Edwina, List: It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's writings.
Speculative grammar is the first branch of semeiotic, and I see one of its primary tasks as *conceptual *analysis. It might look like terminological analysis in some cases, but it is mainly concerned with the concepts themselves and their relations with each other, rather than narrowly focused on their names. That is precisely why I believe that there are *exactly three* interpretants, no matter how many different terminological schemes Peirce tried out for them. Positing more than three interpretants is just as untenable as positing more than two objects, since these structural features are both grounded in the relation of involution/presupposition among the categories, as Robert Marty's podium diagram very helpfully illustrates. Here is another example of the relevance of terminology for getting the concepts right (or wrong)--Peirce explicitly denies that semeiosis is a *dynamic *process, because this would incorrectly imply that it is a matter of strictly *dyadic *interactions. CSP: It is important to understand what I mean by *semiosis*. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three* subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (EP 2:411, 1907) Notice that it is essential to Peirce's *concept *of semeiosis that the sign, its object, and its interpretant are three different *subjects*. In particular, the sign itself is not a *relation*, it is a subject that is *in *a genuine triadic relation with two other subjects--its object and its interpretant. Of course, using an earlier terminology he called them the three *correlates *of a genuine triadic relation (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) and substituted "representamen" for "sign" because he had not yet decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905). Finally, let me repeat once more that when we are talking about the order of the trichotomies, it is a *logical *rather than *temporal* sequence; and let me now add that determination in this context is also *logical*, not *causal*. To say that the final interpretant determines the dynamical interpretant is merely to affirm that if the final interpretant is a possible, such that the sign is a gratific, then the dynamical interpretant can only be a possible, such that the sign is also a sympathetic; and if the dynamical interpretant is a necessitant, such that the sign is a usual, then the final interpretant can only be a necessitant, such that the sign is also a temperative (cf. EP 2:481, 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary F, Auke, list > > I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see that the > 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a > terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms > ignores this actuality. > > My interest is in this semiosic process, as a continuous adaptive > transformative action - which is embodied, not merely in the brain, but in > matter [matter is effete mind]. To me, that's what Peirce is talking about > - and to confine analysis of his work to terms, to me at least, utterly > ignores this fact. > > I also agree with Auke's comment asking why, if Peirce - as JAS insists - > uses only three Interpretants - then why did Peirce use other terms for the > actions of interpretation? Surely his focus on clarification meant that > he developed them for an explanatory function. > > I also reject JAS's inserting the Final interpretant as 'first' in the > trichotomy. This suggests an apriori causal determination and I think that > Peircean semiosis, with its specific capacities for change, adaptation and > evolution, rejects such a determinism. I therefore agree with Gary F with > his comment about the different temporal phases. I'm using Matsuno's terms > [which I've previously referred to] - but, the point is, that Firstness is > atemporal so to speak, occurring in the Present tense. Secondness is in the > Perfect tense...with a clear perimeter between 'the previous second and > this second'. Thirdness or continuity is in the Progressive tense - with a > continuity of action but no 'presentness or perfectness' amd therefore has > no sense of linearity. Thus - it is not deterministic - and the > Final Interpretant IF, IF, it's in a mode of Thirdness certainly can't > be temporally 'first' but is instead, an underlying force-of-continuity > [habit]. > > Edwina >
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