Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jonathan Wilkes]

On 07/09/2013 02:33 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:

Jonathan Wilkes:

On 07/09/2013 10:29 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:

Patrick Mylund Nielsen:

On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:


On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:

If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that

people

You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?

And http://dee.su/cables ?



No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with
multiparty
communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.


While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
protocol.

Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
client.

Email for someone that doesn't already have it:
1. Turn on _any_ computer.
2. Load up _any_ OS.


Here I went overboard-- of course there are all kinds of computers and 
OSes that don't run modern browsers.  I'm just thinking of the most 
common modern devices, like what someone brings into a coffee house or 
uses on public transit to send and receive messages.



3. Run _any_ browser.
4. Go to www.gmail.com.
5. Sign up.
6. Send a message to b...@wherever.com, whose email address you recall
from memory.


You are hilariously oversimplifying the problem.


No, it's just that signing up for Gmail for people who are ignorant 
about the consequences to society of communicating insecurely over the 
internet is frighteningly simple.  If you walk into a coffee house and 
look at the setup people have on their smartphones, tablets, and 
laptops, it's probably some form of leaving messages on a centralized 
service and accessing through a client or smartphone app; that way they 
don't have to worry about syncing, and setting up a new device is as 
easy as entering a human readable login and a password into an app and 
voila.  Very few of those devices even have a usb connection and are 
locked down to the point where you couldn't even boot into a secure 
GNU/Linux distribution if you wanted to, so Cables is a nonstarter.


I'm not proposing Gmail as a solution to "the problem"-- I'm saying your 
statement that using Cables is as easy as using email-- even on a 
machine where it's easy to install-- is not accurate.  At the very least 
your statement ignores the problem of human unreadable addresses and 
only applies to uses of email where the messages reside on a single 
machine of the user that isn't accessible easily from other devices.  
That isn't the most usable form of sending messages insecurely so it 
isn't fair to compare it to the most usable form of sending messages 
securely.  Put another way: the easiest way of using email is less of a 
hassle than the easiest way of using Cables.  I think it's important to 
state that clearly, as well as say that using Cables is as easy as using 
encrypted email (in which case Cables would be superior as it has lots 
of features which sending end-to-end encrypted messages over a 
centralized email service would not).


As far as "the problem": yes, my use of a centralized service is a 
problem and I'd like to rectify it.



  How did you find
b...@wherever.com's address exactly? And while many people use email with
a web browser, surely you don't suggest that people don't use heavy
email clients (gmail app, thunderbird, outlook, applemail, claws, etc)?


What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?

This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.

Roughly I think this is correct:

0. Download https://www.dee.su/liberte
1. Boot any modern computer with the usb disk inserted
2. launch Claws email client
3) write message to bob's cable address and press send


Thanks, I'll try out that setup.

-Jonathan



If you have a supported platform, you can skip 0-2 and replace it with
'install cables' - as one might install a modern browser.

If you're going to say that using Gmail easily happens in any browser on
any OS, I guess I'd tend to disagree.

If we add "securely" into the picture, I guess I'd just laugh and laugh
and laugh. Sadly. It is really a bummer that PRISM exists and that
Google appears to be under the boot of that system. Though accessing
Gmail with Chrome is clearly better than any other choice!

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech



--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Stability in truly "Democratic" decision systems

[Peter Lindener]

Doug C.-

   You steer the conversation in interesting directions, I take it you meant
This:  http://worldteacher.faithweb.com/sociocracy.htm

   The Quakers do seem to have there act together   it's interesting
that you might want to start there...   as the foundation validity of our
work is first established by way of thought exercises withing the fully
cooperative context.. and then we go from there...  and As my Co-Author Joey
Durham  pointer
out critically, "the real magic happens during the group's deliberative
process, as opposed to at the point of ultimate decision",   I would have
to agree, and I gather your reference to
Sociocracy,
only makes the point further.

   Things get a bit more challenging as Strategic vote gaming stress is
introduced into the picture. But I think your point as well as Dr.
Durham's is that it is best to reduce such stress related problems before
they would reach any sense of consequence regarding the more challenging,
Game theory related aspects involved in the formulation of a "truly
democratic" choice function that consistently always represents the
interest of each and every member of the electorate.

   I think Joey's point was that in the end, a group's Social Decision
system will work much better, if the Cardinal valued Ranked alternative
Choice function at it's core, functions under circumstances of reduced
gaming stress..

   As on ventures on the algebraic reasoning that unfolds...  the point you
and Joey make above becomes most distinctly apparent. That is: as one
struggles with erosion of formal utility coherence associated with a pure
summation of voluntarily scaled benifit-cost utility vectors, associated
with the ideal fully cooperative group decision process, to along the way
encounter Condorcet's Game hardened pair-wise differential rank analysis,
that is arguably correct when it does yield a a coherent answer ( it often
does not ), and onward to our insight that the best resolution of any Top
cycle (Schwartz set) incoherent pair-wise ranking, would best be resolved
in terms of the prioritizing the pairwise win/loos relationships in terms
of the median of each pair-wise differential preference distribution..   At
his point, while we could have discussions about how best to resolve these
cyclically ranked majority.
   I gather it might be best to avoid the confusion of a sub-optimal group
decision that would ever need to deal with these formal voting systems
issues in the first.

   Let me express my gratitude, that you would steer this thread's
discussion in this kind of a constructive direction..

All the best
_peter

-






On Mon, Jul 8, 2013 at 9:15 PM, Doug Chamberlin
wrote:

> Seems to me sociocracy would provide some interesting ideas on this
> genuine democracy concept. Check it out.
>
> --
>
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] The Tor Project is looking for a Lead Automation Engineer

[Mike Perry]

The Tor Project wants to deploy nightly builds and continuous
integration for as many of our key software components and platform
combinations as possible.  Your job would be build and deploy the
initial functional versions of a wide range of testing frameworks and
continuous integration systems.

This is a contract position. Candidates are expected to be capable of
taking the lead in selecting, deploying, and maintaining multiple
automation systems in several different programming languages.

Candidates should also be capable of reproducing bugs and writing new
reproduction test cases for one or more of the testing frameworks.
Eventually, we hope to add additional staff to assist in this project,
but to start, you will be expected to prioritize your own work such that
the most important tasks get attention first, without letting any
specific core component starve for attention.

For more details, including information on how to apply, see the job
posting:
https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs-lead-automation.html.en


-- 
Mike Perry
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] CRS on NSA Surveillance Leaks

[Gregory Foster]

Congressional Research Service (Jul 2) - "NSA Surveillance Leaks: 
Background and Issues for Congress":

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43134.pdf

From the Introduction:
Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance 
address unauthorized
disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These 
programs arise from
provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 
However, they rely on separate
authorities, collect different types of information, and raise 
different policy questions. As such,
where possible, the information contained in this report distinguishes 
between the two. For both
programs, there is a tension between the speed and convenience with 
which the government can
access data of possible intelligence value and the mechanisms intended 
to safeguard civil
liberties. The first program collects and stores in bulk domestic 
phone records that some argue
could be gathered to equal effect through more focused records 
requests. The second program
targets the electronic communications of non-U.S. citizens but may 
incidentally collect

information about Americans.

The following sections address (1) what information is being 
collected; (2) the legal basis for the
collection; (3) existing oversight mechanisms; and (4) arguments for 
and against the two
programs. The last section of this report discusses legislation that 
has been proposed in response
to information disclosed about NSA surveillance. Because documents 
leaked to the news media
may be classified, CRS is precluded from providing a detailed analysis 
of the content of those
documents. The information in this report is based largely on public 
comments from intelligence

officials and Members of Congress.


via @saftergood
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/07/nsa-surv/

gf

--
Gregory Foster || gfos...@entersection.org
@gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Guido Witmond]

On 10-07-13 00:57, h0ost wrote:
> On 07/09/2013 06:25 PM, Petter Ericson wrote:
>>>
 What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?

 This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.
>>>
>>> Roughly I think this is correct:
>>>
>>> 0. Download https://www.dee.su/liberte
>>> 1. Boot any modern computer with the usb disk inserted
>>> 2. launch Claws email client
>>> 3) write message to bob's cable address and press send
>>>
>>> If you have a supported platform, you can skip 0-2 and replace it with
>>> 'install cables' - as one might install a modern browser.
>>
>> I do not think that installing a modern browser entails building it from 
>> source for most people. 
>>
>>>
>>> If you're going to say that using Gmail easily happens in any browser on
>>> any OS, I guess I'd tend to disagree.
>>>
>>> If we add "securely" into the picture, I guess I'd just laugh and laugh
>>> and laugh. Sadly. It is really a bummer that PRISM exists and that
>>> Google appears to be under the boot of that system. Though accessing
>>> Gmail with Chrome is clearly better than any other choice!
>>>
>>
>> Unfortunately, the question wasn't how to communicate _securely_, but how to
>> communicate _at all_, which is what most people aim to do in the first place.
>> Please do not pretend that @.onion is as easy to remember as
>> j...@cervant.es or something similar, or that installing dependencies and
>> building from source is similar to a one-click installer.
>>
>> Best
>>
>> /P
> 
> Well, not be cynical, but I think "people" would have to exert a few
> more iotas of energy, and learn how use Tor or software like cables
> starting from now on.  Unless their freedom is something not that
> important to them.
> 
> I mean, people all over have learned how to lock their doors, right?  It
> is definitely inconvenient for me to lock my damn doors at 8 o'clock in
> the morning, as I am rushing off to work.  But I do it, because it has
> been impressed upon me that it is rather important to do so for obvious
> reasons.

I think, it is too much to ask of people to change their ways.

Most of the front doors around here fall into closed mode with a gentle
push. The wedge shape part makes that automatically. Especially in an 8
o'clock rush.

The reason people lock these doors is fear of theft.

With email, there is no fear, nor theft. And there is nothing to hide...

I believe the only way forward is to make using security easier than not
using security. Ie, secure/privacy by design.

That's what cryptocat is trying, dee.su/cables appears to do so in a
spectacular easy to use way. Will have to check it out.

And so do I try to reach that holy grail too with my
eccentric-authentication.


Cheers, Guido.

http://eccentric-authentication.org/

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[h0ost]

On 07/09/2013 06:25 PM, Petter Ericson wrote:
>>
>>> What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?
>>>
>>> This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.
>>
>> Roughly I think this is correct:
>>
>> 0. Download https://www.dee.su/liberte
>> 1. Boot any modern computer with the usb disk inserted
>> 2. launch Claws email client
>> 3) write message to bob's cable address and press send
>>
>> If you have a supported platform, you can skip 0-2 and replace it with
>> 'install cables' - as one might install a modern browser.
> 
> I do not think that installing a modern browser entails building it from 
> source for most people. 
> 
>>
>> If you're going to say that using Gmail easily happens in any browser on
>> any OS, I guess I'd tend to disagree.
>>
>> If we add "securely" into the picture, I guess I'd just laugh and laugh
>> and laugh. Sadly. It is really a bummer that PRISM exists and that
>> Google appears to be under the boot of that system. Though accessing
>> Gmail with Chrome is clearly better than any other choice!
>>
> 
> Unfortunately, the question wasn't how to communicate _securely_, but how to
> communicate _at all_, which is what most people aim to do in the first place.
> Please do not pretend that @.onion is as easy to remember as
> j...@cervant.es or something similar, or that installing dependencies and
> building from source is similar to a one-click installer.
> 
> Best
> 
> /P

Well, not be cynical, but I think "people" would have to exert a few
more iotas of energy, and learn how use Tor or software like cables
starting from now on.  Unless their freedom is something not that
important to them.

I mean, people all over have learned how to lock their doors, right?  It
is definitely inconvenient for me to lock my damn doors at 8 o'clock in
the morning, as I am rushing off to work.  But I do it, because it has
been impressed upon me that it is rather important to do so for obvious
reasons.

Maybe it's time to raise the bar just a bit, and start setting
expectations for emailing that go beyond "Go to gmail.com and start
typing your message to your friend."

The barrier is more ideological and a function of habituation, than a
question of difficulty.  I know those can be steep bars to overcome, but
people all over have learned how to use the Windows control panel (a
nightmare of poor design for an intended audience of non-sophisticated
computer users, if you ask me), how to use their anti-virus checker, and
how to communicate on Twitter in streams of 140 chars (not the most
elegant or intuitive thing in the world, before it existed, and/or
people were told that twitter is easy to use).


Often one has to actually try something new to learn not to fear it's
apparent complexity.

>> All the best,
>> Jacob
>> --
>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
>> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Petter Ericson]

> 
> > What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?
> > 
> > This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.
> 
> Roughly I think this is correct:
> 
> 0. Download https://www.dee.su/liberte
> 1. Boot any modern computer with the usb disk inserted
> 2. launch Claws email client
> 3) write message to bob's cable address and press send
> 
> If you have a supported platform, you can skip 0-2 and replace it with
> 'install cables' - as one might install a modern browser.

I do not think that installing a modern browser entails building it from 
source for most people. 

> 
> If you're going to say that using Gmail easily happens in any browser on
> any OS, I guess I'd tend to disagree.
> 
> If we add "securely" into the picture, I guess I'd just laugh and laugh
> and laugh. Sadly. It is really a bummer that PRISM exists and that
> Google appears to be under the boot of that system. Though accessing
> Gmail with Chrome is clearly better than any other choice!
> 

Unfortunately, the question wasn't how to communicate _securely_, but how to
communicate _at all_, which is what most people aim to do in the first place.
Please do not pretend that @.onion is as easy to remember as
j...@cervant.es or something similar, or that installing dependencies and
building from source is similar to a one-click installer.

Best

/P

> All the best,
> Jacob
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

-- 
Petter Ericson (pett...@acc.umu.se)
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Please take me off the list

[Dragana Kaurin]

Sweta, at the bottom of each LibTech email there are directions on how
to unsubscribe, or change the settings to digest.

Best,

Dragana

On 07/09/2013 04:15 PM, Sweta Sneha wrote:
> Please take me off the list! Although there are good discussions and 
> information on this list, there are days when there is a plethora of emails 
> going back and forth.
>
> Warm Regards,
>
> Sweta
> 
>
> Sweta Sneha, PhD
> Associate Professor of Information Systems
> Leading M-Health Initiative, MAD Center
> Coles College of Business
> Kennesaw State University
> Phone: 770-853-0661
> Email:ssn...@kennesaw.edu
> _
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Marcin de Kaminski" 
> To: "liberationtech" 
> Sent: Tuesday, July 9, 2013 4:04:43 PM
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"
>
> I just asked the Heml.is team to join the list. 
>
> Marcin
>
> 9 jul 2013 kl. 18:52 skrev Julian Oliver :
>
>> Suprised to see Peter Sunde, Leif Högberg & Linus Olsson push out their 
>> private
>> messaging for Android and iOS as closed-source unlock-ware:
>>
>>https://heml.is/
>>
>> (Warning: Self-ingratiating video. Fun-guy team shots)
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> -- 
>> Julian Oliver
>> PGP B6E9FD9A
>> http://julianoliver.com
>> http://criticalengineering.org
>> --
>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
>> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] Please take me off the list

[Sweta Sneha]

Please take me off the list! Although there are good discussions and 
information on this list, there are days when there is a plethora of emails 
going back and forth.

Warm Regards,

Sweta


Sweta Sneha, PhD
Associate Professor of Information Systems
Leading M-Health Initiative, MAD Center
Coles College of Business
Kennesaw State University
Phone: 770-853-0661
Email:ssn...@kennesaw.edu
_

- Original Message -
From: "Marcin de Kaminski" 
To: "liberationtech" 
Sent: Tuesday, July 9, 2013 4:04:43 PM
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

I just asked the Heml.is team to join the list. 

Marcin

9 jul 2013 kl. 18:52 skrev Julian Oliver :

> 
> Suprised to see Peter Sunde, Leif Högberg & Linus Olsson push out their 
> private
> messaging for Android and iOS as closed-source unlock-ware:
> 
>https://heml.is/
> 
> (Warning: Self-ingratiating video. Fun-guy team shots)
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> -- 
> Julian Oliver
> PGP B6E9FD9A
> http://julianoliver.com
> http://criticalengineering.org
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

[Nadim Kobeissi]

This looks awesome! The more alternatives the better.

NK

On 2013-07-09, at 12:52 PM, Julian Oliver  wrote:

> 
> Suprised to see Peter Sunde, Leif Högberg & Linus Olsson push out their 
> private
> messaging for Android and iOS as closed-source unlock-ware:
> 
>https://heml.is/
> 
> (Warning: Self-ingratiating video. Fun-guy team shots)
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> -- 
> Julian Oliver
> PGP B6E9FD9A
> http://julianoliver.com
> http://criticalengineering.org
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

[Marcin de Kaminski]

I just asked the Heml.is team to join the list. 

Marcin

9 jul 2013 kl. 18:52 skrev Julian Oliver :

> 
> Suprised to see Peter Sunde, Leif Högberg & Linus Olsson push out their 
> private
> messaging for Android and iOS as closed-source unlock-ware:
> 
>https://heml.is/
> 
> (Warning: Self-ingratiating video. Fun-guy team shots)
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> -- 
> Julian Oliver
> PGP B6E9FD9A
> http://julianoliver.com
> http://criticalengineering.org
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Urgent! Need a reliable public OpenID provider

[LilBambi]

Glad you were able to find some possible alternatives.

I hear ya. I look forward to reading your foaming-at-the-mouth post on
this. ;)


On Mon, Jul 8, 2013 at 7:46 PM, Uncle Zzzen  wrote:

> Per se, they're not a provider, but https://openid.net/get-an-openid/gives 
> ideas where you can join. Some don't work anymore (e.g. google), but
> thanks for the tip.
>
> All affected customers have found new providers and the initial crisis is
> over (phew), but when I have time I intend to write a foaming-at-the-mouth
> post about those who killed openid (and thus - anonymous accountability)
> because they had a "better business plan" (Booz Allen et al *certainly*had 
> one ;) )
>
>
>
>
> On 7 July 2013 19:49, LilBambi  wrote:
>
>> Is http://openid.net not good enough?
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 6, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Uncle Zzzen  wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks.
>>> Meanwhile, looking for a local "plan b" solution, I've found an
>>> OpenID-provider django project  on
>>> github, and turns out they have a working instance at
>>> https://openid.bearstech.com
>>> Nevertheless, stackexchange looks like a good option to recommend to
>>> customers because it's a well known establishment.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 July 2013 05:44, Mitar  wrote:
>>>
 Hi!

 On Sat, Jul 6, 2013 at 11:21 AM, Uncle Zzzen 
 wrote:
 > Is there a reliable public OpenID provider I can tell folks to
 register to?
 > (riseup? telecomix?) or should I deploy one myself?

 I am using StackExchange:

 https://openid.stackexchange.com/

 And then delegate it to my custom URL:

 http://blog.stackoverflow.com/2009/01/using-your-own-url-as-your-openid/


 Mitar
 --
 Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
 emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings
 at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
>>> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings
>>> at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
>> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>
>
>
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)

[Jillian C. York]

Hi Elham,

Not yet, and in fact, Iran is outside of our scope - that said, anything
published on Global Voices Advocacy often gets translated into multiple
other languages, including Farsi!


On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 2:04 PM, elham gheytanchi wrote:

> Congratulations.
> is there a Farsi version too?
>
> --
> From: r.deib...@utoronto.ca
> Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013 14:01:01 -0400
> To: liberationt...@mailman.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab
> world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)
>
>
> Congratulations Jill!
>
>
> On 2013-07-09, at 1:42 PM, Jillian C. York wrote:
>
> Hi friends,
>
> I just wanted to share a new project, The Digital Citizen (or المواطن
> الرقمي) - a monthly newsletter dedicated to covering digital rights issues
> across the Arab world, in both Arabic and English. Our first edition is due
> shortly, and you can sign up here: http://eepurl.com/B7Qyn
>
> (Of course, if you prefer to read it online, we'll also be publishing over
> at Global Voices Advocacy ).
>
> Our newsletter is a little labor of love produced by Global Voices, EFF,
> Access, and Social Media Exchange Beirut.
>
> Best,
> Jillian
>
> --
> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> site:  jilliancyork.com * | *
> twitter: @jilliancyork* *
>
> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the
> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
>  --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
>
> Ronald Deibert
> Director, the Citizen Lab
> and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
> Munk School of Global Affairs
> University of Toronto
> (416) 946-8916
> PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
> http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
> twitter.com/citizenlab
> r.deib...@utoronto.ca
>
>
>
>
> -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>



-- 
US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
site:  jilliancyork.com * | *
twitter: @jilliancyork* *

"We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the
seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Jonathan Wilkes:
> On 07/09/2013 10:29 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>> Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
>>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
 people

 You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?

 And http://dee.su/cables ?


>>> No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with
>>> multiparty
>>> communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.
>>>
>> While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
>> protocol.
>>
>> Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
>> client.
> 
> Email for someone that doesn't already have it:
> 1. Turn on _any_ computer.
> 2. Load up _any_ OS.
> 3. Run _any_ browser.
> 4. Go to www.gmail.com.
> 5. Sign up.
> 6. Send a message to b...@wherever.com, whose email address you recall
> from memory.
> 

You are hilariously oversimplifying the problem. How did you find
b...@wherever.com's address exactly? And while many people use email with
a web browser, surely you don't suggest that people don't use heavy
email clients (gmail app, thunderbird, outlook, applemail, claws, etc)?

> What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?
> 
> This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.

Roughly I think this is correct:

0. Download https://www.dee.su/liberte
1. Boot any modern computer with the usb disk inserted
2. launch Claws email client
3) write message to bob's cable address and press send

If you have a supported platform, you can skip 0-2 and replace it with
'install cables' - as one might install a modern browser.

If you're going to say that using Gmail easily happens in any browser on
any OS, I guess I'd tend to disagree.

If we add "securely" into the picture, I guess I'd just laugh and laugh
and laugh. Sadly. It is really a bummer that PRISM exists and that
Google appears to be under the boot of that system. Though accessing
Gmail with Chrome is clearly better than any other choice!

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Nadim Kobeissi:
> Hi Jacob,
> You've said a lot about Cryptocat's SSL configuration — can you recommend a 
> better configuration that is similarly compatible?
> 

Hi Nadim,

I mentioned this on the cryptography list - I suggest several things.

First up - either disable all non-forward secure SSL/TLS modes or
configure a different website for those clients. In the latter case, the
website could encourage them to download a new, likely more secure
browser or it could simply inform them that you can't protect them
against important threats with such an old browser.

Secondly - I would suggest that you consider using a web-server that is
type-safe, store any key in a hardware security module, and utilize a
variety of entropy sources.

See also this set of things that can go wrong with forward secrecy:

  https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html

CryptoCat likely makes a few mistakes listed there - if not - ensure
that you document each issue, how it is mitigated and ensure you check
in your configuration files as part of CryptoCat's codebase, so that
there aren't obvious regressions.

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)

[elham gheytanchi]

Congratulations.is there a Farsi version too?
From: r.deib...@utoronto.ca
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013 14:01:01 -0400
To: liberationt...@mailman.stanford.edu
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab 
world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)

Congratulations Jill!

On 2013-07-09, at 1:42 PM, Jillian C. York wrote:Hi friends,

I just wanted to share a new project, The Digital Citizen (or المواطن الرقمي) - 
a monthly newsletter dedicated to covering digital rights issues across the 
Arab world, in both Arabic and English.  Our first edition is due shortly, and 
you can sign up here: http://eepurl.com/B7Qyn

(Of course, if you prefer to read it online, we'll also be publishing over at 
Global Voices Advocacy).

Our newsletter is a little labor of love produced by Global Voices, EFF, 
Access, and Social Media Exchange Beirut.  

Best,
Jillian
-- 
US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088site:  jilliancyork.com | twitter: 
@jilliancyork 

"We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want 
the seemingly impossible to become a reality" - Vaclav Havel

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Ronald DeibertDirector, the Citizen Lab and the Canada Centre for Global 
Security StudiesMunk School of Global AffairsUniversity of Toronto(416) 
946-8916PGP: 
http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txthttp://deibert.citizenlab.org/
twitter.com/citizenlab
r.deib...@utoronto.ca






--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
   --
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)

[Ronald Deibert]

Congratulations Jill!


On 2013-07-09, at 1:42 PM, Jillian C. York wrote:

> Hi friends,
> 
> I just wanted to share a new project, The Digital Citizen (or المواطن الرقمي) 
> - a monthly newsletter dedicated to covering digital rights issues across the 
> Arab world, in both Arabic and English.  Our first edition is due shortly, 
> and you can sign up here: http://eepurl.com/B7Qyn
> 
> (Of course, if you prefer to read it online, we'll also be publishing over at 
> Global Voices Advocacy).
> 
> Our newsletter is a little labor of love produced by Global Voices, EFF, 
> Access, and Social Media Exchange Beirut.  
> 
> Best,
> Jillian
> 
> -- 
> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> site:  jilliancyork.com | twitter: @jilliancyork 
> 
> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the 
> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - Vaclav Havel
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Ronald Deibert
Director, the Citizen Lab 
and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
Munk School of Global Affairs
University of Toronto
(416) 946-8916
PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
twitter.com/citizenlab
r.deib...@utoronto.ca



--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] New newsletter on digital rights in the Arab world - Digital Citizen (المواطن الرقمي)

[Jillian C. York]

Hi friends,

I just wanted to share a new project, The Digital Citizen (or المواطن
الرقمي) - a monthly newsletter dedicated to covering digital rights issues
across the Arab world, in both Arabic and English. Our first edition is due
shortly, and you can sign up here: http://eepurl.com/B7Qyn

(Of course, if you prefer to read it online, we'll also be publishing over
at Global Voices Advocacy ).

Our newsletter is a little labor of love produced by Global Voices, EFF,
Access, and Social Media Exchange Beirut.

Best,
Jillian

-- 
US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
site:  jilliancyork.com * | *
twitter: @jilliancyork* *

"We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the
seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] CyberGhost5 VPN beta testing

[Jurre andmore]

I seriously hope nobody is going to run this.

2013/7/9 Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) :
> Hi,
>
> please consier that sending link to directly downloadable Windows Executable
> over a clear-txt HTTP (easily hijackable) link over a public, high traffic
> mailing list is not a safe and responsible idea.
>
> Rather post a link to a web page, explaining what you are speaking about.
>
> Regards,
>
> --
> Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
> HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
> http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org
>
>
> Il 7/9/13 11:43 AM, oana.ciobo...@cyberghost.ro ha scritto:
>
> Hey guys,
>
>
>
> After the discussion we had on Twitter I decided that it would be great if
> we could share the CyberGhost5 beta link on your lists so a lot more
> interested people could test it.
>
> Here is the link:
>
> http://cyberghostvpn.com/download/cg5_Beta.exe
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

[Julian Oliver]

Suprised to see Peter Sunde, Leif Högberg & Linus Olsson push out their private
messaging for Android and iOS as closed-source unlock-ware:

https://heml.is/

(Warning: Self-ingratiating video. Fun-guy team shots)

Cheers,

-- 
Julian Oliver
PGP B6E9FD9A
http://julianoliver.com
http://criticalengineering.org
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jonathan Wilkes]

On 07/09/2013 10:29 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:

Patrick Mylund Nielsen:

On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:


On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:

If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that

people

You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?

And http://dee.su/cables ?



No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with multiparty
communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.


While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
protocol.

Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
client.


Email for someone that doesn't already have it:
1. Turn on _any_ computer.
2. Load up _any_ OS.
3. Run _any_ browser.
4. Go to www.gmail.com.
5. Sign up.
6. Send a message to b...@wherever.com, whose email address you recall 
from memory.


What are the steps for sending Bob a message using Cables?

This isn't rhetorical, I'd actually like to know what the steps are.

-Jonathan



If you boot liberte - there is little to no configuration beyond
establishing communication and verifying that you've done so correctly.
Once that is done, you do not need to do it again - a key defense
against active attackers. As I understand things this critical step
(verification and persistence, or merely verification in a usable
manner) cannot be done in CryptoCat at the moment. Active attackers will
win against everyone without verification. The last bug ensured that
*passive* attackers won against everyone on the main server and they
would also win against everyone not using forward secret TLS modes. As I
understand, we do not have numbers on how many users are using the less
secure TLS modes.

Please read this page:

   https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=crypto.cat

On three computers near me, I see it using non-forward secret modes
today - SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - this isn't good news.

This also means that if CryptoCat's security may be reduced to SSL, it
is now possible to reduce that to plaintext by forcing disclosure of the
current website's key. This may happen legally or it may happen through
exploitation. I'm not sure why CryptoCat doesn't just exclusively offer
everything with forward secret modes, and encourage everyone else to
upgrade their browser when they use a less secure mode? I suggested this
to Nadim on another mailing list, I'm not sure if he is working on this
already? Perhaps so? I hope so...

In any case, "more secure than CryptoCat" is not a high bar during the
time of this bug. Any CA could have subverted the very little security
provided the web browser trust model. Also the security provided by
non-forward secret TLS connections is a really serious problem.

If you mean "as easy to use" as a plugin in a browser and that it can be
as secure as just chatting over HTTPS protected servers without any
other security, I think that the requirement is not proportional.

Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build usable
software without any security - if we were, we'd all be using Facetime,
Skype, GChat and so on, without any complaints.

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech




--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Patrick Mylund Nielsen]

Sorry, when I wrote "scare normal users away from e.g. MSN", I meant "scare
normal users away from switching from e.g. MSN"


On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 12:31 PM, Patrick Mylund Nielsen <
cryptogra...@patrickmylund.com> wrote:

> > What I hear from you is a common idea: it is the idea is that people
> who don't build those systems don't have a right to voice negative or critical
> views.
>
> Absolutely not. If this is how I came across, I apologize.
>
> Let me try to express myself a little more clearly, and not via a phone.
> Your second reply resonated quite well with my underlying thoughts.
>
> > When we degrade others for their criticisms by suggesting that they
> only get to speak if they've met some arbitrary bar for entry is 
> dis-empowering.
> I know that we all do this but perhaps it isn't the best way to move
> forward?
>
> To be clear, the only thing I take objection to in this thread are the
> snarky, semi-arrogant replies that imply that e.g. Veracode's code reviews
> are useless, and that all the developers behind X are incompetent, while
> not actually providing a lot of constructive commentary. (Admittedly, I am
> already slightly annoyed from reading other comment threads about this same
> issue where the response was a fairly unanimous "Omg, Cryptocat sucks! What
> a bunch of amateurs!", so this is more of a response to that collectively
> than to the comments of Maxim, specifically. That being said, I care very
> little for arguments from authority, unless they make sense.) There may
> be a language barrier, but despite being a non-native speaker myself, the
> comments still came across quite negatively.
>
> By no means should Cryptocat be immune to criticism--it's clear that it
> isn't--and there is no reason why somebody with knowledge on a subject
> can't comment on deficiencies, even if they don't make a competitor, or
> prove that they are able to. But there are several ways to do so--a few
> that I've seen recently in connection with Cryptocat are: 1. To turn to
> the developers of the software and/or contributing to the software itself,
> 2. By flaming the software and its authors on mailing lists and on blogs,
> in discussions that are most closely analogous to "lol, noobs.", and 3. A
> combination: finding vulnerabilities, informing the developers, and posting
> about it on blogs with added opinions that all the developers are
> incompetent.
>
> Obviously, I think #1 is the most useful. #3, while harsh, still is, since
> the vulnerabilities will inevitably be patched, whether or not you provide
> a solution. (Indeed, the history of responsible disclosure shows that this
> is often the only way to get something fixed.) #2 is entirely useless, in
> my opinion. So when I say "if it's so easy, make a better one", I really
> mean "why don't you switch from #2 to either #1 or #3."
>
> There obviously is a limit: where the authors of a piece of software are
> so incompetent, or the software is so badly written, that it should be
> avoided at all costs. I don't think that Nadim, et al, and Cryptocat are at
> or past that point, for several reasons:
>
>   - They very clearly communicate that this is experimental software, that
> you shouldn't put your life on the line using it, and that it hasn't
> undergone a lot of scrutiny
>   - Whenever there's been a new feature or new release, the main request
> from the authors themselves has been that people take a look at it and come
> to them if they see any problems. The authors recognize that they are not
> infallible experts on the subject. (Contrast with Silent Circle where their
> whole argument is that "we are crypto experts and Navy SEALs, and you
> should trust our closed source software", but the software still has
> serious problems.)
>   - Cryptocat is helping bring OTR to the masses
>
> > I'm not sure if you're away but Maxim did exactly this many years ago.
> > He wrote a system called cables:
>
> I was aware of its existence, although I'll admit I haven't used it
> recently.
>
> While I appreciate and recognize your description of its ease-of-use, I
> will say that I think most people aren't going to run a custom Linux
> distribution to communicate securely--and when I say most people, I mean
> "the masses", not liberationtech. Which leads me to my main point...
>
> > Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build
> usable software without any security - if we were, we'd all be using
> Facetime, Skype, GChat and so on, without any complaints.
>
> This is where your reply is in agreement with what was (granted, deeply)
> between the lines of my initial replies, where I continuously highlighted
> usability as a critical feature.
>
> I want secure software. I want something that lets me communicate with
> others securely. But when I, a fairly paranoid person by my own judgement,
> and somebody who writes cryptography and privacy software for a living,
> disable my Android device encryption because it doesn't let you u

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Patrick Mylund Nielsen]

> What I hear from you is a common idea: it is the idea is that people who don't
build those systems don't have a right to voice negative or critical views.

Absolutely not. If this is how I came across, I apologize.

Let me try to express myself a little more clearly, and not via a phone.
Your second reply resonated quite well with my underlying thoughts.

> When we degrade others for their criticisms by suggesting that they only get
to speak if they've met some arbitrary bar for entry is dis-empowering. I
know that we all do this but perhaps it isn't the best way to move forward?

To be clear, the only thing I take objection to in this thread are the
snarky, semi-arrogant replies that imply that e.g. Veracode's code reviews
are useless, and that all the developers behind X are incompetent, while
not actually providing a lot of constructive commentary. (Admittedly, I am
already slightly annoyed from reading other comment threads about this same
issue where the response was a fairly unanimous "Omg, Cryptocat sucks! What
a bunch of amateurs!", so this is more of a response to that collectively
than to the comments of Maxim, specifically. That being said, I care very
little for arguments from authority, unless they make sense.) There may be
a language barrier, but despite being a non-native speaker myself, the
comments still came across quite negatively.

By no means should Cryptocat be immune to criticism--it's clear that it
isn't--and there is no reason why somebody with knowledge on a subject
can't comment on deficiencies, even if they don't make a competitor, or
prove that they are able to. But there are several ways to do so--a few
that I've seen recently in connection with Cryptocat are: 1. To turn to the
developers of the software and/or contributing to the software itself, 2.
By flaming the software and its authors on mailing lists and on blogs, in
discussions that are most closely analogous to "lol, noobs.", and 3. A
combination: finding vulnerabilities, informing the developers, and posting
about it on blogs with added opinions that all the developers are
incompetent.

Obviously, I think #1 is the most useful. #3, while harsh, still is, since
the vulnerabilities will inevitably be patched, whether or not you provide
a solution. (Indeed, the history of responsible disclosure shows that this
is often the only way to get something fixed.) #2 is entirely useless, in
my opinion. So when I say "if it's so easy, make a better one", I really
mean "why don't you switch from #2 to either #1 or #3."

There obviously is a limit: where the authors of a piece of software are so
incompetent, or the software is so badly written, that it should be avoided
at all costs. I don't think that Nadim, et al, and Cryptocat are at or past
that point, for several reasons:

  - They very clearly communicate that this is experimental software, that
you shouldn't put your life on the line using it, and that it hasn't
undergone a lot of scrutiny
  - Whenever there's been a new feature or new release, the main request
from the authors themselves has been that people take a look at it and come
to them if they see any problems. The authors recognize that they are not
infallible experts on the subject. (Contrast with Silent Circle where their
whole argument is that "we are crypto experts and Navy SEALs, and you
should trust our closed source software", but the software still has
serious problems.)
  - Cryptocat is helping bring OTR to the masses

> I'm not sure if you're away but Maxim did exactly this many years ago.
> He wrote a system called cables:

I was aware of its existence, although I'll admit I haven't used it
recently.

While I appreciate and recognize your description of its ease-of-use, I
will say that I think most people aren't going to run a custom Linux
distribution to communicate securely--and when I say most people, I mean
"the masses", not liberationtech. Which leads me to my main point...

> Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build usable 
> software
without any security - if we were, we'd all be using Facetime, Skype, GChat
and so on, without any complaints.

This is where your reply is in agreement with what was (granted, deeply)
between the lines of my initial replies, where I continuously highlighted
usability as a critical feature.

I want secure software. I want something that lets me communicate with
others securely. But when I, a fairly paranoid person by my own judgement,
and somebody who writes cryptography and privacy software for a living,
disable my Android device encryption because it doesn't let you use
something other than the encryption passphrase to unlock the screen (even
though it doesn't actually dismount the disk when the screen is locked), or
use Skype and GChat to communicate with my friends because most other means
are just too cumbersome, I have to recognize that security, even perfect
secrecy, is completely useless if nobody is actually making use of it.

Crypto

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jason Gulledge]

Here are more statistics on TLS modes failing back to less secure modes, and a 
semi-complete listing of affected browsers, published 2 days ago: 

http://jbp.io/2013/07/07/tls-downgrade/


Best,
Jason Gulledge

On Jul 9, 2013, at 4:29 PM, Jacob Appelbaum  wrote:

> Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:
>> 
>>> On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
 If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
>>> people
>>> 
>>> You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?
>>> 
>>> And http://dee.su/cables ?
>>> 
>>> 
>> No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with multiparty
>> communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.
>> 
> 
> While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
> protocol.
> 
> Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
> client.
> 
> If you boot liberte - there is little to no configuration beyond
> establishing communication and verifying that you've done so correctly.
> Once that is done, you do not need to do it again - a key defense
> against active attackers. As I understand things this critical step
> (verification and persistence, or merely verification in a usable
> manner) cannot be done in CryptoCat at the moment. Active attackers will
> win against everyone without verification. The last bug ensured that
> *passive* attackers won against everyone on the main server and they
> would also win against everyone not using forward secret TLS modes. As I
> understand, we do not have numbers on how many users are using the less
> secure TLS modes.
> 
> Please read this page:
> 
>  https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=crypto.cat
> 
> On three computers near me, I see it using non-forward secret modes
> today - SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - this isn't good news.
> 
> This also means that if CryptoCat's security may be reduced to SSL, it
> is now possible to reduce that to plaintext by forcing disclosure of the
> current website's key. This may happen legally or it may happen through
> exploitation. I'm not sure why CryptoCat doesn't just exclusively offer
> everything with forward secret modes, and encourage everyone else to
> upgrade their browser when they use a less secure mode? I suggested this
> to Nadim on another mailing list, I'm not sure if he is working on this
> already? Perhaps so? I hope so...
> 
> In any case, "more secure than CryptoCat" is not a high bar during the
> time of this bug. Any CA could have subverted the very little security
> provided the web browser trust model. Also the security provided by
> non-forward secret TLS connections is a really serious problem.
> 
> If you mean "as easy to use" as a plugin in a browser and that it can be
> as secure as just chatting over HTTPS protected servers without any
> other security, I think that the requirement is not proportional.
> 
> Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build usable
> software without any security - if we were, we'd all be using Facetime,
> Skype, GChat and so on, without any complaints.
> 
> All the best,
> Jacob
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Nadim Kobeissi]

On 2013-07-09, at 10:29 AM, Jacob Appelbaum  wrote:

> Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
>> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:
>> 
>>> On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
 If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
>>> people
>>> 
>>> You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?
>>> 
>>> And http://dee.su/cables ?
>>> 
>>> 
>> No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with multiparty
>> communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.
>> 
> 
> While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
> protocol.
> 
> Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
> client.
> 
> If you boot liberte - there is little to no configuration beyond
> establishing communication and verifying that you've done so correctly.
> Once that is done, you do not need to do it again - a key defense
> against active attackers. As I understand things this critical step
> (verification and persistence, or merely verification in a usable
> manner) cannot be done in CryptoCat at the moment. Active attackers will
> win against everyone without verification. The last bug ensured that
> *passive* attackers won against everyone on the main server and they
> would also win against everyone not using forward secret TLS modes. As I
> understand, we do not have numbers on how many users are using the less
> secure TLS modes.
> 
> Please read this page:
> 
>  https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=crypto.cat
> 
> On three computers near me, I see it using non-forward secret modes
> today - SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - this isn't good news.

Hi Jacob,
You've said a lot about Cryptocat's SSL configuration — can you recommend a 
better configuration that is similarly compatible?

Thanks,
NK

> 
> This also means that if CryptoCat's security may be reduced to SSL, it
> is now possible to reduce that to plaintext by forcing disclosure of the
> current website's key. This may happen legally or it may happen through
> exploitation. I'm not sure why CryptoCat doesn't just exclusively offer
> everything with forward secret modes, and encourage everyone else to
> upgrade their browser when they use a less secure mode? I suggested this
> to Nadim on another mailing list, I'm not sure if he is working on this
> already? Perhaps so? I hope so...
> 
> In any case, "more secure than CryptoCat" is not a high bar during the
> time of this bug. Any CA could have subverted the very little security
> provided the web browser trust model. Also the security provided by
> non-forward secret TLS connections is a really serious problem.
> 
> If you mean "as easy to use" as a plugin in a browser and that it can be
> as secure as just chatting over HTTPS protected servers without any
> other security, I think that the requirement is not proportional.
> 
> Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build usable
> software without any security - if we were, we'd all be using Facetime,
> Skype, GChat and so on, without any complaints.
> 
> All the best,
> Jacob
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Kate Krauss]

On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:57 AM, Jacob Appelbaum  wrote:

> Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
> > If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
> people
> > will use. Talking about how exceedingly easy it is in Internet forums
> > doesn't contribute much.
> >
>
> I'm not sure if you're away but Maxim did exactly this many years ago.
> He wrote a system called cables:
>
>   http://dee.su/cables
>
> What I hear from you is a common idea: it is the idea is that people who
> don't build those systems don't have a right to voice negative or
> critical views.
>
> When we degrade others for their criticisms by suggesting that they only
> get to speak if they've met some arbitrary bar for entry is
> dis-empowering. I know that we all do this but perhaps it isn't the best
> way to move forward?
>
> While I think Maxim is viewed as exceedingly harsh in how he writes, I
> think that your response is really the wrong way to deal with him. We
> should consider that his cultural background is different and that as
> far as I understand it, he isn't a native english speaker. Between the
> two things, perhaps we might just ask him to be nicer?
>
> Allow me to try a different tactic:
>
> Hey - Maxim - people appreciate what you have to say but when you say it
> in a way that they perceive harshly, they can't hear your pretty
> reasonable advice. I think you might care about this - albeit moderately
> - still, I think you'd reach a lot of people if they understood it in a
> different frame. Probably people don't understand that you're a one man
> powerhouse of anonymity and security projects (cables, Liberté Linux,
> etc), they probably stop thinking when they feel insulted or that you've
> insulted someone else. :(
>

Great, constructive idea.

I've also wanted to commend Nadim for making an honest, humble public
apology and spending a lot of time publicly talking through what happened.
(We don't see that kind of thing in the nonprofit world--I can't think of a
single example). Certainly that was the right thing to do, but he could
have been a defensive jerk about it.  He has his eye on the ball--helping
people at risk keep their communications safe in as accessible a way as
possible. Both of you know that it's not a game.


Kate Krauss
Executive Director
AIDS Policy Project
www.AIDSPolicyProject.org
User


> All the best,
> Jacob
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] CyberGhost5 VPN beta testing

[Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)]

Hi,

please consier that sending link to directly downloadable Windows 
Executable over a clear-txt HTTP (easily hijackable) link over a public, 
high traffic mailing list is not a safe and responsible idea.


Rather post a link to a web page, explaining what you are speaking about.

Regards,

--
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org


Il 7/9/13 11:43 AM, oana.ciobo...@cyberghost.ro ha scritto:


Hey guys,

After the discussion we had on Twitter I decided that it would be 
great if we could share the CyberGhost5 beta link on your lists so a 
lot more interested people could test it.


Here is the link:

http://cyberghostvpn.com/download/cg5_Beta.exe




--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:
> 
>> On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
>>> If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
>> people
>>
>> You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?
>>
>> And http://dee.su/cables ?
>>
>>
> No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with multiparty
> communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.
> 

While Cryptocat has OTR - the multi-party communication is not the OTR
protocol.

Cables is as easy to use as email. Generally it is used with an email
client.

If you boot liberte - there is little to no configuration beyond
establishing communication and verifying that you've done so correctly.
Once that is done, you do not need to do it again - a key defense
against active attackers. As I understand things this critical step
(verification and persistence, or merely verification in a usable
manner) cannot be done in CryptoCat at the moment. Active attackers will
win against everyone without verification. The last bug ensured that
*passive* attackers won against everyone on the main server and they
would also win against everyone not using forward secret TLS modes. As I
understand, we do not have numbers on how many users are using the less
secure TLS modes.

Please read this page:

  https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=crypto.cat

On three computers near me, I see it using non-forward secret modes
today - SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - this isn't good news.

This also means that if CryptoCat's security may be reduced to SSL, it
is now possible to reduce that to plaintext by forcing disclosure of the
current website's key. This may happen legally or it may happen through
exploitation. I'm not sure why CryptoCat doesn't just exclusively offer
everything with forward secret modes, and encourage everyone else to
upgrade their browser when they use a less secure mode? I suggested this
to Nadim on another mailing list, I'm not sure if he is working on this
already? Perhaps so? I hope so...

In any case, "more secure than CryptoCat" is not a high bar during the
time of this bug. Any CA could have subverted the very little security
provided the web browser trust model. Also the security provided by
non-forward secret TLS connections is a really serious problem.

If you mean "as easy to use" as a plugin in a browser and that it can be
as secure as just chatting over HTTPS protected servers without any
other security, I think that the requirement is not proportional.

Usability is absolutely critical - but we're not looking to build usable
software without any security - if we were, we'd all be using Facetime,
Skype, GChat and so on, without any complaints.

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] Cables! (was Re: DecryptoCat)

[Nathan of Guardian]

On 07/09/2013 09:22 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> And http://dee.su/cables ?

Glad you brought that up. Cables is one of those things I keep wanting
to dig into but never have enough time.

What is the state of the project, and is there a good primer to get
started on developing around it?

My interest is primarily in using or porting it to a mobile environment,
and not within Liberte Linux itself.

+n
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Patrick Mylund Nielsen:
> If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that people
> will use. Talking about how exceedingly easy it is in Internet forums
> doesn't contribute much.
> 

I'm not sure if you're away but Maxim did exactly this many years ago.
He wrote a system called cables:

  http://dee.su/cables

What I hear from you is a common idea: it is the idea is that people who
don't build those systems don't have a right to voice negative or
critical views.

When we degrade others for their criticisms by suggesting that they only
get to speak if they've met some arbitrary bar for entry is
dis-empowering. I know that we all do this but perhaps it isn't the best
way to move forward?

While I think Maxim is viewed as exceedingly harsh in how he writes, I
think that your response is really the wrong way to deal with him. We
should consider that his cultural background is different and that as
far as I understand it, he isn't a native english speaker. Between the
two things, perhaps we might just ask him to be nicer?

Allow me to try a different tactic:

Hey - Maxim - people appreciate what you have to say but when you say it
in a way that they perceive harshly, they can't hear your pretty
reasonable advice. I think you might care about this - albeit moderately
- still, I think you'd reach a lot of people if they understood it in a
different frame. Probably people don't understand that you're a one man
powerhouse of anonymity and security projects (cables, Liberté Linux,
etc), they probably stop thinking when they feel insulted or that you've
insulted someone else. :(

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Maxim Kammerer:
> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Michael Rogers
>  wrote:
>> Google and Mozilla wouldn't have to run
>> competitions to find holes in their own browsers. There wouldn't be a
>> multi-million-dollar 0day black market.
> 
> You are talking about huge projects with complex design, where the
> architecture itself is a source of security issues. Not to mention
> that WebKit and Mozilla weren't engineered for security to begin with.
> 
>> It wouldn't be possible for
>> the NSA (according to Snowden) to "simply own" the computer of any
>> person of interest.
> 
> Offtopic, but I didn't see any indication in that last paragraph of
> Jacob's interview that Snowden talks about exploiting computers. In
> general, Snowden for some reason is usually terribly vague for someone
> who apparently exhibits excellent command of English language (from my
> non-native speaker's POV).

I think he very clearly stated it:

Interviewer: What happens after the NSA targets a user?

Snowden: They're just owned. An analyst will get a daily (or scheduled
based on exfiltration summary) report on what changed on the system,
PCAPS 9 of leftover data that wasn't understood by the automated
dissectors, and so forth. It's up to the analyst to do whatever they
want at that point -- the target's machine doesn't belong to them
anymore, it belongs to the US government.

If it isn't clear - he is saying that once a user is targeted for
surveillance - their computer systems (and networks) are compromised by
the NSA in a variety of ways. This includes memory corruption bugs,
obviously.

> 
>> Writing secure software is much, much harder than simply writing
>> comments, writing tests and coding defensively.
> 
> This is a thread about Cryptocat. Cryptocat is a web frontend for a
> couple of protocols. Yes, it is that easy.

The protocol that has the most trouble is the homebrewed multi-party
crypto. Though some of the underlying bits obviously impact the rest of it.

All the best,
Jacob
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Patrick Mylund Nielsen]

On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Eugen Leitl  wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> > If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that
> people
>
> You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?
>
> And http://dee.su/cables ?
>
>
No, I mean an alternative to Cryptocat (i.e. an OTR client with multiparty
communication) that is more secure, and as easy to use.
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Eugen Leitl]

On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 09:12:21AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that people

You mean something like http://dee.su/ ?

And http://dee.su/cables ?

> will use. Talking about how exceedingly easy it is in Internet forums
> doesn't contribute much.
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Patrick Mylund Nielsen]

If it's so easy, go ahead and produce a more secure alternative that people
will use. Talking about how exceedingly easy it is in Internet forums
doesn't contribute much.


On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 5:55 AM, Maxim Kammerer  wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Michael Rogers
>  wrote:
> > Google and Mozilla wouldn't have to run
> > competitions to find holes in their own browsers. There wouldn't be a
> > multi-million-dollar 0day black market.
>
> You are talking about huge projects with complex design, where the
> architecture itself is a source of security issues. Not to mention
> that WebKit and Mozilla weren't engineered for security to begin with.
>
> > It wouldn't be possible for
> > the NSA (according to Snowden) to "simply own" the computer of any
> > person of interest.
>
> Offtopic, but I didn't see any indication in that last paragraph of
> Jacob's interview that Snowden talks about exploiting computers. In
> general, Snowden for some reason is usually terribly vague for someone
> who apparently exhibits excellent command of English language (from my
> non-native speaker's POV).
>
> > Writing secure software is much, much harder than simply writing
> > comments, writing tests and coding defensively.
>
> This is a thread about Cryptocat. Cryptocat is a web frontend for a
> couple of protocols. Yes, it is that easy.
>
> --
> Maxim Kammerer
> Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] New Citizen Lab Report

[Ronald Deibert]

Dear LibTech

I am pleased to announce the latest Citizen Lab publication:

Some Devices Wander by Mistake: Planet Blue Coat Redux
Morgan Marquis-Boire (project leader), Collin Anderson (lead technical 
research), Jakub Dalek (lead technical research), Sarah McKune (lead legal 
research), John Scott-Railton (lead legal research), Ron Deibert, Adam Senft, 
Matthew Carrieri, and Saad Khan.

In this report, our third on Blue Coat Systems, we use a combination of network 
measurement and scanning methods and tools to identify instances of Blue Coat 
ProxySG and PacketShaper devices. This kind of equipment can be used to secure 
and maintain networks, but it can also be used to implement 
politically-motivated restrictions on access to information, and monitor and 
record private communications.

We found Blue Coat devices on public networks of 83 countries (20 countries 
with both ProxySG and PacketShaper, 56 countries with PacketShaper only, and 7 
countries with ProxySG only). Included in these countries are regimes with 
questionable human rights records, and three countries that are subject to US 
sanctions: Iran, Syria, and Sudan. 

Our findings raise questions around the sale of “dual-use” communication 
technologies to national jurisdictions where the implementation of such 
technology has not been publicly debated or shaped by the rule of law. The 
issues raised by this report go beyond one company and its products and 
services, and underscore the imperatives of addressing the global public policy 
implications of internationally-marketed communications infrastructure and 
services.

Alongside the publication of our report, we have sent a letter to 
representatives of Blue Coat and its major investor, the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan (OTPP), inquiring about their human rights due diligence 
processes, and commit to publishing in full their reply.
 
Read the full report [PDF]: 
https://citizenlab.org/storage/bluecoat/CitLab-PlanetBlueCoatRedux-FINAL.pdf

View the map: https://citizenlab.org/storage/bluecoat/fig1.jpg

Explore the data: http://goo.gl/EG7Oc

Read the Washington Post article; http://goo.gl/0BxtD

Email the Citizen Lab: i...@citizenlab.org
 

Ronald Deibert
Director, the Citizen Lab 
and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
Munk School of Global Affairs
University of Toronto
(416) 946-8916
PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
twitter.com/citizenlab
r.deib...@utoronto.ca



--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Maxim Kammerer]

On Tue, Jul 9, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Michael Rogers
 wrote:
> Google and Mozilla wouldn't have to run
> competitions to find holes in their own browsers. There wouldn't be a
> multi-million-dollar 0day black market.

You are talking about huge projects with complex design, where the
architecture itself is a source of security issues. Not to mention
that WebKit and Mozilla weren't engineered for security to begin with.

> It wouldn't be possible for
> the NSA (according to Snowden) to "simply own" the computer of any
> person of interest.

Offtopic, but I didn't see any indication in that last paragraph of
Jacob's interview that Snowden talks about exploiting computers. In
general, Snowden for some reason is usually terribly vague for someone
who apparently exhibits excellent command of English language (from my
non-native speaker's POV).

> Writing secure software is much, much harder than simply writing
> comments, writing tests and coding defensively.

This is a thread about Cryptocat. Cryptocat is a web frontend for a
couple of protocols. Yes, it is that easy.

--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

[liberationtech] CyberGhost5 VPN beta testing

[oana.ciobotea]

Hey guys,

After the discussion we had on Twitter I decided that it would be great if we 
could share the CyberGhost5 beta link on your lists so a lot more interested 
people could test it.
Here is the link:
http://cyberghostvpn.com/download/cg5_Beta.exe

We are really keen on finding people’s opinion.

Thanks a lot!
Kind regards | Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Oana Ciobotea
Social Media Marketing Specialist
CyberGhost S.R.L.
Șoseaua Nicolae Titulescu Nr. 1
Bl A7, SC 4, Et 2, Apt 99
Sector 1, 011131 Bucharest
Romania
Phone: +40 (0)31-1010144 | Fax: +40 (0)31-1010145
Email: oana.ciobo...@cyberghost.ro 
|Skype-Name: oana.ciobotea.cyberghost | Web: 
www.cyberghostvpn.com
Trade Register No.: J40/1278/2011 | UDI/VAT ID: RO28003392

--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Michael Rogers]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 08/07/13 20:35, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> Writing secure software is relatively easy, and does not rely much
> on abstraction layers or whatever OOP ideology is popular at the
> moment. You just document each function' input/output, test it
> somehow, and check input/output requirements when calling any other
> function. The simpler, the better, it's not difficult.

This is contradicted by a mountain of evidence. The great majority of
developers clearly don't find it easy to write secure software. If
they did, we wouldn't see a constant stream of security patches for
new and old software alike. Google and Mozilla wouldn't have to run
competitions to find holes in their own browsers. There wouldn't be a
multi-million-dollar 0day black market. It wouldn't be possible for
the NSA (according to Snowden) to "simply own" the computer of any
person of interest.

Writing secure software is much, much harder than simply writing
comments, writing tests and coding defensively. You might as well say
that good government consists of wearing a suit, talking about laws,
and remembering not to have wars or recessions.

Cheers,
Michael

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)

iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJR28w5AAoJEBEET9GfxSfMLT8H/RUK16xsgpomruwd+qZx3hl6
endDibCLoMFL4zWiTtupOMLjxhyvziZFeLKzLb7HGjch9f8tXKG6SRb1PuedIEAd
znZ8Myeg7somPbrdVnNQOHZycwIpYOpWRyo3ZLXl0enbv8H+RjfzVKB1NWmyvYLM
p5PnRJJOtKcuvkXon00uomVe3yHJrbF0ra8D03btv2+AuOU7pHqk6a+OyYJQMlOy
xFc4IAWVth8Z2MgfbQl0HGEvpdJbkwKWMJf1U8KfZHAr4IyrozGIAupBRRCGL88t
P3xZyDUO36n14uG7x6aSUD2pTe534wmWyWTU8+ABqLiMduqK/p0L9tBdRZqWMG8=
=5mEN
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] DecryptoCat

[Petter Ericson]

On 08 July, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote:

> 
> On 2013-07-08, at 2:48 PM, Reed Black  wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Jul 8, 2013 at 11:00 AM, David Goulet  wrote:
> >> 
> >> Furthermore, looking at those lines of code, there is simply NO comments 
> >> at all,
> >> nothing to help peer review, to explain why this or that is done that way 
> >> and
> >> nothing linked to any design document. This is in my opinion VERY 
> >> important that
> >> developers design their system/subsystem beforehand *especially* a crypto 
> >> design
> >> in a public document. And, if it has to change, the design should be peer
> >> reviewed before even making one line of code.
> >> 
> >> So, the technical critical issue, CryptoCat responded well, quickly but the
> >> point here is that there is a problem in terms of how development is done 
> >> and
> >> how *little* the maintainability of the code is.
> > 
> > I think there is a bigger problem in the commit messages. Looking at
> > the history, many are "tweak" "guehh" "update" "FIX THE BUG" and some
> > of those are tied to large many-purpose Swiss Army Knife commits.
> > 
> > Without descriptive commit messages and single-purpose commits,
> > community review is highly unlikely. It takes an order of magnitude
> > more effort for a reviewer to suss out the intent of a code change.
> > The reviewer is also much less likely to ask about suspicious side
> > effects if he's starting with infinite possibility of intent on first
> > encountering the code. Few volunteers will make a routine effort.
> > 
> > 
> > Remember when someone tried slipping this into the Linux kernel?
> > 
> > + if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid = 0))
> > + retval = -EINVAL;
> > 
> > Ask if something that subtle have been spotted so quickly if it were
> > one of many Swiss Army Knife "guehh" commits.
> 
> I'm sure "guehh" and so on are either exceptions or relate to very irrelevant 
> commits.
> If they're not, then we definitely have a commit documentation problem!
> 
> NK

Looking at the commit history, you do.

Specifically, when fixing bugs, you do note the trac number, but you
do not include a link to the bug in question, and neither do you mention
what the actual cause of the bug was. Instead you write "Fix #",
sometimes with a "hopefully", or "maybe". A brief description of what the
bug/feature entailed, and how it was fixed helps immensely if anything goes
wrong later, and it also makes other peoples understanding of the codebase
significantly more likely.

Also, there are numerous instances where you do one thing, and also various
cosmetics or clean-up operations, for example d158c4cd from late May. Try to 
separate commits into fully independent change sets, where code functionality
commits are clearly marked as such, and code cosmetics likewise.

Generally, software development is messy. Try not to make that show in the
commit history.

Best

/P

> 
> > 
> > 
> > I think any project that relies on community review for security needs
> > to first stop and ask what would make community review likely. At the
> > least, that's some venue for review discussion where the developers
> > are reading, single-function commits, and descriptive commit messages.
> > Does anyone know if there's something like a "best practices" page to
> > point to for maintaining a healthy reviewer community?
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> > emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by 
> emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

-- 
Petter Ericson (pett...@acc.umu.se)
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing 
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at 
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech