[PEIRCE-L] FW: The Second Metaphysical Club and its Impact on American Science and Philosophy (Perspectives on Science)

[Catherine Legg]

Dear Peirce List,



This is forwarded from Jean-Marie Chevalier. Looks very interesting!

Cheers, Cathy







*Call for PapersSpecial Issue of Perspectives on Science*
THEME:
*The Second Metaphysical Club and its Impact on the Development of American
Science and Philosophy*

GUEST EDITORS: Jean-Marie Chevalier, Amirouche Moktefi and Ahti-Veikko
Pietarinen

We are pleased to invite submissions for a special issue of Perspectives
on Sciences, devoted to the Second Metaphysical Club and its impact on
the development of American sciences and philosophy. The volume is
expected to appear online in 2015 and in print in 2016.
The importance of the Harvard (the first) Metaphysical Club has been
widely recognised. Though scientifically more influential, the Johns
Hopkins (the second) Metaphysical Club has not received equal attention.
A detailed history of this second club, organised by Charles S. Peirce
from 1879 until 1885 at the Johns Hopkins University, is yet to be
written. Yet the Minute Book of the Club shows that in less than six
years there were 43 meetings in total in which 110 presentations were
delivered.

The second Metaphysical Club has a good claim of having been one of the
most important interdisciplinary gatherings of philosophers and
scientists in the 19th-century United States. Its speakers and attendees
represented a number of disciplines. Notable participants and speakers
included Peirce and his students: Ellery W. Davis, John Dewey, Fabian
Franklin, Benjamin Ives Gilman, Joseph Jastrow, Christine
Ladd(-Franklin), Allan Marquand, Oscar H. Mitchell, Washington Irving
Stringham (mathematics), Henry Taber and Josiah Royce.
The scientists who met there included Adam T. Bruce (biology), James
McKeen Cattell (psychology), Henry Herbert Donaldson (neurology), Henry
Laurence Gantt (engineer), Basil L. Gildersleeve (classics), G. Stanley
Hall (psychology), Edward Mussey Hartwell (physiology), Newell Henry
Martin (zoology), George S. Morris (philosophy), Waldo Selden Pratt
(musicology), Ira Remsen (chemistry), William T. Sedgwick
(bacteriology), Benjamin Eli Smith (editor), Albert Harris Tolman
(English), Lester Frank Ward (sociology) and Edmund Beecher Wilson
(genetics). All were pioneers who shaped the development of American
science and its methodology, the mutual influence between science and
philosophy, and the future of higher education.

We welcome submissions that address the history and the general
influence of the Johns Hopkins Metaphysical Club. Suitable contributions
could focus on:
- Peirce and his students,
- the individual philosophers and scientists who took part in the Club's
meetings,
- their work and place in the history of the disciplines in question,
- Peirce's influence on their thinking and on the logic and methodology
of science,
- the Club's wider significance from the points of view of
philosophical, scientific and intellectual ideas,
- Metaphysical Club and the late 19th-century ideas on interdisciplinary
research,
- Metaphysical Club and the idea of scientific communities in the late
19th-century America,
- ...

Submissions should be sent to: *peirce.works...@gmail.com* no later than
*March 1st, 2015*.
Manuscripts should be prepared in accordance with journal formatting
guidelines:  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/page/sub/posc
*Submissions should not exceed 7500 words* and must be prepared for
blind review.
For enquiries, please contact the guest editors at
peirce.works...@gmail.com.

Perspectives on Science is devoted to studies on the sciences that
integrate historical, philosophical, and sociological perspectives. Its
interdisciplinary approach is intended to foster a more comprehensive
understanding of the sciences and the contexts in which they develop.
Each article appearing in Perspectives on Science will provide the
reader with at least two of the three perspectives on their subject.
Each issue aims at articles which range over case studies and
theoretical essays of a meta-historical and meta-philosophical
character.  The journal fosters historiographical works combining social
and institutional analyses of science, as well as analyses of
experiments, practices, concepts, and theories.  All papers consist of
original research drawing upon the most recent scholarship. The Board of
Advisory Editors is deliberately drawn from a wide range of
subdisciplines within history, philosophy, and sociology of science.
For further information, see http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/posc

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Catherine Legg]

This is a beautiful post, Ben! You expose so clearly the pragmatic heft of
Peirce’s concept of truth.

Such considerations cry out to be presented to first-year philosophy
students, most of whom come in thinking that some kind of social
constructivism is the only educated or open-minded or ‘culturally
sensitive’ view of the world – I am currently being reminded.



Frederik I have really appreciated your naming of ‘culturalism’ and
empirical critique of its effect on scientific research also.



Cheers, Cathy



*From:* Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* Monday, 22 September 2014 4:28 a.m.
*To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,



Stan,

If you think that five minutes' investigation would likely at best reach a
trivial truth about a kind of phenomenon, then substitute 'five days' or
'five months' or 'five decades', etc. The point is the sooner or later, not
an incompletable long run.

You're simply not distinguishing between truth and opinion.  If two
traditions arrive at contrary conclusions about the same kind of
phenomenon, the normal logical conclusion about the contrarity is that at
most one of the conclusions is true and true for sound reasons, at most one
is the result of sufficient investigation even though both traditions claim
sufficiency. Peirce's semiotics is logic studied in terms of signs. You
don't distinguish between sufficiency and claims of sufficiency, truth and
claims of truth, and reality and claims of reality. Both traditions'
conclusions might be false, results of insufficient investigation. They
might both be mixes of truth and falsehood, various inaccuracies, and so
on.

Simply accepting contrary conclusions as reflecting two "realities" because
two traditions arrived at them is a defeatist method of inquiry, a form of
'insuccessibilism'. Imagine the swelling mischief if courts treated widely
discrepant testimony from various witnesses as reflecting different
"realities" rather than different perspectives or mistaken or differently
limited observations or memories, or lack of honesty or candor, and so on.
Imagine being an accused defendant in such a court, with one's money,
career, freedom, life, hanging in the balance.

Waiting for the conflicting traditions to resolve their conflicts and
hoping that their resultant conclusion will be the truth, is a method of
inquiry of last resort, that to which a pure spectator is confined. To go
further and _*define*_ truth as the conclusion of any actual tradition or
actual dialogue among actual traditions, underlies the method of authority,
a form of infallibilism. If two traditions don't resolve their argument and
if you for your part have no way to investigate the question itself and
arrive at a conclusion about the subject of their argument, then your
normal logical conclusion would be that you won't know the answer to the
question, not that there are conflicting true answers to the question.

I disbelieve that you ever did physics in either way. I don't see why you'd
want to impose such weak methods on philosophy, or have a semiotics in
which contrary signs about the same object merely reflect different
"realities"; such would turn logic and semiotics into mush. Peirce's theory
of inquiry, which seems to reflect the attitude of scientific research,
does not boil down to 'poll the experts' or 'poll the traditions', instead
it boils down to 'do the science,' by a method actively motivated and
shaped by the idea of putting into practice the fallibilist recognition
that inquiry can go wrong (because the real is independent of actual
opinion) and the 'successibilist' recognition that inquiry can go right
(because the real is the cognizable). To argue about this, as you do, is to
presuppose that there is a truth about this very matter under discussion, a
truth that can be found and can be missed.

Best, Ben

On 9/20/2014 3:46 PM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

Ben -- Replying to:



The main idea is not that of a long run.  Instead the idea is that of
sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 'sufficiently
far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently good' or
'sufficiently good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll the same basic
idea.

S: Then two different traditions might come up with differently sufficient
understandings about one object.  I accept that, and it implies
nominalism.  Sufficiency might be quite different for different traditions.

If in a given case you believe that you've reached the truth about a given
kind of phenomenon after five minutes of investigation, then you believe
that you have reached, after five minutes, the opinion that anybody
sufficiently investigating, over whatever length of time, would reach about
that kind of phenomenon. It's far from automatically preposterous to
believe that.

S: But, I think, pretty 'shallow' and unsophisticated.

There is no absolute assurance that actual inqui

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

[Jon Awbrey]

Being Trivially A Sign
TG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14180
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14181
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14183
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14201
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14205
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14208

Icons & Indices
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14196
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14197
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14198
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14200
JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14206

Jerry & All,

If I can remember how I got into this ... Tom Gollier split off a thread to
discuss a question from Joseph Brenner about the following fragment that he
attributed to Frederik, the original text and locus of which I do not have:

?FS: an index relies on some actual connections (read: natural interactions)
 which are either not in themselves signs (or only trivially so).

After a number of plies and replies on that thread, I recalled some long ago
discussions, diagrams, and bits of an old dissertation proposal that I thought
might serve to clarify the issue at hand, so I split off this meta-tangent to
adduce and apply that material.

To wit:

1. Inquiry Driven Systems • Indexical Signs
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_1#1.3.4.9._Indexical_Signs

2. Information = Comprehension × Extension • Icons and Indices
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Commentary_Work_Note_9

o-o-o
| Objective Framework |   Interpretive Framework|
o-o-o
|   |
|   q  o|
|  ··   |
|  · ·  |
|  ·  · |
|  ·   ·|
|  ··   |
|  · ·  |
|  ·  · |
|  ·   ·|
|  ·v   |
|  · o  u   |
|  ·/   |
|  v   /|
|   x  o--@ |
|  \|
|   \   |
|o  v   |
|   |
o---o
| Sign u is an Icon of Object x by Virtue of Property q |
o---o

o-o-o
| Objective Framework |   Interpretive Framework|
o-o-o
|   |
|o  u   |
|   /   |
|  /|
|   x  o--@ |
|  ^   \|
|  ·\   |
|  · o  v   |
|  ·^   |
|  ·   ·|
|  ·  · |
|  · ·  |
|  ··   |
|  ·   ·|
|  ·  · |
|  · ·  |
|  ··   |
|   t  o|
|   |
o

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

[Sungchul Ji]

Peirce wrote:

"It is, therefore, true, in the logicians sense of the words,   (6952-1)
although not in that of the psychologists, that the thought
is already expressed there" (EP2: 455).


Wouldn't it be just as logical to conclude that, if no skilled
paleontolist ever happen to lay his/her eyes on the fossil fish, the the
thought is never expressed there ?

If so, one alternative way of describing thought would be that thought
emgerges upon the encounter between a skilled paleontologist and the
fossil fish.

To me all thoughts are dissipative structures, whereas the fossil fish is
not.  It is an equilibrium structure incapable of any action, including
thought.

If this analysis is valid, semioticians may have to watch out against any
similar conflations on the part of Pierce between equilibirium and
dissipative structures.  Another example is "mind", which is also
dissipative structure and as such cannot be associated with equilibrium
structures such as rocks and crystals.

With all the best.

Sung
_
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



>   At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote:
>  Dear Sung, lists -
>  To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead
> us astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a
> psychological process only.
>  Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the
> object of thought and the structure of sound reasoning.
>  So, you might as well say that thought is the result of the norms of
> reasoning and the features of the object thought about. Thinking then is
> the process combining these - but not the process producing thought as
> such. Just like the TV-series you watch is not the product of the
> printing of the DVD only. Or the meal you prepare in your casserole is
> not only the product of the cooking process - but also of the objects you
> add to the casserole and the recipe you follow.
>  Best
>  F
>
>  I agree with what you say here, but I was wondering if it does not go
> further. Frege used "thought" to refer to propositions, as I
> understand him, and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. (I
> studied with a number of Frege experts, but never had a Peirce expert on
> my committee, though my thesis does make homage to Peirce.) I am thinking
> in particular of a peculiar passage that Vinicius Romanini brought to my
> attention:
>
>  () if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations
> upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection
> with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were
> embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of
> an argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of
> a conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical
> sense, that thought has already all the reality it ever will have,
> although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human
> minds to perform that reasoning. For the fish is there, and the actual
> composition of  the stone already in fact determines what the chemist and
> the paleontologists will one day read in them. () It is, therefore, true,
> in the logicians sense of the words, although not in that of the
> psychologists, that the thought is already expressed there (EP2: 455).
>
>  This passage makes much more sense to me, and fits much better my
> information based ontology, if "thought" means what I would
> mean by "proposition".
>
>  John
>
>   Frederik wrote:
>
>  "Thinking, in this sense, may be the object of,(6729-1)
>  psychology thought not so ."
>
>
>  Can you separate thinking and thought?  Isn't the latter the result of
> the
>  former?  If so, why can't the latter be the object of psychology as well
> ?
>
>  With all the best.
>
>  Sung
> John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
>  Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
>  T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
>   Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6938] psychologisms not addressed

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Gary et al,
Orthe painting is not the paint, even though the painting involves the
paint.
Gene

On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 4:06 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Frederik, lists,
>
> I haven't spent much time of late studying the literature of contemporary
> neuroscience in general and Barsalou's theory in particular. Since I'm away
> from my desk until this evening, I thought I'd at least take a glance at
> some of that literature before re-reading your section on psychologism in
> NP. An hour or so ago I found this brief and cogent commentary on
> Barsalou's 'Perceptual Symbol Systems' which might also serve (I think) as
> an outline of some of his principal ideas. See:
> http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/Reviews/Barsalou.htm
>
> Here's a link to Barsalou's paper commented on:
>
> http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_BBS_1999_perceptual_symbol_systems.pdf
>
> I've cut and pasted some intriguing snippets from the beginning of the
> commentary by Lianne Gaboro:
>
> To insist [as Barsalou does] that abstractions are just arrangements of
> perceptual symbols is like insisting that a plant is just seed + water +
> sunlight.
>
> [Rather] it seems more parsimonious to say that what was once a
> constellation of memories of similar experiences has organized itself into
> an entity whose structure and pattern reside primarily at a level that was
> not present in the constituents from which it was derived. This does not
> mean that abstractions can't retain something of their "perceptual
> character" [p. 5].
>
>
> One from the middle:
>
> Barsalou pays surprisingly little attention to the highly relevant work of
> connectionists. The only rationale he provides is to say that because 'the
> starting weights between connections are set to small *random *values'
> ... 'the relation between a conceptual representation and its perceptual
> input is arbitrary' [p. 5, S1.2P8]. This is misleading. Just because there
> are many paths to an attractor doesn't mean the attractor is not
> attracting. Surely there are analogous small random differences in real
> brains. This quick dismissal of connectionism is unfortunate because it has
> addressed many of the issues Barsalou addresses, but its more rigorous
> approach leads to greater clarity.
>
> Consider, for example, what happens when a neural network abstracts a
> prototype such as the concept 'depth', which is used in senses ranging from
> 'deep blue sea' to 'deep-freezed vegetables' to 'deeply moving book'. The
> various context-specific interpretations of the word cancel one another
> out; thus the concept is, for all intents and purposes, amodal, though
> acquired through specific instances. There is no reason to believe this
> does not happen in brains as well. The organizational role Barsalou
> ascribes to 'simulators' emerges implictly in the dynamics of the neural
> network. Moreover, since Barsalou claims that "a concept is equivalent to a
> simulator" [p. 15, S2.4.3P2], it is questionable whether the new jargon
> earns its keep. Why not just stick with the word 'concept'?
>
> And one from the latter part of the article, pointing to her own research:
>
> Harder to counter is Barsalou's critique that an amodal system
> necessitates "evolving a radically new system of representation" [p. 40,
> S4.2P3]. Barsalou repeatedly hints at but does not explicitly claim that
> the origin of abstract thought presents a sort of chicken-and-egg problem.
> That is, it is difficult to see how an abstraction could come into
> existence before discrete perceptual memories have been woven into an
> interconnected worldview that can guide representational redescription down
> potentially fruitful paths. Yet it is just as difficult to see how the
> interconnected worldview could exist prior to the existence of
> abstractions; one would expect them to be the glue that holds the structure
> together. In [Gabora, 1998; Gabora, in press] I outline a speculative model
> of how this might happen, drawing on Kauffman's [1993] theory of how an
> information-evolving system emerges through the self-organization of an
> autocatalytic network. Self-organizing processes are rampant in natural
> systems [Kauffman 1993], and could quite conceivably produce a phase
> transition the catapults the kind of change in representational strategy
> that Barsalou rightly claims is necessary.
>
> Perhaps more on this tomorrow after I reread and reflect on your remarks
> in NP, Frederik. Meanwhile, I'd be very interested to see what you and
> other list members think of Gabora's critique of Barsalou as well as her
> own suggestion that since self-organizing processes are ubiquitous in
> nature that they "*could quite conceivably produce a phase transition the
> catapults the kind of change in representational strategy that Barsalou
> rightly claims is necessary**."*
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6938] psychologisms not addressed

[Gary Richmond]

Frederik, lists,

I haven't spent much time of late studying the literature of contemporary
neuroscience in general and Barsalou's theory in particular. Since I'm away
from my desk until this evening, I thought I'd at least take a glance at
some of that literature before re-reading your section on psychologism in
NP. An hour or so ago I found this brief and cogent commentary on
Barsalou's 'Perceptual Symbol Systems' which might also serve (I think) as
an outline of some of his principal ideas. See:
http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/Reviews/Barsalou.htm

Here's a link to Barsalou's paper commented on:
http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_BBS_1999_perceptual_symbol_systems.pdf

I've cut and pasted some intriguing snippets from the beginning of the
commentary by Lianne Gaboro:

To insist [as Barsalou does] that abstractions are just arrangements of
perceptual symbols is like insisting that a plant is just seed + water +
sunlight.

[Rather] it seems more parsimonious to say that what was once a
constellation of memories of similar experiences has organized itself into
an entity whose structure and pattern reside primarily at a level that was
not present in the constituents from which it was derived. This does not
mean that abstractions can't retain something of their "perceptual
character" [p. 5].


One from the middle:

Barsalou pays surprisingly little attention to the highly relevant work of
connectionists. The only rationale he provides is to say that because 'the
starting weights between connections are set to small *random *values' ...
'the relation between a conceptual representation and its perceptual input
is arbitrary' [p. 5, S1.2P8]. This is misleading. Just because there are
many paths to an attractor doesn't mean the attractor is not attracting.
Surely there are analogous small random differences in real brains. This
quick dismissal of connectionism is unfortunate because it has addressed
many of the issues Barsalou addresses, but its more rigorous approach leads
to greater clarity.

Consider, for example, what happens when a neural network abstracts a
prototype such as the concept 'depth', which is used in senses ranging from
'deep blue sea' to 'deep-freezed vegetables' to 'deeply moving book'. The
various context-specific interpretations of the word cancel one another
out; thus the concept is, for all intents and purposes, amodal, though
acquired through specific instances. There is no reason to believe this
does not happen in brains as well. The organizational role Barsalou
ascribes to 'simulators' emerges implictly in the dynamics of the neural
network. Moreover, since Barsalou claims that "a concept is equivalent to a
simulator" [p. 15, S2.4.3P2], it is questionable whether the new jargon
earns its keep. Why not just stick with the word 'concept'?

And one from the latter part of the article, pointing to her own research:

Harder to counter is Barsalou's critique that an amodal system necessitates
"evolving a radically new system of representation" [p. 40, S4.2P3].
Barsalou repeatedly hints at but does not explicitly claim that the origin
of abstract thought presents a sort of chicken-and-egg problem. That is, it
is difficult to see how an abstraction could come into existence before
discrete perceptual memories have been woven into an interconnected
worldview that can guide representational redescription down potentially
fruitful paths. Yet it is just as difficult to see how the interconnected
worldview could exist prior to the existence of abstractions; one would
expect them to be the glue that holds the structure together. In [Gabora,
1998; Gabora, in press] I outline a speculative model of how this might
happen, drawing on Kauffman's [1993] theory of how an information-evolving
system emerges through the self-organization of an autocatalytic network.
Self-organizing processes are rampant in natural systems [Kauffman 1993],
and could quite conceivably produce a phase transition the catapults the
kind of change in representational strategy that Barsalou rightly claims is
necessary.

Perhaps more on this tomorrow after I reread and reflect on your remarks in
NP, Frederik. Meanwhile, I'd be very interested to see what you and other
list members think of Gabora's critique of Barsalou as well as her own
suggestion that since self-organizing processes are ubiquitous in nature
that they "*could quite conceivably produce a phase transition the
catapults the kind of change in representational strategy that Barsalou
rightly claims is necessary**."*

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

> Dear Lists -
> Now we have taken several weeks discussing ch. 2 of "Natural Propositions"
> concerning (anti-)psychologism.
> Many interesting viewpoints and subjects have been marshaled

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6950] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, Bob, John, list,

Clark, for my part I took Bob to be using the word 'drive' in a narrow 
sense, not in any very broad sense of influencing.


Again, reasoning and cognition can check and balance values and 
sentiments. They arrange for values, etc., to check and balance each 
other, and focus them with more generality as well. Reasoning and 
cognition do this by bringing the mind to focus beyond direct culminal 
ends, beyond one's own proximate pleasures and pains, and on bigger 
pictures, final forms, entelechies, including unintended good and bad 
consequences, clashes and surprising coherences among values, and so on. 
Through the mind, such prospective and imagined final forms, inferred 
from beliefs and experience, can exert an influence on the person 
thinking of them. It is formal causation if anything is.  It's our way 
of not waiting for biological evolution to teach us the errors of our 
ways, and our way of holding ourselves to standards beyond that of 
biological evolutionary success (not that we can outright defy with 
impunity the principles of natural selection). The structure, a thing of 
checks and balances, that one adopts to guide one then guides one's 
sentiments and values, as well as one's decision-making and one's means 
- not by creating any of them _/ex nihilo/_, of course, but by 
adaptation, cultivation, etc., of them. I don't know how much cognitive 
power it takes to have negative sentiments about harm done to those whom 
one personally knows and cares about - it seems instinctive some 
animals. But it takes more than such emotions about particular persons 
to reach and care about an ideal of everybody's right not to undergo 
slavery and its horrors. In the course of the learning process, early 
stages are, in the usual sense, causes of the later stages, and in that 
sense Clark has a point about how cognition can 'drive' sentiments.


In my focus on ends and entelechies, I admit that my thoughts have an 
old-fashioned Scholastic/classical feeling, and I myself like the 'fresh 
breeze' arriving through John's remarks


Best, Ben

On 9/22/2014 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


On Sep 22, 2014, at 11:33 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

On 9/22/2014 12:15 PM, Bob Logan wrote:


Dear All - Sorry for the last posting I inadvertently sent it before 
I was finished. What I wanted to say is this in response to John's 
request for thoughts:


I would say that values drive reasoning but reasoning does not drive 
values. It is not that values are irrational it is just that they 
arise in your guts and not in your brain and then they affect the 
reasoning in your brain. Your thoughts?, John - with best wishes - Bob


[Ben U] I agree that reasoning and cognition don't directly drive 
values and sentiments. But I think it's worth noting that reasoning 
and cognition do check and balance values and sentiments and can help 
somewhat 'evolve' them, by focusing on bigger and more complete 
pictures, including clashes of values, unintended consequences, etc.


Emotions do seem like very quick calculations, very practical in that 
sense, in view of limits on cognitive resources, and I agree with 
John that there may be general lessons from the interplay of 
cognition, sentiment, etc., in homo sapiens. (I've never been partial 
to a very cognitive emphasis in philosophy of mind).


[Clark G] Not sure I agree with the premise. It seems that many of our 
values such as horror at blatant racism are due to reasoning. Now it’s 
true they’ve developed into a habit. And for many people that’s a 
culturally acquired habit without a lot of reasoning behind it. But I 
think emotions frequently are habitual responses developers via 
rational development. Even cultural adaptation may be cultural habits 
developed over a long community “argument.” Think slavery horror for 
instance. Emotions that are tied to common sense norms are almost 
certainly arrived at via a kind of reasoning over the types of 
experiences the community regularly faced.


That’s not to say emotions are always arrived at that way. I’ve no 
idea how new emotions are developed, but it seems many are tied to 
basic experiences the brain quickly triggers. Thus smells can trigger 
extremely strong emotional responses for instance. That makes perfect 
sense when you think of the evolution of humans from earlier mammals. 
Again a kind of community rationality developed over time. It’s not 
always right but that doesn’t make it irrational.



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14169
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14177
JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14179
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14189
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14204
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14228
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14229

Frederik, List,

Of all the admonitions that my teachers in logic, math, and science impressed on 
my psyche over the years one the direst was to tread most angelically with the 
temptations of that universal quantifier "all".  That way lies paradox unless 
each step along the way is carefully watched.  So it's one thing to say that 
analogies, diagrams, icons, likelihoods, likely stories, metaphors, morphisms, 
probabilities, similes, and all the rest of their ilk are extremely important 
and even the main attractions in math and science, but it's a wholly other 
matter to say that's all there is to their pursuits.


Regards,

Jon

Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

Dear Jon, Howard, lists,

As far as I can make out, there are important relation between Hertz' basic
ideas and Peirce's.

To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world
object is not necessarily easy to grasp - on the contrary, in many cases it
requires protracted work of both empirical and theoretical stripe. In
Peirce's doctrine of how reasoning with diagrams is undertaken, however, the
central idea is that the manipulation possibiliites of the diagram correspond
(to some degree) to the real transformation possibilities of the object
depicted by the diagram. So this is an operational definition of diagrammatic
iconicity which I think is non-trivial because it removes similarity far away
from the simpler examples of immediately recognizing perceptual aspects of
one object in another. So, I think this relation between manipulation
possibilities in the diagram and real relations in the object (Peirce)
corresponds to Hertz' idea of the "narrow strip" connecting the consequences
in the model with the consequences in reality.

That said, there's a large difference in rhetoric between the two which may
be superficial but still may lead us astray. Hertz' dramatic language of the
cold and alien world of actual existence on the one hand and mere
"associations of the mind" on the other paints a sort of existentialist
picture of man as an isolated loner in the universe, a bit like Jacques Monod
a century later. Nothing of the kind is found in Peirce's general description
of knowledge which assumes a far more intimate relation between man and
reality. Maybe this difference in style is connected to Hertz' seeming idea
that the universe consists of little more than actual existence while Peirce,
of course, takes reality to encompass also, in addition to actual existence,
all sorts of laws, patterns, tendencies not reducible to such existence (but
here, my knowledge of Hertz may be insufficient).

In any case, despite these differences, I think there's an important core
shared by the two: the procedural, operational possibilities of a good model
mirrors those ot the object modeled - that is a relation which is most often
not direct and often hard to establish.

Best F


Den 20/09/2014 kl. 16.43 skrev Jon Awbrey:

Howard,

I was responding to your assertion that Peirce agreed with Hertz's
epistemology.

The snippets you cite all echo one version or another of the so-called
"correspondence theory of truth", also known as the "mirror of nature theory
of science" because it assumes a purely dyadic form of correspondence:
analogies, diagrams, morphisms, etc.

The correspondence theory is naturally everyone's first theory of truth, but
not all reflectors on the mirror theory stop with that as their next best
guess.  It was roundly criticized by some of the Ancients, by Kant, and even
though he took it as a useful first stepping stone, by Peirce.

As reflected in the images and metaphors you invoke, the correspondence
theory of truth leads to a very Cartesian view of things, a very Saussurean
take on the use of signs, and it issues in all the false problems of "symbol
grounding" that so bedevil some corners and cul-de-sacs of the cognitive
cottage industries.

That "alien world" is no alien void, it is a plenum that we live our lives in
and play our parts in.  The whole modifies the part that we are and the part
that we are modifies the whole.  Many of those modifications, inside our
skins and out, amount to models and theories that we use to understand a part
of what is going on.  The business of signs and inquiry is not mirrorly a
reflection of the whole but a form of participation in the world that leads
to understanding.

Regards,

Jon

HP:Peirce, as a chemist (1887) also agreed with Hertz's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6950] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

[Clark Goble]

> On Sep 22, 2014, at 11:33 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> On 9/22/2014 12:15 PM, Bob Logan wrote:
> 
>> Dear All - Sorry for the last posting I inadvertently sent it before I was 
>> finished. What I wanted to say is this in response to John's request for 
>> thoughts:
>> 
>> I would say that values drive reasoning but reasoning does not drive values. 
>> It is not that values are irrational it is just that they arise in your guts 
>> and not in your brain and then they affect the reasoning in your brain. Your 
>> thoughts?, John - with best wishes - Bob


> I agree that reasoning and cognition don't directly drive values and 
> sentiments. But I think it's worth noting that reasoning and cognition do 
> check and balance values and sentiments and can help somewhat 'evolve' them, 
> by focusing on bigger and more complete pictures, including clashes of 
> values, unintended consequences, etc.
> Emotions do seem like very quick calculations, very practical in that sense, 
> in view of limits on cognitive resources, and I agree with John that there 
> may be general lessons from the interplay of cognition, sentiment, etc., in 
> homo sapiens. (I've never been partial to a very cognitive emphasis in 
> philosophy of mind).
> 

Not sure I agree with the premise. It seems that many of our values such as 
horror at blatant racism are due to reasoning. Now it’s true they’ve developed 
into a habit. And for many people that’s a culturally acquired habit without a 
lot of reasoning behind it. But I think emotions frequently are habitual 
responses developers via rational development. Even cultural adaptation may be 
cultural habits developed over a long community “argument.” Think slavery 
horror for instance. Emotions that are tied to common sense norms are almost 
certainly arrived at via a kind of reasoning over the types of experiences the 
community regularly faced.

That’s not to say emotions are always arrived at that way. I’ve no idea how new 
emotions are developed, but it seems many are tied to basic experiences the 
brain quickly triggers. Thus smells can trigger extremely strong emotional 
responses for instance. That makes perfect sense when you think of the 
evolution of humans from earlier mammals. Again a kind of community rationality 
developed over time. It’s not always right but that doesn’t make it irrational.
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6950] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

[Benjamin Udell]

Bob, John,

I agree that reasoning and cognition don't directly drive values and 
sentiments. But I think it's worth noting that reasoning and cognition 
do check and balance values and sentiments and can help somewhat 
'evolve' them, by focusing on bigger and more complete pictures, 
including clashes of values, unintended consequences, etc.


Emotions do seem like very quick calculations, very practical in that 
sense, in view of limits on cognitive resources, and I agree with John 
that there may be general lessons from the interplay of cognition, 
sentiment, etc., in homo sapiens. (I've never been partial to a very 
cognitive emphasis in philosophy of mind).


Best, Ben

On 9/22/2014 12:15 PM, Bob Logan wrote:

Dear All - Sorry for the last posting I inadvertently sent it before I 
was finished. What I wanted to say is this in response to John's 
request for thoughts:


I would say that values drive reasoning but reasoning does not drive 
values. It is not that values are irrational it is just that they 
arise in your guts and not in your brain and then they affect the 
reasoning in your brain. Your thoughts?, John - with best wishes - Bob


__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan 



On 2014-09-22, at 11:52 AM, John Collier wrote:


At 01:12 PM 2014-09-10, Frederik wrote:

Dear Jeffs, lists,

Reduction is the easiest way to characterize psychologism, but you 
are right that is not the center of my concern. I think the 
important concerns are at least three


1) the ignorance of ideality - thoughts and signs are general (or 
ideal, or schematic) - this is easily missed if general thought is 
reduced to the individual, particular chain of events processing 
those thoughts
2) as P says, substituting psychology for logic is substituting 
something pretty unclear for something pretty clear - to spell it 
out - if psychologism were really true, in order to investigate the 
structure of an idea, we should record the interior, psychic 
processes of a significant sample of all people thinking that 
thought and average over the results  - instead of investigating the 
public externalizations of that idea in statements, books, artworks, 
etc.
Investigating the claim that 2+2=4 should not be a mathematical 
task, but the task of recording the psychical processing of the 
problem in a large sample of persons and averaging over the results. 
If one participant now claims the result to be 3 we might get a 
final average of 3. - this might now be hailed to be a more 
precise, experimental investigation of the age-old 2+2 riddle than 
centuries of lazy, armchair philosophizing by mahtematicians.
3) relativism: if thoughts in a deep sense depend only on the minds 
thinking them, truth evaporates because being relative only to the 
mind of the beholder
So, psychologism (and, in a broader sense, some species of 
naturalization) thus may threaten the very project of science and 
enlightenment, to put it passionately ...


A few points, none of which I especially want to defend, but I think 
they are relevant.


1) There are idealizations to which we might aspire, and then there 
are what my colleague C.A. Hooker calls "degenerate idealizations". 
These are ones that we cannot approach in a linear way, and assuming 
we can might well lead us astray. An example is ideal gas 
thermodynamics. There are some systems for which i9t can be used top 
approximate quite well, such as close to equilibrium systems and most 
steady state systems. But transitional systems and systems with 
chaotic regions need very different methods, and the equilibrium 
definitions and methods tend to not just be poor approximations, but 
also lead to very poor methods.


2) I raise this not because of neurophysiology (though there may be a 
tie in once we know more), but because of behavioural economics, the 
ground for which was broken by Kahneman and Tversky. It turns out 
that much of our reasoning does not obey idealized principles. 
Sometimes we can be led astray in very obvious ways, but in other 
cases it allows to jump to legitimate conclusions that idealized 
reasoning would not allow us to reach by an easily computable 
process. The idealizations invariably involve assumptions. Game 
theory, the foundation of most neoLiberal economic theory assumes 
that values and reasoning are separate. They are not, since they can 
feed into each other in nonlinear ways (sorry Hume). In fact it seems 
that our brains are set up so this is so (Damasio), and if the 
relevant areas are damaged we can't tell which game we should be 
playing  (the famous Phineas Gage, for example), so perhaps 
neurophysiology is relevant.


3) Our reasoning resources are limited (as are any in the universe), 
so given this, even ideally we should be prepared to make concessions

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14236

Gary, List,

Just by way of putting the skinny in the lead, I am going to experiment with 
using the term "dicent proposition" to refer to the specifically Peircean brand 
of proposition treated in this chapter and book and I will continue to use the 
word "proposition" as a generic term to cover the wide variety of meanings it 
has in numerous other contexts, disciplines, and literatures.


The skinny is ended, my tl;dr reasons for drawing this line in the semantics 
will follow in a subsequent post.


Regards,

Jon

Gary Fuhrman wrote:

It’s time to dive into Chapter 3 of Natural Propositions, and since it’s the
longest and weightiest chapter in the book, I thought it best to name each
thread by section number, to facilitate a stepwise approach to the Dicisign.
In this first message, I’ll try to outline some of the basic ideas behind the
Peircean concept of the proposition.

Traditionally, the proposition has usually been regarded as a basic unit of
logic, just as the sentence is a basic unit of language; and often the
structure of the logical unit has been identified or confused with that of
the linguistic unit, on the assumption that a proposition is necessarily
verbal. But in Peirce's view, a verbal sentence (spoken or printed) can only
represent a proposition. Each utterance which represents that proposition is
a replica of it; and if you say something about something in two different
languages, the two individual utterances say the same thing, because each of
them is a replica of the same proposition.

A proposition, then, is not a linguistic phenomenon but a semiotic one: it is
a kind of sign. It's the way that kind of sign functions that makes it a
proposition. So what does a proposition do, and what kind of general form or
structure enables it to do that sort of thing? This is the kind of question
to which Peirce's doctrine of the Dicisign proposes a non-traditional answer.
Chapter 3 of NP explains how Peirce redefines the proposition as a kind of
Dicisign, and shows how this semiotic logic differs from traditional
propositional logic. The Dicisign is a more general concept than the
proposition, but the concept is most easily developed by starting with the
logical structure of the proposition, because that is the most well-known and
easily verbalized kind of Dicisign.

In his Harvard Lectures of 1903, Peirce was using traditional terms when he
said (EP 2:204):

[[ A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An
argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is
intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an
argument, but which separately indicates what object it is intended to
represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate parts. ]]

However, this definition of “proposition” is crucially different from the
received notion of same, as we will see more clearly in NP Chapter 3. So
later in that year, when Peirce was developing his Speculative Grammar,
Peirce invented a new triad of names for that traditional trichotomy, which
names the three kinds of possible relation between representamen and
interpretant: Sumisign, Dicisign, and Suadisign (EP2:275). In his own
subsequent work, though, Dicisign (or Dicent sign) was the only one of the
three new names that ‘stuck’. His diagram of the famous ten classes (EP2:296)
reverts to “rheme” and “argument” for the other two. Peirce also referred to
the Dicisign as a “quasi-proposition,” and sometimes even omitted the “quasi”
— which is natural, because the proposition is the paradigmatic (though not
the only!) kind of Dicisign.

The very next work in EP2, “New Elements”, does not use the term “Dicisign”
at all, but much of what it says about propositions illuminates the
functioning of Dicisigns as “natural propositions”. For instance, EP2:307:

[[ It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can
assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a
weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend
under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This
suggests the true definition of a proposition, which is a question in much
dispute at this moment. A proposition is a sign which separately, or
independently, indicates its object. ]]

This, you will notice, repeats the definition of “proposition” which we find
in Harvard Lecture V (above), but in a new context which also furnishes
important clues to the deep structure of the Dicisign. The easiest way to
approach this, i think, is to begin with the two essential parts of the
Peircean proposition, namely the Subject and Predicate. For this purpose i
would suggest reading the first paragraph of “Kaina Stoicheia” part III
(EP2:303, or http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#1) along with NP
3.1. If there are any questions about Peirce’s usage of Subject a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6842] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, lists,

Responses interleaved.

On 9/20/2014 11:12 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:

>> BU: Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena 
in the sense that they and their deductively implied conclusions 
would be directly testable for falsity by special concrete 
experiments or experiences.


> HP: Does your statement differ significantly from my statement, 
"Epistemologies are not empirically decidable, e.g., not falsifiable."?


BU: Your statement suggests that epistemologies ought but fail to be 
testable in the idioscopic manner of physics, chemistry, etc. Mine does 
not suggest that and was specific about the kind of testability which 
they lack - direct testability of them or their deductively implied 
conclusions by concrete special experiments. Epistemologies are testable 
as statistical principles are - in study and criticism. Likewise with 
math. If somebody miscalculates pi (to some number of digits) and the 
result is problems in manufacturing, then further investigation may 
point doubts toward the employed calculated value. Yes, the application 
was kind of test of the employed value of pi. But better math is what 
disproves the employed value, i.e., shows that it was indeed a 
miscalculation, bad math. If a statistical principle seems to be failing 
in concrete applications, it needs to be investigated and, if need be, 
corrected, at the level of theoretical statistics.


>> BU: That's also true of principles of statistics and of 
statistical inference, yet such principles are not generally regarded 
as requiring a leap of faith. Mathematics is also not directly 
testable by special concrete experiments, yet mathematics, whether as 
theory or language, is not generally regarded as requiring a leap of 
faith.


> HP: I don't follow your logic. If A and B are both not empirically 
testable that does not imply they both require a leap of faith. Of 
course statistics and mathematics require much less faith than 
epistemology. Math has rules. My next statement follows directly from 
the first: "True belief in any epistemology requires a leap of faith." 
Do you disagree?


Your next statement did not follow from the first, because your first 
statement did not include the claim that statistics and mathematics have 
better or stronger rules than epistemology and thus require less of a 
leap of faith.


I agree that theoretical epistemology, as a discipline, has not had the 
same evident success as theory of statistics. Of the sciences of 
reasoning and beings that reason, only the mathematical ones, which I 
take (in my not fully Peircean way) to be mathematical logic and theory 
of structures of order, seem to have escaped serious disciplinal 
dysfunctionality. Maybe it's because, like Peirce said, we homini 
sapientes aren't rational and reasonable enough, at least not yet. Or 
maybe there's an intractable problem with the reflexivity involved (I 
have nothing original to say about this). However, that doesn't mean 
that everybody needs to give up trying to do better than a leap of faith.


>> BU:  What mathematics requires is leaps of transformational 
imagination in honoring agreements (hypothetical assumptions) as 
binding. Two dots in the imagination are as good an example of two 
things as any two physical objects - better, even, since more 
amenable for mathematical study. 


> HP: That is fairly clear. Why do you think I would disagree?
Because in your original statement you said that ideas that are not 
'empirically' (i.e., directly idioscopically) testable require a leap of 
faith. I don't think that mathematics requires much of a leap of faith. 
I brought up the idea of leaps of imagination as a contrast to the idea 
of leaps of faith.
>> BU: Some sets of mathematical assumptions are nontrivial and lead 
inexorably, deductively, to nontrivial conclusions which compel the 
reasoner. If you think that mathematics is _/merely/_ symbols, still 
that's to admit that mathematical symbols form structures that, by 
their transformabilities, model possibilities.


> HP: Of course math is not /merely/ symbols. I said, "Mathematics is 
the best /language/ that we use to describe physical laws. There is an 
inexorability in physical laws that does not exist in the great 
variety of mathematical concepts and rules." Do you disagree?
BU: I disagree. You say 'inexorable' but you mean inexorably 
physically-forceful. It's a transference of sense. I'm thinking of 
inexorable mathematical relations as a kind of inexorable. You're taking 
the word 'real' in a sense much like that of 'actual'. This is why I 
started asking you whether you thought numbers are objectively 
investigable as numbers. I was taking the _/word/_ 'real' out of it, and 
focusing on the meaning with which Peirce used it.
>> BU: Contrary to your claim, physical laws are not physical forces 
and do not depend like forces on time and rates. 


> HP: I did not say laws are forces. However, current fundamental laws 
are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

[Stephen C. Rose]

Hi Clark -

Your nice note encourages me to risk my own common sensism regarding
reality. I have NO math, NO science. But I do have a very clear sense of
how the smallest realities - those which make us up - contain both chance
and mechanical regularity. Any motion my body makes requires that whatever
is within me function not merely mechanically but spontaneously and freely.
This is particularly so when I take a fall - not uncommon at my age. In
everything regularity and the tolerance and flexibility that enables a
spontaneous reaction. Now we could merely look at this as freedom and
destiny. But Lately I have been thinking of predestination as the union of
this freedom and this mechanism (this fixity and this dancer). Which is why
I think Peirce (and myself) seem to believe that ultimately even the worst
and most errant iterations are subsumed in a regularity beyond  the power
of anyone to grasp save as an agapeic supposition. Again I assume this
makes little sense to most, but it is what occurs after your nice post.

*@stephencrose *

On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:17 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>
> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:02 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> "2) Which of Peirce's writings contribute to the development and
> articulation of his late value theory?"
>
> http://buff.ly/XM88XI
>
>
> 'via Blog this'
> 
>
>
> Thank you for that. I hadn't seen that bibliography before. (I always like
> the stuff Kelly Parker does on Peirce)
>
> While perusing it briefly I rather liked this quote:
>
> science is nothing but a development of our natural instincts (CP 6.412)
>
> It's a rather interesting way to think about it. Thinking about Peircean
> developments of common sense it's a rather fruitful way to think about how
> science starts modifying folk theories until it gets scientists to think
> intuitively along different theoretical grounds. Effectively Peirce's
> theory of common sensism explains scientific community rather well. We just
> have a specialized community.
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6900] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

Yes, absolute theoretical certainty would seem to require an infinite 
run of experience.


Best, Ben

On 9/22/2014 10:01 AM, Clark Goble wrote:



On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:44 PM, Clark Goble > wrote:



On Sep 20, 2014, at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


The main idea is not that of a long run.  Instead the idea is that of 
sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 
'sufficiently far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently 
good' or 'sufficiently good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll 
the same basic idea.


Not to be pedantic (and I know conversation has gone on without me). 
This is something I’ve thought long and hard about and have shifted 
views on several times through the years.


On the one hand it’s true that inquiry only has to go long enough so 
as to arrive at a stable truth. The idea about the long run (and I 
think it’s tied to infinities and Peirce’s conception of continuity) 
is that there’s no real way to know if we’re at a local stability 
point that isn’t the long run stability point or not. So we use the 
idea of a long run long enough to give us a “like compared to like” 
comparison. That is we’re at truth when the selection of forces during 
our inquiry stabilizes us in the same way an ideal community of 
inquirers would given sufficient time.


To me the analogy is to calculus the way it’s usually taught. (i.e. 
not in the idealized way most 20th century mathematicians like, but 
the way more lenient 20th century physicists like) You can always keep 
dividing your rectangles when doing calculus but at a certain point 
you’ve gone far enough to get your answer. You say it’s right simply 
because /you could/ keep going on for infinity even if there’s no need.


It’s a very pragmatic approach but which also gets at Peirce’s 
conception of not having direct control over ones beliefs. The inquiry 
is to open you up to sufficient experiences as to get you to truth.


We’re fallibilists but at a certain point we’re skeptical we’ll be 
proven wrong.






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions: revised schedule

[Edwina Taborsky]

As you say, Gary F, it's a trivial but interesting question on pronunciation.  
I myself, to myself, pronounce 'dicent' as 'die-cent'; rather than 'decent' yet 
also with the  soft c. And 'dicisign' also with the soft c.  My 'cultural norm' 
(shades of Stan!) suggests a soft c after the vowels of 'e' and 'i' and a hard 
c after the vowels of 'a' and 'o'.  

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Fuhrman 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List' 
  Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:06 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions: revised schedule


  There have been a few changes in the projected seminar schedule since I 
posted it last, so here it is again.

   

  I’d also like to take this opportunity to raise a rather trivial question 
about the pronunciation of “dicisign” and “dicent”. At the Peirce Centennial 
conference, I heard these pronounced (by Frederik, for one) with a soft c, so 
that “dicent” sounds exactly like “decent” and “dicisign” has two sibilants in 
it. To me, on the other hand, it comes naturally to pronounce both with a hard 
c, like the c in “indicate” (which of course comes from the same root). I 
haven’t found any clues as to how Peirce pronounced it, or any conclusive 
reason for preferring one pronunciation over the other, but I do prefer the 
hard c, and i’m curious whether others have strong preferences.

   

  Here’s the seminar schedule:

   

Chapter
   Natural Propositions
   Threadleader(s)
   Start date
   
1
   introduction
   Frederik Stjernfelt
   1 Sep
   
2
   anti-psychologism
   Jeff Kasser
   8 Sep
   
3.1-7
   dicisigns I
   Gary Fuhrman
   22 Sep
   
3.8-14
   dicisigns II
   Jeff Downard
   6 Oct
   
4
   naturalization
   Tyler Bennett
   20 Oct
   
5
   Cognition
   Mara Woods
   3 Nov
   
6
   Evolution
   John Collier
   17 Nov
   
7
   beyond language
   Tom Gollier
   1 Dec
   
8
   Iconicities
   Gary Richmond
   15 Dec
   
9-10
   Diagrams
   Jon Awbrey
   5 Jan
   
11-12
   Enlightenment
   Yogi Hendlin
   19 Jan
   

   

   

  gary f.

   



--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6900] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:44 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 20, 2014, at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell  > wrote:
> 
> The main idea is not that of a long run.  Instead the idea is that of 
> sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 'sufficiently 
> far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently good' or 'sufficiently 
> good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll the same basic idea.

Not to be pedantic (and I know conversation has gone on without me). This is 
something I’ve thought long and hard about and have shifted views on several 
times through the years.

On the one hand it’s true that inquiry only has to go long enough so as to 
arrive at a stable truth. The idea about the long run (and I think it’s tied to 
infinities and Peirce’s conception of continuity) is that there’s no real way 
to know if we’re at a local stability point that isn’t the long run stability 
point or not. So we use the idea of a long run long enough to give us a “like 
compared to like” comparison. That is we’re at truth when the selection of 
forces during our inquiry stabilizes us in the same way an ideal community of 
inquirers would given sufficient time.

To me the analogy is to calculus the way it’s usually taught. (i.e. not in the 
idealized way most 20th century mathematicians like, but the way more lenient 
20th century physicists like) You can always keep dividing your rectangles when 
doing calculus but at a certain point you’ve gone far enough to get your 
answer. You say it’s right simply because you could keep going on for infinity 
even if there’s no need. 

It’s a very pragmatic approach but which also gets at Peirce’s conception of 
not having direct control over ones beliefs. The inquiry is to open you up to 
sufficient experiences as to get you to truth.

We’re fallibilists but at a certain point we’re skeptical we’ll be proven wrong.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics & Semiosis

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:58 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 17, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt  > wrote:
> 
> I am not sure complexity is enough, also because of the fact that we have no 
> agreed-upon measurement of the degree of complexity of processes. 

I also don’t think complexity is enough. It’s not hard to imagine highly 
complex systems without sign-like features. Rather my claim is that to develop 
sign-like features requires complexity. Given foundational physics focus on the 
simple in foundations it’s unlikely they’ll focus on signs unless mind-like 
aspects are unavoidable from foundations. While, as I noted, there are 
mind-like aspects in the two major works of foundational physics most 
physicists see them as accidental aspects of the way they are described. 

I do think there are some aspects to thermodynamics done starting with 
symmetries to develop the laws rather than via statistical mechanics or 
phenomenology. But that’s definitely getting afield of the discussion on 
dicisigns. Plus I’d have to review my thermodynamics before daring to say too 
much with any strength.




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:59 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 21, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt  > wrote:
> 
> To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world 
> object is not necessarily easy to grasp - on the contrary, in many cases it 
> requires protracted work of both empirical and theoretical stripe. In 
> Peirce's doctrine of how reasoning with diagrams is undertaken, however, the 
> central idea is that the manipulation possibiliites of the diagram correspond 
> (to some degree) to the real transformation possibilities of the object 
> depicted by the diagram. 

Peirce’s notion of icons seems necessarily tied to his scholastic realism. That 
realism is what makes the semiotics possible. Without it iconicity ends up 
being little more than a judgement things are similar and loses its power.

Given that so many in the modern world are nominalists (even when they don’t 
know what the word means) I suspect that’s why the notion of icons are so 
frequently misunderstood and confused with symbols.

I know you make rather clearly that same point in your book. (I just finished 
chapter 3) But I think it’s important to bring up given some scholars who see a 
tension between Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and his scholastic realism. I think 
iconicity, properly understood, resolves most tensions.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6844] Re: Natural Propositions: like

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:00 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 17, 2014, at 3:32 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt  > wrote:
> 
> My claim is certainly not that Husserl and Peirce agree in all respects. Just 
> that both of them unite objectivity with an intersubjective view of science. 
> Peirce certainly clearlyt sees the social character of the scientific 
> institution. But he thinks that despite social strife, science may succeed 
> given that it follows certain central norms (I discuss this a bit in the last 
> ch. of the book) - norms which are not relative to social groups, culture, 
> history, psychology and similar solvents.

Yes, I’m more just being pedantic over what objectivity and intersubjectivity 
means contextually in each. Put an other way it works as a first order 
approximation but probably misleads if one goes much farther. (Which isn’t a 
bad thing - my background was physics so we were all about doing regular first 
order approximations to understand a phenomena)


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Gary Fuhrman  > wrote:
> 
> Clark, in reference to the Peirce passage you quoted about the “community of 
> quasi-minds”, you said that “While we could obviously and perhaps should 
> discuss this purely as efficient causation, I love how Peirce discusses it 
> instead in terms of signs.” But it’s not at all obvious to me how or why we 
> could or should discuss this purely as efficient causation. To me, the 
> material and formal (if not final) causes of the fact determined by this 
> process appear much more prominent than the efficient causes.
> 

Typically physicists and most physical scientists avoid material and formal 
causes in the Aristotilean sense. They become more the properties or 
information that changes. Since the focus is on those changes of state the 
focus is really on efficient causation with little focus on material or formal 
changes - they are simply bracketed and left uninvestigated usually.

When they are investigated by truly theoretical physicists and occasionally 
philosophers things get tricky. One could well argue, for instance, that most 
of string theory is really a theory about material and formal causes for 
instance. While I honestly don’t think most physicists are instrumentalists 
like Feynman, I do think they adhere to a certain instrumentalist ethos that 
says one should leap into the abyss of worrying about ultimate stuff beyond 
what we can empirically talk about clearly. (Which is why string theory has 
long been so controversial, IMO)

The reason this is important is of course how physics conceives of formal and 
material causes tends to view them as somewhat illusionary. That is they are 
emergent phenomena but there’s always the assumption of a true reduction to 
basic physics is in theory possible. (This is different from the reductionism 
of description that I take Frederik was addressing a few weeks ago) So to a 
physicist to only real form and material are the ultimate constituents of the 
universe, whether they be strings, quantum fields or whatever they turn out to 
be. And the reason talk of formal or material causes is pointless is because we 
don’t know the ultimate constituents (or if people think they do, it’s merely 
talk about strings)

I’m not saying this is the only way one could talk about this sort of thing. 
But I do think this is, in practice, the way physicists and to only a slightly 
lesser extent chemists think about all this. Biologists are a different beast 
of course.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:17 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:02 AM, Stephen C. Rose  > wrote:
> 
> "2) Which of Peirce’s writings contribute to the development and articulation 
> of his late value theory?" 
> 
> http://buff.ly/XM88XI 
> 
> 
> 'via Blog this' 
> 
Thank you for that. I hadn’t seen that bibliography before. (I always like the 
stuff Kelly Parker does on Peirce)

While perusing it briefly I rather liked this quote:

science is nothing but a development of our natural instincts (CP 6.412)

It’s a rather interesting way to think about it. Thinking about Peircean 
developments of common sense it’s a rather fruitful way to think about how 
science starts modifying folk theories until it gets scientists to think 
intuitively along different theoretical grounds. Effectively Peirce’s theory of 
common sensism explains scientific community rather well. We just have a 
specialized community.


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[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions: revised schedule

[Gary Fuhrman]

There have been a few changes in the projected seminar schedule since I posted 
it last, so here it is again.

 

I’d also like to take this opportunity to raise a rather trivial question about 
the pronunciation of “dicisign” and “dicent”. At the Peirce Centennial 
conference, I heard these pronounced (by Frederik, for one) with a soft c, so 
that “dicent” sounds exactly like “decent” and “dicisign” has two sibilants in 
it. To me, on the other hand, it comes naturally to pronounce both with a hard 
c, like the c in “indicate” (which of course comes from the same root). I 
haven’t found any clues as to how Peirce pronounced it, or any conclusive 
reason for preferring one pronunciation over the other, but I do prefer the 
hard c, and i’m curious whether others have strong preferences.

 

Here’s the seminar schedule:

 


Chapter

Natural Propositions

Threadleader(s)

Start date


1

introduction

Frederik Stjernfelt

1 Sep


2

anti-psychologism

Jeff Kasser

8 Sep


3.1-7

dicisigns I

Gary Fuhrman

22 Sep


3.8-14

dicisigns II

Jeff Downard

6 Oct


4

naturalization

Tyler Bennett

20 Oct


5

Cognition

Mara Woods

3 Nov


6

Evolution

John Collier

17 Nov


7

beyond language

Tom Gollier

1 Dec


8

Iconicities

Gary Richmond

15 Dec


9-10

Diagrams

Jon Awbrey

5 Jan


11-12

Enlightenment

Yogi Hendlin

19 Jan

 

 

gary f.

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Fuhrman]

Stefan, I haven’t read enough of the authors you cite (except Berger and 
Luckmann) to answer this question, but I think that position would be an 
extreme one even among social constructivists. That’s why I refer to Stan’s 
argument as “radical” social constructivism, because he likes (or feels 
compelled) to polarize the issue. And Ben was responding in kind 
(appropriately, I think).

 

gary f.

 

From: sb [mailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de] 
Sent: 21-Sep-14 5:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,

 

Dear Ben, Gary R., Gary F., List

wich social constructivists with some reputation do hold the position "that the 
objects or findings of inquiry are unreal and mere figments"? Schütz, Berger & 
Luckmann, Piaget, von Foerster, Latour, Bloor or Knorr-Cetina? Foucault, 
Mannheim or Fleck? I wonder

Best
Stefan




Am 21.09.14 23:10, schrieb Gary Richmond:

Ben, lists,

 

A most excellent post, and one of the strongest arguments against 
constructivist epistemology that I've read, having the added virtue of being 
succinct.

 

Best,

 

Gary

 




Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

Stan,

If you think that five minutes' investigation would likely at best reach a 
trivial truth about a kind of phenomenon, then substitute 'five days' or 'five 
months' or 'five decades', etc. The point is the sooner or later, not an 
incompletable long run. 

You're simply not distinguishing between truth and opinion.  If two traditions 
arrive at contrary conclusions about the same kind of phenomenon, the normal 
logical conclusion about the contrarity is that at most one of the conclusions 
is true and true for sound reasons, at most one is the result of sufficient 
investigation even though both traditions claim sufficiency. Peirce's semiotics 
is logic studied in terms of signs. You don't distinguish between sufficiency 
and claims of sufficiency, truth and claims of truth, and reality and claims of 
reality. Both traditions' conclusions might be false, results of insufficient 
investigation. They might both be mixes of truth and falsehood, various 
inaccuracies, and so on. 

Simply accepting contrary conclusions as reflecting two "realities" because two 
traditions arrived at them is a defeatist method of inquiry, a form of 
'insuccessibilism'. Imagine the swelling mischief if courts treated widely 
discrepant testimony from various witnesses as reflecting different "realities" 
rather than different perspectives or mistaken or differently limited 
observations or memories, or lack of honesty or candor, and so on. Imagine 
being an accused defendant in such a court, with one's money, career, freedom, 
life, hanging in the balance. 

Waiting for the conflicting traditions to resolve their conflicts and hoping 
that their resultant conclusion will be the truth, is a method of inquiry of 
last resort, that to which a pure spectator is confined. To go further and 
_define_ truth as the conclusion of any actual tradition or actual dialogue 
among actual traditions, underlies the method of authority, a form of 
infallibilism. If two traditions don't resolve their argument and if you for 
your part have no way to investigate the question itself and arrive at a 
conclusion about the subject of their argument, then your normal logical 
conclusion would be that you won't know the answer to the question, not that 
there are conflicting true answers to the question. 

I disbelieve that you ever did physics in either way. I don't see why you'd 
want to impose such weak methods on philosophy, or have a semiotics in which 
contrary signs about the same object merely reflect different "realities"; such 
would turn logic and semiotics into mush. Peirce's theory of inquiry, which 
seems to reflect the attitude of scientific research, does not boil down to 
'poll the experts' or 'poll the traditions', instead it boils down to 'do the 
science,' by a method actively motivated and shaped by the idea of putting into 
practice the fallibilist recognition that inquiry can go wrong (because the 
real is independent of actual opinion) and the 'successibilist' recognition 
that inquiry can go right (because the real is the cognizable). To argue about 
this, as you do, is to presuppose that there is a truth about this very matter 
under discussion, a truth that can be found and can be missed. 

Best, Ben

On 9/20/2014 3:46 PM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

Ben -- Replying to: 

 

The main idea is not that of a long run.  Instead the idea is that of 
sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 'sufficiently 
far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently good' or 'sufficiently 
good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll the same basic idea.

S: Then two different traditions might come up w

[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

[Gary Fuhrman]

It’s time to dive into Chapter 3 of Natural Propositions, and since it’s the 
longest and weightiest chapter in the book, I thought it best to name each 
thread by section number, to facilitate a stepwise approach to the Dicisign. In 
this first message, I’ll try to outline some of the basic ideas behind the 
Peircean concept of the proposition.

 

Traditionally, the proposition has usually been regarded as a basic unit of 
logic, just as the sentence is a basic unit of language; and often the 
structure of the logical unit has been identified or confused with that of the 
linguistic unit, on the assumption that a proposition is necessarily verbal. 
But in Peirce's view, a verbal sentence (spoken or printed) can only represent 
a proposition. Each utterance which represents that proposition is a replica of 
it; and if you say something about something in two different languages, the 
two individual utterances say the same thing, because each of them is a replica 
of the same proposition.

 

A proposition, then, is not a linguistic phenomenon but a semiotic one: it is a 
kind of sign. It's the way that kind of sign functions that makes it a 
proposition. So what does a proposition do, and what kind of general form or 
structure enables it to do that sort of thing? This is the kind of question to 
which Peirce's doctrine of the Dicisign proposes a non-traditional answer. 
Chapter 3 of NP explains how Peirce redefines the proposition as a kind of 
Dicisign, and shows how this semiotic logic differs from traditional 
propositional logic. The Dicisign is a more general concept than the 
proposition, but the concept is most easily developed by starting with the 
logical structure of the proposition, because that is the most well-known and 
easily verbalized kind of Dicisign. 

 

In his Harvard Lectures of 1903, Peirce was using traditional terms when he 
said (EP 2:204):

[[ A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An 
argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is 
intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an 
argument, but which separately indicates what object it is intended to 
represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate parts. ]]

 

However, this definition of “proposition” is crucially different from the 
received notion of same, as we will see more clearly in NP Chapter 3. So later 
in that year, when Peirce was developing his Speculative Grammar, Peirce 
invented a new triad of names for that traditional trichotomy, which names the 
three kinds of possible relation between representamen and interpretant: 
Sumisign, Dicisign, and Suadisign (EP2:275). In his own subsequent work, 
though, Dicisign (or Dicent sign) was the only one of the three new names that 
‘stuck’. His diagram of the famous ten classes (EP2:296) reverts to “rheme” and 
“argument” for the other two. Peirce also referred to the Dicisign as a 
“quasi-proposition,” and sometimes even omitted the “quasi” — which is natural, 
because the proposition is the paradigmatic (though not the only!) kind of 
Dicisign.

 

The very next work in EP2, “New Elements”, does not use the term “Dicisign” at 
all, but much of what it says about propositions illuminates the functioning of 
Dicisigns as “natural propositions”. For instance, EP2:307:

[[ It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can assert 
anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weathercock does, 
or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under a portrait 
does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This suggests the true 
definition of a proposition, which is a question in much dispute at this 
moment. A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates 
its object. ]]

 

This, you will notice, repeats the definition of “proposition” which we find in 
Harvard Lecture V (above), but in a new context which also furnishes important 
clues to the deep structure of the Dicisign. The easiest way to approach this, 
i think, is to begin with the two essential parts of the Peircean proposition, 
namely the Subject and Predicate. For this purpose i would suggest reading the 
first paragraph of “Kaina Stoicheia” part III (EP2:303, or 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#1) along with NP 3.1. If there are 
any questions about Peirce’s usage of Subject and Predicate, it would be best 
to raise them now, because these will be crucial terms in Chapter 3. Same with 
questions to Frederik about 3.1, as I’ll be moving on to 3.2 shortly.

 

gary f.

 


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6936] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Jeff K, lists -
I merely reproduced P's argument for his hierarchy of sciences from memory 
because it came up in the list discussion - it is not something playing a 
prominent role in the argument of my book (apart from the issue of 
(anti-)psychologism).
Best
F


Den 22/09/2014 kl. 06.50 skrev "Kasser,Jeff" 
mailto:jeff.kas...@colostate.edu>>
:

I'm not sure that I follow you here, Frederik. If the "lower" sciences provide 
data for the "higher" ones, how can they fail to function as tests for the 
"higher" ones? I'm not talking about conclusive tests, of course. Surely 
there's plenty of mediation by auxiliary hypotheses, and so one could maintain 
claims from the "higher" sciences even if they seem to conflict with results 
from the "lower" ones. More importantly, it can be very difficult to get the 
lower-level data to bear on higher-level claims.  But I think Ben's earlier 
post nicely brought out Peirce's challenge to himself and to other logicians to 
find ways to do just that, and that certainly sounds like testing to me. 
Perhaps Peirce's ordering of the sciences has the consequence that an idealized 
intellect would not need lower-level data in order to test higher-level claims, 
but we're not such intellects, and I share Ben's sense that Peirce felt 
significant doubt about some of his logical claims in the absence of
lower-level confirmation of those claims.(I leave as an aside for now the 
interesting questions this raises about the notion of a "positive reason" for 
doubting; I find this notion intriguing and unclear myself.)  I don't think 
that your example of mathematics is persuasive, since the gap between 
mathematics and positive sciences seems to me different in kind than that 
between "higher" and "lower" sciences of positive fact. But I might just be 
misunderstanding you. Do you perhaps want to deny that the special sciences 
actually provide data for logic? One might think that all of the relevant data 
is cenoscopic rather than idioscopic? I think that fits some of the most 
important cases well; Peirce wasn't talking about the special science of 
psychology when he talked about tracing the pragmatic maxim back to 
"psychological" claims like the ones in "Fixation" connecting belief and 
action. He was talking about cenoscopic psychology, not idioscopic. But you 
seem in your message be
low to permit logical sciences to learn from special science!
s and to

have their claims confirmed by results in special sciences. And it seems to me 
that there's no confirmation w/o the possibility of disconfirmation, and again 
that sounds like testing. As we now approach the heart of your book, I'll 
understand if you're too busy to reply, but I'll be interested to get some 
clarification from you if you get a chance.

Best to all,

Jeff K.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon, lists,

I am not a philosopher and have not read Kant, but Jon's quote of Kant
below criticizing the correspondence theory of truth (CTT) seems to me, a
working theoretical cell biologist, to be a bit  shallow.

Perhaps the RPM category theory of modeling I suggested recently (Figure
1) may provide a more realistic way to evaluate the validity of CTT:

   fg
   Reality --->  Phenomenon ---> Model
  |^
  ||
  ||
  h

Figure 1.  The RPM category theory of human knowledge.  f = natural
process; g = mental process; h = correspondence.


Based on the RPM category theory of knowledge, I am inclined to think that
Kant's model of truth under-estimate the importance of Step h, i.e.,
correspondence, empirical validation, or information flow between Object
and interpreter.

With all the best.

Sung
__
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net




defedning
> Peircers,
>
> Here is Kant on the correspondence theory of truth:
>
> 
>
> Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.
> According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to
> be
> true, must agree with the object.  Now, I can only compare the object with
> my
> knowledge by this means, namely, ''by taking knowledge of it''.  My
> knowledge,
> then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for
> truth.
>   For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can
> only
> judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the
> object.
>   Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients ''Diallelos''.
> And
> the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked
> that
> this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should
> make a
> statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but
> who
> defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a
> witness is an honourable man.  (Kant, 45).
>
> 
>
> Kant, Immanuel (1800), ''Introduction to Logic''.
> Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.),
> Dennis Sweet (intro.), Barnes and Noble,
> New York, NY, 2005.
>
> According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence
> is a "mere verbal definition", here making use of Aristotle's
> distinction between a ''nominal definition'', a definition in
> name only, and a ''real definition'', a definition that shows
> the ''true cause'' or essence of the thing whose term is being
> defined.  From Kant's account of the history, the definition of
> truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical
> times, the "skeptics" criticizing the "logicians" for a form of
> circular reasoning, though the extent to which the "logicians"
> actually held such a theory is not evaluated in this account.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>





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[PEIRCE-L] psychologisms not addressed

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Lists - 
Now we have taken several weeks discussing ch. 2 of "Natural Propositions" 
concerning (anti-)psychologism. 
Many interesting viewpoints and subjects have been marshaled - including some 
not addressed in the chapter. 
Absent, however, have been the chapter's discussion of contemporary 
psychologism, discussed in the versions of Barsalou's symbol theory as well as 
in contemporary neuroscience (which was what prompted me to write the chapter 
in the first place - rather than Peirce philology). 
If anyone have comments about those parts of the chapter, however, I would 
still be interested in hearing them!
Best
Frederik
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6901] Re: Natural

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Howard, lists -

Den 22/09/2014 kl. 02.47 skrev Howard Pattee 
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>
:

But Howard, this is a different position than the one you presented in the 
earlier quote just some lines before. There, each foundation of math was 
legitimized by specific tasks - now they are deemed mere empty epistemological 
conventions.

HP: I did not say that epistemologies are empty. I meant only the arguments for 
a "winner" epistemology are empty. All these epistemological models in our 
brains have proven historically to be full of meaning, or at least useful for 
creative thinking. As I try to get across, they are complementary. What I have 
not found productive are the ones like the >2000 years of argument over  
realism vs. nominalism. Few working scientists argue this way any more. Some 
logicians and philosophers still do.

The sports metaphor of one winner is ridiculous, I agree. But there are very 
good arguments that some epistemologies (e.g. the audacious proposal by the 
logical positivists) are untenable. And the fact that discussion has taken 
place in 2000 years does not imply there is no progress.

FS: It may well be the case, as you suggest, that there is no simple solution 
to be found  in any of the foundation headlines stemming from the crisis around 
1900. But that might just as well be a sign this field is still open for 
further investigation and progress.

HP: These arguments 
were more than headlines. What would you call progress? Elimination of one 
epistemology?

Speaking about strawmen, I think you're making one now by trying to make me 
this sports referee eliminating all but one winner. As to the 
nominalism/realism issue there are - as you know - many different types of 
nominalism and realism, including various compromise proposals. A good argument 
for some version of realism is that even nominalists continue to use certain 
general terms ("the mind", "human brains") in a way suggesting they refer to 
structures in reality.

FS: I still think this discussion address deep issues which are not solved by 
archiving the whole field as one of indifferent conventions.

HP: I agree (except indifference is not the same as complementary). This 
discussion is great! My last complaint of "unproductive arguments" was too 
strong. Of course I agree we should openly consider the values of all 
epistemologies. But I do not see the value of trying to eliminate all of them 
except Peirce's, whatever it is.

I am not convinced Peirce was right in everything. I do think he had a good 
proposal for an epistemology of mathematics (that abstract objects are 
accessible via the manipulation of tokens of diagrams presenting, in turn, 
diagram types) - but the sciences have progressed since Peirce's time and I 
think epistemology should be done by continuous consideration of ongoing 
scientific development (including the human and social sciences).

Best
F


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