Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Edwina, Peirce insisted that every theory of science, philosophy, or common sense is fallible. He maintained that much of what we believe is true to the extent that we have tested it. But he also maintained that we can never be certain that any belief is absolutely true. He applied that principle to his own ideas, which were evolving up to the very end. He often picked up an idea he had mentioned years earlier and reinvigorated it from an entirely new perspective. Unless Peirce explicitly stated that some earlier remark was wrong, we must consider it to be compatible with his later developments. Similarly, we must also consider the possibility that some of his later ideas might have been revised if he had lived longer. In fact, some of his still undigitized MSS might contain such ideas. I believe that your six principles (copied below) are in the spirit of Peirce's way of thinking. He would be horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some rigid set of quotations as a definitive formulation of his thought. And by the way, various people have quoted from some of my publications, and others have paraphrased them. But I have never seen any paraphrase that I completely agree with, and I cringe at many of them. I'm sure that Peirce would cringe at most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts. John _ ET:: 1]I feel that you [JAS] are confusing my referring to a 'dynamic semiosic process' ' by which I mean an active semiosic process, which is always triadic - with the use of the word in Peirce of 'dynamical action or action of brute force' which of course is dyadic. For you to confine the word 'dynamic' to only ONE meaning is linguistically untenable. 2] Furthermore - you ignore the functionality of this dynamic semiosic process - which is to enable diversity, adaptation, evolution and complexity of both matter and thought. 3] We've been over this topic of 'relations' before and there is no need, in my view, to redo it again. We disagree. 4] I also disagree with your merging of the term 'representamen' and 'sign' - for the one, in my view, refers to the mediative process and the other refers to the triadic actions. I think it's absolutely vital to differentiate the two. 5] As for your assertion that you are referring to the logical rather than temporal sequence of the three interpretants, I don't think that this changes my view, that the Final Interpretant has to be open to novelty, ie, to the development and the adaptation of its laws - and that this openness means that it cannot determine the previous interpretants. All that the outline of Peirce that you provide asserts is that IF, for example in a particular situation, the FI is in a mode of 1ns, then, of course, the II and DI must also be in that same categorical mode etc. But this says nothing about the function and nature of the FI and its role in the semiosic process of forming mind/matter. 6] I continue to feel that Peirce's many terms used in the Interpretant phase of the semiosic process are viable - in that they refer to the categorical modes of each stage of II, DI, FI. Edwina,Peirce insisted that every theory of science, philosophy, or common sense is fallible. He maintained that much of what we believe is true to the extent that we have tested it. But he also maintained that we can never be certain that any of them are absolutely true.He applied that principle to his own ideas. They were evolving up to the very end. He often picked up an idea he had mentioned years earlier and reinvigorated it from an entirely new perspective. I believe that your six principles are solidly in the spirit of Peirce's way of thinking. He would be horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some rigid set of principles as Peirce/s definitive formulation,John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
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}JAS - list
1]I feel that you are confusing my referring to a 'dynamic semiosic
process' ' by which I mean an active semiosic process, which is
always triadic - with the use of the word in Peirce of 'dynamical
action or action of brute force' which of course is dyadic. For you
to confine the word 'dynamic' to only ONE meaning is linguistically
untenable.
2] Furthermore - you ignore the functionality of this dynamic
semiosic process - which is to enable diversity, adaptation,
evolution and complexity of both matter and thought.
3] We've been over this topic of 'relations' before and there is no
need, in my view, to redo it again. We disagree.
4] I also disagree with your merging of the term 'representamen' and
'sign' - for the one, in my view, refers to the mediative process and
the other refers to the triadic actions. I think it's absolutely
vital to differentiate the two.
5] As for your assertion that you are referring to the logical
rather than temporal sequence of the three interpretants, I don't
think that this changes my view, that the Final Interpretant has to
be open to novelty, ie, to the development and the adaptation of its
laws - and that this openness means that it cannot determine the
previous interpretants. All that the outline of Peirce that you
provide asserts is that IF, for example in a particular situation,
the FI is in a mode of 1ns, then, of course, the II and DI must also
be in that same categorical mode etc. But this says nothing about the
function and nature of the FI and its role in the semiosic process of
forming mind/matter.
6] I continue to feel that Peirce's many terms used in the
Interpretant phase of the semiosic process are viable - in that they
refer to the categorical modes of each stage of II, DI, FI.
Edwina
On Wed 22/04/20 9:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is
an expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of
Peirce's writings.
Speculative grammar is the first branch of semeiotic, and I see one
of its primary tasks as conceptual analysis. It might look like
terminological analysis in some cases, but it is mainly concerned
with the concepts themselves and their relations with each other,
rather than narrowly focused on their names. That is precisely why I
believe that there are exactly three interpretants, no matter how many
different terminological schemes Peirce tried out for them. Positing
more than three interpretants is just as untenable as positing more
than two objects, since these structural features are both grounded
in the relation of involution/presupposition among the categories, as
Robert Marty's podium diagram very helpfully illustrates.
Here is another example of the relevance of terminology for getting
the concepts right (or wrong)--Peirce explicitly denies that
semeiosis is a dynamic process, because this would incorrectly imply
that it is a matter of strictly dyadic interactions.
CSP: It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All
dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical,
either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally
upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or
partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between
pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or
influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects,
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs.
(EP 2:411, 1907)
Notice that it is essential to Peirce's concept of semeiosis that
the sign, its object, and its interpretant are three different
subjects. In particular, the sign itself is not a relation, it is a
subject that is in a genuine triadic relation with two other
subjects--its object and its interpretant. Of course, using an
earlier terminology he called them the three correlates of a genuine
triadic relation (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) and substituted
"representamen" for "sign" because he had not yet decided that "there
was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905).
Finally, let me repeat once more that when we are talking about the
order of the trichotomies, it is a logical rather than temporal
sequence; and let me now add that determination in this context is
also logical, not causal. To say that the final interpretant
determines the dynamical interpretant is merely to affirm that if the
final interpretant is a possible, such that the sign is a gratific,
then the dynamical interpretant can only be a possible, such that the
sign is also a sympathetic; and if the dynamical interpretant is a
necessitant, such that the sign is a usual, then the final
interpretant can only be a
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Edwina, List: It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's writings. Speculative grammar is the first branch of semeiotic, and I see one of its primary tasks as *conceptual *analysis. It might look like terminological analysis in some cases, but it is mainly concerned with the concepts themselves and their relations with each other, rather than narrowly focused on their names. That is precisely why I believe that there are *exactly three* interpretants, no matter how many different terminological schemes Peirce tried out for them. Positing more than three interpretants is just as untenable as positing more than two objects, since these structural features are both grounded in the relation of involution/presupposition among the categories, as Robert Marty's podium diagram very helpfully illustrates. Here is another example of the relevance of terminology for getting the concepts right (or wrong)--Peirce explicitly denies that semeiosis is a *dynamic *process, because this would incorrectly imply that it is a matter of strictly *dyadic *interactions. CSP: It is important to understand what I mean by *semiosis*. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three* subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (EP 2:411, 1907) Notice that it is essential to Peirce's *concept *of semeiosis that the sign, its object, and its interpretant are three different *subjects*. In particular, the sign itself is not a *relation*, it is a subject that is *in *a genuine triadic relation with two other subjects--its object and its interpretant. Of course, using an earlier terminology he called them the three *correlates *of a genuine triadic relation (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) and substituted "representamen" for "sign" because he had not yet decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905). Finally, let me repeat once more that when we are talking about the order of the trichotomies, it is a *logical *rather than *temporal* sequence; and let me now add that determination in this context is also *logical*, not *causal*. To say that the final interpretant determines the dynamical interpretant is merely to affirm that if the final interpretant is a possible, such that the sign is a gratific, then the dynamical interpretant can only be a possible, such that the sign is also a sympathetic; and if the dynamical interpretant is a necessitant, such that the sign is a usual, then the final interpretant can only be a necessitant, such that the sign is also a temperative (cf. EP 2:481, 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Gary F, Auke, list > > I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see that the > 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a > terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms > ignores this actuality. > > My interest is in this semiosic process, as a continuous adaptive > transformative action - which is embodied, not merely in the brain, but in > matter [matter is effete mind]. To me, that's what Peirce is talking about > - and to confine analysis of his work to terms, to me at least, utterly > ignores this fact. > > I also agree with Auke's comment asking why, if Peirce - as JAS insists - > uses only three Interpretants - then why did Peirce use other terms for the > actions of interpretation? Surely his focus on clarification meant that > he developed them for an explanatory function. > > I also reject JAS's inserting the Final interpretant as 'first' in the > trichotomy. This suggests an apriori causal determination and I think that > Peircean semiosis, with its specific capacities for change, adaptation and > evolution, rejects such a determinism. I therefore agree with Gary F with > his comment about the different temporal phases. I'm using Matsuno's terms > [which I've previously referred to] - but, the point is, that Firstness is > atemporal so to speak, occurring in the Present tense. Secondness is in the > Perfect tense...with a clear perimeter between 'the previous second and > this second'. Thirdness or continuity is in the Progressive tense - with a > continuity of action but no 'presentness or perfectness' amd therefore has > no sense of linearity. Thus - it is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant
Auke, List: AvB: Do you think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative grammar? I think we discussed *both*, including how our different approaches to speculative grammar *diverge *from strict application of Peirce's relevant texts. AvB: Lots of other names are to be found in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of different terms, just to indicate the three very same interpretants every time. Why would he? I already gave my answer to this question--I believe that he was *experimenting *with different terms in an effort to figure out which combination was best. Consider what he wrote in two different draft letters to Lady Welby. CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really good name? ... For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at present no better designation than a *Collective*, which is not quite so bad a name as it sounds to be until one studies the matter ... if the Immediate Object is a Necessitant, I call the sign a *Copulant*; for in that case the Object has to be so identified by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a necessitation. My name is certainly a temporary expedient. (EP 2:480, 1908) CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type, a Descriptive an Indefinite (but this was bad), a Denominative a Designation, a Copulative (which is bad) a Distributive (which is much better). I think Potisign/Actisign/Famisign might be called Mark/Token/Type(?) while Descriptive/Denominative/Copulative might be called Descriptive/Denominative/Distributive. (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908) There is nothing "foolish" about the hypothesis that Peirce was likewise wrestling with alternative names for the three interpretants and their divisions. After all, within just a few days in late December 1908, he referred to them as Explicit/Effective/Destinate (EP 2:481), Immediate/Dynamic/Normal (EP 2:482-483), and Immediate(or Felt?)/Dynamical/Eventual (EP 2:489-490). I find it utterly implausible that he had eight (or nine?) *different* interpretants in mind, and I see no reason *in these texts* to distinguish the normal interpretant from the eventual interpretant, since both are explicitly assigned to the eighth trichotomy. AvB: You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot. I was also "talking about making sense of the lot," as should be evident from my lengthy replies appended below, as well as my two detailed responses (so far) to Gary Fuhrman's recent posts. We just seem to have come to very different conclusions. AvB: So, in the end we proved not to communicate. I am sincerely sorry that you see it that way. I personally found it to be a stimulating discussion and appreciate the dialogue. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 2:00 AM wrote: > Jon Alan, > > You wrote: > > Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of > interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [ > > - > > No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign > segment of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in > order to identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That > would make things more difficult. > > You wrote: > > ] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by > analysis in speculative grammar. > > -- > > First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you > think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative > grammar? You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for > you. As far as i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e. > my interest is systematic not biographical. > > Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three > interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be > found in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such > a lot of different terms, just to indicate the three very same > interpretants every time. Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness? > > Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants > only. I was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot. > > So, in the end we proved not to communicate. > > Best, > > Auke > > Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > AvB: You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from > the 'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of > its own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects. > > > Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of > interpretant signs within the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Gary F., List: GF: ... I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). Understood and agreed. :-) GF: It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two--which would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after them. Again, I was referring to the *logical* order of determination, which (according to Peirce, EP 2:481,1908) dictates which classes of signs are possible. When I say that the division of signs according to the purpose of the final interpretant comes *before* the one according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, I am not saying anything about their *temporal *relationship. Instead, I am simply suggesting the following. - A gratific (ideally would produce a feeling) is always a sympathetic (actually does produce a feeling). - An actuous (ideally would produce an exertion) can be either a sympathetic or a percussive (actually does produce an exertion). - A temperative (ideally would produce a further sign) can be a sympathetic, a percussive, or a usual (actually does produce a further sign). As I have mentioned before, the upshot is that the actual effect of a sign can only deviate from its ideal/intended effect in the direction of involution (3ns→2ns→1ns). Likewise, when I say that the division of signs according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant comes *before *the one according to the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant, I am simply suggesting the following. - A sympathetic is always a hypothetic (EG is an unattached spot). - A percussive can be either a hypothetic or a categorical (EG has one line of identity). - A usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative (EG has two or more lines of identity). The upshot here is not as clear, at least until we also look at what I believe is the *next* division of signs, according to the nature of the influence of the sign, which corresponds to its relation with the final interpretant--term/seme, proposition/pheme, or argument/delome. Sticking with the traditional names ... - A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or a relative (triadic or higher). - A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term). - An argument is always a relative (involving two or more propositions). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 8:32 AM wrote: > Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis, but I > find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of > it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process > is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). So I only have > one small suggestion to offer. You wrote, “This combination requires the > trichotomy for the final interpretant to come *before *the other two, as > it does in my logical order of determination, rather than *after *them, > as it does in Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a > final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which > would imply that its mode of being “comes” *both* before and after them. > > > > Gary f. > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories At Play Beyond The Signs
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}Very funny. Exactly. But remember - we 'see' within our beliefs...It
takes a lot of cool and objective induction, with many examples and
questions, to decide whether to stick with those 'a priori' beliefs
or take the plunge and develop a scientific analysis.
Edwina
On Wed 22/04/20 4:24 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
Who you gonna believe,
my à priori scheme
or your lying eyes?
— also sprach 0*
-
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories At Play Beyond The Signs
Who you gonna believe, my à priori scheme or your lying eyes? — also sprach 0* - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Dear colleagues, I have had hundreds of discussions with my students and colleagues, I have conducted master's thesis in several fields and Phd like any academic. Obviously most of them have exploited in their classifications the texts CP 2.254 to 2,265 formalized by me in the lattice of the classes of signs (see https://www.academia.edu/40493861/The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants proposed for discussion in this list and immediately drowned in subjects not always adjacent). These analytical practices have shown that the main or even unique cause of the observed discrepancies is due to the fact that when each classifies a sign it places it somewhere in the lattice but at the same time its class of signs presupposes structurally (or implies if you prefer) all classes of signs that are "below". It often happens that we see a denial of an analysis by other analyses that classify the sign precisely in a class below. This is evident in debates about the relationship to the object with photographs: icons, indexes or symbols is the question. My German colleague Max Bense had created the "top icon" that captured the formation of icons in the sense that it is heard in the media today (the current best example is Greta Thunberg). One can even observe the three classifications in a debate and a fine analysis with the categories is necessary to obtain -not always - a consensus, which can only be obtained with a rigorous examination of the "ground" of the sign, that is to say on the characters of the signs that are really active in the communication, that is to say selected by a perceptual judgment shared by the community to which it is addressed. The signs of advertising allow a large amount of endless analysis and debate Le mer. 22 avr. 2020 à 19:35, John F. Sowa a écrit : > Edwina, > > That's an important point: > > ET > I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see > that the 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a > terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms > ignores this actuality. > > The great tragedy of Peirce's career is his lack of daily discussions with > students and colleagues during the last three decades of his life. A > discussion of semiosis requires a huge number of examples to illustrate the > open-ended variety of possibilities. If he had daily discussions with > students, they would have bombarded him with a constant stream of new > examples. > > Instead of constantly quoting and requoting passages, it would be much > better to take specific examples that have been used in 20th & 21st c > discussions and show how Peirce's categories could be used to clarify them. > > A great advantage of that approach is that it would show modern linguists, > psychologists, logicians, and philosophers the importance of studying > Peirce's writings. > > John > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Edwina, That's an important point: ET >I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see that the 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms ignores this actuality. The great tragedy of Peirce's career is his lack of daily discussions with students and colleagues during the last three decades of his life. A discussion of semiosis requires a huge number of examples to illustrate the open-ended variety of possibilities. If he had daily discussions with students, they would have bombarded him with a constant stream of new examples. Instead of constantly quoting and requoting passages, it would be much better to take specific examples that have been used in 20th & 21st c discussions and show how Peirce's categories could be used to clarify them. A great advantage of that approach is that it would show modern linguists, psychologists, logicians, and philosophers the importance of studying Peirce's writings. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Gary F, Auke, list I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see that the 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms ignores this actuality. My interest is in this semiosic process, as a continuous adaptive transformative action - which is embodied, not merely in the brain, but in matter [matter is effete mind]. To me, that's what Peirce is talking about - and to confine analysis of his work to terms, to me at least, utterly ignores this fact. I also agree with Auke's comment asking why, if Peirce - as JAS insists - uses only three Interpretants - then why did Peirce use other terms for the actions of interpretation? Surely his focus on clarification meant that he developed them for an explanatory function. I also reject JAS's inserting the Final interpretant as 'first' in the trichotomy. This suggests an apriori causal determination and I think that Peircean semiosis, with its specific capacities for change, adaptation and evolution, rejects such a determinism. I therefore agree with Gary F with his comment about the different temporal phases. I'm using Matsuno's terms [which I've previously referred to] - but, the point is, that Firstness is atemporal so to speak, occurring in the Present tense. Secondness is in the Perfect tense...with a clear perimeter between 'the previous second and this second'. Thirdness or continuity is in the Progressive tense - with a continuity of action but no 'presentness or perfectness' amd therefore has no sense of linearity. Thus - it is not deterministic - and the Final Interpretant IF, IF, it's in a mode of Thirdness certainly can't be temporally 'first' but is instead, an underlying force-of-continuity [habit]. Edwina On Wed 22/04/20 9:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis, but I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). So I only have one small suggestion to offer. You wrote, “ This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after them. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 21-Apr-20 21:15 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs Gary F., List: Thanks for posting this interesting analysis. It probably will not surprise anyone that I am responding mainly to your last statement. GF: I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the signs, objects and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational example above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order of determination applies to its six components. In accordance with Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, both examples are obviously replicas of propositions; i.e., dicent symbols, and therefore legisigns. In accordance with the hexad, both examples are tokens of symbolic types, and therefore must be collectives according to the dynamical object and copulatives according to the immediate object. That does not seem to square with Peirce's identification of the dynamical objects as "the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains" and "the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment." However, it is consistent with his statements elsewhere that the dynamical object of every proposition is the entire universe, while the immediate object is the universe of discourse--the collection of whatever possibly could be denoted by the terms that the proposition involves. The latter matches up reasonably well with "the weather at that time" and "the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine." Again, I do not believe that a linear sequence of trichotomies is ultimately the right approach for speculative grammar, especially when it comes to the two objects and the sign itself. For one thing, I consider the S-Od division to be a matter of degree, rather than a sharp distinction; signs are iconic, indexical, and symbolic, rather than pure icons, indices, or symbols. For another, in my view symbolic signs are clearly not limited to being collectives, copulatives, and types. For example, the dynamical object of a symbolic term can be an abstract quality (abstractive), a concrete thing (concretive), or an ens rationis (collective); it can identify its immediate object by
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis, but I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). So I only have one small suggestion to offer. You wrote, “This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after them. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 21-Apr-20 21:15 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs Gary F., List: Thanks for posting this interesting analysis. It probably will not surprise anyone that I am responding mainly to your last statement. GF: I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the signs, objects and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational example above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order of determination applies to its six components. In accordance with Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, both examples are obviously replicas of propositions; i.e., dicent symbols, and therefore legisigns. In accordance with the hexad, both examples are tokens of symbolic types, and therefore must be collectives according to the dynamical object and copulatives according to the immediate object. That does not seem to square with Peirce's identification of the dynamical objects as "the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains" and "the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment." However, it is consistent with his statements elsewhere that the dynamical object of every proposition is the entire universe, while the immediate object is the universe of discourse--the collection of whatever possibly could be denoted by the terms that the proposition involves. The latter matches up reasonably well with "the weather at that time" and "the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine." Again, I do not believe that a linear sequence of trichotomies is ultimately the right approach for speculative grammar, especially when it comes to the two objects and the sign itself. For one thing, I consider the S-Od division to be a matter of degree, rather than a sharp distinction; signs are iconic, indexical, and symbolic, rather than pure icons, indices, or symbols. For another, in my view symbolic signs are clearly not limited to being collectives, copulatives, and types. For example, the dynamical object of a symbolic term can be an abstract quality (abstractive), a concrete thing (concretive), or an ens rationis (collective); it can identify its immediate object by relying on past collateral experience (descriptive) or present collateral observation (designative); and in itself, like all types, it exists only in its tokens. As for the interpretants, in the first example Peirce says that the immediate is "the quality of the weather," the dynamical is "my answering her question" (not the answer itself), and the final is "her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day." This seems to indicate that his wife's question, "What sort of a day is it?" is a categorical (graphed with one line of identity), a percussive (actual effect is an exertion), and a temperative (intended to produce self-control). However, I am inclined to say that the purpose of every question, unless it is strictly rhetorical, is to elicit an answer--i.e., to produce an action--which would make it an actuous, rather than a temperative. This combination is possible regardless of the order of the interpretant trichotomies, since all three are existents. In the second example, Peirce says that the immediate interpretant is "the schema in her imagination, i.e., the vague Image of what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day"; the dynamical is "the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her"; and the final is "the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc." This seems to indicate that his response, "It is a stormy day," is a categorical, a percussive, and a temperative; I consider his wife's disappointment to be an exertion, rather than a feeling, because it is a physical response. This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's. There are two remaining divisions in Peirce's 1905-1909 taxonomies--the manner of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant
Jon Alan, You wrote: Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [ - No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign segment of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in order to identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That would make things more difficult. You wrote: ] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in speculative grammar. -- First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative grammar? You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for you. As far as i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e. my interest is systematic not biographical. Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be found in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of different terms, just to indicate the three very same interpretants every time. Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness? Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot. So, in the end we proved not to communicate. Best, Auke > Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : > > Auke, List: > > > > > AvB: You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a > sign' differs from the 'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown > sign, in need of its own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant > aspects. > > > > > > Why would you say that? We have not been talking about a series of > interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis, but rather the > three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in speculative > grammar. Moreover, not all signs have further signs as their dynamical > interpretants (usuals); some produce exertions (percussives), while others > produce only feelings (sympathetics). > > > > > AvB: ... the structure is given for the interpretant > regarded as a sign 1. A; 2. B. a.b.; 3. C. abc. > > > > > > That structure is given for any sign whatsoever, as follows (R > 339:386[253r], 1905 Oct 8). > * A is the "Division according to the matter of the sign," S = > qualisign/sinsign/legisign. > * Under B are the "Divisions according to the Object." > o B.a is "According to the Immediate Object (how represented)," > Oi = indefinite/singular/distributively general. > o Under B.b are the divisions "According to the Dynamic Object." > + B.b.α is according to the "Matter of the Dynamic > Object," Od = abstract/concrete/collection. > + B.b.β is according to the "Mode of representing > object," Od-S = icon/index/symbol. > * Under C are the "Division[s] according to Interpretant." > o C.a is "According to Immediate Interpretant (How > represented)," Ii = clamatory/imperative/representative. > o Under C.b are the divisions "According to Dynamic > Interpretant." > + C.b.α is according to the "Matter of Dynamic > Interpretant," Id = feeling/conduct/thought. > + C.b.β is according to the "Mode of Affecting Dynamic > Interp.," S-Id = by sympathy/compulsion/reason. > o Under C.c are the divisions "According to Representative > Interpretant." > + C.c.α is according to the "Matter of Representative > Interpretant," If. > + C.c.β is according to the "Mode of being represented by > Representative Interpretant," S-If. > + C.c.γ is according to the "Mode of being represented to > represent its object by Repr. Interp.," Od-S-If. > These are the same ten trichotomies that Peirce consistently identifies > between 1905 and 1909. The terminology varies over that time--"dynamic" vs. > "dynamical," the names of the three interpretants, and the names of the > classes within each division--but the overall scheme remains unchanged. > Francesco Bellucci discusses what was basically the very last wrinkle on pp. > 346-347 of his book, Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotic--the > suggestion of a hierarchical rather than linear order. > > > > > CSP: The light which the 2 trichotomies referred to in > the last paragraph but one above [Od-S and S-Id] throw upon each other > suggests a method of study that I have hitherto employed only in getting as > clear ideas as I have (and they ought to be more definite) of the 1st and 2nd > trichotomies [S and Oi] or (using the excellent notation of 1905 Oct 12) A > and Ba. I am now applying the same
