Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John, Jon,

I agree with John on the issue of "every word.."

Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording 
in:



JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as

open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.


Shouldn*t the last word be "asserting", thus using the verb, not the 
noun?
This may sound trifle, but I do think it is important to make clear 
whether and when one is talking about an act, or an entitity.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 28.11.2017 22:03:

Jon A and Kirsti,

Jon, replying to JFS

[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.


In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.


Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion
about the Sheet of Assertion is too restrictive.

Jon

By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...


No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only
be interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the in
question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that
I will describe it." (NEM 3:162)

I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a  comparison
with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds
of entities in the universe of discourse.

In 1911, he did not limit the part of speech of the words or phrases
that named rhemes or predicates.  See Peirce's own examples in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm :

From the first two graphs:  -man, -eats.  Fig 1:  -phoenix.
Fig 3: -thunder, -lightening.   Unlabeled graph:  -is-.
Fig 5: -will die.  Fig 7: -boy, -industrious.
Fig 9: -known for certain, -communication with-.  Fig 10: -deceased.

Kirsti

If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or
a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human
beings to make even the empty ones.


Yes, and those people must have some reason or intention for doing so.
Assertion is just one reason among many.

Peirce discussed the kinds of "speech acts" long before John Austin.
Any of those acts may be performed with EGs:  metalanguage (talking
about an EG); hypothesis (suggesting an EG without claiming it's true);
proof (drawing implications before the conclusion is known); teaching
the syntax and rules for EGs (what Peirce was doing in his lectures)...

In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as
open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.

For more examples of contexts in language and logic, see the
slides in http://jfsowa.com/contexts.pdf .

John



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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen C. Rose]

I have put Edwina's note in bold.


*1]  I'm not sure what you mean by 'universal agreement on choice, freedom,
options and so forth'.  'Universal agreement' by whom??*

I was referring to this discussion and what I took to be an agreement of
the correspondents.

*2] I don't think that options are 'more real' the more consciously
decisions are made. I think that there are MORE options for a species
with consciousness than for a species without consciousness. But that's
hardly an earth-shattering observation.*

I see consciousness as being a spectrum like most other things.

*3] I disagree with your comment that: 'Peirce by making the triadic a sort
of default effects a massive block to notions of behaviour as instinctive'.*

It is merely a way of suggesting that triadic thinking weakens the sort of
thought that assumes most things are instinctive, aka without thought. I
think that triadic thinking is a substantial boost past the dominant binary
mode.

*First - the triad IS basic, and not a 'sort of default'. But it certainly
doesn't function as a 'massive block to instinctive behaviour'! With the
requirement for mediation rather than direct interaction [as referred to by
John Collier], then, this mediative process can include the knowledge base
known as Thirdness. As Peirce observed, "the objective final opinion is
independent of the thoughts of any particular men, but is not independent
of thought in general' [7.336].*

*It seems to me, and I may be misunderstanding you, but your analysis seems
to exclude 'thought in general' - which is the basis of instinct.*

I think the Peirce quote is a mite abstruse. I understand Peirce to hole
that there are things that are so irrespective of what people may think and
I agree. I think there is a way of thinking that is triadic but I am not
clear myself on how basic it is. I would like to think it is basic. Thought
in general as the basis of instinct? I am not sure what that means. In the
context of this discussion, I see instinct as subordinate to conscious
choice among options for expression and action. One could also have a much
more positive take on instinct -- seeing it as one capacity to sense
realities that might not be that obvious.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Stephen, list
>
> 1]  I'm not sure what you mean by 'universal agreement on choice, freedom,
> options and so forth'.  'Universal agreement' by whom??
>
> 2] I don't think that options are 'more real' the more consciously
> decisions are made. I think that there are MORE options for a species
> with consciousness than for a species without consciousness. But that's
> hardly an earth-shattering observation.
>
> 3] I disagree with your comment that: 'Peirce by making the triadic a sort
> of default effects a massive block to notions of behaviour as instinctive'.
>
> First - the triad IS basic, and not a 'sort of default'. But it certainly
> doesn't function as a 'massive block to instinctive behaviour'! With the
> requirement for mediation rather than direct interaction [as referred to by
> John Collier], then, this mediative process can include the knowledge base
> known as Thirdness. As Peirce observed, "the objective final opinion is
> independent of the thoughts of any particular men, but is not independent
> of thought in general' [7.336].
>
> It seems to me, and I may be misunderstanding you, but your analysis seems
> to exclude 'thought in general' - which is the basis of instinct.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sun 10/12/17 11:50 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so forth.
> Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more real the more
> consciously decisions are made and the more choices one allows oneself.
> Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects a massive block to
> notions of behavior as instinctive.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is not
>> reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent:
>>
>> I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came to
>> realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially
>> input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this
>> account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly
>> organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that
>> there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar
>> irreducibility.
>>
>> I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but
>> there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly
>> Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
>>

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Jerry Rhee]

What’s so palpable about this ironic situation is that a claim is made by
ones who claim Peirce, that the ‘self’ emerges by experience, while at the
same time, denying *accident* in life.  Does not tychism also belong to the
river of pragmatism?



That is, what does it matter what woman is for man when the purpose is
always the child?



Predispositions?  I forget predispositions!



It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions. Should I
not have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with
me?



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list:
>
>
>
> “List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
> helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. “
>
>
>
> “A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish.
> Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her
> body were that of a man.”
>
>
>
> __
>
>
>
> "Such is the language of all fish," saidst thou; "what they do not fathom
> is unfathomable.”
>
>
>
> “There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being
> any real meaning or law in things.  This scepticism is strongest in the
> most masculine thinkers.”
>
>
>
> Hth,
>
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:
>
>> >” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that
>> matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the
>> 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self,
>> learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate
>> stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of
>> which that single bird is merely one example?”
>>
>> My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for
>> birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic
>> resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I
>> discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics
>> .
>> The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous
>> is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information
>> determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA
>> nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an
>> alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what
>> do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and
>> experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that
>> Changes Itself).
>>
>> >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed
>> the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”
>>
>> Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are
>> these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once
>> connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same
>> *predispositions* in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel
>> technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as
>> they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is
>> predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud
>> huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they
>> are isolated from one another.
>>
>> >”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the
>> organism as to its behaviour.”
>>
>> The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when
>> he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
>> http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunk
>> er-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html
>>
>> >”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not
>> an analysis in my view.”
>>
>> What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident
>> observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman
>> Doidge), and a winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly.
>> Furthermore, in many species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their
>> parents. That is, they learn to apply their winged predispositions, from
>> their parents. So again, imitation plays an important role, despite the
>> physiological predispositions.
>>
>> >”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems
>> to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these
>> Peircean categories within its framework.”
>>
>> Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was
>> addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is
>> best characterized in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it
>> that *motivates* an organism to imitate (the associations that become
>> habits)? That’s a question, in the first 

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



“List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. “



“A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish.
Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her
body were that of a man.”



__



"Such is the language of all fish," saidst thou; "what they do not fathom
is unfathomable.”



“There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any
real meaning or law in things.  This scepticism is strongest in the most
masculine thinkers.”



Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> >” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that
> matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the
> 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self,
> learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate
> stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of
> which that single bird is merely one example?”
>
> My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for
> birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic
> resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I
> discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics
> .
> The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous
> is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information
> determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA
> nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an
> alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what
> do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and
> experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that
> Changes Itself).
>
> >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed
> the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”
>
> Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are
> these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once
> connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same
> *predispositions* in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel
> technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as
> they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is
> predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud
> huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they
> are isolated from one another.
>
> >”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the
> organism as to its behaviour.”
>
> The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when
> he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
> http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-
> debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html
>
> >”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not
> an analysis in my view.”
>
> What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident
> observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman
> Doidge), and a winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly.
> Furthermore, in many species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their
> parents. That is, they learn to apply their winged predispositions, from
> their parents. So again, imitation plays an important role, despite the
> physiological predispositions.
>
> >”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems
> to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these
> Peircean categories within its framework.”
>
> Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was
> addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is
> best characterized in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it
> that *motivates* an organism to imitate (the associations that become
> habits)? That’s a question, in the first instance, of Firstness.
>
> >”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the
> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].”
>
> Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis –
> pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level
> of the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the
> recursion of behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s
> beyond the point that I wanted to emphasize.
>
> Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of
> thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout
> the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am
> outlining, with my line of 

RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. 
>But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that 
>matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
>insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
>knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
>single bird is merely one example?”

My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. 
Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

>”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same 
>technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these 
different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected 
but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions 
in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. 
Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human 
mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like 
fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across 
most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another.

>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the 
>organism as to its behaviour.”

The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he 
attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an 
>analysis in my view.”

What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… 
like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a 
winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many 
species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they 
learn to apply their winged predispositions, from their parents. So again, 
imitation plays an important role, despite the physiological predispositions.

>”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to 
>focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean 
>categories within its framework.”

Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was addressing 
that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is best characterized 
in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it that motivates an 
organism to imitate (the associations that become habits)? That’s a question, 
in the first instance, of Firstness.

>”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the collective 
>[i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].”

Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis – 
pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level of 
the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the recursion of 
behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s beyond the point 
that I wanted to emphasize.

Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of thinking. 
There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout the universe, 
with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am outlining, with my 
line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not accidental. It’s a 
living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the entropy problem - Shannon 
entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the tendency to disorder. By 
contrast, the notion of instinct as stored information, as with the 
NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent with the reality of entropy. 
It is the persistence of complexity across time, as evident in the persistence 
of life across time on Earth, that is the deal-breaker for any kind of 
information determinism.

Regards sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen, list

1]  I'm not sure what you mean by 'universal agreement on choice,
freedom, options and so forth'.  'Universal agreement' by whom??

2] I don't think that options are 'more real' the more consciously
decisions are made. I think that there are MORE options for a species
with consciousness than for a species without consciousness. But
that's hardly an earth-shattering observation. 

3] I disagree with your comment that: 'Peirce by making the triadic
a sort of default effects a massive block to notions of behaviour as
instinctive'. 

First - the triad IS basic, and not a 'sort of default'. But it
certainly doesn't function as a 'massive block to instinctive
behaviour'! With the requirement for mediation rather than direct
interaction [as referred to by John Collier], then, this mediative
process can include the knowledge base known as Thirdness. As Peirce
observed, "the objective final opinion is independent of the thoughts
of any particular men, but is not independent of thought in general'
[7.336].

It seems to me, and I may be misunderstanding you, but your analysis
seems to exclude 'thought in general' - which is the basis of
instinct.

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 11:50 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so
forth. Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more
real the more consciously decisions are made and the more choices one
allows oneself. Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects
a massive block to notions of behavior as instinctive. 
 amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
 On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is
not reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca [3] sent:
I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he   
   came to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient   
   (especially input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are  
open-ended on this account and not reducible to input-output  
relations (they are complexly organized, as Cliff Hooker and I  
call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that there are instincts that  
are thirds, then they would have a similar irreducibility. 

I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right  
now, but there are a couple of articles on this on my web page  
that are certainly Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.   
 

John
 On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek   wrote:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis,
it would be helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with
the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL organism's are
decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems.
What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of
options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to
"know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would
behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if
her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a   
 preprogrammed blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend 
   the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. That is, the
mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not  
  what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in
accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics,
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics 
   of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are the product
of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind  
  my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics [4]. 
 While we are discussing the role of mind-body   
 predispositions in semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded  
  of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its original
form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor  
  mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of
freedom for the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so forth.
Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more real the more
consciously decisions are made and the more choices one allows oneself.
Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects a massive block to
notions of behavior as instinctive.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is not
> reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent:
>
> I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came to
> realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially
> input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this
> account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly
> organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that
> there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar
> irreducibility.
>
> I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but
> there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly
> Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
>
> John
>
> On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
>
> List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
> helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No
> such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their
> ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
> animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a
> goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms
> have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my
> body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a
> woman would behave if her body were that of a man.
>
> And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
> blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms
> and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
> forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
> Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with
> their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also
> to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
> enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical
> bonds and subatomic forces are the product of semiosis, and not its
> cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum
> Semiotics
> .
>
>
> While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis
> and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In
> its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
> miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body)
> looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and
> it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve:
>
> I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>
> I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>
> Away, I'd rather sail away
> Like a swan that's here and gone
> A man gets tied up to the ground
> He gives the world its saddest sound
> It's saddest sound
>
> I'd rather be a forest than a street
> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>
> I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>
> Regards
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>
>
>
> Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to
> its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant,
> with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.
>
> Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic
> quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But
> semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a
> relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with
> another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,
> confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both
> spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness.
>
> But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal
> simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms
> such that Mind both attracts and organizes this 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is
not reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent:
I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he   
   came to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient   
   (especially input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are  
open-ended on this account and not reducible to input-output  
relations (they are complexly organized, as Cliff Hooker and I  
call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that there are instincts that  
are thirds, then they would have a similar irreducibility. 

I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right  
now, but there are a couple of articles on this on my web page  
that are certainly Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.   
 

John
 On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek   wrote:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis,
it would be helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with
the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL organism's are
decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems.
What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of
options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to
"know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would
behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if
her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a   
 preprogrammed blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend 
   the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. That is, the
mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not  
  what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in
accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics,
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics 
   of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are the product
of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind  
  my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics [1]. 
 While we are discussing the role of mind-body   
 predispositions in semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded  
  of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its original
form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor  
  mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of
freedom for the miners to achieve:
 I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Away, I'd rather sail away
 Like a swan that's here and gone
 A man gets tied up to the ground
 He gives the world its saddest sound
 It's saddest sound
 I'd rather be a forest than a street
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Regards 
From:   Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] 
   Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
   To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
[4]; Mike   Bergman
   Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
 
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical  
realm refers to its functioning as a triadic process:  
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in   
   any one of the three modal categories. 

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking   
   is a basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion   
   of such by atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [   
   which is a modal category]. It is a relational or interactive  
process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with another 'bit'
  of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,   
   confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes 
 both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[John Collier]

I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came 
to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially 
input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this 
account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly 
organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that 
there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar 
irreducibility.


I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but 
there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly 
Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.


John


On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:


List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be 
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. 
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from 
their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in 
other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options 
(analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide 
ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly 
as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it 
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were 
that of a man.


And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed 
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to 
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and 
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular 
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how 
to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions... 
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and 
nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic 
forces are the */product/* of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the 
motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
. 



While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in 
semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El 
Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a 
group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor 
(condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies 
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for 
the miners to achieve:


I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

*From:*Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
*Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
*To:* g...@gnusystems.ca ; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ; Mike Bergman

*Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers 
to its functioning as a triadic process: 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any one 
of the three modal categories.


Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a 
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by 
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal 
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit' 
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as 
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions 
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, 
Mind or Thirdness.


But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a 
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, 
are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this 
expansion. The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would 
say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - 
with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But organization of 
the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.


Edwina



*On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com 
 sent:*


Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and
the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question
well. Are there passages from Peirce where he specifically
connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than the passing
reference to crystals? I believe we can 

RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Hi Edwina

No, knowing how to be is not a synonym for instinct. It is an expression of 
pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter. 
It particularly relates to firstness and self. Knowing how to be incorporates 
the self into pragmatism. I suppose one might say, in this context, that a 
proper appreciation of firstness needs to factor in the role of self, and the 
self’s relationship to the world, in the context of its needs. By taking this 
approach, we attain a different and more compelling perspective on the role of 
imitation, particularly in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in 
imitation, we obtain a greater appreciation of the nuances that motivate a self 
to imitation… for example, fear. Fear motivates selves to imitate the current 
Bitcoin craze… the fear of missing out, versus the fear of loss when people 
begin to flee the market. The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown.

Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body provides the 
“tools” that predispose us to how we define the things that matter… as per Mark 
Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man whose only tool is a hammer will perceive the 
world in terms of nails’.

There are different layers to pragmatism, for example:

1)  There are the mind-body predispositions;

2)  There is imitation.

 

Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for example, in the 
domestication of animals or in the feralization of humans (feral children, eg, 
the Wild Boy of Aveyron).

Regards

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 


Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you haven't explained 
what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist? Where? How does it evolve? 
It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'!

What is a 'mind-body' predisposition?

Edwina
 

On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
 
. 

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca 
 ] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
 ; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
 ; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 

Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you
haven't explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist?
Where? How does it evolve? It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'!

What is a 'mind-body' predisposition?

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct.
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices
from their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as
instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon
of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl
instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A
fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a
fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would
behave if her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know
how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and
nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
forces are the  product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the
motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics
[1]. 
 While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in
semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El
Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about
a group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor
(condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for
the miners to achieve:
 I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Away, I'd rather sail away
 Like a swan that's here and gone
 A man gets tied up to the ground
 He gives the world its saddest sound
 It's saddest sound
 I'd rather be a forest than a street
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] 
 Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]; Mike
Bergman
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm
refers to its functioning as a triadic process:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any
one of the three modal categories. 

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit'
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also,
Mind or Thirdness.  

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are
its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion.
The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a
simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each
node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the
results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness. 

Edwina
 On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com [5] sent:

Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the
tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are
there passages from Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or
signs to nature, other than the passing reference to crystals? I
believe we can infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature
to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like
that? 

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or
semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though
suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little more
to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes up in his
discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel.
Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Everett, Daniel]

I agree with Stephen, to a large degree, though he states it stronger than I 
might.

I have written extensively on the absence of instincts. Two book-length studies:

https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8=1512918473=8-5=daniel+everett

https://www.amazon.com/Language-Cultural-Daniel-L-Everett/dp/0307473805/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8=1512918473=8-4=daniel+everett


There is also this very good book by Marc Blumberg:

https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Instinct-Behavior-Mark-Blumberg/dp/1560256591/ref=sr_1_1?s=books=UTF8=1512918543=1-1=basic+instinct+blumberg

My book in progress on Peirce’s epistemology for Oxford U Press, deals with the 
concept of “instinct” in Peirce and other earlier writers (e.g. Hume). Though 
sometimes their ideas of instinct overlapped slightly with what many 
contemporary nativists believe, in general their use of the term is quite 
different.

Dan



On Dec 10, 2017, at 10:05 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum 
Semiotics.

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards


From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature


Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 
functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each 
of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic 
quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But 
semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a 
relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with 
another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, 
confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both spontaneity 
[Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness.

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal simply 
increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms such that Mind 
both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic 
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction 
is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But 
organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.

Edwina



On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman 
m...@mkbergman.com sent:

Hi Gary f, List,

I am 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
 
. 

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 
functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each 
of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic 
quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But 
semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a 
relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with 
another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, 
confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both spontaneity 
[Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness. 

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal simply 
increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms such that Mind 
both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic 
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction 
is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But 
organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.

Edwina

 

On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:

Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the tendencies 
to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there passages from 
Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than 
the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely 
believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere 
stated something like that?

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis in the 
context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was helpful. I read 
on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like 
the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, 
pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!

Mike

 

On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca 
  wrote:

Mike,

 

There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis with 
Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general 
laws, Thirdness is 

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.3

[gnox]

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.2,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13882

 

 

There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any
real meaning or law in things. This scepticism is strongest in the most
masculine thinkers. I applaud scepticism with all my heart, provided it have
four qualities: first, that it be sincere and real doubt; second, that it be
aggressive; third, that it push inquiry; and fourth, that it stand ready to
acknowledge what it now doubts, as soon as the doubted element comes clearly
to light. To be angry with sceptics, who, whether they are aware of it or
not, are the best friends of spiritual truth, is a manifest sign that the
angry person is himself infected with scepticism,- not, however, of the
innocent and wholesome kind, that tries to bring truth to light, but of the
mendacious, clandestine, disguised, and conservative variety that is afraid
of truth, although truth merely means the way to attain one's purposes. If
the sceptics think that any account can be given of the phenomena of the
universe while they leave Meaning out of account, by all means let them go
ahead and try to do it. It is a most laudable and wholesome enterprise. But
when they go so far as to say that there is no such idea in our minds,
irreducible to anything else, I say to them, "Gentlemen, your strongest
sentiment, to which I subscribe with all my heart, is that a man worthy of
that name will not allow petty intellectual predilections to blind him to
truth, which consists in the conformity of his thoughts to his purposes. But
you know there is such a thing as a defect of candor of which one is not
oneself aware. You perceive, no doubt, that if there be an element of
thought irreducible to any other, it would be hard, on your principles, to
account for man's having it, unless he derived it from environing Nature.
But if, because of that, you were to turn your gaze away from an idea that
shines out clearly in your mind, you would be violating your principles in a
very much more radical way." 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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