Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-17 Thread Susanne Oberhauser
Matt Zimmerman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 05:08:54PM +0100, Susanne Oberhauser wrote:

  Sergey Korzhevsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
   Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove 'root'
   name from a system?
 
  there is none --- to the contrary doing so is Evil (tm) for LSB
  compliant distributions.

 However, to rely on LSB compliance in portable programs is just as
 Evil.

 10 Thou shalt foreswear, renounce, and abjure the vile heresy which
 claimeth that ``All the world's [an LSB-compliant Linux system]'',
 and have no commerce with the benighted heathens who cling to this
 barbarous belief, that the days of thy program may be long even
 though the days of thy current machine be short.


:))) ok, ok, I do --- being no native speaker, I can't abjure that
poetically, but yes, of course there are other operating systems out
there ;), I've even heard of some with very strange names for root,
Stratminidator or the like...

Nevertheless would you agree with me that for systmes claiming to run
on *Linux*, relying on the existence of a user 'root' should be ok?
This would allow portable software to have just *one* platform
specific backend for *all* flavors of Linux, and would ease porting of
such software to Linux.


Susanne



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-17 Thread Alan Cox
On Tue, 2002-12-17 at 15:08, Susanne Oberhauser wrote:
 Nevertheless would you agree with me that for systmes claiming to run
 on *Linux*, relying on the existence of a user 'root' should be ok?
 This would allow portable software to have just *one* platform
 specific backend for *all* flavors of Linux, and would ease porting of
 such software to Linux.

Its a very bad habit but generally safe. If you want be more correct you
canuse getpwuid(0) and ask the OS what root is



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-17 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Tue, Dec 17, 2002 at 04:08:26PM +0100, Susanne Oberhauser wrote:

 Nevertheless would you agree with me that for systmes claiming to run on
 *Linux*, relying on the existence of a user 'root' should be ok?  This
 would allow portable software to have just *one* platform specific backend
 for *all* flavors of Linux, and would ease porting of such software to
 Linux.

Certainly, a program which is not expected to work on anything but an
LSB-compliant system can make this assumption, and many others.  But in this
specific case, it is (in many cases) in fact easier to check for uid=0 than
username=root anyway, and in general, there are relatively few cases where
it makes sense to test for root privileges rather than something more
specific.  With the continuing development and proliferation of more
fine-grained access control systems for Linux, root will become less magic,
and could be removed or assigned reduced privileges.

--
 - mdz



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-17 Thread John Summerfield
On Tue, 17 Dec 2002, Matt Zimmerman wrote:

 On Tue, Dec 17, 2002 at 04:08:26PM +0100, Susanne Oberhauser wrote:

  Nevertheless would you agree with me that for systmes claiming to run on
  *Linux*, relying on the existence of a user 'root' should be ok?  This
  would allow portable software to have just *one* platform specific backend
  for *all* flavors of Linux, and would ease porting of such software to
  Linux.

 Certainly, a program which is not expected to work on anything but an
 LSB-compliant system can make this assumption, and many others.  But in this
 specific case, it is (in many cases) in fact easier to check for uid=0 than
 username=root anyway, and in general, there are relatively few cases where
 it makes sense to test for root privileges rather than something more
 specific.  With the continuing development and proliferation of more
 fine-grained access control systems for Linux, root will become less magic,
 and could be removed or assigned reduced privileges.


Indeed. Engarde Linux has been around a while, and it's hardened with
LIDS. There's no gurantee that root can do anything you'd want to if
you're running LIDS-enabled.

I'm pretty sure you will encounter difficulty if you're using selinux or
Bastille.

Possessors of such systems won't care whether they're LSB-compliant,
though they mare care that tests for privilege fail.

--


Cheers
John.

Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Sergey Korzhevsky
Hi

Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove 'root' name
from a system?
Local user can read /etc/passwd and find out who is really root, so it is
not save us.
For remote logins we can disable root. Is this not enough?

Thank you.
WBR, Sergey



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Alan Cox
On Mon, 2002-12-16 at 11:04, Sergey Korzhevsky wrote:
 Hi

 Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove 'root' name
 from a system?

In many languages the letter sequence root is meaningless, or even not
in their default characters.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Daniel Jarboe
Alan Cox wrote:
 On Mon, 2002-12-16 at 11:04, Sergey Korzhevsky wrote:
  Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove
  'root' name from a system?

 In many languages the letter sequence root is meaningless,
 or even not
 in their default characters.


So what about names like like /etc, /mnt, /var, /bin, /proc, which
probably don't translate well either.  And commands (ls, mv, cp), and
file names (/etc/shadow, /etc/fstab).  Where does one draw the line?

But of course I agree with the UID/GID thing... If something needs
priveledges of UID 0, then the process should check that UID is 0, not
that username is root.  Most any requirement that a username/groupname
be news, ftp, root, nobody, etc is poor design (a bug), but all in all,
standardized system usernames are a good thing, aren't they?

~ Daniel










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Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Alan Cox
On Mon, 2002-12-16 at 14:53, Daniel Jarboe wrote:
 So what about names like like /etc, /mnt, /var, /bin, /proc, which
 probably don't translate well either.  And commands (ls, mv, cp), and
 file names (/etc/shadow, /etc/fstab).  Where does one draw the line?

Wherever you like. Note that for file naming you want symlinks because
the standards make guarantees. Normally people just translate the gui.
However, when you log in, you do with your username...



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Sergey Korzhevsky
It is all right, but when i asked this question, i mean for security. Does
it improve security?


WBR, Sergey




Alan Cox [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent by: Linux on 390 Port [EMAIL PROTECTED]
16.12.2002 18:12
Please respond to Linux on 390 Port


To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc:
Subject:Re: LINUX  Security


On Mon, 2002-12-16 at 14:53, Daniel Jarboe wrote:
 So what about names like like /etc, /mnt, /var, /bin, /proc, which
 probably don't translate well either.  And commands (ls, mv, cp), and
 file names (/etc/shadow, /etc/fstab).  Where does one draw the line?

Wherever you like. Note that for file naming you want symlinks because
the standards make guarantees. Normally people just translate the gui.
However, when you log in, you do with your username...



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Susanne Oberhauser
Sergey Korzhevsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Hi
 
 Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove 'root'
 name from a system?


there is none --- to the contrary doing so is Evil (tm) for LSB
compliant distributions.

From http://www.linuxbase.org/spec/gLSB/gLSB/usernames.html:

   Linux Standard Base Specification 1.3.pr8   
Prev  Chapter 19. Users  Groups   Next
---

User  Group Names

Below is a table of required mnemonic user and group names. This specification
makes no attempt to numerically assign uid or gid numbers. The exception is the
uid and gid for root which are equal to 0.

Table 19-1. Required User  Group Names

+-+
|User  |Group |Comments   |
|--+--+---|
|root  |root  |Administrative user with no restrictions   |

...

Table 19-2. Optional User  Group Names

+---+
|User|Group   |Comments |
|++-|
|adm |adm |Administrative special privileges|
|lp  |lp  |Printer special privileges   |
|sync|sync|Login to sync the system |
|shutdown|shutdown|Login to shutdown the system |
|halt|halt|Login to halt the system |
|mail|mail|Mail special privileges  |
|news|news|News special privileges  |
|uucp|uucp|UUCP special privileges  |
|operator|root|Operator special privileges  |
|man |man |Man special privileges   |
|nobody  |nobody  |Used by NFS  |
+---+




-- 
Susanne Oberhauser penguins SuSE Linux AG
+49-911-74053-574enjoy  Deutschherrnstr. 15-19
[EMAIL PROTECTED] dinosaurs90429 Nürnberg



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 05:08:54PM +0100, Susanne Oberhauser wrote:

 Sergey Korzhevsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

  Could you explain me, please, what is the reason to remove 'root'
  name from a system?

 there is none --- to the contrary doing so is Evil (tm) for LSB
 compliant distributions.

However, to rely on LSB compliance in portable programs is just as Evil.

10   Thou shalt foreswear, renounce, and abjure the vile heresy which claimeth
that ``All the world's [an LSB-compliant Linux system]'', and have no commerce
with the benighted heathens who cling to this barbarous belief, that the days
of thy program may be long even though the days of thy current machine be
short.


--
 - mdz



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-16 Thread John Summerfield
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Sergey Korzhevsky wrote:

 It is all right, but when i asked this question, i mean for security. Does
 it improve security?

Not nearly as much as having a decent password.



--


Cheers
John.

Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-12 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 10:18:07AM +0800, John Summerfield wrote:

 However, don't suppose that not having a root account called root is
 something you would want to do.

It would earn you dirty looks from wizened UNIX folk, but should be
supported.

 Just a couple of hours ago I was looking at a Debian script that asumes
 id -u -n returns root for UID=0.

Please report a bug against that package, or tell me where you saw this and
I will report the bug.

--
 - mdz



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-12 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Fri, Dec 13, 2002 at 05:25:52AM +0800, John Summerfield wrote:

 On Thu, 12 Dec 2002, Matt Zimmerman wrote:
  Please report a bug against that package, or tell me where you saw this and
  I will report the bug.

 The script is su-to-root, the package menu.

Bug

 I'd certainly not bet that the same thing doesn't occur in Red Hat Linux,
 and the fact someone ran RHL without an account called root doesn't mean a
 lot. I'm sure I could run this system for a long time without running into
 the problem.

Probably so.  This is generally valid, but definitely nonstandard.  In the
case of su-to-root, the script will do the wrong thing for users with uid 0
which are not named 'root', which is wrong anyway.

 I don't think using UID=0 as a test for whether a user has the capacity to
 perform some action is all that wonderful either, though I don't know a
 better way. In some cases, one can test by trying to do it - to see if I
 can write in a particular directory, try to create a file there.Lots of
 people here have /usr mounted ro. Some may have played with LIDS. I had a
 play with Engarde Linux a while ago, and root is severely curtailed.

In the case of su-to-root, checking for uid 0 is the best solution available
due to the nature of the interface provided.  It provides a means for
arbitrary commands which require root privileges to be (for example)
launched from a menu interface, by providing the user the opportunity to su.
If they are already root, this is obviously unnecessary.

On a filesystem, the access() system call is the right thing to do.

--
 - mdz



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-12 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:53:54PM -0500, Matt Zimmerman wrote:

 Bug

Bug #172831, that is.

--
 - mdz



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-12 Thread Jeremy Warren
We have not tried it yet but there exists MKS AD4Unix which is an NT/2000
Active Directory Extension to allow Unix authentication and user
information to be stored in Active Directory.

Check out:
http://www.css-solutions.ca/ad4unix/

and

http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1563






  James Melin
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  epin.mn.us   cc:
  Sent by: Linux on Subject:  Re: [LINUX-390] LINUX  
Security
  390 Port
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  ST.EDU


  12/10/2002 01:26
  PM
  Please respond to
  Linux on 390 Port






I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases, or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



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Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information ?

Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-12 Thread John Summerfield
On Thu, 12 Dec 2002, Matt Zimmerman wrote:

 On Thu, Dec 12, 2002 at 04:53:54PM -0500, Matt Zimmerman wrote:

  Bug

 Bug #172831, that is.

Thanks Matt.

One of the things I like about Debian is the ability to report bugs bu
email.

I've not yet tried reporting a bug offline, but I have hopes.


--


Cheers
John.

Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Wesley Parish
On Wednesday 11 December 2002 04:42 am, you wrote:
 Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
 been asked these questions:

 - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
 environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

 - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or violations
 to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

 - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information ?

http://www.linuxsecurity.com/
http://lsm.immunix.org/
http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/
http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=21266
http://www.grsecurity.net/
http://www.snort.org/
http://www.chkrootkit.org/
http://www.wiretapped.net/
http://www.cert.org/

That's what I came up with on short notice.

security-enhanced linux and grsecurity-linux have an intensive development of 
Access Control Lists and Role Based Access Control, though in different ways.  
I expect they would be of equal interest at this preliminary stage.

I don't know anything about SuSE; I don't use it.

Wesley Parish


 Thanks.

-- 
Mau e ki, He aha te mea nui?
You ask, What is the most important thing?
Maku e ki, He tangata, he tangata, he tangata.
I reply, It is people, it is people, it is people.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Joseph Sumi
Thanks to everyone !!
Joe 

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/10/02 06:11PM 
On Wednesday 11 December 2002 04:42 am, you wrote:
 Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
 been asked these questions:

 - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
 environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

 - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or violations
 to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

 - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information ?

http://www.linuxsecurity.com/ 
http://lsm.immunix.org/ 
http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/ 
http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=21266 
http://www.grsecurity.net/ 
http://www.snort.org/ 
http://www.chkrootkit.org/ 
http://www.wiretapped.net/ 
http://www.cert.org/ 

That's what I came up with on short notice.

security-enhanced linux and grsecurity-linux have an intensive development of 
Access Control Lists and Role Based Access Control, though in different ways.  
I expect they would be of equal interest at this preliminary stage.

I don't know anything about SuSE; I don't use it.

Wesley Parish


 Thanks.

-- 
Mau e ki, He aha te mea nui?
You ask, What is the most important thing?
Maku e ki, He tangata, he tangata, he tangata.
I reply, It is people, it is people, it is people.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Carlos Ordonez
Vince, I guess my question is, if I have 50 linux images running under VM
and each of them have a root user, can I have a different password for each
of them? Carlos :-)


Saying goes: Great minds think alike - I say: Great minds think for
themselves!

Carlos A. Ordonez
IBM Corporation
Server Consolidation



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 Vince, can you have multiple root ids and passwords? Carlos :-)

If you're asking whether you can have multiple user IDs with UID=0, then
the answer is yes. UID/GID, shell program and home directory all come
from the PAM server (ACF2, Top Secret, etc.), and there's no reason you
couldn't have multiple UID 0 IDs if you wanted to.

The nice thing about our PAM implementation is that you have a lot of
flexibility when it comes to restricting which Linux images (or
facilities within a Linux system) a given user can access. You might set
it up so that users get root privileges, but only on a particular Linux
image. Or, perhaps you'd let them use Telnet but not FTP. Because the
authentication is processed by ACF2/Top Secret, all of the normal system
entry controls are extended and apply to Linux as well. For example, an
earlier post asked about auditing, and with our PAM plug-in, you will
most definitely see a complete audit trail of Linux sign-on activity in
your z/OS SMF records.

Having said that, multiple UID 0 users might or might not be a good
thing on Linux because there would be no way to segregate their
permissions (that is, once logged on, any root user would have access to
all resources). Keep in mind that PAM is just for user authentication -
if you want true access control then you need something more. This is
where our eTrust Access Control product fits in: it's essentially
z/OS-style resource protection for Linux, and it provides the kind of
granular resource protection (including controlling what root users may
do), auditing, etc. that mainframe sites would be accustomed to.


Vince Re
Computer Associates



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Arty Ecock
On Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:06:39 -0500 David Boyes said:
 If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
 open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly
 against ACF2
 or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
 available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel
 and mainframe
 Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
 our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
 existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all
 that's needed.

Nice. Will it be available for VM:Secure?

How about RACF?

Cheers,
Arty



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Re, Vincent
 if I have 50 linux images running under VM and 
 each of them have a root user, can I have a different 
 password for each of them?

There are lots of options here, depending on exactly what you're trying
to achieve. Personally (as one who hates to remember different
passwords), I would rather have one ID and password, and use security
policy to control which systems I'm allowed to connect to. But if I
prefer, I could just as easily have a different root account/password on
each system. Or a mixture of both. The exact details vary depending on
which security product (ACF2, Top Secret, eTrust Access Control) you're
working with, but in general all of the system entry validation features
of the security products apply. 

Vince Re
Computer Associates



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Carlos Ordonez
Thanks... that's cool - very nicely done Carlos :-)


Saying goes: Great minds think alike - I say: Great minds think for
themselves!

Carlos A. Ordonez
IBM Corporation
Server Consolidation



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 if I have 50 linux images running under VM and
 each of them have a root user, can I have a different
 password for each of them?

There are lots of options here, depending on exactly what you're trying
to achieve. Personally (as one who hates to remember different
passwords), I would rather have one ID and password, and use security
policy to control which systems I'm allowed to connect to. But if I
prefer, I could just as easily have a different root account/password on
each system. Or a mixture of both. The exact details vary depending on
which security product (ACF2, Top Secret, eTrust Access Control) you're
working with, but in general all of the system entry validation features
of the security products apply.

Vince Re
 Computer Associates



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread John Summerfield
On Wed, 11 Dec 2002, Ihno Krumreich wrote:


 I hope my understanding of the terms is right..
 For me accouting is to find out WHO has used a resource how much (to write bills).
 systat does not provide this information. systat just tells you
 how much a resource has been used at a given time. Its main goal
 is to find bottlenecks or to find a reason to the statement the
 system is slow.

I don't know; I've not used it. However, this makes me think it might do
more:
   -x pid | SELF | SUM | ALL
  Report statistics for a given process.  pid is the process
iden-
  tification number. The SELF keyword  indicates  that
statistics

Maybe the information's there. Presumably, Sebastien Godard
[EMAIL PROTECTED], the author, would know what's there and
what can be added.


--


Cheers
John.

Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Kittendorf, Craig
Does it work with Top Secret on z/OS 1.4 ?

 -Original Message-
From:   Re, Vincent [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent:   Tuesday, December 10, 2002 3:32 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:Re: LINUX  Security

The short answer is that yes, we're committed to including PAM server
components in all of our security products.

I believe ACF2 VM and Top Secret VM PAM support are already announced,
and I also believe VM:Secure is in the works. We're also looking at
providing PAM server support in our eTrust Access Control product, which
runs on Windows, Linux (mainframe and Intel) and a number of UNIX
platforms.


Vince Re
Computer Associates



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Alan Cox
On Wed, 2002-12-11 at 13:02, Carlos Ordonez wrote:
 Vince, I guess my question is, if I have 50 linux images running under VM
 and each of them have a root user, can I have a different password for each
 of them? Carlos :-)

You don't have to call your uid 0 root either btw. Unix cares about uid
and cap bits not about the name. The name is a userspace construct
purely for human convenience. So you can have

bofh:*:0:... etc for your root



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Rob van der Heij
At 23:20 10-12-02, Re, Vincent wrote:

If you're asking whether you can have multiple user IDs with UID=0, then
the answer is yes.

We tried this because I thought it would be nice to automatically logon the account 
'Operator' on the console and let it have uid=0, but be able to separate from 'root' 
in that it has its own home directory and things.
Unfortunately that made the 'id' command under root return 'Operator' with all kind of 
annoying effects.

Rob



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Jere Julian
While there are exceptions to every rule it is VERY BAD form to use the
root account for much of anything!  Its just too dangerous.   The
current best practice is to disable logins as root.  First root should
never login over a network and probably should be locked completely.
what one should do instead is setup sudo such that groups of persons
have explicit access to what they need to do.  This has the advantage of
logging any root level actions that are performed and any unauthorized
attempts to perform root level actions.

for more information see 'man sudo' 'man sudoers' and do a google search
on sudo.

-Jere

On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 04:35:43PM +0100, Rob van der Heij wrote:
 At 23:20 10-12-02, Re, Vincent wrote:
 
 If you're asking whether you can have multiple user IDs with UID=0, then
 the answer is yes.
 
 We tried this because I thought it would be nice to automatically logon the account 
'Operator' on the console and let it have uid=0, but be able to separate from 'root' 
in that it has its own home directory and things.
 Unfortunately that made the 'id' command under root return 'Operator' with all kind 
of annoying effects.
 
 Rob
---end quoted text---

-- 
-
   | Jere Julian, RHCE, CCNA  Cisco Systems, Inc.  ITD - IBM Sustaining  |
   | mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]  7025 Kit Creek Rd, RTP, NC 27709  |
-



msg10239/pgp0.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread Michael Katz
Beware though that with the current rootkits available a total idiot with a
browser can download programs that can bypass many of these schemes and
become root very, very, very easily.  You really need to know nothing in
most cases to run these rootkits so beware and keep your ftp, ssh and ssl
daemons patched up to the minute.

M Katz
RAE Internet

-Original Message-
From: Linux on 390 Port [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of
Jere Julian
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 11:24 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security


While there are exceptions to every rule it is VERY BAD form to use the
root account for much of anything!  Its just too dangerous.   The
current best practice is to disable logins as root.  First root should
never login over a network and probably should be locked completely.
what one should do instead is setup sudo such that groups of persons
have explicit access to what they need to do.  This has the advantage of
logging any root level actions that are performed and any unauthorized
attempts to perform root level actions.

for more information see 'man sudo' 'man sudoers' and do a google search
on sudo.

-Jere

On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 04:35:43PM +0100, Rob van der Heij wrote:
 At 23:20 10-12-02, Re, Vincent wrote:

 If you're asking whether you can have multiple user IDs with UID=0, then
 the answer is yes.

 We tried this because I thought it would be nice to automatically logon
the account 'Operator' on the console and let it have uid=0, but be able to
separate from 'root' in that it has its own home directory and things.
 Unfortunately that made the 'id' command under root return 'Operator' with
all kind of annoying effects.

 Rob
---end quoted text---

--
-
   | Jere Julian, RHCE, CCNA  Cisco Systems, Inc.  ITD - IBM Sustaining  |
   | mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]  7025 Kit Creek Rd, RTP, NC 27709  |
-



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-11 Thread John Summerfield
On Wed, 11 Dec 2002 23:42, you wrote:
 On Wed, 2002-12-11 at 13:02, Carlos Ordonez wrote:
  Vince, I guess my question is, if I have 50 linux images running under VM
  and each of them have a root user, can I have a different password for
  each of them? Carlos :-)

 You don't have to call your uid 0 root either btw. Unix cares about uid
 and cap bits not about the name. The name is a userspace construct
 purely for human convenience. So you can have

 bofh:*:0:... etc for your root

However, don't suppose that not having a root account called root is something
you would want to do.

Just a couple of hours ago I was looking at a Debian script that asumes id -u
-n returns root for UID=0.



--
Cheers
John Summerfield


Microsoft's most solid OS: http://www.geocities.com/rcwoolley/
Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread David Boyes
 - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in
 the z/VM environment ?

No.

 If not, how is security handled ?

Purely internally. Treat it as a standalone Unix system, with the exact
same requirements.

 - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access
 or violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

There are entries in /var/log, just as on a normal Unix system. Neale's
hcp command can be used to write those messages from syslog to a
VM-based service, but it is not in the standard distributions.  There is
also rudimentary SVC 76 support for writing accounting records, but this
also doesn't fit the bill.

 - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux
 information ?

It is done exactly like discrete Intel boxes. Your local bookstore
should have plenty of Linux security books.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread A. Harry Williams
On Tue, 10 Dec 2002 11:52:52 -0500 David Boyes said:
 - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in
 the z/VM environment ?

No.

 If not, how is security handled ?

Purely internally. Treat it as a standalone Unix system, with the exact
same requirements.

 - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access
 or violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

There are entries in /var/log, just as on a normal Unix system. Neale's
hcp command can be used to write those messages from syslog to a
VM-based service, but it is not in the standard distributions.  There is
also rudimentary SVC 76 support for writing accounting records, but this
also doesn't fit the bill.


SVC 76 is LOGREC (aka EREP), and while similar in many ways to syslog,
isn't going to have SMF80 records, which I believe is what
you would want from MVS.  The syslog is going to record that in Linux.
One of the biggest differences between SMF and syslog is that SMF
allows binary data.

For VM, if journalling is turned on, SMF80 would be accounting records
cut and collected by DISKACNT on most systems or your ESM would do it itself.
Other type of SMF records would end up being Monitor records.  With the
DIAG driver, you could use DIAG 4C to cut VM accounting records from
Linux, but you would need OPTION ACCT in the CP directory and
they still wouldn't be the exact same format as the CP generated bad logon,
bad link etc.




 - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux
 information ?

It is done exactly like discrete Intel boxes. Your local bookstore
should have plenty of Linux security books.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread James Melin
I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases, or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



|-+
| |   Joseph Sumi  |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   v   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
| |   AM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+
  
--|
  |
  |
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  |
  |   cc:  
  |
  |   Subject:  LINUX  Security   
  |
  
--|




Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information ?

Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Joe Poole
Although I'm not deep enough into the process to be dangerous, you 
might want to look at the z/OS LDAP server.  Check the Redbook 
Securing Linux for zSeries with a Central z/OS (RACF) LDAP Server 
and the two publications SC24-5923-03 and SC24-5924-02 dealing with 
administration and Client programming.  It might answer some of your 
questions.  We're looking at it as a way to perform the old RACHECK 
from a client application to authenticate a user's connection to a 
specific RACF group.

On Tuesday 10 December 2002 13:26, you wrote:
 I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

 Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT
 central domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing
 that has anyone gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2
 secuirity databases, or even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF
 or ACF2 instead of manually trying to synchronize Linux user
 lists/passwords/groups/ etc

 |-+
 |
 | |   Joseph Sumi  |
 | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
 | |   v   |
 | |   Sent by: Linux on|
 | |   390 Port |
 | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
 | |   IST.EDU |
 | |
 | |
 | |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
 | |   AM   |
 | |   Please respond to|
 | |   Linux on 390 Port|
 |
 |-+
 |
   -
   -|
   
   |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
   | |
   | cc: 
   |   | Subject:
   |  LINUX  Security   
   |  |
   |
   -
   -|

 Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and
 I've been asked these questions:

 - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the
 z/VM environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

 - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
 violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

 - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux
 information ?

 Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Re, Vincent
If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly against ACF2
or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel and mainframe
Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all that's needed. 

Compared to the LDAP approach, our PAM implementation is faster, just as
secure (we use OpenSSL on the network connection), and includes a number
of additional features that help you control who should be able to
connect to a particular Linux image. 

It's described in the ACF2 6.5 Product Announcement, which you can read
here:
http://www3.ca.com/Files/ProductAnnouncements/etrust_acf2_pd_rel65.pdf

Vince Re
Computer Associates

-Original Message-
From: James Melin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security

I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases,
or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



|-+
| |   Joseph Sumi  |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   v   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
| |   AM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+
 
---
---|
  |
|
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
  |   cc:
|
  |   Subject:  LINUX  Security
|
 
---
---|




Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information
?

Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread David Boyes
 If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
 open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly
 against ACF2
 or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
 available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel
 and mainframe
 Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
 our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
 existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all
 that's needed.

Nice. Will it be available for VM:Secure?

-- db





Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread James Melin
We are currently an ACF2 shop, but as of Sunday the 15th, we're RACF  -
unfortunately for us. We are removing every piece of CA software on our
OS/390 system because of the prohibitively high licensing costs our manager
'negotiated'.  I would have preferred to keep ACF2, but alas.




|-+
| |   Re, Vincent|
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   m   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 01:48 |
| |   PM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+
  
--|
  |
  |
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  |
  |   cc:  
  |
  |   Subject:  Re: LINUX  Security   
  |
  
--|




If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly against ACF2
or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel and mainframe
Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all that's needed.

Compared to the LDAP approach, our PAM implementation is faster, just as
secure (we use OpenSSL on the network connection), and includes a number
of additional features that help you control who should be able to
connect to a particular Linux image.

It's described in the ACF2 6.5 Product Announcement, which you can read
here:
http://www3.ca.com/Files/ProductAnnouncements/etrust_acf2_pd_rel65.pdf

Vince Re
Computer Associates

-Original Message-
From: James Melin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security

I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases,
or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



|-+
| |   Joseph Sumi  |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   v   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
| |   AM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+

---
---|
  |
|
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
  |   cc:
|
  |   Subject:  LINUX  Security
|

---
---|




Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information
?

Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Gowans, Chuck
Is this a proprietary solution?

We have installed (on an Intel-based Linux) a PAM plug-in that authenticates
- via LDAP - to both RACF and ACF2 LDAP servers running on OS/390 2.10; We
are just starting to test the same on S390-based Linux.

How would the CA Direct-to-ACF2/TopSecret solution be faster?

Chuck Gowans
USDA - Nat'l IT Center



-Original Message-
From: Re, Vincent [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:49 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security


If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly against ACF2
or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel and mainframe
Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all that's needed.

Compared to the LDAP approach, our PAM implementation is faster, just as
secure (we use OpenSSL on the network connection), and includes a number
of additional features that help you control who should be able to
connect to a particular Linux image.

It's described in the ACF2 6.5 Product Announcement, which you can read
here:
http://www3.ca.com/Files/ProductAnnouncements/etrust_acf2_pd_rel65.pdf

Vince Re
Computer Associates

-Original Message-
From: James Melin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security

I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases,
or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



|-+
| |   Joseph Sumi  |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   v   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
| |   AM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+

---
---|
  |
|
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
  |   cc:
|
  |   Subject:  LINUX  Security
|

---
---|




Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information
?

Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Re, Vincent
The short answer is that yes, we're committed to including PAM server
components in all of our security products. 

I believe ACF2 VM and Top Secret VM PAM support are already announced,
and I also believe VM:Secure is in the works. We're also looking at
providing PAM server support in our eTrust Access Control product, which
runs on Windows, Linux (mainframe and Intel) and a number of UNIX
platforms. 


Vince Re
Computer Associates  

-Original Message-
From: David Boyes [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 3:07 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security

 If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
 open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly
 against ACF2
 or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
 available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel
 and mainframe
 Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
 our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
 existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all
 that's needed.

Nice. Will it be available for VM:Secure?

-- db





Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Carlos Ordonez
Vince, can you have multiple root ids and passwords? Carlos :-)


Saying goes: Great minds think alike - I say: Great minds think for
themselves!

Carlos A. Ordonez
IBM Corporation
Server Consolidation



|-+---
| |   Re, Vincent   |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   om |
| |   Sent by: Linux  |
| |   on 390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   RIST.EDU   |
| |   |
| |   |
| |   12/10/2002 02:48|
| |   PM  |
| |   Please respond  |
| |   to Linux on 390 |
| |   Port|
| |   |
|-+---
  
---|
  |
   |
  |To:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   |
  |cc: 
   |
  | From:  
   |
  |   Subject:  Re: LINUX  Security   
   |
  |
   |
  
---|




If you are an ACF2 (or CA-Top Secret) customer, then we have an
open-source PAM plug-in that lets you authenticate directly against ACF2
or Top Secret. The client side (the part that runs on Linux) is
available in source code or pre-built RPM form (both Intel and mainframe
Linux). The server is simply a built-in integrated part of ACF2. With
our plug-in installed, you need no user definition on Linux - your
existing mainframe security rules and passwords are all that's needed.

Compared to the LDAP approach, our PAM implementation is faster, just as
secure (we use OpenSSL on the network connection), and includes a number
of additional features that help you control who should be able to
connect to a particular Linux image.

It's described in the ACF2 6.5 Product Announcement, which you can read
here:
http://www3.ca.com/Files/ProductAnnouncements/etrust_acf2_pd_rel65.pdf

Vince Re
Computer Associates

-Original Message-
From: James Melin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: LINUX  Security

I'd like to add a follow-on question to this

Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT central
domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing that has anyone
gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2 secuirity databases,
or
even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually
trying to synchronize Linux user lists/passwords/groups/ etc



|-+
| |   Joseph Sumi  |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   v   |
| |   Sent by: Linux on|
| |   390 Port |
| |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| |   IST.EDU |
| ||
| ||
| |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
| |   AM   |
| |   Please respond to|
| |   Linux on 390 Port|
| ||
|-+

---
---|
  |
|
  |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
  |   cc:
|
  |   Subject:  LINUX  Security
|

---
---|




Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and I've
been asked these questions:

- Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the z/VM
environment ? If not, how is security handled ?

- Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
violations
to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

- Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux information
?

 Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Re, Vincent
 Is this a proprietary solution?

The client side (the PAM plug-in that runs on Linux) is open-source. In
the example we talked about below, the *server* - which is an integrated
feature of our ACF2 (or our other security products) - is proprietary,
but there's no reason that IBM (or anyone else) couldn't develop an
alternate server of their own. In this regard, our PAM plug-in is
exactly like what you're using for LDAP: the protocol and clients are
open-source, but the LDAP server implementation (whether you use IBM's
or ours) is proprietary. 

 How would the CA Direct-to-ACF2/TopSecret solution be faster?

The short answer is that our protocol is more efficient because it's
tailored to the specific needs of a Linux user logging on through PAM.
In contrast, LDAP is a general purpose function capable of much more
than just authenticating Linux users, and this added complexity makes it
less efficient. Since ACF2 includes both LDAP and direct PAM interfaces,
you could certainly setup both and compare...I believe you'll see less
CPU utilization and network traffic with our PAM solution. 


Vince Re
Computer Associates  



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Wolfe, Gordon W
Keep us informed on this, will you Joe?

Christmas is a funny season.  What other time of the year do you sit in front of a 
dead tree and eat candy out of your socks?
Gordon Wolfe, Ph.D. (425)865-5940
VM Technical Services, The Boeing Company

 --
 From: Joe Poole
 Reply To: Linux on 390 Port
 Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 11:31 AM
 To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject:  Re: LINUX  Security
 
 Although I'm not deep enough into the process to be dangerous, you 
 might want to look at the z/OS LDAP server.  Check the Redbook 
 Securing Linux for zSeries with a Central z/OS (RACF) LDAP Server 
 and the two publications SC24-5923-03 and SC24-5924-02 dealing with 
 administration and Client programming.  It might answer some of your 
 questions.  We're looking at it as a way to perform the old RACHECK 
 from a client application to authenticate a user's connection to a 
 specific RACF group.
 
 On Tuesday 10 December 2002 13:26, you wrote:
  I'd like to add a follow-on question to this
 
  Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT
  central domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing
  that has anyone gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or ACF2
  secuirity databases, or even authenticate logon using LDAP into RACF
  or ACF2 instead of manually trying to synchronize Linux user
  lists/passwords/groups/ etc
 
  |-+
  |
  | |   Joseph Sumi  |
  | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
  | |   v   |
  | |   Sent by: Linux on|
  | |   390 Port |
  | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
  | |   IST.EDU |
  | |
  | |
  | |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
  | |   AM   |
  | |   Please respond to|
  | |   Linux on 390 Port|
  |
  |-+
  |
-
-|

|   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
| |
| cc: 
|   | Subject:
|  LINUX  Security   
|  |
|
-
-|
 
  Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM, and
  I've been asked these questions:
 
  - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the
  z/VM environment ? If not, how is security handled ?
 
  - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
  violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?
 
  - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux
  information ?
 
  Thanks.
 
 



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread John Summerfield
On Tue, 10 Dec 2002, A. Harry Williams wrote:

  - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access
  or violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?

I don't know of a way to detect accesses to datasets a user shouldn't be
accessing. An ordinary user can't read /etc/shadow, but I don't know how
to detect the attempt.

 There are entries in /var/log, just as on a normal Unix system. Neale's
 hcp command can be used to write those messages from syslog to a
 VM-based service, but it is not in the standard distributions.  There is
 also rudimentary SVC 76 support for writing accounting records, but this
 also doesn't fit the bill.
There is accounting available. Look at sysstat, homepage
http://perso.wanadoo.fr/sebastien.godard/

I've no idea how it performs, accounting is not something I've wanted to
do.




--


Cheers
John.

Join the Linux Support by Small Businesses list at
http://mail.computerdatasafe.com.au/mailman/listinfo/lssb



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Joe Poole
Will do.  Also, for those with access to the presentations from the 
October Tech Conference in Miami (VM/VSE/zOS/Linux) see A02 and A08 
by Jon Furminger of IBM.  Good overviews.  

On Tuesday 10 December 2002 15:37, you wrote:
 Keep us informed on this, will you Joe?

 Christmas is a funny season.  What other time of the year do you
 sit in front of a dead tree and eat candy out of your socks? Gordon
 Wolfe, Ph.D. (425)865-5940
 VM Technical Services, The Boeing Company

  --
  From: Joe Poole
  Reply To: Linux on 390 Port
  Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 11:31 AM
  To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Subject:  Re: LINUX  Security
 
  Although I'm not deep enough into the process to be dangerous, you
  might want to look at the z/OS LDAP server.  Check the Redbook
  Securing Linux for zSeries with a Central z/OS (RACF) LDAP
  Server and the two publications SC24-5923-03 and SC24-5924-02
  dealing with administration and Client programming.  It might
  answer some of your questions.  We're looking at it as a way to
  perform the old RACHECK from a client application to authenticate
  a user's connection to a specific RACF group.
 
  On Tuesday 10 December 2002 13:26, you wrote:
   I'd like to add a follow-on question to this
 
   Has anone gotten Linux to update user ID's/Passwords from an NT
   central domain ? Is it possible to synchronize those, or failing
   that has anyone gotten Linux security to refresh from RACF or
  ACF2 secuirity databases, or even authenticate logon using LDAP
  into RACF or ACF2 instead of manually trying to synchronize Linux
  user lists/passwords/groups/ etc
 
   |-+
   |
   | |   Joseph Sumi  |
   | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
   | |   v   |
   | |   Sent by: Linux on|
   | |   390 Port |
   | |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]|
   | |   IST.EDU |
   | |
   | |
   | |   12/10/2002 09:42 |
   | |   AM   |
   | |   Please respond to|
   | |   Linux on 390 Port|
   |
   |-+
   |
 --
 ---
  -
 |
 
 |   To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 |
 | cc:
 |   | 
Subject:
 |
 |  LINUX  Security
 |
 --
 ---
  -
 |
 
   Hello, we have just started to research SUSE Linux under z/VM,
  and I've been asked these questions:
 
   - Does SUSE Linux issue any SAF (RACF) calls for security in the
   z/VM environment ? If not, how is security handled ?
 
   - Are there any types of SMF records cut to record access or
   violations to resources in a Linux z/VM environment ?
 
   - Does anyone have a link to more specific security / Linux
   information ?
 
   Thanks.



Re: LINUX Security

2002-12-10 Thread Re, Vincent
 Vince, can you have multiple root ids and passwords? Carlos :-)

If you're asking whether you can have multiple user IDs with UID=0, then
the answer is yes. UID/GID, shell program and home directory all come
from the PAM server (ACF2, Top Secret, etc.), and there's no reason you
couldn't have multiple UID 0 IDs if you wanted to. 

The nice thing about our PAM implementation is that you have a lot of
flexibility when it comes to restricting which Linux images (or
facilities within a Linux system) a given user can access. You might set
it up so that users get root privileges, but only on a particular Linux
image. Or, perhaps you'd let them use Telnet but not FTP. Because the
authentication is processed by ACF2/Top Secret, all of the normal system
entry controls are extended and apply to Linux as well. For example, an
earlier post asked about auditing, and with our PAM plug-in, you will
most definitely see a complete audit trail of Linux sign-on activity in
your z/OS SMF records.   

Having said that, multiple UID 0 users might or might not be a good
thing on Linux because there would be no way to segregate their
permissions (that is, once logged on, any root user would have access to
all resources). Keep in mind that PAM is just for user authentication -
if you want true access control then you need something more. This is
where our eTrust Access Control product fits in: it's essentially
z/OS-style resource protection for Linux, and it provides the kind of
granular resource protection (including controlling what root users may
do), auditing, etc. that mainframe sites would be accustomed to. 


Vince Re
Computer Associates
 



Re: Linux security questions

2002-05-03 Thread John Summerfield

 I have to find some answers to these questions for our security
 plan (why is that part always harder than the install).  This is
 for SuSE 2.4.7 kernel.


 1. How can I enforce a password to contain at least 1
numeric, 1 alpha, and 1 special character?

I suspect you will need to change passwd (unix passwords) or smbpasswd
(passwords for Windows users) or provide a wrapper and hide those programs.


 2. How can I lockout a userid after 3 bad attempts at
password

pass.

It's an invitation to a DoS attack tough.

 3. How can I set a login to timeout if a valid userid/pwd
is not entered within 2 minutes?


Isn't one minute good enough?

The standard login has one minute; ssh (I think) has its own limit which may be
different, but it does time out.

I have to say one minute can be a pain. I've had problems when the system was
thrashing (on Linux AND OS/2) and I could not login within the minute so as to
be able to investigate.



--
Cheers
John Summerfield

Microsoft's most solid OS: http://www.geocities.com/rcwoolley/

Note: mail delivered to me is deemed to be intended for me, for my disposition.

==
If you don't like being told you're wrong,
be right!



Re: Linux security questions

2002-05-02 Thread Ulrich Weigand

Mary Cortes wrote:

1. How can I enforce a password to contain at least 1
   numeric, 1 alpha, and 1 special character?

2. How can I lockout a userid after 3 bad attempts at
   password

3. How can I set a login to timeout if a valid userid/pwd
   is not entered within 2 minutes?

This is all stuff handled by the PAM (Pluggable Authentication
Modules) mechanism.

Unfortunately, PAM is so infinitely configurable that I'm
always at a loss trying to find out how to achieve any
particular setting ;-(

Maybe someone else knows the details, otherwise I can only
suggest reading the documentation, starting with 'man pam'
and looking under /usr/doc/packages/pam/.

Bye,
Ulrich

--
  Dr. Ulrich Weigand
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Linux security questions

2002-05-02 Thread Post, Mark K

Marcy,

Most of this would be controlled by /etc/login.defs.  I don't know if PAM
overrules what's in here, honors it, ignores it, or what, though.

1. I'm not sure you can enforce this, per se, but if you enable cracklib
checking of passwords, they'll be reasonably strong passwords.
CRACKLIB_DICTPATH  /var/cache/cracklib/cracklib_dict

2. I don't know if locking out someone is possible, out of the box.

3. Two minutes is kind of long, but:
LOGIN_TIMEOUT   120

Mark Post

-Original Message-
From: Marcy Cortes [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Thursday, May 02, 2002 4:37 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Linux security questions


I have to find some answers to these questions for our security
plan (why is that part always harder than the install).  This is
for SuSE 2.4.7 kernel.


1. How can I enforce a password to contain at least 1
   numeric, 1 alpha, and 1 special character?

2. How can I lockout a userid after 3 bad attempts at
   password

3. How can I set a login to timeout if a valid userid/pwd
   is not entered within 2 minutes?

Thanks in advance!

Marcy Cortes
VM Systems Programming
Wells Fargo Services Company



Re: Linux Security

2001-12-20 Thread Post, Mark K

Gerard,

Just a quick look at the links on the linuxvm.org site turned up these.
There are others that will be more valuable coming from other people (and
then I get to add them to the list of links!):
Site Security Handbook - http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2196.html
Securing DNS (Linux version) - http://www.psionic.com/papers/dns/dns-linux
Linux-Privs - POSIX capabilities (security) -
http://www.uk.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
Linux Security State of the Union -
http://oss.software.ibm.com/developer/opensource/linux/whitepapers/LTC-Secur
ity-Whitepaper-external.pdf

Mark Post

-Original Message-
From: Gerard Graham [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 10:00 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Linux Security


In our efforts to move Linux along we are try to get internet access to our
mainframe running Linux under VM. With that said I need to furnish my
security
department with documentation and articles that releate to Linux security.
This
is a new world for them and the better understanding they have of Linux
security
the faster they will move in getting our Linux out to the net. The VM RACF
or
ACF2 stuff I can handle I just need more security doc on Linux. Can anyone
point
me in the right direction?



Re: Linux Security

2001-12-20 Thread Werner

On Thu, 20 Dec 2001, Gerard Graham wrote:

 In our efforts to move Linux along we are try to get internet access to our
 mainframe running Linux under VM. With that said I need to furnish my security
 department with documentation and articles that releate to Linux security. This
 is a new world for them and the better understanding they have of Linux security
 the faster they will move in getting our Linux out to the net. The VM RACF or
 ACF2 stuff I can handle I just need more security doc on Linux. Can anyone point
 me in the right direction?

I'm doing a lot of security work and part of my job was to come up with a
comprehensive security standard and procedure for all our Linux servers
which are connected to the Internet (we are constantly under a security
audit by another company).

Here are my recommendations:

- Securing Linux: Step-by-Step from the SANS institute:
   http://www.sansstore.org/

   Try to follow these steps as close as possible for getting basic
   security installed on your servers.

- Securing  Optimizing Linux: The Ultimate Solution
  http://www.puschitz.com/Security.html

  This book is a must. It helps you to install _very_ secure Linux
  servers.

Hope this helps
Werner