies that non-supported mitigation actions, while not subject to international MRV, will be communicated to the Parties and while be subject to consultation and analysis. This is compromise text short of international MRV, but which goes beyond many developing countries' demands that these be entirely off limits for international scrutiny. THis was a huge stumbling block to a deal and is one of the 2-3 biggest political redlines here in India. The text only really partially fixes the problem since the devil will lie in the details of consultation and analysis. But it does enable the Parties to park the issue and move on. For those interested the WSJ website has the text along with commentary by three observers: a WWF rep, someone from the American Chamber of Commerce, and myself as a developing country voice. Unsurprisingly, we all perform true to type in our reading of the text. Thanks, Navroz. On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 7:45 AM, Pam Chasek p...@iisd.org wrote: I'm in the middle of editing the ENB summary on this crazy meeting, but I'll take a minute to respond. See my comments below. Pam Pamela S. Chasek, Ph.D. Executive Editor, Earth Negotiations Bulletin IISD Reporting Services 300 East 56th Street #11A New York, NY 10022 USA Tel: +1 212-888-2737- Fax: +1 646 219 0955 E-mail: p...@iisd.org International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) www.iisd.org IISD Reporting Services - Earth Negotiations Bulletin www.iisd.ca Subscribe for free to our publications http://www.iisd.ca/email/subscribe.htm -Original Message- From: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu [mailto: owner-gep...@listserve1.allegheny.edu] On Behalf Of Lorraine Elliott Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 9:01 PM To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu Subject: Re: Copenhagen result Hi all A few quick questions in finding one's way through the Accord - surely some of the most garbled syntax adopted at an international negotiation? While the 2 degrees celsius number is mentioned at least twice, as I read it there isn't actually a /formal /commitment to that as a stabilization target. PAM: No, as I understand it, there is no formal commitment. Furthermore, since countries will be able to indicate whether they want to be associated with this or not, it has even less meaning. And it was only taken note of by the COP -- not adopted. Article 5 is rather confusing but it seems to say that mitigation actions by non-Annex I parties will be subject to their own MRV processes unless they are seeking 'international support' in which case they will be subject to the same international MRV as for Annex I parties. Have I read this correctly? PAM: As I understand it, if they receive international support for their mitigation actions, they will be subject to international MRV. If no support is provided (think China), then they will do their own domestic MRV. Clarification on article 8 - $100 billion by 2020 of which $30 billion should be forthcoming in the period 2010-12, yes? PAM: Actually it says $100 billion a year by 2020. Appendix I - on emissions targets for Annex I parties by 2020, also includes a column for base year. Does this mean that countries can set their own base year rather than being tied to the 1990 levels in the KP? PAM: Yes, Annex I parties can set their own, as I understand it. Cheers (or not as the case may be) Lorraine -- Dr Lorraine Elliott Senior Fellow in International Relations Department of International Relations Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA t: +61 2 6125 0589 f: +61 2 6125 8010 e: lorraine.elli...@anu.edu.au http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/admin/elliott.php http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/tec -- Navroz K. Dubash Senior Fellow Centre for Policy Research Dharma Marg Chanakyapuri New Delhi 110 021 India Tel: +91-11-2611-5273/74/75/76 Fax: +91-11-2687-2746 Email: ndub...@gmail.com www.cprindia.org
