Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R - yes, that's a very difficult passage.

First, in my view, the triadic Sign (R-O, R-R, R-I) IS an 'instance of 
semiosis'. It can be a molecule, a bird, a song, a word, a cloud, a. Of 
course, no existential instance exists per se, alone and isolate; all are 
semiosically networked with other 'instances' and with other Relations. 

And, the Relations are not dyads, understanding a dyadic interaction as between 
two existential 'things'; The 'nodes' of Object, Representamen, Interpretant 
don't exist as such except within the semiosic interaction.

Now, that passage of Peirce's - 
A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. 

The way I see it, is that the Interpretant must relate to its Object.. It can't 
simply be the 'end production' of a linear communication line. What is the 
nature of this relation?  My view of the Representamen is not that it is a 
'mover-of-data/information' from one site to another, from the Object to the 
Interpretant. It mediates, and this isn't a 'shove-it-along' action; it 
transforms that input data from the Object and 'outputs' it as the 
Interpretant. There is some change between the O and I. This suggests as well 
that this Interpretant is in interaction with its Object in a transformative 
mode...because the Representamen's nature is to mediate, to transform...not to 
simply mechanically 'shove the data along from one site to another site'. 

How much of a transformation is done, depends on the modal category of the 
Representamen. 

This then leads to the question: Does the Interpretant 'transform' the Object? 
If the Representamen mediates between the Object and the Interpretant, then, 
the Interpretant must do so, within the force of the Representamen (laws, 
habits). So, an object (a shrub) is transformed by the Representamen into an 
Interpretant as (a medically useful shrub)..and this information then affects 
how one interacts with that shrub as an Object in the future.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 6:55 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, Gary F, list,


  Edwina, you wrote: The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - 
embodied, while the 9 Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three 
Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) and function in each of the three categorical modes). 
The Sign, the full triad, on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and 
depth.


  I'd suggest that the table of 10 classes does not itself offer embodied 
sgins, but that this is yet another analysis within semiotic grammar, differing 
from the list of 9 parameters in representing classes of signs which may be 
embodied in an actual semiosis, each such real semiosis being so complex (or 
involving so many complexities) that any attempt to completely analyze its 
putative 'elements' would necessarily be incomplete, not to mention, de post 
facto. 


  And I think complexity exists even at the level of the analysis of each of 
the ten classes, so that to emphasize, as you do, the three Relations (R-O, 
R-R, R-I) separately, so to speak, seems to me to deemphasize what I think is a 
quintessential character of the Sign, as expressed in many of Peirce's 
definitions, namely that the Interpretant stands in the same (not even 
'similar', but "the same triadic relation") to the Object as the Representamen 
stands to its Object. I do not see that your "three Relations" shows this. See, 
for example, this oft quoted defintion, no. 13, in Robert Marty's "76 
Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce" 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM which begins:
A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. 

  I think this additional factor is of the greatest importance, indeed cannot 
be over-emphasized. Thus, the 'three relati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Gary F, list,

Edwina, you wrote: The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand -
embodied, while the 9 Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three
Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) and function in each of the three categorical
modes). The Sign, the full triad, on the other hand, is embodied, in both
breadth and depth.

I'd suggest that the table of 10 classes does not itself offer embodied
sgins, but that this is yet another analysis within semiotic grammar,
differing from the list of 9 parameters in representing classes of signs
which *may *be embodied in an actual semiosis, each such real semiosis
being so complex (or involving so many complexities) that any attempt to
completely analyze its putative 'elements' would necessarily be incomplete,
not to mention, *de post facto*.

And I think complexity exists even at the level of the analysis of each of
the ten classes, so that to emphasize, as you do, the three Relations (R-O,
R-R, R-I) separately, so to speak, seems to me to deemphasize what I think
is a *quintessential* character of the Sign, as expressed in many of
Peirce's definitions, namely that *the Interpretant stands in the same (not
even 'similar', but "the same triadic relation") to the Object as the
Representamen stands to its Object.* I do not see that your "three
Relations" shows this. See, for example, this oft quoted defintion, no. 13,
in Robert Marty's "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce"
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM which begins:

A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is
genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that
does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason
the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the
Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself
does.

I think this additional factor is of the greatest importance, indeed cannot
be over-emphasized. Thus, the 'three relations' are seen to be no
"complexus of dyadic relations" but a single Sign *when embodied*, as you
have always insisted. But note well that in def. 13 above, as in a number
of other places, Peirce writes "A sign, or Representamen," as I see it,
thus equating the 'sign itself' with the entire "genuine" triadic relation,
which in an important sense it is, In other words, the three relations are
one *in semiosis*.

So, at the moment, I am thinking that both you and Gary are partially right
and partially wrong. The triadic 'Sign' should not, in my opinion, be
considered an instance of semiosis itself, but an *abstract *tricategorial
analysis of it.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - thanks for this clarification. I agree; the table of 9 are NOT
> embodiments.
>
> I consider them the terms for the Relations; eg, in the letters to Lady
> Welby, where he writes:
>
> "Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their
> relations to their objects, and as to their relations to their
> interpretants" (8.333).  And
>
> "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs
> into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. [Gary F and I differ strongly on
> certain aspects of this, as he considers the term 'sign' to refer to and
> only to the Representamen, whereas i consider the term to refer to either
> the Represenamen OR the full triad of relations].
>
> And, "in regard to its relation to its signified Interperpretant, a sign
> is either a Rheme, a Dicent or an Argument" 8.337.
>
> These are the two Relations that offer 'breadth' to the semiosic Sign (the
> triad) - ie the R-O and the R-I. The Representamen relates to itself 'As it
> is in itself" (8.224) and this, in my view, offers DEPTH, offering the 
> *generalized
> history *of this Representamen in its other two Relations - that between
> the R and the O, and that between the R and the I.
>
> The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - embodied, while the 9
> Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three Relations (R-O, R-R,
> R-I) and function in each of the three categorical modes). The Sign, the
> full triad, on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and depth.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:26 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> List,
>
> Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my
> opinion a great deal of semiotic confus

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R - thanks for this clarification. I agree; the table of 9 are NOT 
embodiments.

I consider them the terms for the Relations; eg, in the letters to Lady Welby, 
where he writes:

"Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their 
relations to their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants" 
(8.333).  And

"In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into 
Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. [Gary F and I differ strongly on certain 
aspects of this, as he considers the term 'sign' to refer to and only to the 
Representamen, whereas i consider the term to refer to either the Represenamen 
OR the full triad of relations].

And, "in regard to its relation to its signified Interperpretant, a sign is 
either a Rheme, a Dicent or an Argument" 8.337.

These are the two Relations that offer 'breadth' to the semiosic Sign (the 
triad) - ie the R-O and the R-I. The Representamen relates to itself 'As it is 
in itself" (8.224) and this, in my view, offers DEPTH, offering the generalized 
history of this Representamen in its other two Relations - that between the R 
and the O, and that between the R and the I.

The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - embodied, while the 9 
Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) 
and function in each of the three categorical modes). The Sign, the full triad, 
on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and depth.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:26 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  List,


  Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my 
opinion a great deal of semiotic confusion has been generated by confusing and 
conflating (1) sign types with sign classes. No doubt Peirce himself 
contributed to this confusion, although in some cases and in context it seems 
quite logical (and Peirce offers legitimate reasons) to refer to one of the 
classes by less than its full triadic name, for example, 'Qualisign' to refer 
to the 1st of the 10 classes, the rhematic iconic qualisign. But, again, even 
this sort of abbreviation has wreaked a kind of semiotic havoc. (Btw, this is 
not the only way Peirce contributes to this confusion.)


  Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing a 
paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and 
classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer to 
Peirce's meaning.


  This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9 
classes are not analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like' and 
quasi-individual, but, again, are the mere parameters of the 10 possible signs 
which might be embodied, that is, the 10 classes. 


  There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if they 
represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not.


  Best,


  Gary R






  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists,



You wrote:


" . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign 
types defined in NDTR,   (120815-1)
including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity 
in the concepts of 
genuine and degenerate; . . . "


(1)  Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"?  
Peirce defines 


(A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics) 


1. qualisign, 
2. sinsign, 
3. legisign,
4. icon, 
5. index, 
6. symbol, 
7. rheme, 
8. dicisign, and 
9. arguement) , and 




(B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks)


1. rhematic iconic qualisign, 
2. rhematic iconic sinsign, 
3. rhematic iconic legisign, 
4. rhematic indexical sinsign,
5. rhematic indexical legisign,
6. rhematic symbolic legisign,
7  decent indexical sinsign,
8. decent indexical legisign,
9. decent symbolic legisign
10. argument symbolic legisign.




Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs 
may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, s, t and 
b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons). 


(2)  According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in earlier 
posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") cannot 
exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as the 
"composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons.


(3) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks in 
a proton, or  u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so perhaps

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my
opinion a great deal of semiotic confusion *has* been generated by
confusing and conflating (1) sign types with sign classes. No doubt Peirce
himself contributed to this confusion, although in *some *cases and *in
context* it seems quite logical (and Peirce offers legitimate reasons) to
refer to one of the classes by less than its full triadic name, for
example, 'Qualisign' to refer to the 1st of the 10 classes, the* rhematic
iconic qualisign. *But, again, even this sort of abbreviation has wreaked a
kind of semiotic havoc. (Btw, this is not the only way Peirce contributes
to this confusion.)

Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing
a paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and
classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer
to Peirce's meaning.

This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9
classes are *not* analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like'
and quasi-individual, but, again, are the *mere *parameters of the 10
possible signs which *might *be embodied, that is, the 10 classes.

There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if they
represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists,
>
> You wrote:
>
> " . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign
> types defined in NDTR,   (120815-1)
> including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible
> ambiguity in the concepts of
> genuine and degenerate; . . . "
>
> (*1*)  Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"?
> Peirce defines
>
> (A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics)
>
> 1. qualisign,
> 2. sinsign,
> 3. legisign,
> 4. icon,
> 5. index,
> 6. symbol,
> 7. rheme,
> 8. dicisign, and
> 9. arguement) , and
>
>
> (B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks)
>
> 1. rhematic iconic qualisign,
> 2. rhematic iconic sinsign,
> 3. rhematic iconic legisign,
> 4. rhematic indexical sinsign,
> 5. rhematic indexical legisign,
> 6. rhematic symbolic legisign,
> 7  decent indexical sinsign,
> 8. decent indexical legisign,
> 9. decent symbolic legisign
> 10. argument symbolic legisign.
>
>
> Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of
> signs may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c,
> s, t and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons).
>
> (*2*)  According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in
> earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs")
> cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as
> the "composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons.
>
> (*3*) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks
> in a proton, or  u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so
> perhaps there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs together
> within a composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in semiotics may be
> referred to as the "*semantic force*" or "*semiotic force*", in analogy
> to the "strong force".
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> >
>> > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types
>> defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a
>> possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly
>> this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and
>> of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph
>>
>> I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many
>> of these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their
>> terms since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology
>> that seems obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may
>> be wrong, my sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our
>> various disagreements are located.
>>
>> All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more
>> fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions
>> proceed.
>>
>> I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching
>> up. I see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of
>> sign, continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these
>> subtle points it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over
>> the applicability of certain terms. It’s not cle

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon A.S. :
On Dec 8, 2015, at 2:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

>  In other words, a qualisign is always and only an icon; it can never be an 
> index or a symbol. 

Are you missing a critical presupposition here?

What did CSP intend for these three trichotomies?

Is each component of the three trichotomies a term in a premiss or in the set 
of premisses that form an argument?

Is it necessary that any conclusion of the argument must be consistent with the 
set of legisigns used in the premisses?.

Is it necessary that, for any particular situation, these three trichotomies 
form a relational product?

Is it possible that during the concatenation of intermediate terms of the set 
of premises, that one of the terms may be substituted for another term?

In other words, in the logical manipulations of terms within CSP's relational 
algebra, is it possible that products are substituted for relational products?

Cheers

Jerry






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists,

You wrote:

" . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign
types defined in NDTR,   (120815-1)
including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity
in the concepts of
genuine and degenerate; . . . "

(*1*)  Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"?
Peirce defines

(A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics)

1. qualisign,
2. sinsign,
3. legisign,
4. icon,
5. index,
6. symbol,
7. rheme,
8. dicisign, and
9. arguement) , and


(B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks)

1. rhematic iconic qualisign,
2. rhematic iconic sinsign,
3. rhematic iconic legisign,
4. rhematic indexical sinsign,
5. rhematic indexical legisign,
6. rhematic symbolic legisign,
7  decent indexical sinsign,
8. decent indexical legisign,
9. decent symbolic legisign
10. argument symbolic legisign.


Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, s, t
and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons).

(*2*)  According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in
earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs")
cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as
the "composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons.

(*3*) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks
in a proton, or  u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so
perhaps there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs together
within a composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in semiotics may be
referred to as the "*semantic force*" or "*semiotic force*", in analogy to
the "strong force".

All the best.

Sung





On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
>
> > On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> >
> > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types
> defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a
> possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly
> this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and
> of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph
>
> I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many of
> these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their terms
> since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology that
> seems obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may be
> wrong, my sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our
> various disagreements are located.
>
> All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more
> fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions
> proceed.
>
> I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching
> up. I see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of
> sign, continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these
> subtle points it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over
> the applicability of certain terms. It’s not clear to me yet that we have a
> substantial difference in content.
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

Much of what you wrote in your last message is above my pay grade, but one
comment warrants a brief response.

JD:  Gary F. says that qualisigns are always icons, while you say that the
icons are always based on the relation of the sign to the dynamical
interpretant.

This is the second time in this exchange that you have incorrectly
associated icon/index/symbol with the relation of sign to dynamical
INTERPRETANT.  Again, icon/index/symbol is based on the relation of sign to
dynamical OBJECT.  It was probably a simple mistake both times, but
obviously it makes a huge difference.  Presented/urged/submitted (or
suggestive/imperative/indicative) is based on the relation of sign to
dynamical INTERPRETANT.

In any case, Gary F. and I are both simply repeating things that Peirce
himself wrote--qualisigns are always icons, and icons are always based on
the relation of sign to dynamical object.  In other words, a qualisign is
always and only an icon; it can never be an index or a symbol.  This
is because a possible can only determine a possible, and the trichotomy of
the sign itself logically precedes the trichotomy of the relation between
sign and dynamical object.  Along with the fact that a necessitant can only
be determined by a necessitant, this is why three trichotomies produce only
10 sign classes, rather than 27; and why ten trichotomies produce only 66
sign classes, rather than 59,049.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Matt Faunce]

I accidentally hit the send button. I started to re-write it but I'm out 
of time now. I won't be able to clean this up, or re-write it, until 
tonight. But I did clean up the last sentence so hopefully you know 
where I was going with this response.


Matt

On 12/8/15 2:16 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

Clark,

Are you saying that we should judge music like we judge medicine—e.g., just 
because certain music works for me doesn't mean music that doesn't work for me 
is bad? Similarly, should we judge music like we judge mathematics relative to 
their applications?

Just like I can recognize that a class of certain medicine doesn't work for me 
but does for others, I can recognize that certain subsets of that class are 
more effective. This recognition is by analogy. By analogy I can recognize that 
that the surprise in Haydn's Surprise Symphony was invigorating to people in 
the Classical Period, even though its not invigorating to me because I can 
relate to more modern musical surprises.

Are you saying that we'll always have a way to properly judge music from other 
times? That there will always be an over-riding category to adjudicate the 
objects being compared?

Matt

On Dec 8, 2015, at 1:41 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:


Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music?

My first response is that "in the long run" for Peirce is a normative idea in 
science and does not apply necessarily--maybe only very little, or not at all--to the 
fine arts.

It is true that Bach and Mozart, for example, after hundreds of years, still 
have considerable appeal. In my opinion, some of this is the result of (or at 
least involves) acoustical phenemona which they 
exploit--harmonies,counterpoints, etc.--which really do have a visceral effect 
on the human nervous system. But I do not think that it is at all certain that 
even they will be appreciated in several hundred or so years.

Aren’t we making a category error here?

Peirce’s regulatory notion of final opinion seems tied towards representations 
and their truth values. This isn’t to deny we can talk about final 
interpretants, but more that certain representation are finalized. So the claim 
“this music is of high quality” meaning aesthetic value seems something we can 
determinate and thus sensible for consideration as a final interpretant.

My sense though is that we need to unpack what we’re actually analyzing. After 
all as Gary notes just because something is held as true today need not imply 
it will in the future. This is both due to the nature of inquiry but also I 
think because we’re conflating two issues. The first whether something is 
appealing to some finite group. Obviously just because something appeals to one 
group it need not appeal to an other group. The second issue is whether 
something is universally aesthetical. These are two very different questions. 
One can answer differently for each.

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--
Matt


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Clark Goble]

> On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types 
> defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a 
> possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly 
> this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and 
> of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph

I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many of 
these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their terms 
since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology that seems 
obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may be wrong, my 
sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our various 
disagreements are located.

All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more 
fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions proceed.

I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching up. I 
see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of sign, 
continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these subtle points 
it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over the applicability of 
certain terms. It’s not clear to me yet that we have a substantial difference 
in content.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Gary Richmond]

Clark, list,

I'm not exactly sure what you're arguing here, Clark. You wrote:

Peirce’s regulatory notion of final opinion seems tied towards
representations and their truth values. This isn’t to deny we can talk
about final interpretants, but more that certain representation are
finalized. So the claim “this music is of high quality” meaning aesthetic
value seems something we can determinate and thus sensible for
consideration as a final interpretant.


I don't agree. First, and again, "in the long run" is a normative idea of
science. Peirce argues that whole societies, whole eras may get aspects of
science wrong, but that eventually science *will-be *self-correcting.
Indeed, powerful sub-societies of very well-educated (for their time)
scientists can be wrong for a very long time on some matter, but in the
long run a scientific method which is open, honest, and self-correcting,
that is, a pragmatic method, will at least asymptotically approach "the
truth" of each matter under consideration. This is not the case for
aesthetic artifacts.

Clark continued:

My sense though is that we need to unpack what we’re actually analyzing.
After all as Gary notes just because something is held as true today need
not imply it will in the future. This is both due to the nature of inquiry
but also I think because we’re conflating two issues. The first whether
something is appealing to some finite group. Obviously just because
something appeals to one group it need not appeal to an other group. The
second issue is whether something is universally aesthetical. These are two
very different questions. One can answer differently for each.


I do not see how any cultural artifact can be "universally aesthetical"
except in Peirce's sense that everything has its own esthetic character
(Peirce substitutes 'e' for 'ae' when discussing the normative science of
esthetics), and even if, say, that character is a kind of ugliness, etc.

As for the fine arts, by way of example, among my aesthetic peers in music,
by which in this case I mean people I know personally who love music, have
listened to a great deal of it for many years, have studied it, read up on
it, etc. there is a tremendous amount of difference of opinion as to the
aesthetic quality of given works of art. Indeed, even some composers whom I
personally very much admire are discounted by others, for example. Thus,
even in consideration of the great European master composers there is
anything but consensus, and there is certainly no individual work which
might be considered "universally aesthetical." When we turn to contemporary
music and music of other cultures (even when it's fairly well
known/understood), there is even less agreement.

Finally, as I noted, it is the self-correcting of science which brings *us*
closer to the theoretical truth of any matter. Peirce suggests that if
anyone were sufficiently scientifically prepared, that he or she would be
able to agree with the others that such and such a matter is fairly settled
in say its demonstration of, for example, a geometrical principle.

There is no such self-correcting in art. Each work is more of less *sui
generis*, and while a given work may have a *very large* appreciative
audience in some culture(s) at some time(s), it is my already stated
opinion that this will not be sustained in the long run.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 1:41 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> >> Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music?
> >
> > My first response is that "in the long run" for Peirce is a normative
> idea in science and does not apply necessarily--maybe only very little, or
> not at all--to the fine arts.
> >
> > It is true that Bach and Mozart, for example, after hundreds of years,
> still have considerable appeal. In my opinion, some of this is the result
> of (or at least involves) acoustical phenemona which they
> exploit--harmonies,counterpoints, etc.--which really do have a visceral
> effect on the human nervous system. But I do not think that it is at all
> certain that even they will be appreciated in several hundred or so years.
>
> Aren’t we making a category error here?
>
> Peirce’s regulatory notion of final opinion seems tied towards
> representations and their truth values. This isn’t to deny we can talk
> about final interpretants, but more that certain representation are
> finalized. So the claim “this music is of high quality” meaning aesthetic
> value seems something we can determinate and thus sensible for
> consideration as a final interpretant.
>
> My sense though is that we need to unpack what we’re actually analyzing.
> After all as Gary notes just because something is held as true today need
> not imply it will in the future. This is both due to the nature of inquiry
> but also I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Matt Faunce]

Clark,

Are you saying that we should judge music like we judge medicine—e.g., just 
because certain music works for me doesn't mean music that doesn't work for me 
is bad? Similarly, should we judge music like we judge mathematics relative to 
their applications?

Just like I can recognize that a class of certain medicine doesn't work for me 
but does for others, I can recognize that certain subsets of that class are 
more effective. This recognition is by analogy. By analogy I can recognize that 
that the surprise in Haydn's Surprise Symphony was invigorating to people in 
the Classical Period, even though its not invigorating to me because I can 
relate to more modern musical surprises.

Are you saying that we'll always have a way to properly judge music from other 
times? That can always there will always be an over-riding category to 
adjudicate the objects being compared 

Matt

On Dec 8, 2015, at 1:41 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>>> Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music?
>> 
>> My first response is that "in the long run" for Peirce is a normative idea 
>> in science and does not apply necessarily--maybe only very little, or not at 
>> all--to the fine arts. 
>> 
>> It is true that Bach and Mozart, for example, after hundreds of years, still 
>> have considerable appeal. In my opinion, some of this is the result of (or 
>> at least involves) acoustical phenemona which they 
>> exploit--harmonies,counterpoints, etc.--which really do have a visceral 
>> effect on the human nervous system. But I do not think that it is at all 
>> certain that even they will be appreciated in several hundred or so years.
> 
> Aren’t we making a category error here? 
> 
> Peirce’s regulatory notion of final opinion seems tied towards 
> representations and their truth values. This isn’t to deny we can talk about 
> final interpretants, but more that certain representation are finalized. So 
> the claim “this music is of high quality” meaning aesthetic value seems 
> something we can determinate and thus sensible for consideration as a final 
> interpretant.
> 
> My sense though is that we need to unpack what we’re actually analyzing. 
> After all as Gary notes just because something is held as true today need not 
> imply it will in the future. This is both due to the nature of inquiry but 
> also I think because we’re conflating two issues. The first whether something 
> is appealing to some finite group. Obviously just because something appeals 
> to one group it need not appeal to an other group. The second issue is 
> whether something is universally aesthetical. These are two very different 
> questions. One can answer differently for each.
> 
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> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon S., Gary F., List,

Jon, given what you say in 1&2 below, then we do have a question.  Gary F. says 
that qualisigns are always icons, while you say that the icons are always based 
on the relation of the sign to the dynamical interpretant.  

What, then, should we say about the following kind of case that Peirce 
explicitly considers in his writings on perception.  In seeing a yellow chair 
with a green cushion, the awareness of the chair and pillow is a percept that 
serves as the immediate object.  The percept does not represent the chair.  
Rather, it is a vague awareness that is largely characterized in following 
terms:  "it appears to me," "makes no professions of any kind," "It does not 
stand for anything," "I can’t dismiss is, as I would a fancy."

Peirce asks:  what logical bearing does the percept have upon knowledge and 
belief?  He says that it can be summed up in three precepts:
a. It contributes something positive.
b. It compels the perceiver to acknowledge it. 
c. It neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any 
pretension to reasonableness. 

If the person perceiving the chair attends to the feeling of yellow, then this 
quality of feeling can stand as a qualisign so long as it bears the right kind 
of relationship to an interpretant.  In this case, the immediate interpretant 
is something like a schema in the imagination, which he describes as having the 
form of a skeleton of a set, which is a formal set of relations that can serve 
as a diagram of sorts.  To put things in quite simple terms:  the quality of 
the feeling of "yellow" can be thought of as a dot (a monadic kind of thing), 
that stands in a relation to the quality of feeling of "color," which is also 
pictured by Peirce as a dot on a page, and the relation of containment between 
yellow and color is pictured as a line between the dots.

So, what is the qualisign? It is not the quality of the feeling of yellow 
considered in isolation.  In order for such a quality to serve as a qualisign, 
Peirce claims that it must be considered in its relation to other qualities of 
the feeling--such as the various shades of yellow, the color green or the 
quality of color itself.  What is the immediate interpretant?  It is a possible 
diagram consisting of a skeleton of a set that can be constructed of the formal 
relations between these colors.  He calls the immediate interpretant the 
percipuum.  When he lays out what the percipuum is, it turns out that this 
interpretant is quite rich in its relation to past and future anticipated 
feelings--all of which are ordered in terms of such things are relative 
intensity, time, being spread in space, etc.

What then, is the character of the relation between the qualisign (the quality 
of the feeling of yellow) and the immediate object (the vague awareness of the 
yellow chair with the green cushion as a percept)?  Jon suggest that this 
relationship is not one of iconicity.  Such a term does not apply because this 
is an internal relation.  I suspect that this language of internal relation may 
prove to be quite helpful, because it is a general way of describing an 
important distinction between kinds of relations.  In "On a New List of 
Categories," Peirce draws on the scholastic distinction between relations of 
equiparance and disquiparance.  The former can fruitfully be thought of as 
internal relations of similarity.  How does this help us understand the opening 
moves in NDTR?  Peirce later found it necessary to modify the account of what 
relations of equiparance consist in:  

In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations 
constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, 
with necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations 
of disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out 
of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with 
relations of reason and relations in re. (CP 1.567)

My hunch is that Peirce's examination genuinely triadic sign relations in NDTR 
is guided by his evolving understanding of what is necessary for establishing 
the kinds of ordered relations between the vague qualities of feelings in our 
percepts that are necessary for making comparisons between such things as the 
hue of a yellow chair and the hue of a green pillow.  In fact, I think he is 
attributing to the qualisign the features that are necessary to explain how 
such comparisons are possible (e.g., in the relatively uncontrolled inferences 
that give rise to our perceptual judgments).

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 1:29 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

J

[PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Clark Goble]

>> Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music? 
> 
> My first response is that "in the long run" for Peirce is a normative idea in 
> science and does not apply necessarily--maybe only very little, or not at 
> all--to the fine arts. 
> 
> It is true that Bach and Mozart, for example, after hundreds of years, still 
> have considerable appeal. In my opinion, some of this is the result of (or at 
> least involves) acoustical phenemona which they 
> exploit--harmonies,counterpoints, etc.--which really do have a visceral 
> effect on the human nervous system. But I do not think that it is at all 
> certain that even they will be appreciated in several hundred or so years.

Aren’t we making a category error here? 

Peirce’s regulatory notion of final opinion seems tied towards representations 
and their truth values. This isn’t to deny we can talk about final 
interpretants, but more that certain representation are finalized. So the claim 
“this music is of high quality” meaning aesthetic value seems something we can 
determinate and thus sensible for consideration as a final interpretant.

My sense though is that we need to unpack what we’re actually analyzing. After 
all as Gary notes just because something is held as true today need not imply 
it will in the future. This is both due to the nature of inquiry but also I 
think because we’re conflating two issues. The first whether something is 
appealing to some finite group. Obviously just because something appeals to one 
group it need not appeal to an other group. The second issue is whether 
something is universally aesthetical. These are two very different questions. 
One can answer differently for each.
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[PEIRCE-L] Aw: Re: Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Jon, list,

thank you, Jon. Your example is less complicated than mine was. So the elementary relation does not determine the general relation or general relative term. So, both, elementary and general relation do not have a token-type- connection with each other, I think. So it is confusing to me, that both are called "relation". In mathematics, I think, an actual subset of a cartesian product is a relation. This seems like secondness to me. The term "smaller than" is a relative term, I guess. This seems like firstness or thirdness to me, depending on whether it is the reason for (ground of, quality of) an actual subset, or the interpretation of this actual subset.

Best,

Helmut


 08. Dezember 2015 um 02:08 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey"  wrote:
 



 


Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17902
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17907
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17911
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17916
 

Helmut, 

 

I think a few people are making this harder than it needs to be.

 

Let's put aside potential subtleties about elementary vs. individual vs. infinitesimal relatives and simply use “elementary relative” to cover them all at a first approximation. One of the advantages of this usage is that it allows us to exploit a very close analogy with the way “elementary transformations” function in linear algebra, affording a bridge to practical applications of semiotics.

 

Let's make a concrete example. Say we have a universe of discourse X = biblical characters.

 

Linguistic phrases like “brother of___” or “x is y's brother” and many others can be used to indicate a dyadic relation B forming a subset of X x X such that (x, y) is in B if a only if x is a brother of y.

 

I will use Peirce's notation x:y for the ordered pair (x, y). Among other things it's easier to type on the phone. 

 

In the universe X of biblical characters, Abel : Cain is an elementary relation in the brotherhood relation B.

 

But Abel : Cain also belongs to the relation E indicated by “elder brother of" and again to the relation V indicated by “victim of”.  So the elementary relation by itself does not determine the general relation or general relative term that we may chose to consider it under.

 

This means that classifying relations is a task at a categorically higher level than classifying elementary relations.

 

In the special case of triadic sign relations, almost all the literature so far has tackled only the case of elementary sign relations.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Dec 3, 2015, at 5:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 





Hi Jon, All,

I dont want to interrupt the discussion about terms, but I have a question that is about the mathematical relation- but I think this consideration might be expanded to semantics and semiotics. In mathematics, I have read somewhere, a relation is a subset of a cartesian product. Now I think, that there is a difference between the actual subset, and the reason for it, as well as the result of it. So I think, there are three different things: relation reason, actual relation (subset), and relation result. I wonder, whether this is a matter in mathematics. It seems triadic somehow. Example: Three equal sets A=B=C={1,2,3}. The relation reason is:"a unequal b unequal c unequal a", in other words: "No equal elements in a tuple". The actual relation is then: {(123)(132)(213)(231)(312)(321)}. Now this actual relation could have had another relation reason too: "a+b+c=a*b*c", in words: "The elements added is equal as the elements multiplied with each other". So, for relation result you have the relation reason, plus this second thing, the "might-have-been-too-reason". Of course this is a coincidence, but by fetching a bit far, one might say, that it is a crude example for how prejudices or myths come into being. Now, am I right with guessing, that the actual relation (the subset) is the elementary relation, and eg. "no equal elements" is a proper relation?

Helmut

 

 03. Dezember 2015 um 21:00 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" 
 

Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894

A budget of readings for present and future reference:

Survey of Relation Theory
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/11/30/survey-of-relation-theory-%E2%80%A2-2/

First, we need to be clear about the difference between objects and signs:

Relations are formal objects of discussion and thought while
Relative Terms are signs we use to denote/describe relations.
(The shorthand term "relative" is short for "relative term".

The default meaning for "relative term" is "general relative term",
that is, a term whose denotation 

[PEIRCE-L] Peircean Information (PI): A diagramatic definition of information

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

(*1*) Information is triadic in that it has three mutually exclusive
aspects --

(i) *amount* (how many bits of information can your USB store ?),
(ii) *meaning* (What is the meaning of this series of  DNA nucleotides ?),
and
(iii) *value *(What does this series of DNA nucleotides do for the living
cell?).

(*2*) Most definitions of information (e.g., Hartley, Shannon, von Neumann,
'Planckian information' [1], etc.) in the literature are in the form
of *mathematical
equations* and attempt to capture the *amount* of information and not the
meaning or value.  There are about 40 different such quantitative
definitions of information discussed in [2].

(*3*)  The main purpose of this post is to propose the following,
diagrammatic, definition of "information" that is inspired by the
definition of the sign given by Peirce as shown in (120815-2) and *Figure
1:*


 "Information is anything that is transferred from
*B* to *C* mediated by *A*."
 (120815-1)


Please note that the placeholders, *A*, *B*, and* C*, are generalizations
of the A, B and C that appear in the definition of the sign given in
(120815-2) below; hence the suggested name *Peircean information *(PI).

The placeholders, *A*, *B* and *C* are analogous to the *free parameters*
appearing in mathematical equations.  Thus, (120815-1) can be viewed as a
'qualitative parametric' definition of information in contrast to the
*parametric
definition of information* given by Burgin in [2] which may be considered
as a 'quantitative parametric' definition of information.  If this view is
correct, it would mean that 'information' is a complementary union of
*quantity* and *quality*, in general agreement with the yin-yang doctrine
of the Daoist philosophy.


(Reproduced from yesterday's post)

*"30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
July 1905 .  *(120815-2)

So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman
element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:

A "sign" is anything, A, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C,
this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation,
µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation
Þ."
This definition of the sign can be diagrammatically represented as
shown in *Figure
1, *which clearly shows that there are three *dyadic relations (or
arrows) *(two
of which are designated as Þ and µ  and the third is not explicitly
mentioned by Peirce but represented by me as g in *Figure A*).  MOST
IMPORTANTLY, the sign, A is related to object B in two ways -- (i)
*dyadically through
the relation **Þ*, and (ii) *triadically *through the relation µ *(*and the
relation g, in my opinion*)*.


 * Þ  g*
 Object  -->  sign  ->  Interpretant
   (*B*)  (*A*) (*C*
)
 |^
 ||
 ||
  *µ*


*Figure 1.*  A diagrammatic representation of the Irreducible Triadic
Relation (ITR) embodied in the Peircean sign.
 Þ = sign production; g = sign interpretation;  µ= *information
transfer.*


(*4*)  It is interesting to note that *Figure 1* that defines the Peircean
SIGN simultaneously defines INFORMATION as well, the former  emphasizing
the *node*, *A* , and the latter emphasizing the *edge*, *µ*.

(*5*)  This leads me to suggest the following generalization:


"Just as a *network* cannot exist without *nodes* and *edges*, so it is
impossible to *communicate* without *signs* and *information *they carry."

 (120815-3)


With all the best.

Sung

-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



References:

   [1] Ji, S. (2015) Planckian information (IP): A new measure of order in
atoms, enzymes, cells, brains, human societies, and the cosmos. In: *Unified
Field Mechanics: Natural Science *
*beyond the Veil of Spacetime* (R. Amoroso, P. Rowlands, and L. Kauffman,
eds.), World Scientific, New Jersey, pp. 579-589.
   [2] Burgin, M. (2010).  Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity
and Unification.  World Scientific, New Jersey.

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