Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread David Howe

at Monday, January 27, 2003 7:50 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
was seen to say:
 This is not correct. VPN simply extends security policy to a different
 location. A VPN user must make sure that local security policy
 prevents other traffic from entering VPN connection.
This is nice in theory, but in practice is simply not true. even
assuming that the most restrictive settings are used (user may not
install software by admin setting, has no local administration on his
machine, IP traffic other than via the VPN is exclusive to the vpn
client) it is *still* possible that the machine could be compromised by
(say) an email virus who then bypasses security by any one of a dozen
routes.




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread cowie


  Wow, for a minute I thought I was looking at one of our old
  plots, except for the fact that the x-axis says January 2003
  and not September 2001 :) :)
 
 seeing that the etiology and effects of the two events were quite
 different, perhaps eyeglasses which make them look the same are
 not as useful as we might wish?
 
 randy

If you've been watching, you might agree that the interesting thing is 
not that it looked like that in September 2001,  but that we really
haven't seen a signal that looks like that SINCE September 2001.  

The large differences between the worms are exactly what should make us  
doubly interested in fingering the common mechanism that connects very 
high speed, high diversity wormscan to increased bgp activity.

So far it's been visible as an apparently accidental byproduct of an attack
with other goals.  Are you willing to bet your bifocals that the same 
mechanism can't be weaponized and used against the routing infrastructure 
directly in the future?

--
James Cowie
Renesys Corporation
http://gradus.renesys.com





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread Jack Bates

From:


 So far it's been visible as an apparently accidental byproduct of an
attack
 with other goals.  Are you willing to bet your bifocals that the same
 mechanism can't be weaponized and used against the routing infrastructure
 directly in the future?


Yet the question becomes the reasoning behind it. How much is a direct
result of the worm and how much is a result of actions based on the NE's?
The other question is BGP deployment within smaller networks. I've seen a
lot of different BGP configs handed down from reputable NEs to smaller
businesses and ISPs. Unfortunately, the configs are usually comparable to
what you'd use in a network that has peers beneath it versus what a network
that only has two uplinks requires (ie, AS filtering not really required).

It is quite common that /24 networks listed on connected interfaces not be
null routed which has it's good points and bad. When you lose the interface,
the traffic will stop at the local ISP's BGP routers if using ARIN assigned
addresses or it will stop at the upstream provider's routers due to
aggregates if using their IPs. In general, unless cost is an issue, it's
usually good to let the packet come all the way to your network. It makes
external troubleshooting easier and keeps BGP stable so long as the peering
connection isn't lost. Of course, people need to learn to use metrics when
doing null routes. Some people forget they exist. :)

BGP update storms are enough to drop some peering sessions due to
underpowered routers. Some large providers reject updates if the network
goes critical in order to keep traffic manageable while the problem is
determined and rectified. So while I do agree that the worms themselves hold
some sway over the BGP activity, the same lack of preparation that allowed
the worm to run so rampant can also be seen in the networks themselves.

I personally have dealt with enough DOS/DDOS attacks that I have a emergency
plan in place which allows as much control over the network from remote
without depending on the network itself. I have an understanding of how my
network is effected by different loads and which direction cascade failures
will go. Luckily, I have a relatively small network, yet such an
understanding and research should exist for any network regardless of size.
The records of both worms should be indications of the weak points in
people's networks.

Jack Bates
BrightNet Oklahoma




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread cowie

  So far it's been visible as an apparently accidental byproduct of an
 attack
  with other goals.  Are you willing to bet your bifocals that the same
  mechanism can't be weaponized and used against the routing infrastructure
  directly in the future?
 
 
 Yet the question becomes the reasoning behind it. How much is a direct
 result of the worm and how much is a result of actions based on the NE's?

Good question. null routing of traffic destined to a network with a BGP
interface on it will cause the session to drop. That is a BGP effect due
to engineers' actions, indirectly triggered by the worm.  

On the other hand, we also know (from private communications and from
other mailing lists.. ahem) that high rate and high src/dst diversity
of scans causes some network devices to fail (devices that cache flows, or
devices that suffer from cpu overload under such conditions). 

Some BGP-speaking routers (not all, by any means, but some subpopulation)
found themselves pegged at 100% CPU on Saturday.  Just one example: 

   http://noc.ilan.net.il/stats/ILAN-CPU/new-gp-cpu.html

Whether you believe anthropogenic explanations for the instability 
depends on how fast you believe NEs can look, think, and type, compared
to the speed with which the BGP announcement and withdrawal rates are 
observed to take off.  For my part, I'd bet that the long slow exponential 
decay (with superimposed spiky noise) is people at work.  But the initial 
blast is not.

--
James Cowie
Renesys Corporation
http://gradus.renesys.com



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread Jack Bates

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

snip
 On the other hand, we also know (from private communications and from
 other mailing lists.. ahem) that high rate and high src/dst diversity
 of scans causes some network devices to fail (devices that cache flows, or
 devices that suffer from cpu overload under such conditions).

 Some BGP-speaking routers (not all, by any means, but some subpopulation)
 found themselves pegged at 100% CPU on Saturday.  Just one example:

http://noc.ilan.net.il/stats/ILAN-CPU/new-gp-cpu.html

Was it not known that under certain conditions the router would flatline?
What percautionary measures were put into place in such an event to limit
the damage?

 Whether you believe anthropogenic explanations for the instability
 depends on how fast you believe NEs can look, think, and type, compared
 to the speed with which the BGP announcement and withdrawal rates are
 observed to take off.  For my part, I'd bet that the long slow exponential
 decay (with superimposed spiky noise) is people at work.  But the initial
 blast is not.

When the crisis is on you, it's too late. You are either prepared and know
exactly what to do at that critical moment or you don't. You either had a 5
minute response time to the crisis or you didn't. We also know (from private
communications and from other mailing lists.. yes, I'm a thief :) that many
NEs were caught with their pants down, a mistake they aren't apt to do
again. It comes down to one's outlook. Do you just configure and maintain or
do you strive to push it to the envelope? Do you truly know your network?
Remember, it's a living, breathing thing. The complexity of variables makes
complete predictability impossible, and so we must learn to understand it
and how it reacts.

Then again, perhaps I'm a lunatic. :)

Jack Bates
BrightNet Oklahoma




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread Hank Nussbacher

At 09:47 AM 28-01-03 -0600, Jack Bates wrote:


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

snip
 On the other hand, we also know (from private communications and from
 other mailing lists.. ahem) that high rate and high src/dst diversity
 of scans causes some network devices to fail (devices that cache flows, or
 devices that suffer from cpu overload under such conditions).

 Some BGP-speaking routers (not all, by any means, but some subpopulation)
 found themselves pegged at 100% CPU on Saturday.  Just one example:

http://noc.ilan.net.il/stats/ILAN-CPU/new-gp-cpu.html

Was it not known that under certain conditions the router would flatline?


Yes.  And so does Cisco.


What percautionary measures were put into place in such an event to limit
the damage?


A very reactive NOC.  -Hank



 Whether you believe anthropogenic explanations for the instability
 depends on how fast you believe NEs can look, think, and type, compared
 to the speed with which the BGP announcement and withdrawal rates are
 observed to take off.  For my part, I'd bet that the long slow exponential
 decay (with superimposed spiky noise) is people at work.  But the initial
 blast is not.

When the crisis is on you, it's too late. You are either prepared and know
exactly what to do at that critical moment or you don't. You either had a 5
minute response time to the crisis or you didn't. We also know (from private
communications and from other mailing lists.. yes, I'm a thief :) that many
NEs were caught with their pants down, a mistake they aren't apt to do
again. It comes down to one's outlook. Do you just configure and maintain or
do you strive to push it to the envelope? Do you truly know your network?
Remember, it's a living, breathing thing. The complexity of variables makes
complete predictability impossible, and so we must learn to understand it
and how it reacts.

Then again, perhaps I'm a lunatic. :)

Jack Bates
BrightNet Oklahoma





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread Jared Mauch

On Tue, Jan 28, 2003 at 03:34:15PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Some BGP-speaking routers (not all, by any means, but some subpopulation)
 found themselves pegged at 100% CPU on Saturday.  Just one example: 
 
http://noc.ilan.net.il/stats/ILAN-CPU/new-gp-cpu.html

I wonder how much of this was because of packets
destined *TO* the router.  I don't know about you but I'm not
about to go put access-lists on all 600+ interfaces in some of
my routers.  My push is for Cisco to (and i'm sure others agree, as
well as the other vendors who don't have a similar feature today)
to port their ip receive acl to other important platforms.  The
GSR is not the only router that needs to be protected on the internet
and they seem to be missing that bit of direction.

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1829/products_feature_guide09186a00800a8531.html

Not putting this feature in the next releases of software
would be irresponsible on their part after the critical nature
of this attack, IMHO.

- jared

-- 
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from [EMAIL PROTECTED]
clue++;  | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only mine.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-28 Thread Haesu

 http://noc.ilan.net.il/stats/ILAN-CPU/new-gp-cpu.html  Was it not
 known that under certain conditions the router would flatline? What
 percautionary measures were put into place in such an event to limit
 the damage?

scheduler allocate

-hc





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread alex

 Alex, although technically correct, its not practical.  How many end users
 vpn in from home from say a public ip on their dsl modem leaving
 themselves open to attack but now also having this connection back to the
 Secure inside network.  Has anyone heard of any confirmed cases of this
 yet?

So then they are using a wrong tool. Using a wrong security tool tends to
bite one in the censored.

Yes, I have seen attacks mounted via VPNs. Work like charm.

Alex




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Mon, 27 Jan 2003, Scott Granados wrote:


 Alex, although technically correct, its not practical.  How many end users
 vpn in from home from say a public ip on their dsl modem leaving
 themselves open to attack but now also having this connection back to the
 Secure inside network.  Has anyone heard of any confirmed cases of this
 yet?


I hate to blow a vendor's horn, BUT... checkpoint has atleast thought this
through with SecureClient. There is the ability to push down on the vpn
client a local security policy that SHOULD allow you to enforce corporate
network security policy on the remote system.


 On Mon, 27 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
Note that in the case of a worm, a VPN could work against you.  If you
have all the right filters in place at your perimeter and yet let
your employees in through a VPN solution of some sort, you could still
be screwed if one of their home systems gets infected somehow.
  
   So what you're saying is that a really good worm could infiltrate any secure
   network by targetting those who vpn from exterior sources, collect data, and
   then run? Hmmm. Wait a sec. Would that constitute a worm if it had purpose?
  
 
  This is not correct. VPN simply extends security policy to a different
  location. A VPN user must make sure that local security policy prevents
  other traffic from entering VPN connection.
 
  Alex
 
 





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:50:22 EST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:

 This is not correct. VPN simply extends security policy to a different
 location. A VPN user must make sure that local security policy prevents
 other traffic from entering VPN connection.

Given that the head of one of our three-letter-agencies managed to get
this sort of thing wrong,  what makes you think that Joe Middle-Manager
who's more concerned about fixing a spreadsheet will get it correct?



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Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Simon Lockhart

On Mon Jan 27, 2003 at 03:03:09PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Alex, although technically correct, its not practical.  How many end users
  vpn in from home from say a public ip on their dsl modem leaving
  themselves open to attack but now also having this connection back to the
  Secure inside network.  Has anyone heard of any confirmed cases of this
  yet?
 So then they are using a wrong tool. Using a wrong security tool tends to
 bite one in the censored.

So what's the right tool? Yes, dial or dsl directly into corporate network
is my preferred option, but doesn't fit the corporate plan for the future.
 
 Yes, I have seen attacks mounted via VPNs. Work like charm.

As I suspected, but I keep being told that these problems were in old style
VPN clients, and stuff is much better these days. I remain unconvinced.

Simon
-- 
Simon Lockhart |   Tel: +44 (0)1628 407720  (BBC ext 37720)
Technology Manager |   Fax: +44 (0)1628 407701  (BBC ext 37701)
BBC Internet Services  | Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
BBC Technology, Maiden House, Vanwall Road, Maidenhead. SL6 4UB. UK



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread alex

 On Mon Jan 27, 2003 at 03:03:09PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   Alex, although technically correct, its not practical.  How many end users
   vpn in from home from say a public ip on their dsl modem leaving
   themselves open to attack but now also having this connection back to the
   Secure inside network.  Has anyone heard of any confirmed cases of this
   yet?
  So then they are using a wrong tool. Using a wrong security tool tends to
  bite one in the censored.
 
 So what's the right tool? Yes, dial or dsl directly into corporate network
 is my preferred option, but doesn't fit the corporate plan for the future.

Use a client that will push down corporate policy to the client.

  Yes, I have seen attacks mounted via VPNs. Work like charm.
 
 As I suspected, but I keep being told that these problems were in old style
 VPN clients, and stuff is much better these days. I remain unconvinced.

VPN client creates a fake IP interface. If that interface deos not get the
policy of a corporate network, you have an open enterance. Some of the
clients (such as the ones CheckPoint has) do that. Others dont.

Alex




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread alex

  This is not correct. VPN simply extends security policy to a different
  location. A VPN user must make sure that local security policy prevents
  other traffic from entering VPN connection.
 
 Given that the head of one of our three-letter-agencies managed to get
 this sort of thing wrong,  what makes you think that Joe Middle-Manager
 who's more concerned about fixing a spreadsheet will get it correct?

Because it is not that difficult. A security policy of a little office is
very different from a security policy of a three letter agency. In fact,
fixing a spreadsheet could be mode difficult than implementing a security
policy for an office with 5 computers that are connected to the Internet.

Alex





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:33:34 EST, [EMAIL PROTECTED]  said:
 
   This is not correct. VPN simply extends security policy to a different
   location. A VPN user must make sure that local security policy prevents
   other traffic from entering VPN connection.
  
  Given that the head of one of our three-letter-agencies managed to get
  this sort of thing wrong,  what makes you think that Joe Middle-Manager
  who's more concerned about fixing a spreadsheet will get it correct?
 
 Because it is not that difficult. A security policy of a little office is
 very different from a security policy of a three letter agency. In fact,
 fixing a spreadsheet could be mode difficult than implementing a security
 policy for an office with 5 computers that are connected to the Internet.

Ahh... but in the case of SQLSlapper, you have a packet coming in to the
PC.. That traffic doesn't get restricted by your hypothetical security
policy, since it's not entering the VPN, and the outbound traffic isn't
either, because it's locally generated.

This also means that your security policy needs to be fixed so Outlook is not
permitted to connect to any other mail servers - because otherwise the user can
check their AOL account, pick up a Nimda, and whomp it into the VPN.

In fact, if you're talking to the VPN and allow any non-VPN connections
*at any time* (even when the VPN isn't active), you have a vulnerability - think
about downloading a file that has a virus that doesn't have a signature from
the vendors yet (like the first 75,000 copies of Nimda that his our mail
server).  Wanna bet that when that VPN connects, there's some shares available
for the virus to attack? ;)

It's not as easy as it looks.




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Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Barney Wolff

On Mon, Jan 27, 2003 at 08:10:15PM +, Simon Lockhart wrote:
 
 As I suspected, but I keep being told that these problems were in old style
 VPN clients, and stuff is much better these days. I remain unconvinced.

A good VPN client (I'm familiar with Nortel) will enforce no *simultaneous*
access to or from on-VPN and off-VPN destinations.  But I'm not aware of
anything that will enforce that a home or portable machine has never been
connected to anything but the corporate network.  That would take TCPA
or the equivalent, which would not bother me if it's on the company's
machine and under control of the company - maybe the only scenario where
TCPA/Palladium-ng would be acceptable.

-- 
Barney Wolff http://www.databus.com/bwresume.pdf
I'm available by contract or FT, in the NYC metro area or via the 'Net.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread alex

   Given that the head of one of our three-letter-agencies managed to get
   this sort of thing wrong,  what makes you think that Joe Middle-Manager
   who's more concerned about fixing a spreadsheet will get it correct?
  
  Because it is not that difficult. A security policy of a little office is
  very different from a security policy of a three letter agency. In fact,
  fixing a spreadsheet could be mode difficult than implementing a security
  policy for an office with 5 computers that are connected to the Internet.
 
 Ahh... but in the case of SQLSlapper, you have a packet coming in to the
 PC.. That traffic doesn't get restricted by your hypothetical security
 policy, since it's not entering the VPN, and the outbound traffic isn't
 either, because it's locally generated.

Umm... Why is outside world talking to your database server without
supervision?

 This also means that your security policy needs to be fixed so Outlook is
 not permitted to connect to any other mail servers - because otherwise the
 user can check their AOL account, pick up a Nimda, and whomp it into the
 VPN.

Umm.. Why is your security policy allowing outlook to connect to somewhere
other than your company mail server?

 In fact, if you're talking to the VPN and allow any non-VPN connections
 *at any time* (even when the VPN isn't active), you have a vulnerability - think
 about downloading a file that has a virus that doesn't have a signature from
 the vendors yet (like the first 75,000 copies of Nimda that his our mail
 server).  Wanna bet that when that VPN connects, there's some shares available
 for the virus to attack? ;)

Nope, in fact, the idea allow everything from inside to out is the reason
the vast majority of the problems in the policy.

 It's not as easy as it looks.

It is very easy. 

Deny everything.
Allow outbound port 80
Allow mail server to 25
Allow ident
If you need netmeeting, allow netmeeting server to other servers.
If you need AIM, allow AIM from workstations to oscar.aol.com and whatever
the name of the other mahine.

I am failing to see a problem.
 
 

-- 




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Simon Lockhart

On Mon Jan 27, 2003 at 04:00:51PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 It is very easy. 
 
 Deny everything.
 Allow outbound port 80
 Allow mail server to 25
 Allow ident
 If you need netmeeting, allow netmeeting server to other servers.
 If you need AIM, allow AIM from workstations to oscar.aol.com and whatever
 the name of the other mahine.
 
 I am failing to see a problem.

That's fine for a non-MS view of the world (admittedly, a view I prefer),
but then you've got to allow TCP 138/139 to all the MS servers in your
organisation (why couldn't they seperate auth from file sharing from...). 
And then whatever protocols Outlook uses to talk to your
Exchange servers (and if I understand it correctly, that might be more than
one to get to Public Folders, etc). And then SAP. And then Business App A. 
And the Business App B. And...  And...

Me? I'd give them ports 443, 80, 53, 25 and 22, and be done with it. 
If you can't do it with those ports, it's probably not implemented right ;-)

Simon
-- 
Simon Lockhart |   Tel: +44 (0)1628 407720  (BBC ext 37720)
Technology Manager |   Fax: +44 (0)1628 407701  (BBC ext 37701)
BBC Internet Services  | Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
BBC Technology, Maiden House, Vanwall Road, Maidenhead. SL6 4UB. UK



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Simon Lockhart

On Mon Jan 27, 2003 at 04:16:00PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Again, but why does it talk to the outside world unsupervised?  Your
 organization clearly has a border that separates its internal systems from
 external ones. Why not apply those restrictions on *those* borders?

From inside the organisation to outside, yes, ish. Except all those SSL sites
on random port numbers. And other protocols which use random port numbers
(not just peer-to-peer, but also things like FTP, etc).

But, we were talking about end-user connected into the inside network using
a VPN. That user needs to have pretty much unfettered access to the
business parts of your internal network. (Okay, mission critical stuff
should be seperately firewalled, but MS makes that hard enough, due to
things like Active Directory, where everything needs to talk to everything).

Simon
-- 
Simon Lockhart |   Tel: +44 (0)1628 407720  (BBC ext 37720)
Technology Manager |   Fax: +44 (0)1628 407701  (BBC ext 37701)
BBC Internet Services  | Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
BBC Technology, Maiden House, Vanwall Road, Maidenhead. SL6 4UB. UK



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003 16:00:51 EST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 It is very easy. 
 
 Deny everything.
 Allow outbound port 80

Bzzt! You just let in an ActiveX exploit. Or Javascript. Or

 Allow mail server to 25

Bzzt! You just let in a new Outlook exploit.

 If you need AIM, allow AIM from workstations to oscar.aol.com and whatever
 the name of the other mahine.

Bzzt! You just let in an AIM exploit.  That's assuming that you even *know*
what the current name of the other machine is this time around - this
laptop has had 6 IP addresses in as many hours.  Remember there's a reason
why 'talk [EMAIL PROTECTED]' isn't as common anymore

 I am failing to see a problem.

Well.. other than you let a box that wants to talk on the VPN get outside
access to 3 things that are *KNOWN* vectors of malware which could then
attack the VPN side of things, no, there's no problem here.



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Re: [Re: Level3 routing issues?]

2003-01-27 Thread Joshua Smith

Simon Lockhart [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 On Mon Jan 27, 2003 at 04:16:00PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Again, but why does it talk to the outside world unsupervised?  Your
  organization clearly has a border that separates its internal systems
from
  external ones. Why not apply those restrictions on *those* borders?
 
 From inside the organisation to outside, yes, ish. Except all those SSL
sites
 on random port numbers. And other protocols which use random port numbers
 (not just peer-to-peer, but also things like FTP, etc).
 
 But, we were talking about end-user connected into the inside network using
 a VPN. That user needs to have pretty much unfettered access to the
 business parts of your internal network. (Okay, mission critical stuff
 should be seperately firewalled, but MS makes that hard enough, due to
 things like Active Directory, where everything needs to talk to
everything).
 

and don't forget the fact that nearly every M$ service pack/'critical' 
update changes what ports that program is using (exchange/outlook are
really bad about this)

joshua


 Simon
 -- 
 Simon Lockhart |   Tel: +44 (0)1628 407720  (BBC ext 37720)
 Technology Manager |   Fax: +44 (0)1628 407701  (BBC ext 37701)
 BBC Internet Services  | Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 BBC Technology, Maiden House, Vanwall Road, Maidenhead. SL6 4UB. UK



Walk with me through the Universe,
 And along the way see how all of us are Connected.
 Feast the eyes of your Soul,
 On the Love that abounds.
 In all places at once, seemingly endless,
 Like your own existence.
 - Stephen Hawking -




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread David G. Andersen

On Sun, Jan 26, 2003 at 12:17:20AM -0500, Tim Griffin mooed:
 
 
 hc wrote:
  I am on Verizon-GNI via Qwest and Genuity and seeing the same problem as
  well.
 
 here's a plot showing the impact on BGP routing tables from seven ISPs 
 (plotted using route-views data): 
 http://www.research.att.com/~griffin/bgp_monitor/sql_worm.html

And as an interesting counterpoint to this, this graph shows
the number of BGP routing updates received at MIT before, during,
and after the worm (3 day window).  Tim's plots showed that the
number of actual routes at the routers he watched was down
significantly - these plots show that the actual BGP traffic
was up quite a bit.  Probably the withdrawals that were taking
routes away from routeviews...

http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~dga/sqlworm.html

  -Dave

-- 
work: [EMAIL PROTECTED]  me:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science   http://www.angio.net/
  I do not accept unsolicited commercial email.  Do not spam me.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread alex


  Deny everything.
  Allow outbound port 80
 Bzzt! You just let in an ActiveX exploit. Or Javascript. Or

And I have successfully blocked everything other than AcriveX or JavaScript
or whatever else.

  Allow mail server to 25
 
 Bzzt! You just let in a new Outlook exploit.

It is talking only to your own server. Presumably you already made sure that
your Outlook by itself does not do anything funny?

  If you need AIM, allow AIM from workstations to oscar.aol.com and whatever
  the name of the other mahine.
 
 Bzzt! You just let in an AIM exploit.  That's assuming that you even *know*
 what the current name of the other machine is this time around - this
 laptop has had 6 IP addresses in as many hours.  Remember there's a reason
 why 'talk [EMAIL PROTECTED]' isn't as common anymore

Oscar.aol.com and whatever the name of another .aol.com machine it is
are the names associated with services that AIM connects to. 

  I am failing to see a problem.
 
 Well.. other than you let a box that wants to talk on the VPN get outside
 access to 3 things that are *KNOWN* vectors of malware which could then
 attack the VPN side of things, no, there's no problem here.

That's why the policy on that box that wants to talk to the secure network
over VPN is to drop all but the traffic to/from gateway VPN client connects
to on the floor. 

It is being done. CheckPoint, for example, manages to manage policy on the
client not to contradict the policy of the site. Why dont others do it is
beyond me.

Alex




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread cowie



  here's a plot showing the impact on BGP routing tables from seven ISPs 
  (plotted using route-views data): 
  http://www.research.att.com/~griffin/bgp_monitor/sql_worm.html
 
 And as an interesting counterpoint to this, this graph shows
 the number of BGP routing updates received at MIT before, during,
 and after the worm (3 day window).  Tim's plots showed that the
 number of actual routes at the routers he watched was down
 significantly - these plots show that the actual BGP traffic
 was up quite a bit.  Probably the withdrawals that were taking
 routes away from routeviews...
 
 http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~dga/sqlworm.html
 
   -Dave

Wow, for a minute I thought I was looking at one of our old plots, 
except for the fact that the x-axis says January 2003 and not 
September 2001  :) :)  

Your plot is consistent with what we saw on Saturday as well.  Looks 
much like a little Nimda. 

Blast from the past:

http://www.renesys.com/projects/bgp_instability

--jim

--
James Cowie
Renesys Corporation
http://gradus.renesys.com




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread David G. Andersen

On Mon, Jan 27, 2003 at 06:15:33PM -0800, Randy Bush mooed:
 
  Wow, for a minute I thought I was looking at one of our old
  plots, except for the fact that the x-axis says January 2003
  and not September 2001 :) :)
 
 seeing that the etiology and effects of the two events were quite
 different, perhaps eyeglasses which make them look the same are
 not as useful as we might wish?

  Actually, an eyeballing of the MIT data would suggest that the SQL
worm hit harder and faster than NIMDA, and resulted in a more
drastic effect on routing tables.  I've updated the page I mentioned
before:

  http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~dga/sqlworm.html

  to also contain the graph of MIT updates during the NIMDA worm.

I should note that our route monitor moved closer to MIT's border
router between these updates - it's now colocated in the same datacenter,
and before it was across the street, which made it a bit more susceptable
to link resets during the NIMDA worm attack.  LCS is more prone to
dropping off the network than is the entire MIT campus.  Therefore, the
NIMDA graph probably has a few more session resets (the spikes up to
100,000 routes updated) than it should.

  -Dave

-- 
work: [EMAIL PROTECTED]  me:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science   http://www.angio.net/
  I do not accept unsolicited commercial email.  Do not spam me.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-27 Thread Christopher L. Morrow



On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Bill Woodcock wrote:


   On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
   Lots of traffic on udp port 1434 coming in here via TW Telecom and Sprint
   Looks like we may have a winner for DDoS of the year (so far)
  What kind of traffic levels are you seeing?

 I'm working on it for some friends, and I'm seeing about 900mbits/second
 on a gigabit link coming out of their hosting facility.  Lots and lots of
 Microsoft crap in there, I guess.

gotcha beat :) dual gig pipes, each with sustained 780mbps... from one
facility, 1.5+gbps sustained!!!


 Somebody remind me why Microsoft is still allowed to exist?


I think the reason is somewhere in layer8 eh?? Certianly NOT due to any
good technical reason.




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-26 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, K. Scott Bethke wrote:

  Keep in mind that these problems aren't from 'well behaved' hosts, and
  'well behaved' hosts normally listen to ECN/tcp-window/Red/WRED
  classic DoS attack scenario. :(

 I understand the evils, but are we really at the mercy of situations like
 this?  Of course we can firewall the common sense things ahead of time,

I don't think this one could have been reasonably firewalled using a
non-stateful firewall (such as a simple router access list): the port is
unpriviliged so it will be used as a source port for regular UDP traffic
such as DNS queries. However, rate limiting UDP would have helped. This
is a reasonable thing to do for customers that have a lot of bandwidth
but don't run high-bandwidth UDP protocols.

 we can jump right in and block evil traffic when it happens, after it takes
 down our network but what sorts of things can we design into our networks
 today to help with these situations?

Rate limit everything you can rate limit, make sure your routers and
switches have enough CPU even if interfaces are saturated with
minimum-sized packets to random destinations. But this type of rDOS
(reversed denial of service) is easy: you can simply filter the
offending systems. If it's the other way around (DOS) there is not much
you can do.

To really solve this we need a mechanism for destination hosts to
authorize source hosts to send data in such a way that intermediate
routers/firewalls can check this authorization and drop unauthorized
packets.




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-26 Thread Jack Bates

From: Michael Lamoureux


 Note that in the case of a worm, a VPN could work against you.  If you
 have all the right filters in place at your perimeter and yet let
 your employees in through a VPN solution of some sort, you could still
 be screwed if one of their home systems gets infected somehow.


So what you're saying is that a really good worm could infiltrate any secure
network by targetting those who vpn from exterior sources, collect data, and
then run? Hmmm. Wait a sec. Would that constitute a worm if it had purpose?

Jack Bates
Network Engineer





RE: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Christopher J. Wolff

Of the customers I've had to shut off for being DOS targets, all are
windows boxen.  Perhaps there is a new windows exploit?

Regards,
Christopher J. Wolff, VP CIO
Broadband Laboratories, Inc.
http://www.bblabs.com



-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of
hc
Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 11:39 PM
To: Joel Perez
Cc: Aaron Burnett; Alex Rubenstein; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?



Okay this is getting bad.. one of our routers just locked up from udp 
1434's. Can't even telnet to it now.

-hc

Joel Perez wrote:

My firewalls are going nuts with hits on UDP port 1434 also from 
everywhere!

   -Original Message- 
   From: Aaron Burnett [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
   Sent: Sat 1/25/2003 1:19 AM 
   To: Alex Rubenstein 
   Cc: hc; [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
   Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?
   
   



   On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
   
   
   
I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple
hours, all kinds
of new traffic.
   
like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a
sudden:
   
   
http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/switch9.oct.nac.net-3865.ht
ml
   
   
We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- nearly
1/2 our ports
are in delta alarm right now.
   
Anyone else?
   
   
   Yep. Since about 12:30 am. Getting pounded on UDP port 1434 from
all over
   the world to any address on my network.
   
   

  







RE: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Andrew Staples

Not just L3Genuity is getting whacked.  ELI is getting whacked.
Somebody needs to be gelded.

Andrew




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Alex Rubenstein



This is definately a world-wide problem.

Many networks are reporting all sorts of things. Nothing clear, except
that it's all aimed at 1434.

01:28:33.331686 64.21.34.210.28295  238.192.142.61.1434:  udp 376 [ttl 1]
01:28:33.331720 207.99.21.121.1917  226.39.19.228.1434:  udp 376 [ttl 1]
01:28:33.331772 64.247.0.168.1379  239.194.46.210.1434:  udp 376 [ttl 1]
01:28:33.331841 207.99.77.34.3894  227.154.8.29.1434:  udp 376 [ttl 1]
01:28:33.331992 207.99.21.120.2558  231.16.91.78.1434:  udp 376 [ttl 1]


FYI:

ms-sql-m1434/tcp   #Microsoft-SQL-Monitor
ms-sql-m1434/udp   #Microsoft-SQL-Monitor







On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:


 I am on Verizon-GNI via Qwest and Genuity and seeing the same problem as
 well.

 -hc

 Joel Perez wrote:

 I am also seeing increased traffic on my network. It has gotten so bad for one of 
my edge routers that i cant telnet into it.
 But i am on Qwest and GBLX.
 
  -Original Message-
  From: Alex Rubenstein [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
  Sent: Sat 1/25/2003 1:04 AM
  To: hc
  Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?
 
 
 
 
 
  I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple hours, all kinds
  of new traffic.
 
  like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a sudden:
 
  
http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/switch9.oct.nac.net-3865.html
 
 
  We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- nearly 1/2 our ports
  are in delta alarm right now.
 
  Anyone else?
 
  I will dig more to look at the traffic.
 
 
 
 
  On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:
 
  
   Anyone seeing routing problems with Level3 at this hour? I just
   witnessed tons of prefixes behind level3's network withdraw. Any
   information on what is happening (if you know) would be great. Thanks!
  
   -hc
  
  
  
 
  -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
  --Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --
 
 
 
 
 
 


-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread matthew zeier

Internap has posted an alert noting widespread latency and packetloss
affecting all their pnaps.

Any SQL Server host at my facilily shows an enourmous traffic spike at the
times below.  We've begun filtering udp port 1434 in/out.

- Original Message -
From: Andy Dills [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Alex Rubenstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: hc [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 10:37 PM
Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?



 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:

 
 
  I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple hours, all
kinds
  of new traffic.
 
  like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a sudden:
 
 
http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/switch9.oct.nac.net-3865.html
 
 
  We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- nearly 1/2 our
ports
  are in delta alarm right now.
 
  Anyone else?
 
  I will dig more to look at the traffic.

 Interesting, at almost the exact same time (call it 12:30), qwest dropped
 all but 1000 routes through IAD...still trying to get somebody on the
 phone at their IP noc, not having much luck. Genuity seems fine at the
 moment...

 Any speculation yet? Kind of an odd coincidence of problems...

 Oh, just got through...fiber cut in DC?

 Andy

 
 Andy Dills  301-682-9972
 Xecunet, LLCwww.xecu.net
 
 Dialup * Webhosting * E-Commerce * High-Speed Access






Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread william

Really, really bad - most traffic I see is from this virus/dos:

Extended IP access list 152
deny udp any any eq 1434 (5639464 matches) - 94%
permit ip any any (311888 matches) - 6%

Wow!!!

On Fri, 24 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 
 Really bad.  Quick capture of filter drops:
 
 PROTO 17 (UDP) pkt from (IP's from all over the world)/1033 to (All my IP
 space)/1434 dropped
 
 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:
 
 
  Okay this is getting bad.. one of our routers just locked up from udp
  1434's. Can't even telnet to it now.
 
  -hc
 
  Joel Perez wrote:
 
  My firewalls are going nuts with hits on UDP port 1434 also from
  everywhere!
  
 -Original Message-
 From: Aaron Burnett [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Sat 1/25/2003 1:19 AM
 To: Alex Rubenstein
 Cc: hc; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?
  
  
  
  
  
 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
  
 
 
  I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple hours,
  all kinds
  of new traffic.
 
  like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a
  sudden:
 
 
  http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/switch9.oct.nac.net-3865.html
 
 
  We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- nearly 1/2
  our ports
  are in delta alarm right now.
 
  Anyone else?
 
  
 Yep. Since about 12:30 am. Getting pounded on UDP port 1434 from
  all over
 the world to any address on my network.
  
  
  
  
  
 
 




New worm/DOS/Level3 routing issues

2003-01-25 Thread Jack Bates

repost* Forgive me if this shows up twice. Mail is flaked via this smtp, and
the last time I sent this, I accidentally sent it to the individual and not
list. heh.

Temporary block in place. My border cpu was starting to hammer up.

Outbound stat about 2 minutes later:
deny udp any any eq 1434 (445523 matches)
permit ip 69.8.0.0 0.0.63.255 any (55749 matches)
permit ip 206.27.138.0 0.0.1.255 any
permit ip 206.30.96.0 0.0.31.255 any (97851 matches)
permit ip 205.162.224.0 0.0.15.255 any (146920 matches)
permit ip 205.240.128.0 0.0.15.255 any (49146 matches)
permit ip 204.249.192.0 0.0.15.255 any (27351 matches)
permit ip 192.133.7.0 0.0.0.255 any (5 matches)
permit ip 63.136.128.0 0.0.3.255 any (379 matches)
permit ip 216.226.0.0 0.0.31.255 any (27173 matches)
permit ip 64.58.32.0 0.0.15.255 any (17368 matches)
permit ip 206.230.34.128 0.0.0.127 any
permit ip 209.54.40.0 0.0.1.255 any
permit ip 206.61.140.0 0.0.0.255 any (52 matches)

Inbound stat at same time:
deny udp any any eq 1434 (53534 matches)
permit ip any any (431556 matches)

cpu load drop of about 20%Definately a bad port. virus suspected due to
inbound and outbound.


Jack Bates
Network Engineer
BrightNet Oklahoma







RE: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Matthew Kaufman

We are also seeing this traffic at AS4436. Appears to be coming from IP
addresses all over the space. Here's a box that traps all of
165.227.0.0/16:

23:08:13.257197 165.194.123.131.1227  165.227.92.176.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.259778 129.187.150.78.2667  165.227.84.186.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.276695 61.40.143.242.3794  165.227.21.48.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.284191 128.218.133.213.1078  165.227.198.96.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.286648 169.229.141.44.1065  165.227.255.90.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.294512 218.232.109.22.3302  165.227.146.129.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.300412 137.79.10.100.2478  165.227.5.230.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.302869 128.143.100.86.1397  165.227.41.248.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.317327 203.226.64.220.3081  165.227.216.188.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.319908 209.41.170.8.4033  165.227.252.85.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.322365 64.71.177.201.2439  165.227.128.21.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.327937 216.120.60.154.3005  165.227.125.156.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.330435 64.239.145.3.3231  165.227.4.161.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.333016 204.228.229.106.4049  165.227.238.69.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.335350 212.209.231.186.52703  165.227.38.136.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.337930 207.46.200.162.2343  165.227.96.170.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.340388 61.178.83.30.4525  165.227.77.119.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.342887 62.250.16.28.1385  165.227.119.91.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.345468 66.155.116.10.1041  165.227.106.35.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.362506 207.226.255.124.2331  165.227.189.42.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.364964 63.241.139.196.1150  165.227.135.221.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.367422 66.109.239.200.1117  165.227.67.250.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.370042 194.100.187.36.2342  165.227.103.27.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.372501 158.38.141.86.3269  165.227.239.113.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.374959 212.71.66.23.2019  165.227.232.118.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.377417 158.38.141.65.1382  165.227.169.58.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.379915 130.127.8.157.2980  165.227.107.122.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.382496 207.46.200.146.2718  165.227.49.107.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.386100 80.237.200.171.1198  165.227.93.216.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.388557 64.71.180.135.1915  165.227.38.41.1434:  udp 376
23:08:13.394660 211.117.60.188.2806  165.227.49.12.1434:  udp 376

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On 
 Behalf Of Scott Granados
 Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 10:41 PM
 To: Alex Rubenstein
 Cc: hc; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?
 
 
 
 We just had a box inside one of my customers networks start 
 sending tons of small packets not sure what kind yet.
 
 
 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
 
 
 
  I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple hours, all 
  kinds of new traffic.
 
  like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a sudden:
 
  
  
 http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/s
witch9.oct.nac.net-3865.
  html
 
 
  We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- 
 nearly 1/2 our 
  ports are in delta alarm right now.
 
  Anyone else?
 
  I will dig more to look at the traffic.
 
 
 
 
  On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:
 
  
   Anyone seeing routing problems with Level3 at this hour? I just 
   witnessed tons of prefixes behind level3's network withdraw. Any 
   information on what is happening (if you know) would be great. 
   Thanks!
  
   -hc
  
  
  
 
  -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
  --Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --
 
 
 
 




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Adam Korab

Hey Blaine,

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 01:53:49AM -0600, Blaine Kahle wrote:

 Same symptoms here. After disabling MS SQL, which required a reboot as
 the process didn't want to shut down normally, the traffic stopped. I
 found 3 boxes on our network that were generating massive amounts of
 traffic, all of which run MS SQL.

This may or may not prove useful:

http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=enFamilyID=DCFDCBE9-B4EB-4446-9BE7-2DE45CFA6A89

Cheers,

--Adam
-- 
Adam Korab  



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Jack Bates

From: Dave Stewart


 Lots of traffic on udp port 1434 coming in here via TW Telecom and Sprint

 Looks like we may have a winner for DDoS of the year (so far)


Temporary block in place. My border cpu was starting to hammer up.

Outbound stat about 2 minutes later:
deny udp any any eq 1434 (445523 matches)
permit ip 69.8.0.0 0.0.63.255 any (55749 matches)
permit ip 206.27.138.0 0.0.1.255 any
permit ip 206.30.96.0 0.0.31.255 any (97851 matches)
permit ip 205.162.224.0 0.0.15.255 any (146920 matches)
permit ip 205.240.128.0 0.0.15.255 any (49146 matches)
permit ip 204.249.192.0 0.0.15.255 any (27351 matches)
permit ip 192.133.7.0 0.0.0.255 any (5 matches)
permit ip 63.136.128.0 0.0.3.255 any (379 matches)
permit ip 216.226.0.0 0.0.31.255 any (27173 matches)
permit ip 64.58.32.0 0.0.15.255 any (17368 matches)
permit ip 206.230.34.128 0.0.0.127 any
permit ip 209.54.40.0 0.0.1.255 any
permit ip 206.61.140.0 0.0.0.255 any (52 matches)

Inbound stat at same time:
deny udp any any eq 1434 (53534 matches)
permit ip any any (431556 matches)

cpu load drop of about 20%Definately a bad port. virus suspected due to
inbound and outbound.


Jack Bates
Network Engineer
BrightNet Oklahoma





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Alex Rubenstein



MS SQL, or SQL Monitor?



On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Blaine Kahle wrote:

 On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:05:42AM -0500, Kevin Welch wrote:
  I am seeing similar traffic loads on my network at this hour, one of our
  MS SQL servers seemed to be sending a large amount of traffic out to the
  Internet. Still looking into it but too similar for me to avoid sending
  an e-mail.

 Same symptoms here. After disabling MS SQL, which required a reboot as
 the process didn't want to shut down normally, the traffic stopped. I
 found 3 boxes on our network that were generating massive amounts of
 traffic, all of which run MS SQL.

 --
 Blaine Kahle
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 0x178AA0E0


-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --





RE: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Kevin Welch

Same results here, shut down SQL problem went away... started it back
up.. problem started again, so I shut them all down.  One side note all
the egress traffic headed out UU.NET, not our CW or Sprint DS3's...
since we have full routes from all carriers this may be an indicator of
the destination.  Too bad I have a 700MB netflow file I cannot load or
parse or I might be able to provide more detailed information as to a
destination.

-
Kevin Welch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Network EngineerThe Iserv Company
Desk Ph: 616.493.0577   Cell Ph: 616.437.3861


-Original Message-
From: Blaine Kahle [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2003 2:54 AM
To: Kevin Welch
Cc: 'Alex Rubenstein'; 'hc'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:05:42AM -0500, Kevin Welch wrote:
 I am seeing similar traffic loads on my network at this hour, one of
our
 MS SQL servers seemed to be sending a large amount of traffic out to
the
 Internet. Still looking into it but too similar for me to avoid
sending
 an e-mail.

Same symptoms here. After disabling MS SQL, which required a reboot as
the process didn't want to shut down normally, the traffic stopped. I
found 3 boxes on our network that were generating massive amounts of
traffic, all of which run MS SQL.

-- 
Blaine Kahle
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
0x178AA0E0




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Josh Richards

* Josh Richards [EMAIL PROTECTED] [20030124 23:25]:
 
 Same here.  We first saw what looked like a DoS at about 
 09:00 PST.  We're seeing strange stuff all over the place.

Oops, meant to say 09:30 PST.  

-jr


Josh Richards jrichard@{ geekresearch.com, cubicle.net, digitalwest.net }
Geek Research, LLC - Digital West Networks, Inc - San Luis Obispo, CA 
KG6CYK - IP/Unix/telecom/knowledge/coffee/security/crypto/business/geek




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Jack Bates

From: Mikael Abrahamsson


 What kind of traffic levels are you seeing? With a handful of /16 etc
 we're not seeing more than 5-10 megabits of traffic according to my
 global transit graphs.

 People who havent null routed their unused prefixes properly will probably
 see a lot of problems though (but that's default).

Going by the decline in both my outbound and inbound access lists over time,
I suspect that the traffic increases when a sql server is found. Once
communication is cut between the two, it appears that there is just scan
data passing through at a lower rate. I have little data to go on, though,
so my assessment may not be accurate.

Jack Bates
BrightNet Oklahoma




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread George William Herbert


Has someone reported the details to CERT yet?
Preferably someone who's got logs and such?


-george william herbert
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Gary Coates

Appears to relate to this cert advisory

http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-01.html

We have it totally blocked on our network but the routers are working 
over time just rejecting packets.

The only way to stop it is to stop MySQL or kill the hosts network 
connection.




[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

It is global.

01:42:04.040462 194.87.13.21.1812  x.x.x.x.1434:  rad-account-req
376 [id 1] Attr[  User User User User User User User User User User User
User User User User User User User User User User User User User User User
User User User User User User User [|radius]

That is the traffic...


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:



I am on Verizon-GNI via Qwest and Genuity and seeing the same problem as
well.

-hc

Joel Perez wrote:



I am also seeing increased traffic on my network. It has gotten so bad for one of my edge routers that i cant telnet into it.
But i am on Qwest and GBLX.

	-Original Message-
	From: Alex Rubenstein [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
	Sent: Sat 1/25/2003 1:04 AM
	To: hc
	Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
	Subject: Re: Level3 routing issues?





	I dunno about that. But, I am seeing, in the last couple hours, all kinds
	of new traffic.

	like, customers who never get attacked or anything, all of a sudden:

	http://mrtg.nac.net/switch9.oct.nac.net/3865/switch9.oct.nac.net-3865.html


	We are seeing this on ports all across out network -- nearly 1/2 our ports
	are in delta alarm right now.

	Anyone else?

	I will dig more to look at the traffic.




	On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, hc wrote:

	
	 Anyone seeing routing problems with Level3 at this hour? I just
	 witnessed tons of prefixes behind level3's network withdraw. Any
	 information on what is happening (if you know) would be great. Thanks!
	
	 -hc
	
	
	

	-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
	--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --

















--

Message scanned for viruses and dangerous content by
http://www.newnet.co.uk/av/ and believed to be clean




Re: dos of the week? was RE: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Eric Gauthier

 my transit traffic doubled (luckily it is the low time of the night for 
 me) from 10-12ish

I work at a really large east coast University.  Our sensors show the problem
starting between 12:30-12:45am this morning...

Eric :)



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 01:13:30AM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
 
   On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
   Lots of traffic on udp port 1434 coming in here via TW Telecom and Sprint
   Looks like we may have a winner for DDoS of the year (so far)
  What kind of traffic levels are you seeing?
 
 I'm working on it for some friends, and I'm seeing about 900mbits/second
 on a gigabit link coming out of their hosting facility.  Lots and lots of
 Microsoft crap in there, I guess.
 Somebody remind me why Microsoft is still allowed to exist?

Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
:-)
A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Alex Rubenstein


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:

  Somebody remind me why Microsoft is still allowed to exist?

 Dunno, arent they negligent?

 In any other industry a fundemental flaw would be met with lawsuits, in the
 computer world tho people seem to get around for some reason.

 Steve

Including the developers of SSHD, HTTPD, NAMED, CVS?

How about Linus? Wanna call him up?

I am no windows cheerleader, but to think this is something that happens
only in windows-land is whack -- might as well put your head in the sand.

Simple philosophy: Everything sucks at all times and all places. Routers,
switches, hosts, OS's. We, as operators, have to do our best to deal.

It's arguable you are as liable as anyone else, since this particular
exploit is 'old news' and a patch has been available for it for some time.

Also; everyone who just posted to this list made it abundantly clear that
they don't have a firewall in front of at least one MS SQL server on their
network. Should you really have port 1433/4 open to the world? Would you
do this with a MySql server?




-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Blaine Kahle

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:57:16AM -0500, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
 
 MS SQL, or SQL Monitor?

Are those two separate programs? I don't know; I'm not a windows guy. I
just watched over the shoulders of a few other techs as they shut what
appeared to be everything-MSSQL down. I just found the blinkenlights
that were causing the problems, shut those lights off, and pointed the
windows guys to the offending boxes :)


 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Blaine Kahle wrote:
 
  On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:05:42AM -0500, Kevin Welch wrote:
   I am seeing similar traffic loads on my network at this hour, one of our
   MS SQL servers seemed to be sending a large amount of traffic out to the
   Internet. Still looking into it but too similar for me to avoid sending
   an e-mail.
 
  Same symptoms here. After disabling MS SQL, which required a reboot as
  the process didn't want to shut down normally, the traffic stopped. I
  found 3 boxes on our network that were generating massive amounts of
  traffic, all of which run MS SQL.
 
  --
  Blaine Kahle
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  0x178AA0E0
 
 
 -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
 --Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --
 

-- 
Blaine Kahle
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
0x178AA0E0



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread C. Jon Larsen


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:

[snip]

 Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
 :-)
 A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3

Would it not also be a good idea/practice *not* to ever let a MS SQL 
server (or *any* database server) sit on a network that is directly 
accessible from the internet ?  Having a firewall(s) in front of your 
database server regardless of the type is pretty much common sense, right?

Its bad enough to be stuck having to run/support IIS and MSSQL in any 
scenario, but letting MSSQL talk to the world just seems like asking for 
even more trouble.

-jon

-- 
+ Jon Larsen; Chief Technology Officer, Richweb.com
+ GnuPG Public Key http://richweb.com/jlarsen.gpg
+ Richweb.com: Providing Internet-Based Business Solutions since 1995
+ Business Telephone: (804) 359.2220
+ Jon Larsen Cell Phone: (804) 307.6939





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Alex Rubenstein



From what I have read and researched, it does.



On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Jack Bates wrote:


 From: Avleen Vig

 
 snip
  Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
  :-)
  A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3
 
 

 Has it been verified that the mid-2002/SP3 patches work? I haven't heard
 anything difinitive on this yet.

 Jack Bates
 Network Engineer
 BrightNet Oklahoma


-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread K. Scott Bethke

BIll,
- Original Message -
From: Bill Woodcock [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 I'd agree with it.  Except the herds of losers who still buy exploding
 crap from Vendor M don't seem to be thinning themselves out quickly

dude, the Exploding Cars are so much easier to drive than the ones from
Vendor L.  (tic)

 enough.  Maybe they're sexually attractive to each other, and reproduce
 before their stupidity kills them.  That would be unfortunate.  Or maybe
 it's just that none of this computer stuff actually matters, so exploding
 crap isn't actually fatal.  Maybe that's it.

I think it sucks that they are exploding on MY highway.

With that in mind is it time yet to talk about solutions to problems like
this from the network point of view?  Sure its easy to put up access list's
when needed but I have 100megs available to me on egress and I was trying to
push 450megs.  Is there anything protocol, vendor specific or otherwise that
will not allow rogue machines to at will take up 100% of available
resources?  I know extreme networks has the concept of Max Port utilization
on thier switches, will this help?  Suggestions?

-Scotty





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 12:20:41PM -0500, C. Jon Larsen wrote:
 
 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:
 
 [snip]
 
  Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
  :-)
  A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3
 
 Would it not also be a good idea/practice *not* to ever let a MS SQL 
 server (or *any* database server) sit on a network that is directly 
 accessible from the internet ?  Having a firewall(s) in front of your 
 database server regardless of the type is pretty much common sense, right?
 
 Its bad enough to be stuck having to run/support IIS and MSSQL in any 
 scenario, but letting MSSQL talk to the world just seems like asking for 
 even more trouble.

I agree absolutely. This is just bad practice and the network admins
here need to re-think their security architecture.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Neil J. McRae

 Would it not also be a good idea/practice *not* to ever let a MS SQL 
 server (or *any* database server) sit on a network that is directly 
 accessible from the internet ?  Having a firewall(s) in front of your 
 database server regardless of the type is pretty much common sense, right?
 
 Its bad enough to be stuck having to run/support IIS and MSSQL in any 
 scenario, but letting MSSQL talk to the world just seems like asking for 
 even more trouble.
 

That depends on what you are using the server for - it might be
used by various offices around the world, or to interface
with other corporations platforms etc. Ideally this would be in
a secured VPN or at the very least be limited by IP address, but
MS SQL admins are not alone in the pretend everything will be ok
from a security standpoint.

Neil.
--
Neil J. McRae - Alive and Kicking
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Marc Slemko

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Alex Rubenstein wrote:

 Including the developers of SSHD, HTTPD, NAMED, CVS?

 How about Linus? Wanna call him up?

 I am no windows cheerleader, but to think this is something that happens
 only in windows-land is whack -- might as well put your head in the sand.

It is interesting to note that one inadvertent advantage of open
source (when it requires people to compile from source, and pick
and choose options at compile time... popular distributions with
precompiled packages obviously break this to a certain degree) is
that it leads to a much more heterogenous set of software WRT
attacks like buffer overflows.

Contrast this to something that is compiled once (or a small handfull)
of times by the vendor, resulting in a much more predictable environment
for many types of exploits.

There have been several worms that have demonstrated this difference.

[...]

 Also; everyone who just posted to this list made it abundantly clear that
 they don't have a firewall in front of at least one MS SQL server on their
 network. Should you really have port 1433/4 open to the world? Would you
 do this with a MySql server?

It is interesting to note that apparently Windows NT and 2000
systems default to a somewhat dated and limited ephemeral port
range of 1024-5000 (cf.  ms kb article 196271).  If you are blocking
traffic on a variety of inbound UDP ports in that range using a
simple packet filter, you will randomly be blocking responses to
legitimate outbound UDP traffic, such as DNS.

Granted, in many environments there is no need to allow MS systems to
directly make DNS queries to anything outside the firewall.

There are quite disturbing reports of hosts such as activex.microsoft.com,
lawsqlsrv2.hotmail.com, etc. sourcing these packets (ie. appearing
to be infected), but they need to be taken with a grain of salt.
It is certainly possible that places who have hosts that are
otherwise firewalled (that's ok, don't need to patch them...) aren't
properly filtering UDP since it is harder to do properly if you
require support for UDP traffic.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Daniel Senie

At 11:56 AM 1/25/2003, Bill Woodcock wrote:



  Dunno, arent they negligent?
  In any other industry a fundemental flaw would be met with 
lawsuits, in the
  computer world tho people seem to get around for some reason.

 Not true, look at cars and recalls. Also as I understand it MS
 issued a fix for this sometime ago - it the users who didn't 
implement it!

Uh, lemme see if I get your argument.  People who buy exploding cars from
Vendor M are at fault when the cars explode, since cars from Vendor M
always explode, and Vendor M always disclaims responsibility, since
someone usually points out in advance that the cars will explode?

To further torture analogies: So what type of vehicles ARE safe for the 
road, and for which roads? Taking a lawn tractor out on the Interstate 
surely is the fault of the driver, and not the manufacturer. At what point 
do folks figure out that putting production servers out on the Internet 
with no protection whatsoever is an invitation to abuse? Firewalls may not 
be perfect. Server software may not be perfect. Layering security can sure 
help.

It appears this worm only sought to annoy. Perhaps the next one that goes 
after the mass of unpatched MS SQL servers will instead take the 
opportunity to raid these servers for personal information? The 
opportunities for mass-scale identity theft are rather staggering. 



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Neil J. McRae

 Not sure you can claim something you have for free is liable or with 
 guarantee

Thats total rubbish. Whether you pay for it or not shouldn't matter. 
You might also want to consider reading the various software agreement 
licenses that come with various pieces of software both free and non-free.

 True altho it does appear to affect MS more so than it ought to even considering
 their market lead.

What evidence do you have here? If I count the number of DDOS attacks
from insecure Linux boxes that we've seen in the last year, I'd say that its 
on par. 

 I expect my purchases to live up to their sales description

 Yes, thats bad.. people should be more clueful than they are, I blame folks
 being cheap, having staff who are clueless, low quality equipment, this is the
 market we're in. 

Do you actually use MS SQL?  From what you've posted I'd say not. Have
you had a network outage that your customers have had to suffer? 

You are blaming yourself in the last statement as its upto operators to
make sure customers get the message about securing their network.
I've been whining at router manufacturers about alot of their
default options for years. Last week I whined at Cisco to put a
huge sticker on every CPE router they sell warning about Network
Security and Day to Day administration. How much of this to you
talk to your own customers about? Or do you just take the money?
I don't know of an industry where costs aren't always being lowered.

Regards,
Neil.
--
Neil J. McRae - Alive and Kicking
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Neil J. McRae

 I think you are on the right lines below in suggesting that products and
 services should be supplied safe and not require additional maintenance out of
 the box to make them so (additional changes should make them weaker)

There is no such thing as safe! You have control over what risks you want
to take the aim should always be to lower them but if you want safe, pull
the power plug, place your box in a large metal container and sink it in very 
deep waters.

  I don't know of an industry where costs aren't always being lowered.
 
 I dont know of one where prices are below cost values such that players of all
 sizes regularly go bankrupt and services are squeezed harder and harder.

Microsoft and XBox is an example, lots of industries have loss
leaders. Still waiting on evidence that most security issues are due
to Microsoft though!

Regards,
Neil.
--
Neil J. McRae - Alive and Kicking
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread K. Scott Bethke

On 1/25/03 2:53 PM, Christopher L. Morrow [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Keep in mind that these problems aren't from 'well behaved' hosts, and
 'well behaved' hosts normally listen to ECN/tcp-window/Red/WRED
 classic DoS attack scenario. :(


Well not everyone plays fair out there.  I imagine this is built into SLA's
too right?  My network will be up as long as everyone is well behaved

I understand the evils, but are we really at the mercy of situations like
this?  Of course we can firewall the common sense things ahead of time, and
we can jump right in and block evil traffic when it happens, after it takes
down our network but what sorts of things can we design into our networks
today to help with these situations?

-Scotty




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Grant A. Kirkwood

On Saturday 25 January 2003 10:03 am, Avleen Vig wrote:
 On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 12:20:41PM -0500, C. Jon Larsen wrote:
  On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:
 
  [snip]
 
   Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their
   boxes
  
   :-)
  
   A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3
 
  Would it not also be a good idea/practice *not* to ever let a MS SQL
  server (or *any* database server) sit on a network that is directly
  accessible from the internet ?  Having a firewall(s) in front of your
  database server regardless of the type is pretty much common sense,
  right?
 
  Its bad enough to be stuck having to run/support IIS and MSSQL in any
  scenario, but letting MSSQL talk to the world just seems like asking
  for even more trouble.

 I agree absolutely. This is just bad practice and the network admins
 here need to re-think their security architecture.

Sometimes that's just not an option. We operate a colo facility, and while 
we strongly encourage best practices customers don't always listen. My 
personal firewall will protect me etc...

It's just unfortunate when one person's ignorance leads to problems for 
other people, as in this case.

-- 
Grant A. Kirkwood - grant(at)tnarg.org
Fingerprint = D337 48C4 4D00 232D 3444 1D5D 27F6 055A BF0C 4AED



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Neil J. McRae

 Third point to the correlation above: The vast majority of Windows admins
 are dingbat-morons, self-proclaimed experts. Had then not been
 dingbat-morons, and applied the readily available and widely announced
 patches (as zealously as unix folks patch thier stuff), this'd be all
 moot, and we'd all have gotten a better nights sleep.

I don't think this is fair statement either, Linux and Microsoft
have the most issues because they have the largest market share - security
by obscurity. It doesn't mean they have anymore issues than any other 
vendors, success brings problems and this is one of them.

Regards,
Neil.
--
Neil J. McRae - Alive and Kicking
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Neil J. McRae wrote:

  I think you are on the right lines below in suggesting that products and
  services should be supplied safe and not require additional maintenance out of
  the box to make them so (additional changes should make them weaker)
 
 There is no such thing as safe! You have control over what risks you want
 to take the aim should always be to lower them but if you want safe, pull
 the power plug, place your box in a large metal container and sink it in very 
 deep waters.

Agreed but on the assumption people will connect their new PC to the Internet
the supplied OS should be appropriately configured.

   I don't know of an industry where costs aren't always being lowered.
  
  I dont know of one where prices are below cost values such that players of all
  sizes regularly go bankrupt and services are squeezed harder and harder.
 
 Microsoft and XBox is an example, lots of industries have loss
 leaders. Still waiting on evidence that most security issues are due
 to Microsoft though!

A loss leader does not cause bankruptcy, they have a profitable section to
sustain the loss making product. In our industry we just seem to run with too
small a margin.

Hmm dont think I can argue the Linux vs MS point tho, its a big can of worms!
This may be academic tho in our discussion, are you saying COLT uses MS servers
in favour of linux for its public services?

The question of which is more secure depends on numbers, application, etc I see
loads of linux patches every month that I dont install because I have not
installed or disabled most features in my OS. I believe if you count security
bulletins linux has in fact overtaken microsoft. On the other hand if you count
incidents you'll find the Codered, Nimda and probably this one too at the top of
the list. But then offset that against the market penetration MS has into joe
public.. and so on.

Heres my advice to the uninitiated. Run linux, run firewalls, disable what you
dont need and listen to folks who have real world experience.

Steve





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, K. Scott Bethke wrote:


 BIll,
 - Original Message -
 From: Bill Woodcock [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  I'd agree with it.  Except the herds of losers who still buy exploding
  crap from Vendor M don't seem to be thinning themselves out quickly

 dude, the Exploding Cars are so much easier to drive than the ones from
 Vendor L.  (tic)

unfortunately (being a vendor L user myself) you must admit that these too
have problems :( (at times)


  enough.  Maybe they're sexually attractive to each other, and reproduce
  before their stupidity kills them.  That would be unfortunate.  Or maybe
  it's just that none of this computer stuff actually matters, so exploding
  crap isn't actually fatal.  Maybe that's it.

 I think it sucks that they are exploding on MY highway.

 With that in mind is it time yet to talk about solutions to problems like
 this from the network point of view?  Sure its easy to put up access list's
 when needed but I have 100megs available to me on egress and I was trying to
 push 450megs.  Is there anything protocol, vendor specific or otherwise that
 will not allow rogue machines to at will take up 100% of available
 resources?  I know extreme networks has the concept of Max Port utilization
 on thier switches, will this help?  Suggestions?


Keep in mind that these problems aren't from 'well behaved' hosts, and
'well behaved' hosts normally listen to ECN/tcp-window/Red/WRED
classic DoS attack scenario. :(




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:

 
 On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 12:20:41PM -0500, C. Jon Larsen wrote:
  
  On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:
  
  [snip]
  
   Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
   :-)
   A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3
  
  Would it not also be a good idea/practice *not* to ever let a MS SQL 
  server (or *any* database server) sit on a network that is directly 
  accessible from the internet ?  Having a firewall(s) in front of your 
  database server regardless of the type is pretty much common sense, right?
  
  Its bad enough to be stuck having to run/support IIS and MSSQL in any 
  scenario, but letting MSSQL talk to the world just seems like asking for 
  even more trouble.
 
 I agree absolutely. This is just bad practice and the network admins
 here need to re-think their security architecture.

I've not looked at any great detail into the exact sources but of the few I
looked at earlier I was surprised to find them on ADSL .. these may be corporate
networks this is the bit I dont know but some of them seemed to be residential,
weird!

Steve




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 05:08:22PM +, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:
  Also; everyone who just posted to this list made it abundantly clear that
  they don't have a firewall in front of at least one MS SQL server on their
  network. Should you really have port 1433/4 open to the world? Would you
  do this with a MySql server?
 
 Yes, thats bad.. people should be more clueful than they are, I blame folks
 being cheap, having staff who are clueless, low quality equipment, this is the
 market we're in. 

The market we are in was specifically bred by Microsoft in the 90's when
they claimed Windows was so eay to use, anyone could admin it.
They've since changed their tune, but the damage has been done and
continues to be done like last night :(



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Robert A. Hayden

What about doing some priority-based QoS?  If a single IP exceeds X amount
of traffic, prioritize traffic above that threshold as low.  It would keep
any one single host from saturating a link if the threshold is low.

For example, you may say that each IP is limited to 10mb of prioirty
traffic.  Yes, a compromised host may try to barf out 90mb of chaff, but
the excess would be moved down the totem pole.

Obviously, this may not make sense in all environments, but in a campus or
large enterprise situation, I can see this occuring on your WAN links in
particular.

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, K. Scott Bethke wrote:


 BIll,
 - Original Message -
 From: Bill Woodcock [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  I'd agree with it.  Except the herds of losers who still buy exploding
  crap from Vendor M don't seem to be thinning themselves out quickly

 dude, the Exploding Cars are so much easier to drive than the ones from
 Vendor L.  (tic)

  enough.  Maybe they're sexually attractive to each other, and reproduce
  before their stupidity kills them.  That would be unfortunate.  Or maybe
  it's just that none of this computer stuff actually matters, so exploding
  crap isn't actually fatal.  Maybe that's it.

 I think it sucks that they are exploding on MY highway.

 With that in mind is it time yet to talk about solutions to problems like
 this from the network point of view?  Sure its easy to put up access list's
 when needed but I have 100megs available to me on egress and I was trying to
 push 450megs.  Is there anything protocol, vendor specific or otherwise that
 will not allow rogue machines to at will take up 100% of available
 resources?  I know extreme networks has the concept of Max Port utilization
 on thier switches, will this help?  Suggestions?

 -Scotty







Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Christopher L. Morrow


On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:

 I've not looked at any great detail into the exact sources but of the few I
 looked at earlier I was surprised to find them on ADSL .. these may be corporate
 networks this is the bit I dont know but some of them seemed to be residential,
 weird!


Seems this borked software bit is in more than just hardcore SQLServer. It
seems that the bits are also in visio2000 and a few other things :( Hence
the 'more than server platform' infection spread. This also helps to
explain the speed of infection and spread, as with more possible targets
things should move more quickly.

The interesting is the huge spike at a common time (00:30EST) one wonders
if there is a group tracking down the initial infector or not :)




worm design (Re: Level3 routing issues?)

2003-01-25 Thread E.B. Dreger

MS Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2003 10:17:01 -0800 (PST)
MS From: Marc Slemko


MS It is interesting to note that one inadvertent advantage of open
MS source (when it requires people to compile from source, and pick
MS and choose options at compile time... popular distributions with
MS precompiled packages obviously break this to a certain degree) is
MS that it leads to a much more heterogenous set of software WRT
MS attacks like buffer overflows.

1. Position-relative opcodes used in shellcode
2. Syscalls triggered via a software trap, not subroutine call
3. Dynamic linking involves fixups stored in the binary
4. Activate a syscall, then check the stack to find %eip


Eddy
--
Brotsman  Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division
Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building
Phone: +1 (785) 865-5885 Lawrence and [inter]national
Phone: +1 (316) 794-8922 Wichita

~
Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 11:23:58 + (GMT)
From: A Trap [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Please ignore this portion of my mail signature.

These last few lines are a trap for address-harvesting spambots.
Do NOT send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED], or you are likely to
be blocked.




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Rafi Sadowsky



## On 2003-01-25 20:04 - Stephen J. Wilcox typed:

SJW 
SJW 
SJW Heres my advice to the uninitiated. Run linux, run firewalls, disable what you
SJW dont need and listen to folks who have real world experience.
SJW 
SJW Steve
SJW 
 
 Please don't start a flame war about this but are you implying that the
Major Linux distributions are the most secure Unix-like OS 
(at least out of the box) ???


-- 
Thanks
Rafi




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Stephen J. Wilcox

On Sun, 26 Jan 2003, Rafi Sadowsky wrote:

 
 
 ## On 2003-01-25 20:04 - Stephen J. Wilcox typed:
 
 SJW 
 SJW 
 SJW Heres my advice to the uninitiated. Run linux, run firewalls, disable what you
 SJW dont need and listen to folks who have real world experience.
 SJW 
 SJW Steve
 SJW 
  
  Please don't start a flame war about this but are you implying that the
 Major Linux distributions are the most secure Unix-like OS 
 (at least out of the box) ???

I hadnt really thought about it, I was just offering my approach to running
servers on the public Internet

Dont read too much into it, I wasnt suggesting that snippet as the absolute way
to connect to the internet.. it was preceded by a discussion on where folks
place their database servers..

Steve




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Jack Bates

From: Robert A. Hayden


 What about doing some priority-based QoS?  If a single IP exceeds X amount
 of traffic, prioritize traffic above that threshold as low.  It would keep
 any one single host from saturating a link if the threshold is low.

 For example, you may say that each IP is limited to 10mb of prioirty
 traffic.  Yes, a compromised host may try to barf out 90mb of chaff, but
 the excess would be moved down the totem pole.

snip

Down the totem pole isn't off the totem pole. In most cases the issue wasn't
traffic priority. Most network equipment isn't designed to handle 100%
capacity from all ports. Under standard operation, maximum capacity is never
reached. It is cost prohibitive to support it. In addition, this was a dual
issue. Not only did the bandwidth saturate, the packets are so small that in
reaching for 100% saturation, many routers and switches first exceeded their
maximum pps thresholds. The best defense is to monitor and know your
traffic. When traffic becomes uncommon, someone needs to be alerted. A 30%
processor increase is not a good thing; ever. Second, know the optimizations
for your particular equipment and code. Each piece of equipment has it's own
optimizations. In my case, it was better to access-list at the router level
than to run bandwidth limiting, and I run a crummy 7200. It's even nicer on
a 7500+ where it's offloaded to the linecard processors. If a portion of the
network or a specific port is unrecoverable, shut it down. The server won't
be able to handle traffic anyways, and it is better to cut off a portion of
the network than lose the entire network.

Jack Bates
Network Engineer
BrightNet Oklahoma






Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:10:59PM -0800, Stephen Milton wrote:
 
 We have had multiple customers who had SP3 on their boxes that were
 hit.  SP3 was _supposed_ to include this patch, there is no
 verification so far that it did.
 
 Since all the providers have been blocking the attack spread from the
 routers, installing SP3 on boxes post-attack hasn't really been put to
 the test yet.

Did you install WIDOWS service pack 3 or SQL SERVER service pack 3?



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Alex Rubenstein


MS SQL SP3, _NOT_ MS Windows 2000 SP3.

BIG DIFFERENCE.

http://www.microsoft.com/sql/downloads/2000/sp3.asp



On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Stephen Milton wrote:


 We have had multiple customers who had SP3 on their boxes that were
 hit.  SP3 was _supposed_ to include this patch, there is no
 verification so far that it did.

 Since all the providers have been blocking the attack spread from the
 routers, installing SP3 on boxes post-attack hasn't really been put to
 the test yet.

 YMMV

 On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 08:40:53AM -0800, Avleen Vig eloquently stated:
 
  Let's not blame MS for admins who don't know how to secure their boxes
  :-)
  A patch was released mid-2002 and was also part of SQL Server SP3

 --
 Stephen Milton - Vice President(425) 881-8769 x102
 ISOMEDIA.COM - Premium Internet Services(425) 869-9437 Fax
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://www.isomedia.com


-- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, [EMAIL PROTECTED], latency, Al Reuben --
--Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net   --





Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Jared Mauch

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 08:56:06AM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
 
   Dunno, arent they negligent?
   In any other industry a fundemental flaw would be met with lawsuits, in the
   computer world tho people seem to get around for some reason.
 
  Not true, look at cars and recalls. Also as I understand it MS
  issued a fix for this sometime ago - it the users who didn't implement it!
 
 Uh, lemme see if I get your argument.  People who buy exploding cars from
 Vendor M are at fault when the cars explode, since cars from Vendor M
 always explode, and Vendor M always disclaims responsibility, since
 someone usually points out in advance that the cars will explode?
 
 I'm not sure that your argument has anything to do with the law or with
 right and wrong, but in a sort of social-Darwinism sort of way, I guess
 I'd agree with it.  Except the herds of losers who still buy exploding
 crap from Vendor M don't seem to be thinning themselves out quickly
 enough.  Maybe they're sexually attractive to each other, and reproduce
 before their stupidity kills them.  That would be unfortunate.  Or maybe
 it's just that none of this computer stuff actually matters, so exploding
 crap isn't actually fatal.  Maybe that's it.

Time for someone to fight the product liability included
in the 'shrinkwrap' licenses.

I do believe that there should be some sort of
inital grace period for the software industry.. they are
well intentioned and not as old as the car industry.. but the
dire affects and lost sleep for some people need to eventually
be reckoned with.  The grace period should probally be over
now and the industry declared 'mature and liable' for shoddy
software.  If my car has a recall notice, i get a letter saying
dear sir, your gas tank may explode if used.  please come in for
our inspection.  If they can keep track of those millions of cars
each year, at least somewhat, it should be simple to track who purchased
the software and send them a letter saying get these patches now..

or perhaps they can do some agrement with AOL to include
all the latest patches in those CDs^H^H^HCoasters they send me.

- Jared

-- 
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from [EMAIL PROTECTED]
clue++;  | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only mine.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Jack Bates

From: K. Scott Bethke

 Well not everyone plays fair out there.  I imagine this is built into
SLA's
 too right?  My network will be up as long as everyone is well behaved

You know that customers won't behave. Prepare for it.

 I understand the evils, but are we really at the mercy of situations like
 this?  Of course we can firewall the common sense things ahead of time,
and
 we can jump right in and block evil traffic when it happens, after it
takes
 down our network but what sorts of things can we design into our networks
 today to help with these situations?


If a customer is infected, then the problem is on their end. The fact that
they don't have throughput is their issue, not that of the provider's. As
for collateral damage, proper monitoring of the entire network and early
warning systems allow engineers to hopefully stop the problem before it goes
critical. The spool up on this worm was massive and effected some networks
too fast to prevent them going critical. However, tracking and resolution
should easily have been within the SLA windows.

My policy: Hmm, I'm not sure. *ring* Dude, wake up. It's a critical outage.
The whole network is collapsing. Think! *rambles for 5 minutes* Oh, wait.
Never mind, I got it. Go back to sleep. Thanks.

Jack Bates
Network Engineer
BrightNet Oklahoma




Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Avleen Vig

On Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 10:02:54PM +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
 
 On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Avleen Vig wrote:
 
  The market we are in was specifically bred by Microsoft in the 90's when
  they claimed Windows was so eay to use, anyone could admin it.
  They've since changed their tune, but the damage has been done and
  continues to be done like last night :(
 
 I would agree somewhat with Avleen here... BUT, like I said, its long past
 the time when every internet connected org really should reevaluate their
 security force's size and abilities :) security is 'important' and we
 really SHOULD get that across to EVERYONE... or atleast that's my thought
 :)

You've highlightest my sentiments well :-)
The past is no excuse for running a poor shop now.
there have been multiple incidents over the last 3 years alone that
should wake people up to the problems with their sysadmin and security
staff's lack of skill be people seem not to care at all.

It's ironic to note that most companies who 'dont care', do so because
they don't want to pay the slightly higher buck for good staff or decent
training (hard to find). While at the same time it is these companies
that struggle to float while the ones spending the money get staff who
really care about their work and thus impress the customers more.

(this is of course just one point of view and not the only reasons
companies float/sink).



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Dave Stewart

At 05:10 PM 1/25/2003, you wrote:


We have had multiple customers who had SP3 on their boxes that were
hit.  SP3 was _supposed_ to include this patch, there is no
verification so far that it did.

Since all the providers have been blocking the attack spread from the
routers, installing SP3 on boxes post-attack hasn't really been put to
the test yet.

YMMV


Not extensive testing, no... but again...

SQL Server 2000 SP3 is not the same animal as Windows 2000 SP3.

And after installing SQL Server 2000 SP3, I opened up the router to allow 
all the 1434 traffic that came in... the box was hit on numerous occasions 
over the next hour or so, and never did it get infected again.

SQL Server 2000 SP3 was just released on 1/17/2003... while the patch for 
this vulnerability has been out since last July (and yes, I'm guilty of not 
following it closely enough myself... no excuses)



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Dave Stewart



If a customer is infected, then the problem is on their end. The fact that
they don't have throughput is their issue, not that of the provider's.


Many, many customers don't understand this - if they don't have throughput, 
it's the provider's problem and the provider has to fix it.  One of the 
reasons I'm not providing anymore.

As for collateral damage, proper monitoring of the entire network and early
warning systems allow engineers to hopefully stop the problem before it goes
critical. The spool up on this worm was massive and effected some networks
too fast to prevent them going critical. However, tracking and resolution
should easily have been within the SLA windows.


I've seen various references to this worm firing off and saturating 
networks worldwide within 1 minute... if *that* isn't scary, I don't know 
what is.  It shows that someone, with the right tools and enough vulnerable 
servers can take out a good portion of the Internet in seconds.  And how 
can we predict *every* possible issue and block it?

My policy: Hmm, I'm not sure. *ring* Dude, wake up. It's a critical outage.
The whole network is collapsing. Think! *rambles for 5 minutes* Oh, wait.
Never mind, I got it. Go back to sleep. Thanks.


I think there's only so much one can do in advance.  Sure, we all know we 
shouldn't have these servers exposed, but again, many are in the position 
of having to leave them open to some extent - case in point, I have a 
developer who uses dialup (because he's in the sticks in northern Georgia, 
and nothing else is available, and he's a skinflint who uses the free or 
nearly-free dialup providers)... he's also not going to use a VPN... he'll 
just bitch because he can't get to the server.

More cases where you do what you have to... a couple of years ago, when I 
*was* doing the provider bit... I blocked the netbios ports on the 
border.  You have no idea what a cry went up from customers... they *want* 
to share drives over the Internet, and didn't care what risks might be 
involved.  It was, to them, too complicated and/or expensive to do it via a 
VPN.

So I ended up having to open them back up, but kept them blocked to my own 
machines.  Sometimes the best you can do is explain the risks, and then let 
the customer do what they will.  Until they're causing problems... of 
course at that point you can cut 'em off (how many of you shut down 
customer boxen last night?).

I'm no great thinker, and having said that, I'm just not sure we can 
protect everything/everybody.



Re: Level3 routing issues?

2003-01-25 Thread Matthew Kaufman

 I've seen various references to this worm firing off and saturating 
 networks worldwide within 1 minute... if *that* isn't scary, I don't know 
 what is.  It shows that someone, with the right tools and enough vulnerable 
 servers can take out a good portion of the Internet in seconds.  And how 
 can we predict *every* possible issue and block it?

The good news with this worm was that the ports it used had low real utility
for inter-provider traffic. Compare and contrast to Code Red, where block
TCP port 80 isn't such a great way to slow down the worm if you have any 
customers who like to use the web

A combination of the speed at which this spread and a port nobody wants to
block will undoubtedly happen in the future, and be ugly, both.

Matthew Kaufman
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (home)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (work)