[PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
specialists. No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be
jumped on for 'misuse of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis
becomes confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject
open exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and until the
discussants 'use the correct words'. It becomes almost an insider's
cult, where one focuses on which term to use, the year it was
introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not what I like to
see. And I don't think you want to see that either.

There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn
within Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic
action [DO, IO, R, II, DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we
use in basic common natural language cannot be used  - because in
Peirce, they have strictly singular meanings, is, in my view, not
merely isolationist but inhibits the study and use of Peirce.

After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It
denies the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic
'something going on' IS an action! A particular action within the
format of Thirdness. JAS informed us that 'what is going on in
Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But, in natural language, a
manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told that we cannot use
the term.

I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely
intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of
semiosis in my view INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its
functionality in economics, biology, physics, societal. I disagree
that if one uses the term 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is
confined to the purely intellectual and not its pragmatic
functionality.

My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research
focus on terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one
cannot use natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead
move natural language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only'
usage inhibits and prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of
what is going on in the world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean
semiosic framework a powerful analytic tool for examining what is
going on - in the real world - and I think that a 'cultlike hold on
language' prevents many people from using that framework.

Edwina
 On Thu 09/08/18 11:30 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Mike, Jon, Edwina, List,
 Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action,
both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret
natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'." 
 Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion
that 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in
any of Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only
highly unlikely, but actually would contradict most everything he had
to say about not only 3ns but also 2ns.
 Whatever you might mean by "natural language" in the present
context, we are concerned here with technical scientific terminology,
specifically Peirce's in consideration of his three universal
categories. Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly
connected in Peirce's phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it
seems peculiarly obdurate to suggest that they are not, that they may
be associated in any integral way with 3ns. You will certainly have to
offer more support for your comment than your mere assertion that it
is so. 
 Best,
 Gary
  Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:41 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
Jon, Edwina, List, 

Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both
Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret   
 natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'. 

Mike
 On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt   wrote:
Edwina, List: 
 ET:  And Peirce referred to cognition,
to Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic consciousness,
mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which is 1ns]
but is active. 1.377/8  
  No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the
cited   passage.  In fact, this is a blatantly inaccurate
paraphrase   of it, so I will quote it in full. 
 CSP:  It seems, then, that the true
categories of consciousness are: fi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

I understand your point.  In fact, I used to treat "Sign-action" as a
synonym for semiosis, before discovering that Peirce *never *used that
particular term, at which point I stopped doing so.  Since you mentioned
"triadic action," I wondered if Peirce ever used *that *term; and as it
turns out, he did in two places.

CSP:  The action of a sign calls for a little closer attention. Let me
remind you of the distinction referred to above between dynamical, or
dyadic, action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by
brute force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn
produce a third event, C. The fact that the event, C, is about to be
produced by B has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It is
impossible that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a
contingent future event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic action,
which is so called because each step of it concerns a pair of objects.

But now when a microscopist is in doubt whether a motion of an animalcule
is guided by intelligence, of however low an order, the test he always used
to apply when I went to school, and I suppose he does so still, is to
ascertain whether event, A, produces a second event, B, *as a means* to the
production of a third event, C, or not. That is, he asks whether B will be
produced if it will produce or is likely to produce C in its turn, but will
not be produced if it will not produce C in its turn nor is likely to do
so. (CP 5.472-473; 1907)


Here it does not seem to be the nature of the *actions *themselves that is
distinguished, but the *relation *between the corresponding *events*; and
any event (or occurrence) is always a matter of 2ns, not 3ns.  Of course,
no one disputes the propriety of talking about triadic *relations*--whether
genuine (irreducible), like I take DO-S-FI to be, or degenerate (composed
of dyadic relations), like I take DO-SR-DI = DO-SR + SR-DI to be.

CSP:  That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with
the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident
to be demonstrable. But in case that dyadic action is merely a member of a
triadic action, then so far from its furnishing the least shade of
presumption that all the action in the physical universe is dyadic, on the
contrary, the entire and triadic action justifies a guess that there may be
other and more marked examples in the universe of the triadic pattern. (CP
6.332; c. 1909)


Here it is likewise clear that any triadic action has "members" that are
dyadic actions.  As Peirce stated in the immediately preceding paragraph,
"Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships ... "  So
we can perhaps say that actions are *involved *in 3ns, even though they
themselves belong to 2ns--just as Tokens are involved in Types, Indices are
involved in Symbols, and Dicisigns are involved in Arguments.  And in the
paragraph right before that ...

CSP:  Any dynamic action--say, the attraction by one particle of
another--is in itself *dyadic*. It is governed by a law; but that law no
more furnishes a correlate to the relation than the vote of a legislator
which insures a bill's becoming a statute makes him a participator in the
blow of the swordsman who, in obedience to the warrant issued after
conviction according to that statute, strikes off the head of a condemned
man. In the law, *per se*, there is no physical force nor other compulsion.
It is nothing but a formula, a maxim. The particles follow the law simply
because, being sprung from the stock of reason, they naturally incline to
obey reason. It is true that the attraction of one particle for another
acts through continuous Time and Space, both of which are of triadic
constitution. Yes; but this continuous Time and Space merely serve to weld
together (while imparting form to the welded whole) instantaneous impulses
in which there is neither continuous Time, Space, nor any third correlate;
and it is such instantaneous impulse that I say is dyadic. However, the
dyadic action is not the whole action; and the whole action is, in a way,
triadic. (CP 6.330; c. 1909)


Law as 3ns *governs *dynamic/dyadic action as 2ns, and *continuous *space-time
is the *medium *in which such action occurs.  However, neither law nor
space-time is a third *Correlate *that acts on, reacts to, or interacts
with the two attracting particles.  Likewise, Signs *as Real generals *do
not act on, react to, or interact with anything; only their Instances or
Replicas *as Existent individuals* do so, each producing a *Dynamic
*Interpretant
by *actually *determining some Quasi-mind to a feeling, to an exertion, or
to another Sign-Replica.

This exchange illustrates my general approach to List discussions.  When
someone posts something that seems inconsistent with how I understand
Peirce's writings, I look for relevant passages in them, and usually end up
quoting them in my response.  As Gary F. noted recently, t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Gary, List,
'Binding' and 'sense' are direct terms used in the Peirce quote
cited.
BTW, I was NOT claiming that action-reaction are not related
to 2ns, nor are a basis for 3ns.
  
Mike


On 8/9/2018 10:30 PM, Gary Richmond
  wrote:


  
  
Mike, Jon, Edwina, List,


Mike wrote: "Are not
'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's
words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret
natural language, including what is meant by the word
'action'."


Please offer some context
  and some textual support for your notion that 'binding' and
  'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of
  Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only
  highly unlikely, but actually would contradict most everything
  he had to say about not only 3ns but also 2ns.


Whatever you might mean by
  "natural language" in the present context, we are concerned
  here with technical scientific terminology, specifically
  Peirce's in consideration of his three universal categories.
  Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly connected
  in Peirce's phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it
  seems peculiarly obdurate to suggest that they are not, that
  they may be associated in any integral way with 3ns. You will
  certainly have to offer more support for your comment than
  your mere assertion that it is so.


Best,


Gary


  
  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  Gary Richmond
  
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City
  University of New York
  718
  482-5690

  

  

  

  

  

  


On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:41 PM, Mike
  Bergman 
  wrote:
  

  Jon, Edwina, List,
  Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of
  action, both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are
  many ways to interpret natural language, including
  what is meant by the word 'action'.
  
  Mike
  

  
 
  On
8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
  
  
Edwina, List:
  
  
  
ET:  And Peirce referred to cognition, to
  Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic
  consciousness, mediation, is not a passive
  consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active.
  1.377/8
  
  
  
  No, he did not; at least, certainly not in
the cited passage.  In fact, this is a blatantly
inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it
in full.
  
  
  
CSP:  It seems, then, that the true
  categories of consciousness are: first,
  feeling, the consciousness which can be
  included with an instant of time, passive
  consciousness of quality, without recognition
  or analysis; second, consciousness of an
  interruption into the field of consciousness,
  sense of resistance, of an external fact, of
  another something; third, synthetic
  consciousness, binding time together, sense of
  learning, thought.
  
  
If we accept these [as] the fundamental
  elementary modes 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Perhaps you missed my post last night quoting Peirce's own unambiguous
opinion about the merits of exact terminology in all scientific (including
semiotic) inquiry.

CSP:  As to the ideal to be aimed at, it is, in the first place, desirable
for any branch of science that it should have a vocabulary furnishing a
family of cognate words for each *scientific *conception, and that each
word should have a single exact meaning, unless its different meanings
apply to objects of different categories that can never be mistaken for one
another. To be sure, this requisite might be understood in a sense which
would make it utterly impossible. For every symbol is a living thing, in a
very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol
changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements
and throws off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the
essence of every scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute
exactitude is not so much as conceivable. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264; 1903)


This is obviously not a case of someone *unfamiliar *with Peirce's thought
using natural language on the List and being criticized for it; I am
confident that all of us would be much more charitable than that.  However,
I think that it is quite reasonable to expect those who are *very familiar*
with Peirce's thought to adjust their use of language in List discussions
accordingly, for the sake of clarity and consistency.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 8:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
> confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of specialists.
> No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped on for 'misuse
> of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes confined and owned
> by almost an elite set of people who reject open exploration of Peircean
> semiosic research unless and until the discussants 'use the correct words'.
> It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to
> use, the year it was introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not
> what I like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either.
>
> There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn within
> Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
> Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
> DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
> language cannot be used  - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
> meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but inhibits the study
> and use of Peirce.
>
> After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
> exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies
> the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on'
> IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS
> informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But,
> in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told
> that we cannot use the term.
>
> I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely intellectual
> discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of semiosis in my view
> INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its functionality in economics,
> biology, physics, societal. I disagree that if one uses the term
> 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined to the purely
> intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality.
>
> My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research focus on
> terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one cannot use
> natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move natural
> language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits and
> prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in the
> world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful
> analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I
> think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using
> that framework.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 09/08/18 11:30 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Mike, Jon, Edwina, List,
>
> Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both
> Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural
> language, including what is meant by the word 'action'."
>
> Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that
> 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of
> Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only highly unlikely,
> but actually would contradict most everything he had to say

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

The words of 'action' and 'interaction' are not scientific terms.
They are part of natural language.

The words of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness etc ARE scientific
terms because they do refer to a scientific conception and do have
single exact meanings.

One can use natural language in describing scientific terms - such
as 'a dyadic action' is operative within Secondness. AND, one can 
say that a 'triadic action'  or a 'manifestation action' is operative
in Thirdness.

I consider, as I said, that the restriction of the use of natural
language within Peircean research and an insistence that the words in
natural language are instead, scientific terms and confined to
singular meanings - inhibits and restricts Peircean research to a
small set of cultists. That's not what Peirce, to me, is all about.

Edwina
 On Fri 10/08/18  9:40 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Perhaps you missed my post last night quoting Peirce's own
unambiguous opinion about the merits of exact terminology in all
scientific (including semiotic) inquiry.
  CSP:  As to the ideal to be aimed at, it is, in the first place,
desirable for any branch of science that it should have a vocabulary
furnishing a family of cognate words for each scientific conception,
and that each word should have a single exact meaning, unless its
different meanings apply to objects of different categories that can
never be mistaken for one another. To be sure, this requisite might
be understood in a sense which would make it utterly impossible. For
every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no
mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its
meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old
ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every
scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is
not so much as conceivable. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264; 1903) 
This is obviously not a case of someone unfamiliar with Peirce's
thought using natural language on the List and being criticized for
it; I am confident that all of us would be much more charitable than
that.  However, I think that it is quite reasonable to expect those
who are very familiar with Peirce's thought to adjust their use of
language in List discussions accordingly, for the sake of clarity and
consistency. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  
 On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 8:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R, list

To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
specialists. No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be
jumped on for 'misuse of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis
becomes confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject
open exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and until the
discussants 'use the correct words'. It becomes almost an insider's
cult, where one focuses on which term to use, the year it was
introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not what I like to
see. And I don't think you want to see that either. 

There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn
within Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic
action [DO, IO, R, II, DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we
use in basic common natural language cannot be used  - because in
Peirce, they have strictly singular meanings, is, in my view, not
merely isolationist but inhibits the study and use of Peirce.

After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It
denies the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic
'something going on' IS an action! A particular action within the
format of Thirdness. JAS informed us that 'what is going on in
Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But, in natural language, a
manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told that we cannot use
the term. 

I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely
intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of
semiosis in my view INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its
functionality in economics, biology, physics, societal. I disagree
that if one uses the term 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is
confined to the purely intellectual and not its pragmatic
functionality.

My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research
focus on terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one
cannot use natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead
move natura

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Gary R, Jon, list,
+1
This is another thread that has devolved into silliness. No
one is trying to deny Peirce's technical terms, no one is being
obdurate, and no one is saying anything other than we use
natural language to communicate, and it has vagaries of
interpretation.
We could say that the phrase 'triadic action' approaches
being a technical term, and we cannot deny that Peirce used it,
especially in his later years when supposedly his assertions
have more value than his earlier ones. (Not to mention other
references to mediating action which are not specifically labeled
'triadic action,' which I am sure number many more than two references.)
Furthermore, we can quote about these 'triadic actions' and then
deny them, claiming they are all just 'relations' that should be
expressed as dyadic actions. Picking and choosing which Peirce
quotes to insist are the absolute truth while denying the clear
language of other quotes is not a good way to advance scholarly
discussion.
I will comment no further on this thread.
Mike
  
 


On 8/10/2018 8:49 AM, Edwina Taborsky
  wrote:


  
  
JAS,
list
  The words of 'action' and 'interaction' are not scientific
terms. They are part of natural language.
  The words of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness etc ARE
scientific terms because they do refer to a scientific
conception and do have single exact meanings.
  One can use natural language in describing scientific terms -
such as 'a dyadic action' is operative within Secondness. AND,
one can  say that a 'triadic action'  or a 'manifestation
action' is operative in Thirdness.
  I consider, as I said, that the restriction of the use of
natural language within Peircean research and an insistence that
the words in natural language are instead, scientific terms and
confined to singular meanings - inhibits and restricts Peircean
research to a small set of cultists. That's not what Peirce, to
me, is all about.
  Edwina
  
  
  
  
  

 

On Fri 10/08/18 9:40 AM , Jon
  Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

  
Edwina, List:
  
  
  Perhaps you missed my post last night quoting Peirce's
own unambiguous opinion about the merits of exact
terminology in all scientific (including semiotic) inquiry.
  
  
  

  CSP:  As to the ideal to be aimed at, it
  is, in the first place, desirable for any branch of
  science that it should have a vocabulary furnishing a
  family of cognate words for each scientific conception,
  and that each word should have a single exact meaning,
  unless its different meanings apply to objects of
  different categories that can never be mistaken for
  one another. To be sure, this requisite might be
  understood in a sense which would make it utterly
  impossible. For every symbol is a living thing, in a
  very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech.
  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning
  inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws
  off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep
  the essence of every scientific term unchanged and
  exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as
  conceivable. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264; 1903)
  


This is obviously not a case of someone unfamiliar with
Peirce's thought using natural language on the List and
being criticized for it; I am confident that all of us would
be much more charitable than that.  However, I think that it
is quite reasonable to expect those who are very familiar with
Peirce's thought to adjust their use of language in List
discussions accordingly, for the sake of clarity and
consistency.
  
  
  Regards,
  

  

  

  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
  

  

  


On Fri, Aug

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Triadic action is most probably actions that emerge from following the
pragmaticist maxim. Along with expressions, they would be the substance of
matters we "go upon", so to speak. That seems to me the point of his
philosophy.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 10:15 AM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list,
>
> +1
>
> This is another thread that has devolved into silliness. No one is trying
> to deny Peirce's technical terms, no one is being obdurate, and no one is
> saying anything other than we use natural language to communicate, and it
> has vagaries of interpretation.
>
> We could say that the phrase 'triadic action' approaches being a technical
> term, and we cannot deny that Peirce used it, especially in his later years
> when supposedly his assertions have more value than his earlier ones. (Not
> to mention other references to mediating action which are not specifically
> labeled 'triadic action,' which I am sure number many more than two
> references.) Furthermore, we can quote about these 'triadic actions' and
> then deny them, claiming they are all just 'relations' that should be
> expressed as dyadic actions. Picking and choosing which Peirce quotes to
> insist are the absolute truth while denying the clear language of other
> quotes is not a good way to advance scholarly discussion.
>
> I will comment no further on this thread.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> On 8/10/2018 8:49 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> JAS, list
>
> The words of 'action' and 'interaction' are not scientific terms. They are
> part of natural language.
>
> The words of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness etc ARE scientific terms
> because they do refer to a scientific conception and do have single exact
> meanings.
>
> One can use natural language in describing scientific terms - such as 'a
> dyadic action' is operative within Secondness. AND, one can  say that a
> 'triadic action'  or a 'manifestation action' is operative in Thirdness.
>
> I consider, as I said, that the restriction of the use of natural language
> within Peircean research and an insistence that the words in natural
> language are instead, scientific terms and confined to singular meanings -
> inhibits and restricts Peircean research to a small set of cultists. That's
> not what Peirce, to me, is all about.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 10/08/18 9:40 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Perhaps you missed my post last night quoting Peirce's own unambiguous
> opinion about the merits of exact terminology in all scientific (including
> semiotic) inquiry.
>
> CSP:  As to the ideal to be aimed at, it is, in the first place, desirable
> for any branch of science that it should have a vocabulary furnishing a
> family of cognate words for each scientific conception, and that each
> word should have a single exact meaning, unless its different meanings
> apply to objects of different categories that can never be mistaken for one
> another. To be sure, this requisite might be understood in a sense which
> would make it utterly impossible. For every symbol is a living thing, in a
> very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol
> changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements
> and throws off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the
> essence of every scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute
> exactitude is not so much as conceivable. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264; 1903)
>
>
> This is obviously not a case of someone unfamiliar with Peirce's thought
> using natural language on the List and being criticized for it; I am
> confident that all of us would be much more charitable than that.  However,
> I think that it is quite reasonable to expect those who are very familiar
> with Peirce's thought to adjust their use of language in List discussions
> accordingly, for the sake of clarity and consistency.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 8:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
>> confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of specialists.
>> No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped on for 'misuse
>> of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes confined and owned
>> by almost an elite set of people who reject open exploration of Peircean
>> semiosic research unless and until the discussants 'use the correct words'.
>> It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to
>> use, the year it was introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not
>> what I like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either.
>>
>> There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn within
>> Peircean research - such as the c

[PEIRCE-L] Beginning of Life a Triadic Action?

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
List,

I think we can expand Stephen's suggestion, to which I think I
agree, that triadic action is involved Peirce's pragmatic maxim.
I think we can understand the supreme importance of triadic
action by questioning how life began from inanimate matter.
There are many hypotheses about how life emerged from the 'soup'
or thermal vents or others. In all cases, though, the common
postulate is that some event (such as a spark or spontaneous
change in chirality or ???) occurs, but in the presence of the
right amino acids or protein precursors. The dyadic action of
the initial event (say a lightening strike) needed some form of
requisite environment (interpretant) in order for the action of
'create life' to occur. This action and its relations can be
investigated by dyadic means, but cannot be explained by them.

Our creation and use of symbols requires the same triadic
action. Peirce notes many times that symbols without an
interpretant are mere scribbles, discernible, but meaningless.

When we communicate with natural language, we are able to do so
in part because context informs our interpretation. I submit
this, as well, is a form of triadic action.

All signs, evolution, and semiosis depend on triadic action. My
guess is that one of reasons for Peirce's animus to Descartes
was due to the confining lens of dyadic action.

Mike

  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beginning of Life a Triadic Action?

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Feynman in some of his teaching videos is disarmingly appealing in a way
that any thinking such as yours is also appealing -- it has no airs and
leaves room for understanding our limitations -- ergo fallibility. I am not
sure anyone will ever explain origins to the satisfaction of that imagined
community Peirce had in mind. But I am sure that it was a triadic process.
It involved whatever was there or not there as the case may have been, a
speed bump and a smidgeon of progress, which is sort of the way a conscious
human being should operate in my view. A bit of triadic action. For your
dyadic, I use binary and in a somewhat pejorative way as I see the
ignominious defeat of binary thinking as Peirce's dominant achievement.
Best,S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 11:07 AM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> List,
>
> I think we can expand Stephen's suggestion, to which I think I agree, that
> triadic action is involved Peirce's pragmatic maxim.
>
> I think we can understand the supreme importance of triadic action by
> questioning how life began from inanimate matter. There are many hypotheses
> about how life emerged from the 'soup' or thermal vents or others. In all
> cases, though, the common postulate is that some event (such as a spark or
> spontaneous change in chirality or ???) occurs, but in the presence of the
> right amino acids or protein precursors. The dyadic action of the initial
> event (say a lightening strike) needed some form of requisite environment
> (interpretant) in order for the action of 'create life' to occur. This
> action and its relations can be investigated by dyadic means, but cannot be
> explained by them.
>
> Our creation and use of symbols requires the same triadic action. Peirce
> notes many times that symbols without an interpretant are mere scribbles,
> discernible, but meaningless.
>
> When we communicate with natural language, we are able to do so in part
> because context informs our interpretation. I submit this, as well, is a
> form of triadic action.
>
> All signs, evolution, and semiosis depend on triadic action. My guess is
> that one of reasons for Peirce's animus to Descartes was due to the
> confining lens of dyadic action.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beginning of Life a Triadic Action?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Mike, list

Thanks for this post - and for your previous post on scientific and
natural language - 

Yes, there are many hypotheses about the emergence of life; thermal
vents being a strong suggestion but who knows which will be 'the
infallible final' - but the key is, as you note, that life operates
within a triadic action. That is, the habits-of-organization,
Thirdness, move into the individual adtuality rather than functioning
aa an external law- and - operate as an action of mediation. 

By this I mean that, for example, chemical molecules are 'organized
forms of matter', but the storage of the laws of their organization
are not carried within the molecule. Instead, the molecule
'manifests' as an individual articulation of the laws which all
molecules in that community express. This format provides enormous
stability to the physical-chemical realm, for deviant molecules, 
with different organizational patterns, would rarely develop.

But the biological realm is completely different. There, Thirdness
or the laws of organization move into and are stored within each
articulation. This permits a self-organized Thirdness, open to chance
differences, slight deviations from the norm according to not merely
chance but to the effects of the local environment. These differences
can be reproduced and become another species. Therefore, the
biological realm is the opposite of stability; it enables enormous
diversity and complexity.

This type of analysis, understanding Mind-as-Matter, a basic
Peircean concept, and the role of the three categories and the
triadic semiosic process, seems to me, to be a powerful analytic tool
for understanding both the emergence of life and how adaptation and
evolution takes place. Using Peircean semiosis, I think that it shows
that there is more "Mind' going on than is found in mechanical
Neo-Darwinism.

Edwina
 On Fri 10/08/18 11:07 AM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
List,
 I think we can expand Stephen's suggestion, to which I think
I agree, that triadic action is involved Peirce's pragmatic
maxim. 

I think we can understand the supreme importance of triadic
action by questioning how life began from inanimate matter.
There are many hypotheses about how life emerged from the 'soup' 
   or thermal vents or others. In all cases, though, the common   
 postulate is that some event (such as a spark or spontaneous
change in chirality or ???) occurs, but in the presence of the   
 right amino acids or protein precursors. The dyadic action of
the initial event (say a lightening strike) needed some form of   
 requisite environment (interpretant) in order for the action of  
  'create life' to occur. This action and its relations can be
investigated by dyadic means, but cannot be explained by them.
 Our creation and use of symbols requires the same triadic   
 action. Peirce notes many times that symbols without an
interpretant are mere scribbles, discernible, but meaningless.
 When we communicate with natural language, we are able to do
so in part because context informs our interpretation. I
submit this, as well, is a form of triadic action.
 All signs, evolution, and semiosis depend on triadic action.
My guess is that one of reasons for Peirce's animus to
Descartes was due to the confining lens of dyadic action.
 Mike 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

[Stephen Jarosek]

>” There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit 
>relieved.”

Stephen, I regard Peirce as the Isaac Newton of mind science (that’s a 
compliment). However… to really test one’s theory of Mind, one needs to test 
their firstness. And to do this, one needs to immerse themselves into 
culturally alien contexts, and then observe how their motivations change with 
said re-immersion. I mean, a lifestyle change. Up and relocate, maybe speak a 
new language. And that means incorporating the assumptions of your new locale, 
tune into the narratives of your new surroundings… i.e., imitation. You need to 
become the people that you want to understand. You need to imitate them. It’s 
the difference between theory and practice. That’s why an academic focus on 
theory alone is never enough. You need to become amazed at how your motivations 
have changed with your re-immersions. That’s why the importance of imitation 
can never be appreciated when confined to within a single academic or cultural 
context alone… it is perceived as “real” because its core narratives are never 
questioned, even when you think you are questioning them… how can you question 
a narrative while using the very narrative that you are questioning? You can’t 
question your culture’s assumptions from an armchair. You will never be amazed 
seated in an armchair.

sj

 

From: Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, August 9, 2018 1:05 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

 

There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit 
relieved. Harold Blom is salient on the subject but it is not, I think, any 
more lasting that some of his other ideas. Borderline gossip. As to the subject 
as worth delving into, I delved for years in the fields of Rene Girard and 
finally emerged with this valedictory sonnet:

 

Mimesis Jesus can this compass truth

As Oedipus and chums and geigenwelt

Once seemed a way of parsing in my youth

Before Girardian influence was felt

What minds so compass all reality

All things to stated causes they reduce

What story can compel us just to see

A single vision our mimetic noose

I'll take the Bard to be our still-best guide

And Jesus as our best iconoclast

And never more behind a theory hide

Or seek on earth a premise that will last

I'm free at last for I have finally found

There's nothing I can wrap my mind around

 

From WINNING THE WAR WITHIN

 

 

 




amazon.com/author/stephenrose

 

On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 6:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

List, following on from our thread on "Culture wires the brain", I want to
look more closely at imitation (mimesis, knowing how to be) as a basic form
of pragmatism.

It now surprises me that something as fundamental and sweeping as imitation
goes under everyone's noses, throughout academia, barely noticed. This bears
testimony to the power of a pre-existing narrative blinding us to the
obvious. We are so immersed within the "because genes" mythology that we
fail to see the imitation that precedes it... the imitation that led to its
acceptance and subsequent popularization. "But what about the genes?" we
reflexively ask. The idea of imitation as a genetically determined adaptive
trait (natural selection) has it seriously the wrong way around.

Forget the genes. They are clearly very important, certainly with respect to
biology and inheritance of physical traits. They certainly impact on our
predispositions. But I suggest that genes/DNA are better understood in the
context of momentum (habituation), predisposition, and resistance to
change... it is a fundamental mistake to conflate their correlation with
causation.

But it's obvious when you think it through. Role models (as cultural
attractors), the company we keep. Gender roles depend on imitation within
the context of mind-body predispositions. We imitate accents, whether we
like them or not, even when they make us cringe. Jesus told his followers to
imitate him. Social insects, like ants, perish rapidly when kept in
isolation, without any fellow ants to imitate. The domestication of animals
relies on their imitation of human civility. Feral children (children raised
by wild animals) imitate their "adoptive parents" to become impossible to
assimilate into "normal" society later... the video of Oxana Malaya
(neglected but not strictly feral), available online, provides compelling
insight into the power of imitation, with respect to the dogs that nurtured
her. Imitation is so fundamental, so comprehensive, so sweeping, but we
don't see it because we are swayed by the very illusions that are derived
from it. We assume these illusions to be "just reality as it is, what is
there to question?"

Of course for some critters, imitation does not seem to be that crucial...
turtles that hatch and make a dash for the open ocean... turtles safely
cocooned in a thick shell don't need to imitate anyone, they su

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

[Stephen Jarosek]

HELMUT >” The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than 
two genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid 
anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both, 
none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better to 
them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody one of 
two labels is rigid.”

The only duty we have is to respect one another. Most of us do not have a 
problem with people living out their personal preferences, so long as they 
respect others’ personal space. But people trying to foist “alternative” 
definitions into a culture and demand that they be observed are not liberal at 
all… they have an agenda and their demands are propaganda.

HELMUT>”A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal 
culture.”

Many of us observing proceedings taking place in America would disagree. It is 
the Left in America that is agitating for war. They want to deny the Right 
their freedom of speech. They call anyone that they disagree with nazis. They 
want to deny a president that was democratically elected. Their fascism 
masquerading as antifascism is laughably transparent, and the violence of their 
Antifa reveals the mindboggling extent of their hypocrisy. History is 
repeating, and it is the Left that is at the center of it, fascism red in 
hammer and sickle.

sj

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:32 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Stephen Jarosek; Daniel L Everett; Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

 

Edwina, Daniel, Stephen, List,

I agree with Edwina. I think there are social and altruistic instincts, but 
they may be destroyed by a rigid culture, and replaced with other instincts, 
which are "if-then"- routines, such as egocentric, tribal, and warrior 
instincts.

I think, that the nature of humans is usually good, in a liberal and 
equality-supporting culture. But there are also sleeping bad predispositions, 
which may be awakened in a bad environment, for the purpose of surviving there 
too. But of course, a human always has choices.

The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than two 
genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid 
anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both, 
none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better to 
them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody one of 
two labels is rigid.

A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal culture. In a 
war situation, bad instincts are awakened, up to making psychopaths out of 
people. A psychiatrist visiting a continuous war zone in Congo has said, the 
psychopaths ratio in the population was 70%. The other 30% remain, because 
people still have brains and choices.

All this may have to do with "brain wiring", ok, but not with cultural 
relativity, as "rigid", "liberal", "equality-supporting", and so on are 
universal terms.

Best,

Helmut

08. August 2018 um 14:41 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:

Interesting - but - if you see our species [homo sapiens] as a kind of 'black 
slate' so to speak - then, how do you explain the fact that the infant has to 
be socialized; i.e., our species is not born with innate knowledge and requires 
a long nurturance period.  And our type of socialization requires language. So- 
how do you get away from the notion that the requirement for language is innate?

Edwina

 

On Wed 08/08/18 5:14 AM , Daniel L Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:


https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo16611802.html 

 

https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004132

 

Here are two recent works of mind on culture and cognition. I will be exploring 
these further in a specifically Peircean context in a book coming out next year 
from OUP. 

 

Dan Everett

  

Sent from my iPhone


On Aug 8, 2018, at 06:12, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
 

List, here's an interesting article that resonates with ideas that I've
touched on in this forum (culture, neural plasticity, scaffolding,
bucket-of-bugs... no such thing as instinct, no such thing as a "blueprint"
that wires the brain). I'm not sure whether the author would take it as far
as I do, but definitely of direct semiotic/biosemiotic relevance:
https://news.northeastern.edu/2018/08/06/what-if-people-from-different-cultu
res-and-economic-backgrounds-have-different-brain-wiring/

Barrett's paper also got me thinking about a point that I've been mulling
over recently... the importance of initial conditions (scaffolding in the
context of chaos theory)... the idea that experiences can never occur in
isolation (objectivity), but must build on prior experiences (subjectivity):

   "This leads to another significant implication-that childrearing and
early childhood experiences are more important than we thought. N

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Hi Stephen. Quite clearly the regimen you suggest is a means of overcoming
divisions and attaining understanding. but it is a necessity scarce event.
Such things as interracial intimacy are more in evidence.

I cannot describe how alienated I felt after an attempt to immerse myself
into the thinking of Rene Girard and the articulation of it in a group I
once corresponded with.

I am a remarkably imitative person quite naturally, probably empathetic
also.

But just as a matter of philosophical starting points, isn't the
commonality of humanity where we should begin? Cultural barriers should not
leave us with a sense of impotence in seeking common understandings and
actions. Migrations seem a sort of antiphon to the need for cultural
immersion. Best, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 11:50 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> >” There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a
> bit relieved.”
>
> Stephen, I regard Peirce as the Isaac Newton of mind science (that’s a
> compliment). However… to really test one’s theory of Mind, one needs to
> test their firstness. And to do this, one needs to immerse themselves into
> culturally alien contexts, and then observe how their motivations change
> with said re-immersion. I mean, a lifestyle change. Up and relocate, maybe
> speak a new language. And that means incorporating the assumptions of your
> new locale, tune into the narratives of your new surroundings… i.e.,
> imitation. You need to *become* the people that you want to understand.
> You need to imitate them. It’s the difference between theory and practice.
> That’s why an academic focus on theory alone is never enough. You need to
> become amazed at how your motivations have changed with your re-immersions.
> That’s why the importance of imitation can never be appreciated when
> confined to within a single academic or cultural context alone… it is
> perceived as “real” because its core narratives are never questioned, even
> when you think you are questioning them… how can you question a narrative
> while using the very narrative that you are questioning? You can’t question
> your culture’s assumptions from an armchair. You will never be amazed
> seated in an armchair.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* Thursday, August 9, 2018 1:05 PM
> *To:* Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism
>
>
>
> There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit
> relieved. Harold Blom is salient on the subject but it is not, I think, any
> more lasting that some of his other ideas. Borderline gossip. As to the
> subject as worth delving into, I delved for years in the fields of Rene
> Girard and finally emerged with this valedictory sonnet:
>
>
>
> Mimesis Jesus can this compass truth
>
> As Oedipus and chums and geigenwelt
>
> Once seemed a way of parsing in my youth
>
> Before Girardian influence was felt
>
> What minds so compass all reality
>
> All things to stated causes they reduce
>
> What story can compel us just to see
>
> A single vision our mimetic noose
>
> I'll take the Bard to be our still-best guide
>
> And Jesus as our best iconoclast
>
> And never more behind a theory hide
>
> Or seek on earth a premise that will last
>
> I'm free at last for I have finally found
>
> There's nothing I can wrap my mind around
>
>
>
> From WINNING THE WAR WITHIN
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 6:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:
>
> List, following on from our thread on "Culture wires the brain", I want to
> look more closely at imitation (mimesis, knowing how to be) as a basic form
> of pragmatism.
>
> It now surprises me that something as fundamental and sweeping as imitation
> goes under everyone's noses, throughout academia, barely noticed. This
> bears
> testimony to the power of a pre-existing narrative blinding us to the
> obvious. We are so immersed within the "because genes" mythology that we
> fail to see the imitation that precedes it... the imitation that led to its
> acceptance and subsequent popularization. "But what about the genes?" we
> reflexively ask. The idea of imitation as a genetically determined adaptive
> trait (natural selection) has it seriously the wrong way around.
>
> Forget the genes. They are clearly very important, certainly with respect
> to
> biology and inheritance of physical traits. They certainly impact on our
> predispositions. But I suggest that genes/DNA are better understood in the
> context of momentum (habituation), predisposition, and resistance to
> change... it is a fundamental mistake to conflate their correlation with
> causation.
>
> But it's obvious when you think it through. Role models (as cultural
> attractors), the company we keep. Gender roles depend on imitation within
> the context of mind-body predispositions. We imitate accents, whether we
> like them or not, even w

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Wow! The blanket lumping of liberals with the selected vignetter you give
of fascist liberalism sounds a bit like Jordan Peterson skewering
post-modernist French intellectuals. Most liberals in my experience are
nonviolent, oppose war, and do not use clearly provocative lingo even if
they are rabidly opposed to their opponents. They can embrace a
democratic-socialist all the way to a necessarily blue dog type. I am not
sure where the animus behind your words comes from but I am tempted to
apologize. Cheers, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> HELMUT >” The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are
> more than two genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not
> wanting to forbid anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian,
> gay, trans, both, none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of
> those suits better to them than either "male" or "female". A culture that
> presses on everybody one of two labels is rigid.”
>
> The only duty we have is to respect one another. Most of us do not have a
> problem with people living out their personal preferences, so long as they
> respect others’ personal space. But people trying to foist “alternative”
> definitions into a culture and demand that they be observed are not liberal
> at all… they have an agenda and their demands are propaganda.
>
> HELMUT>”A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal
> culture.”
>
> Many of us observing proceedings taking place in America would disagree.
> It is the Left in America that is agitating for war. They want to deny the
> Right their freedom of speech. They call anyone that they disagree with
> nazis. They want to deny a president that was democratically elected. Their
> fascism masquerading as antifascism is laughably transparent, and the
> violence of their Antifa reveals the mindboggling extent of their
> hypocrisy. History is repeating, and it is the Left that is at the center
> of it, fascism red in hammer and sickle.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de ]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:32 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca
> *Cc:* Stephen Jarosek; Daniel L Everett; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain
>
>
>
> Edwina, Daniel, Stephen, List,
>
> I agree with Edwina. I think there are social and altruistic instincts,
> but they may be destroyed by a rigid culture, and replaced with other
> instincts, which are "if-then"- routines, such as egocentric, tribal, and
> warrior instincts.
>
> I think, that the nature of humans is usually good, in a liberal and
> equality-supporting culture. But there are also sleeping bad
> predispositions, which may be awakened in a bad environment, for the
> purpose of surviving there too. But of course, a human always has choices.
>
> The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than two
> genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid
> anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both,
> none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better
> to them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody
> one of two labels is rigid.
>
> A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal culture.
> In a war situation, bad instincts are awakened, up to making psychopaths
> out of people. A psychiatrist visiting a continuous war zone in Congo has
> said, the psychopaths ratio in the population was 70%. The other 30%
> remain, because people still have brains and choices.
>
> All this may have to do with "brain wiring", ok, but not with cultural
> relativity, as "rigid", "liberal", "equality-supporting", and so on are
> universal terms.
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
> 08. August 2018 um 14:41 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" 
> wrote:
>
> Interesting - but - if you see our species [homo sapiens] as a kind of
> 'black slate' so to speak - then, how do you explain the fact that the
> infant has to be socialized; i.e., our species is not born with innate
> knowledge and requires a long nurturance period.  And our type
> of socialization requires language. So- how do you get away from the notion
> that the requirement for language is innate?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> *On Wed 08/08/18 5:14 AM , Daniel L Everett danleveret...@gmail.com
>  sent:*
>
>
> https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo16611802.html
>
>
>
> https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004132
>
>
>
> Here are two recent works of mind on culture and cognition. I will be
> exploring these further in a specifically Peircean context in a book coming
> out next year from OUP.
>
>
>
> Dan Everett
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On Aug 8, 2018, at 06:12, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
>
>
> List, here's an interesting article that resonates with ideas that I've
> touched on in this forum (culture, neural plasticity, scaffolding,
> bucket-of-bugs... no such thing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Stephen R., Stephen J., List:

SCR:  There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP.


Actually, there is.

CSP:  Cannot a man act under the influence of a vague personification of
the community and yet according to a general rule of conduct? Certainly: he
so acts when he conforms to custom. Only if it is mere custom and not law,
it is not a case of obedience, but of *conformity to norm*, or exemplar. (I
never use the word *norm *in the sense of a precept, but only in that of a
pattern which is copied, this being the original metaphor.) ... Conformity
to a norm may take place by an immediate impulse. It then becomes
instinctive imitation. But here the man does not vaguely personify the
community, but puts himself in the shoes of another person, as we say. (CP
1.586; c. 1903)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 10:50 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> >” There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a
> bit relieved.”
>
> Stephen, I regard Peirce as the Isaac Newton of mind science (that’s a
> compliment). However… to really test one’s theory of Mind, one needs to
> test their firstness. And to do this, one needs to immerse themselves into
> culturally alien contexts, and then observe how their motivations change
> with said re-immersion. I mean, a lifestyle change. Up and relocate, maybe
> speak a new language. And that means incorporating the assumptions of your
> new locale, tune into the narratives of your new surroundings… i.e.,
> imitation. You need to *become* the people that you want to understand.
> You need to imitate them. It’s the difference between theory and practice.
> That’s why an academic focus on theory alone is never enough. You need to
> become amazed at how your motivations have changed with your re-immersions.
> That’s why the importance of imitation can never be appreciated when
> confined to within a single academic or cultural context alone… it is
> perceived as “real” because its core narratives are never questioned, even
> when you think you are questioning them… how can you question a narrative
> while using the very narrative that you are questioning? You can’t question
> your culture’s assumptions from an armchair. You will never be amazed
> seated in an armchair.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* Thursday, August 9, 2018 1:05 PM
> *To:* Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism
>
>
>
> There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit
> relieved.
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Martin Kettelhut]

What sets Peirce apart from analytic philosophy is his acknowledgment that the 
INTERaction (of individual actualities) is general/lawful, and it is real.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
303 747 4449


On Aug 9, 2018, at 12:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:


JAS, list

What is going on here, is a situation where two people are using the same word 
- each with a different usage. So- we are talking past each other, and that's 
hardly productive.

I use the term 'interact' to mean that two or more forces act on and have an 
effect on each other. But a key point:  I do not confine the nature of these 
forces to actualities and so, I include the effect that a law can have on a 
particular object.

I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action between 
two actualities, two existent 'things'.

Again, Jon, your quotes that you provided do not, in my view, contradict my use 
of the term  'interact'. I have always acknowledged that the general, the law, 
has no separate actuality in itself but is 'embodied' in an individual 
morphology.  This is basic Peirce [and Aristotle]. BUT, I consider that the 
general, the law, as embedded,  does act as a genuine informational force,  and 
so it as itself, as its generality, acts, interacts...with individual 
morphologies. And this is not simply an act of constraint, but, in my view, of 
actual generative formation. That enables the increase of complexity - a basic 
conclusion for Peirce.

This is something about which we have a basic disagreement.

Edwina



On Thu 09/08/18 2:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt 
jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those quotations, 
only existential particulars can interact, and only with other existential 
particulars.  A general cannot interact with anything as a general, so it does 
not interact with existential particulars; instead, it  governs them.

CSP:  But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and 
prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP 2:274; 1903)

CSP:  By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over again, 
translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or algebraical 
formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not mean any existing 
individual object but a type, a general, which does not exist but governs 
existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

JAS, list

I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply have to 
agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which I fully agree 
with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my view] - which I'll repeat 
below:

" I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. 
My view is that both are informationally functional and interact 
informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate individual existence for 
each. Informational action between information encoded as a general and 
information encoded as a particular is, in my view, quite possible."

That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my view, interact 
with the existential particular.

Edwina

On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt 
jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns.

CSP:   Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just what 
it consists in.  If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you 
will tell me that it consists in its happening  then and there. The 
specifications  then and there  involve all its relations to other existents. 
The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of 
existents ... We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which 
seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, 
I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a 
second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24; 1903)

CSP:  That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the cognate 
origin of the terms actuality and activity is one of the most deeply 
illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies a generalization of 
effort; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and resistance being 
inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has also a dyadic form. (CP 
4.542; 1906)

CSP:  The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I 
am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces ... 
(CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908)

CSP:  Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in their 
Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) 
concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Martin- yes - I agree. That means that the interaction between two
individual entities functions within both 2ns and 3ns. Sometimes it
is only within 2ns, as an accidental rock-fall but even that,
includes 3ns as to how the grass that the rock fell on -
interprets/reacts to the falling rocks. 

Edwina
 On Fri 10/08/18 12:53 PM , Martin Kettelhut mkettel...@msn.com sent:
What sets Peirce apart from analytic philosophy is his
acknowledgment that the INTERaction (of individual actualities) is
general/lawful, and it is real. 
   Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD  303 747 4449 
  On Aug 9, 2018, at 12:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote: 
 JAS, list 

 What is going on here, is a situation where two people are using
the same word - each with a different usage. So- we are talking past
each other, and that's hardly productive. 

 I use the term 'interact' to mean that two or more forces act on
and have an effect on each other. But a key point:  I do not confine
the nature of these forces to actualities and so, I include the
effect that a law can have on a particular object. 

 I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an
action between two actualities, two existent 'things'. 

 Again, Jon, your quotes that you provided do not, in my view,
contradict my use of the term  'interact'. I have always acknowledged
that the general, the law, has no separate actuality in itself but is
'embodied' in an individual morphology.  This is basic  Peirce [and
Aristotle]. BUT, I consider that the general, the law, as embedded, 
does act as a genuine informational force,  and so it as itself, as
its generality, acts, interacts...with individual morphologies. And
this is not simply an act of constraint,  but, in my view, of actual
generative formation. That enables the increase of complexity - a
basic conclusion for Peirce. 

 This is something about which we have a basic disagreement. 

 Edwina
 On Thu 09/08/18 2:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
   Edwina, List: 
  The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those
quotations, only existential particulars can interact, and only with 
other existential particulars.  A general cannot interact with
anything as a general, so it does not interact with existential 
particulars; instead, it  governs them. 
   CSP:  But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in"
individuals, and prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP
2:274; 1903) 
CSP:  By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over
and over again, translated into another language, embodied in a
logical graph or algebraical formula, and still be one and the same
proposition, we do not mean any existing individual  object but a
type, a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which
individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905)  
  Regards, 
  Jon S.   
 On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list 

I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply
have to agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which
I fully agree with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my
view] - which I'll repeat below:  

" I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from its
Tokens'. My view is that both are informationally functional and
interact informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate
individual existence for each. Informational action  between
information encoded as a general and information encoded as a
particular is, in my view, quite possible."  

That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my
view, interact with the existential particular. 

Edwina 

On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[4] sent:
   Edwina, List: 
  Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns. 
   CSP:   Let us begin with  considering actuality, and try to make
out just what it consists in.  If  I ask you what the actuality of an
event consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening 
then and there. The  specifications  then and there  involve  all its
relations to other existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie
in its relations to the universe of existents ... We have a  two-sided
consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come
tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we
have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second
object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24;  1903)   
  CSP:  That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the
cognate origin of the terms actuality and activity is  one of the
most deeply illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies
a generalization of effort; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and
resistance  being inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has
also a dyadic form. (CP

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

[Stephen Jarosek]

The liberals of your experience remind me of the liberals that I used to 
identify with before I turned to the right. But times have changed, and the 
liberals of today are not what they used to be. This video clip reminds me of 
the reasons that I originally changed sides (I was ahead of my time J):
https://youtu.be/4Pjs7uoOkag

So don’t apologize… get those who now routinely betray what you believe in to 
apologize to you… or walk away.

sj

 

From: Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, August 10, 2018 6:37 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

 

Wow! The blanket lumping of liberals with the selected vignetter you give of 
fascist liberalism sounds a bit like Jordan Peterson skewering post-modernist 
French intellectuals. Most liberals in my experience are nonviolent, oppose 
war, and do not use clearly provocative lingo even if they are rabidly opposed 
to their opponents. They can embrace a democratic-socialist all the way to a 
necessarily blue dog type. I am not sure where the animus behind your words 
comes from but I am tempted to apologize. Cheers, S




amazon.com/author/stephenrose

 

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

HELMUT >” The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than 
two genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid 
anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both, 
none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better to 
them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody one of 
two labels is rigid.”

The only duty we have is to respect one another. Most of us do not have a 
problem with people living out their personal preferences, so long as they 
respect others’ personal space. But people trying to foist “alternative” 
definitions into a culture and demand that they be observed are not liberal at 
all… they have an agenda and their demands are propaganda.

HELMUT>”A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal 
culture.”

Many of us observing proceedings taking place in America would disagree. It is 
the Left in America that is agitating for war. They want to deny the Right 
their freedom of speech. They call anyone that they disagree with nazis. They 
want to deny a president that was democratically elected. Their fascism 
masquerading as antifascism is laughably transparent, and the violence of their 
Antifa reveals the mindboggling extent of their hypocrisy. History is 
repeating, and it is the Left that is at the center of it, fascism red in 
hammer and sickle.

sj

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:32 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Stephen Jarosek; Daniel L Everett; Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

 

Edwina, Daniel, Stephen, List,

I agree with Edwina. I think there are social and altruistic instincts, but 
they may be destroyed by a rigid culture, and replaced with other instincts, 
which are "if-then"- routines, such as egocentric, tribal, and warrior 
instincts.

I think, that the nature of humans is usually good, in a liberal and 
equality-supporting culture. But there are also sleeping bad predispositions, 
which may be awakened in a bad environment, for the purpose of surviving there 
too. But of course, a human always has choices.

The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than two 
genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid 
anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both, 
none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better to 
them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody one of 
two labels is rigid.

A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal culture. In a 
war situation, bad instincts are awakened, up to making psychopaths out of 
people. A psychiatrist visiting a continuous war zone in Congo has said, the 
psychopaths ratio in the population was 70%. The other 30% remain, because 
people still have brains and choices.

All this may have to do with "brain wiring", ok, but not with cultural 
relativity, as "rigid", "liberal", "equality-supporting", and so on are 
universal terms.

Best,

Helmut

08. August 2018 um 14:41 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:

Interesting - but - if you see our species [homo sapiens] as a kind of 'black 
slate' so to speak - then, how do you explain the fact that the infant has to 
be socialized; i.e., our species is not born with innate knowledge and requires 
a long nurturance period.  And our type of socialization requires language. So- 
how do you get away from the notion that the requirement for language is innate?

Edwina

 

On Wed 08/08/18 5:14 AM , Daniel L Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:


https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo1

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I watched the move of folk like Dick Neuhaus and Mike Novak to the right
and felt it was as much economic motivation as anything else. Both
prospered. Meanwhile, Christianity and Crisis which was my roost at the
time went under. The liberal move to the right has had no discernable
effect on the Right's sorry performance including its present sad
captivity, My brand of liberalism which is not neo-liberalism but rather a
liberalism based on fairness and non-violence will eventually triumph as
the strong tree from which future politics can grow -- in a world of
democracies once today's miasm blows away. Think long-term. I suspect
Peirce did.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:29 PM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> The liberals of your experience remind me of the liberals that I used to
> identify with before I turned to the right. But times have changed, and the
> liberals of today are not what they used to be. This video clip reminds me
> of the reasons that I originally changed sides (I was ahead of my time J):
> https://youtu.be/4Pjs7uoOkag
>
> So don’t apologize… get those who now routinely betray what you believe in
> to apologize to you… or walk away.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, August 10, 2018 6:37 PM
> *To:* Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain
>
>
>
> Wow! The blanket lumping of liberals with the selected vignetter you give
> of fascist liberalism sounds a bit like Jordan Peterson skewering
> post-modernist French intellectuals. Most liberals in my experience are
> nonviolent, oppose war, and do not use clearly provocative lingo even if
> they are rabidly opposed to their opponents. They can embrace a
> democratic-socialist all the way to a necessarily blue dog type. I am not
> sure where the animus behind your words comes from but I am tempted to
> apologize. Cheers, S
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:
>
> HELMUT >” The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are
> more than two genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not
> wanting to forbid anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian,
> gay, trans, both, none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of
> those suits better to them than either "male" or "female". A culture that
> presses on everybody one of two labels is rigid.”
>
> The only duty we have is to respect one another. Most of us do not have a
> problem with people living out their personal preferences, so long as they
> respect others’ personal space. But people trying to foist “alternative”
> definitions into a culture and demand that they be observed are not liberal
> at all… they have an agenda and their demands are propaganda.
>
> HELMUT>”A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal
> culture.”
>
> Many of us observing proceedings taking place in America would disagree.
> It is the Left in America that is agitating for war. They want to deny the
> Right their freedom of speech. They call anyone that they disagree with
> nazis. They want to deny a president that was democratically elected. Their
> fascism masquerading as antifascism is laughably transparent, and the
> violence of their Antifa reveals the mindboggling extent of their
> hypocrisy. History is repeating, and it is the Left that is at the center
> of it, fascism red in hammer and sickle.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de ]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:32 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca
> *Cc:* Stephen Jarosek; Daniel L Everett; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Culture wires the brain
>
>
>
> Edwina, Daniel, Stephen, List,
>
> I agree with Edwina. I think there are social and altruistic instincts,
> but they may be destroyed by a rigid culture, and replaced with other
> instincts, which are "if-then"- routines, such as egocentric, tribal, and
> warrior instincts.
>
> I think, that the nature of humans is usually good, in a liberal and
> equality-supporting culture. But there are also sleeping bad
> predispositions, which may be awakened in a bad environment, for the
> purpose of surviving there too. But of course, a human always has choices.
>
> The "Left" do not utter "nonsense" by saying that there are more than two
> genders, but they (the "Left") are merely liberal, by not wanting to forbid
> anybody defining their own special gender, like "lesbian, gay, trans, both,
> none, or between man and woman...", if they feel one of those suits better
> to them than either "male" or "female". A culture that presses on everybody
> one of two labels is rigid.
>
> A rigid culture is more likely of starting a war than a liberal culture.
> In a war situation, bad instincts are awakened, up to making psychopaths
> out of people. A psychiatrist visiting a continuous war zone in Congo has
> said, the psychopaths ratio in the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Martin Kettelhut]

It also includes the consciousness (interpretant / 3n) which says, ‘That 
rockfall appears to be accidental,’ until further study accounts for it.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449

[cid:AE1F85A5-73CE-47F9-B178-3A6DEC85D9B0@hsd1.co.comcast.net]

On Aug 10, 2018, at 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:


Martin- yes - I agree. That means that the interaction between two individual 
entities functions within both 2ns and 3ns. Sometimes it is only within 2ns, as 
an accidental rock-fall but even that, includes 3ns as to how the grass that 
the rock fell on - interprets/reacts to the falling rocks.

Edwina



On Fri 10/08/18 12:53 PM , Martin Kettelhut 
mkettel...@msn.com sent:

What sets Peirce apart from analytic philosophy is his acknowledgment that the 
INTERaction (of individual actualities) is general/lawful, and it is real.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
303 747 4449


On Aug 9, 2018, at 12:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


JAS, list

What is going on here, is a situation where two people are using the same word 
- each with a different usage. So- we are talking past each other, and that's 
hardly productive.

I use the term 'interact' to mean that two or more forces act on and have an 
effect on each other. But a key point:  I do not confine the nature of these 
forces to actualities and so, I include the effect that a law can have on a 
particular object.

I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action between 
two actualities, two existent 'things'.

Again, Jon, your quotes that you provided do not, in my view, contradict my use 
of the term  'interact'. I have always acknowledged that the general, the law, 
has no separate actuality in itself but is 'embodied' in an individual 
morphology.  This is basic Peirce [and Aristotle]. BUT, I consider that the 
general, the law, as embedded,  does act as a genuine informational force,  and 
so it as itself, as its generality, acts, interacts...with individual 
morphologies. And this is not simply an act of constraint, but, in my view, of 
actual generative formation. That enables the increase of complexity - a basic 
conclusion for Peirce.

This is something about which we have a basic disagreement.

Edwina



On Thu 09/08/18 2:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those quotations, 
only existential particulars can interact, and only with other existential 
particulars.  A general cannot interact with anything as a general, so it does 
not interact with existential particulars; instead, it  governs them.

CSP:  But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and 
prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP 2:274; 1903)

CSP:  By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over again, 
translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or algebraical 
formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not mean any existing 
individual object but a type, a general, which does not exist but governs 
existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

JAS, list

I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply have to 
agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which I fully agree 
with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my view] - which I'll repeat 
below:

" I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. 
My view is that both are informationally functional and interact 
informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate individual existence for 
each. Informational action between information encoded as a general and 
information encoded as a particular is, in my view, quite possible."

That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my view, interact 
with the existential particular.

Edwina

On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns.

CSP:   Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just what 
it consists in.  If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you 
will tell me that it consists in its happening  then and there. The 
specifications  then and there  involve all its relations to other existents. 
The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of 
existents ... We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which 
seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, 
I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a 
second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24; 1903)

CSP:  That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the cognate 
origin of the terms actuality and activ

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


Peirce draws a distinction between thinking according to a rule of thumb, which 
functions as a standard of what is normal, and reasoning on the basis of a 
principle of logic, which is governed by higher ideals. The difference hinges 
on the degree of self-control that is exerted in thought and action.


This division surfaces in the different ways that Peirce characterizes the 
third type of interpretant:  (1) the "normal interpretant" seems to involve 
reference to standards of what is normal that may, in some respects, involve 
instinctive or conventional notions of correctness--but lack a logical 
conception of truth as regulating; (2) the "final interpretant" seems to 
involve reference to logical principles and a logical conception of truth and 
falsity.


One of the goals of the semiotic theory, I think, is to explain how final 
interpretants having a logical character might evolve from normal interpretants 
that lack, in some degree, such a character. Do you accept this sort of 
interpretation of the distinction between normal and final (or ultimate) 
interpretants?


For my part, I take this distinction to be rooted in Peirce's commitment to 
critical common-sensism. As such, I think it runs through the whole of the 
semiotic theory. In fact, it is one of the ideas that is driving the move to 
generalize with respect to many of the classes of signs (e.g., from term to 
rheme, and from proposition to dicisign)


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, August 10, 2018 9:40:14 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

Stephen R., Stephen J., List:

SCR:  There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP.

Actually, there is.

CSP:  Cannot a man act under the influence of a vague personification of the 
community and yet according to a general rule of conduct? Certainly: he so acts 
when he conforms to custom. Only if it is mere custom and not law, it is not a 
case of obedience, but of conformity to norm, or exemplar. (I never use the 
word norm in the sense of a precept, but only in that of a pattern which is 
copied, this being the original metaphor.) ... Conformity to a norm may take 
place by an immediate impulse. It then becomes instinctive imitation. But here 
the man does not vaguely personify the community, but puts himself in the shoes 
of another person, as we say. (CP 1.586; c. 1903)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 10:50 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote:
>” There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit 
>relieved.”

Stephen, I regard Peirce as the Isaac Newton of mind science (that’s a 
compliment). However… to really test one’s theory of Mind, one needs to test 
their firstness. And to do this, one needs to immerse themselves into 
culturally alien contexts, and then observe how their motivations change with 
said re-immersion. I mean, a lifestyle change. Up and relocate, maybe speak a 
new language. And that means incorporating the assumptions of your new locale, 
tune into the narratives of your new surroundings… i.e., imitation. You need to 
become the people that you want to understand. You need to imitate them. It’s 
the difference between theory and practice. That’s why an academic focus on 
theory alone is never enough. You need to become amazed at how your motivations 
have changed with your re-immersions. That’s why the importance of imitation 
can never be appreciated when confined to within a single academic or cultural 
context alone… it is perceived as “real” because its core narratives are never 
questioned, even when you think you are questioning them… how can you question 
a narrative while using the very narrative that you are questioning? You can’t 
question your culture’s assumptions from an armchair. You will never be amazed 
seated in an armchair.

sj

From: Stephen Curtiss Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 9, 2018 1:05 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

There is neither a reference to imitation nor mimesis in CP. I am a bit 
relieved.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peircean research

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

I'll make one last attempt at clarifying what my position is in the matters
we've been discussing. But since we seem not to be making much, if any,
progress in such matters as the terminology best suited to particular
sciences, in particular, *logic as semeiotic*, as well as the character and
value of that one, distinct science, I'll make a few inter-paragraphical
remarks and leave it at that. Please do have the last word as I'd be quite
interested in it if you do care to respond. [I have inserted numbers in
places in Edwina's comments so I can refer to specific remarks she made in
my own comments below each of her paragraphs. I have also put *logic as
semeiotic* in boldface throughout to make a point which I hope will be
apparent by the conclusion of this post] Edwina wrote:

ET: 1.To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
2.confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
specialists. 3.No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped
on for 'misuse of terms'. 4.And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes
confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject open
exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and until the discussants
'use the correct words'. 5.It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one
focuses on which term to use, the year it was introduced, the exact
references and so on. 6.That's not what I like to see. And I don't think
you want to see that either.


1. as far as I can tell, no one here is rejecting "natural language in the
study and use of Peirce," and quite the contrary; but you appear to be
rejecting a technical terminology within that seminal semiotic science, *logic
as semeiotic*.
2. suggesting that those who are working in--and have stated that they are
working--in *one specific science, *as "essentially an isolate cult of
specialists" is just name calling and hardly appropriate to the culture of
this forum.
3. to find it of the utmost importance that terminology in a given
science--in the present case, the second normative science of cenoscopic,
namely, the three branches of *logic as semeiotic*--that the terminology of
that particular science ought be well considered, precise, and as well
defined as it can be to facilitate discussions *within that given science*,
seems to me to be at the heart of Peirce's ethics of terminology, something
he spent considerable time arguing for (and working on).
4. one would expect that someone working in *logic as semeiotic* as Peirce
conceived it would use the terminology which he worked so hard to develop,
pioneering the field ("backwoodsman" in it as he once said, but clearing
the way for future research). Not to do so denies the value of the precise
technical terminology he found especially necessary for further research
into this science and would seem to deny the terminological ethics Peirce
thought essential to each and every distinct science.
5. to suggest that the result of exactly following Peirce in employing
terminology specific to the normative science of *logic as semeiotic*
results in Peircean thought being "confined and owned by. . .an elite set
of people who reject exploration of Peircean semiosic research" in other
arts and sciences is total nonsense; to speak of those following Peirce's
terminological lead in attempting to establish a very precise technical
language for discussions within that one, unique science  as a "cult" is,
frankly, in my opinion, beneath the communication practice of most all
scientists whom I know or know of.
6. what I'd like to see is greater respect for those here who, at least at
the moment, are doing work in one specific science, the pure theory of *logic
as semeiotic*, developing and employing its own terminology, something
Peirce thought of as essential for optimal communication within that
science. An important part of this work involves paying close attention to
how Peirce used terminology within that science, how that terminology
developed over time, how and where it is vague or contradictory, etc. So,
you are quite wrong: in that one science which I keep referring to, this
seems to me to be essential work within that science. So opposed to what
you may think, I *do* want to see that terminological inquiry done there.
For there it seems to me most appropriate, nay, necessary (whereas in other
arts and sciences it probably is less so or not at all).

ET: 1.There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn
within Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
DI, FI]…..2.But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
language cannot be used  - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but 3. inhibits the study
and use of Peirce.

1. there more certainly are "specific technical terms" one working
within *logic
as semeiotic* uses, but one i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peircean research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

From what I can gather from your post - you seem to be asserting
that those who are studying 'logic-as-semiotic' have a specific
vocabulary which includes not merely Peirce's technical terms but
also a transformation of various natural language words into
technical terms. 

 But- - please note -  when have I ever said that I was discussing
logic-as-semiotic? Yet, when I use terms such as 'action' and
'interaction' when I am referring to what is going on in the semiosis
of the biological realm - I am chastised for so doing. So- who is
mixing up research areas? If people working in logic as semiotic want
to focus on terminology and insist on the singular meaning of not
merely technical terms but even natural language used in their
research - fine, that's their choice. But I object to their
insistence that such a focus be extended to the rest of semiosis. And
biosemiotics is NOT a subset of semiotics; it's a basic aspect of it -
and we can see this in Peirce's outline of protoplasm.

And I repeat: there is 'natural language' and 'scientific language';
i.e., the technical terms used by Peirce such as Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness, and the DO, IO etc. But, Peirce did not
transform natural language into scientific terminology such that one
could no longer use natural language in discussing semiosis. 

 And I completely and totally disagree that 'the language of action'
is confined to the dyadic reaction, interaction. There is such a thing
as triadic action. And the use of these words does NOT contradict what
is going on in semiotics.

I also completely disagree with your claim , with reference to
Peircean terms that " one is most certainly free to use other
terminology when working in other arts and  sciences"  The use of
Peircean semiosis is not confined to 'logic-as-semiotic' and its use
in analyzing what is going on, semiotically, within the realms of
biology, physics, economics etc - i.e., in the real pragmatic world 
- is not 'other arts and sciences' - which suggest somehow that these
are not 'genuine semiosis fields'. These other areas are an integral
part of the whole field of semiosis.

Peircean semiosis is not, in my view, confined to logic-as-semiotic
and I certainly don't consider this area 'germinal' or seminal. 

And to insist on such a restricted use of terms - that is, if one is
studying Peircean semiosis in linguistics, in biology, in economics
-to insist  that one must consider logic-as-semiotic the germinal
base and all its terminology  - including the transformation of
natural language terms into specific technical terms - must be
followed, seems to me - to be a cult-like mode of  behaviour.

Again, those who are focused on logic as semiotic - fine, they can
deal with the restrictions imposed on natural language terms  as used
within that field. But those who are focused on biology as semiotic,
or economics as semiotic - I think they must be able to use natural
language to examine those areas.

Edwina
 On Fri 10/08/18  5:21 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List,
 I'll make one last attempt at clarifying what my position is in the
matters we've been discussing. But since we seem not to be making
much, if any, progress in such matters as the terminology best suited
to particular sciences, in particular, logic as semeiotic, as well as
the character and value of that one, distinct science, I'll make a
few inter-paragraphical remarks and leave it at that. Please do have
the last word as I'd be quite interested in it if you do care to
respond. [I have inserted numbers in places in Edwina's comments so I
can refer to specific remarks she made in my own comments below each
of her paragraphs. I have also put  logic as semeiotic in boldface
throughout to make a point which I hope will be apparent by the
conclusion of this post] Edwina wrote:
 ET: 1.To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of
Peirce 2.confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult
of specialists. 3.No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be
jumped on for 'misuse of terms'. 4.And so- we see how Peircean
analysis becomes confined and owned by almost an elite set of people
who reject open exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and
until the discussants 'use the correct words'. 5.It becomes almost an
insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to use, the year it
was introduced, the exact references and so on. 6.That's not what I
like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either. 
 1. as far as I can tell, no one here is rejecting "natural language
in the study and use of Peirce," and quite the contrary; but you
appear to be rejecting a technical terminology within that seminal
semiotic science, logic as semeiotic.2. suggesting that those who are
working in--and have stated that they are work

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peircean research

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina,

Even though you apparently skim-read my post (it took hours to compose, but
minutes for you to respond) and missed, or misrepresented, or distorted
virtually all of my points, I said that I'd give you the last substantive
word. Suffice it to say that I disagree with most all of your
interpretations and am sorry that I apparently wasted my time and effort
(and your time) in responding to your post.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 6:02 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> From what I can gather from your post - you seem to be asserting that
> those who are studying 'logic-as-semiotic' have a specific vocabulary which
> includes not merely Peirce's technical terms but also a transformation of
> various natural language words into technical terms.
>
>  But- - please note -  when have I ever said that I was discussing
> logic-as-semiotic? Yet, when I use terms such as 'action' and 'interaction'
> when I am referring to what is going on in the semiosis of the biological
> realm - I am chastised for so doing. So- who is mixing up research areas?
> If people working in logic as semiotic want to focus on terminology and
> insist on the singular meaning of not merely technical terms but even
> natural language used in their research - fine, that's their choice. But I
> object to their insistence that such a focus be extended to the rest of
> semiosis. And biosemiotics is NOT a subset of semiotics; it's a basic
> aspect of it - and we can see this in Peirce's outline of protoplasm.
>
> And I repeat: there is 'natural language' and 'scientific language'; i.e.,
> the technical terms used by Peirce such as Firstness, Secondness,
> Thirdness, and the DO, IO etc. But, Peirce did not transform natural
> language into scientific terminology such that one could no longer use
> natural language in discussing semiosis.
>
>  And I completely and totally disagree that 'the language of action' is
> confined to the dyadic reaction, interaction. There is such a thing as
> triadic action. And the use of these words does NOT contradict what is
> going on in semiotics.
>
> I also completely disagree with your claim , with reference to Peircean
> terms that " one is most certainly free to use other terminology when
> working in other arts and  sciences"  The use of Peircean semiosis is not
> confined to 'logic-as-semiotic' and its use in analyzing what is going on,
> semiotically, within the realms of biology, physics, economics etc - i.e.,
> in the real pragmatic world  - is not 'other arts and sciences' - which
> suggest somehow that these are not 'genuine semiosis fields'. These other
> areas are an integral part of the whole field of semiosis.
>
> Peircean semiosis is not, in my view, confined to logic-as-semiotic and I
> certainly don't consider this area 'germinal' or seminal.
>
> And to insist on such a restricted use of terms - that is, if one is
> studying Peircean semiosis in linguistics, in biology, in economics -to
> insist  that one must consider logic-as-semiotic the germinal base and all
> its terminology  - including the transformation of natural language terms
> into specific technical terms - must be followed, seems to me - to be a
> cult-like mode of  behaviour.
>
> Again, those who are focused on logic as semiotic - fine, they can deal
> with the restrictions imposed on natural language terms  as used within
> that field. But those who are focused on biology as semiotic, or economics
> as semiotic - I think they must be able to use natural language to examine
> those areas.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 10/08/18 5:21 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> I'll make one last attempt at clarifying what my position is in the
> matters we've been discussing. But since we seem not to be making much, if
> any, progress in such matters as the terminology best suited to particular
> sciences, in particular, logic as semeiotic, as well as the character and
> value of that one, distinct science, I'll make a few inter-paragraphical
> remarks and leave it at that. Please do have the last word as I'd be quite
> interested in it if you do care to respond. [I have inserted numbers in
> places in Edwina's comments so I can refer to specific remarks she made in
> my own comments below each of her paragraphs. I have also put logic as
> semeiotic in boldface throughout to make a point which I hope will be
> apparent by the conclusion of this post] Edwina wrote:
>
> ET: 1.To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
> 2.confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
> specialists. 3.No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped
> on for 'misuse of terms'. 4.And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes
> confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject open
> explor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean research

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

MB:  We could say that the phrase 'triadic action' approaches being a
technical term, and we cannot deny that Peirce used it ...


No one is denying that Peirce used it; on the contrary, I quoted the (only)
two specific passages where he did so, and then offered my interpretation
of them.  "Triadic action" is dyadic action undertaken for a *purpose*,
governed by a *law*, or occurring in a *medium*.  The purpose, law, or
medium is the element of 3ns; the actions themselves, and the Existents
participating in them, are elements of 2ns.  An Instance of a Sign--i.e.,
an event of concrete semiosis--is likewise a "triadic action" in the sense
that the production of an *individual *Dynamic Interpretant by an *individual
*Sign-Replica is governed by the *genuine *triadic relation between the
Dynamic Object, Sign, and Final Interpretant.

MB:  Not to mention other references to mediating action which are not
specifically labeled 'triadic action,' which I am sure number many more
than two references.


Unlike "triadic action," the term "mediating action" does not appear in CP
or EP *at all*.  If there are specific passages where Peirce used the word
*action *to describe mediation, I would be glad to review and consider them.

MB:  Picking and choosing which Peirce quotes to insist are the absolute
truth while denying the clear language of other quotes is not a good way to
advance scholarly discussion.


If I have been guilty of this, I would sincerely appreciate being shown
where.  At least I routinely *provide* Peirce quotes as purported warrant
for my claims, rather than simply making bare assertions.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 9:15 AM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list,
>
> +1
>
> This is another thread that has devolved into silliness. No one is trying
> to deny Peirce's technical terms, no one is being obdurate, and no one is
> saying anything other than we use natural language to communicate, and it
> has vagaries of interpretation.
>
> We could say that the phrase 'triadic action' approaches being a technical
> term, and we cannot deny that Peirce used it, especially in his later years
> when supposedly his assertions have more value than his earlier ones. (Not
> to mention other references to mediating action which are not specifically
> labeled 'triadic action,' which I am sure number many more than two
> references.) Furthermore, we can quote about these 'triadic actions' and
> then deny them, claiming they are all just 'relations' that should be
> expressed as dyadic actions. Picking and choosing which Peirce quotes to
> insist are the absolute truth while denying the clear language of other
> quotes is not a good way to advance scholarly discussion.
>
> I will comment no further on this thread.
>
> Mike
> --
>
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation
> 319.621.5225skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nurture and imitation as pragmatism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

To answer your specific question--no, I do not currently consider there to
be an important distinction between Normal and Final Interpretants.  In the
context of logic as semeiotic, I basically take "normal" as meaning
"normative" and "final" as alluding to "final cause."  As such, they
*both *"involve
reference to logical principles and a logical conception of truth and
falsity," rather than "instinctive or conventional notions of
correctness."  Moreover, I do not see how a Final Interpretant could
"evolve," since I take it to be the Dynamic Interpretant that an Instance
of the Sign *would* produce in the *ideal *state of Substantial Information.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> Peirce draws a distinction between thinking according to a rule of thumb,
> which functions as a standard of what is normal, and reasoning on the basis
> of a principle of logic, which is governed by higher ideals. The difference
> hinges on the degree of self-control that is exerted in thought and action.
>
> This division surfaces in the different ways that Peirce characterizes the
> third type of interpretant:  (1) the "normal interpretant" seems to
> involve reference to standards of what is normal that may, in some
> respects, involve instinctive or conventional notions of correctness--but
> lack a logical conception of truth as regulating; (2) the "final
> interpretant" seems to involve reference to logical principles and a
> logical conception of truth and falsity.
>
> One of the goals of the semiotic theory, I think, is to explain how final
> interpretants having a logical character might evolve from normal
> interpretants that lack, in some degree, such a character. Do you accept
> this sort of interpretation of the distinction between normal and final (or
> ultimate) interpretants?
>
> For my part, I take this distinction to be rooted in Peirce's commitment
> to critical common-sensism. As such, I think it runs through the whole of
> the semiotic theory. In fact, it is one of the ideas that is driving the
> move to generalize with respect to many of the classes of signs (e.g., from
> term to rheme, and from proposition to dicisign)
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .