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}JAS - list
1]I feel that you are confusing my referring to a 'dynamic semiosic
process' ' by which I mean an active semiosic process, which is
always triadic - with the use of the word in Peirce of 'dynamical
action or action of brute force' which of course is dyadic. For you
to confine the word 'dynamic' to only ONE meaning is linguistically
untenable.
2] Furthermore - you ignore the functionality of this dynamic
semiosic process - which is to enable diversity, adaptation,
evolution and complexity of both matter and thought.
3] We've been over this topic of 'relations' before and there is no
need, in my view, to redo it again. We disagree.
4] I also disagree with your merging of the term 'representamen' and
'sign' - for the one, in my view, refers to the mediative process and
the other refers to the triadic actions. I think it's absolutely
vital to differentiate the two.
5] As for your assertion that you are referring to the logical
rather than temporal sequence of the three interpretants, I don't
think that this changes my view, that the Final Interpretant has to
be open to novelty, ie, to the development and the adaptation of its
laws - and that this openness means that it cannot determine the
previous interpretants. All that the outline of Peirce that you
provide asserts is that IF, for example in a particular situation,
the FI is in a mode of 1ns, then, of course, the II and DI must also
be in that same categorical mode etc. But this says nothing about the
function and nature of the FI and its role in the semiosic process of
forming mind/matter.
6] I continue to feel that Peirce's many terms used in the
Interpretant phase of the semiosic process are viable - in that they
refer to the categorical modes of each stage of II, DI, FI.
Edwina
On Wed 22/04/20 9:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is
an expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of
Peirce's writings.
Speculative grammar is the first branch of semeiotic, and I see one
of its primary tasks as conceptual analysis. It might look like
terminological analysis in some cases, but it is mainly concerned
with the concepts themselves and their relations with each other,
rather than narrowly focused on their names. That is precisely why I
believe that there are exactly three interpretants, no matter how many
different terminological schemes Peirce tried out for them. Positing
more than three interpretants is just as untenable as positing more
than two objects, since these structural features are both grounded
in the relation of involution/presupposition among the categories, as
Robert Marty's podium diagram very helpfully illustrates.
Here is another example of the relevance of terminology for getting
the concepts right (or wrong)--Peirce explicitly denies that
semeiosis is a dynamic process, because this would incorrectly imply
that it is a matter of strictly dyadic interactions.
CSP: It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All
dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical,
either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally
upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or
partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between
pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or
influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects,
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs.
(EP 2:411, 1907)
Notice that it is essential to Peirce's concept of semeiosis that
the sign, its object, and its interpretant are three different
subjects. In particular, the sign itself is not a relation, it is a
subject that is in a genuine triadic relation with two other
subjects--its object and its interpretant. Of course, using an
earlier terminology he called them the three correlates of a genuine
triadic relation (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) and substituted
"representamen" for "sign" because he had not yet decided that "there
was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905).
Finally, let me repeat once more that when we are talking about the
order of the trichotomies, it is a logical rather than temporal
sequence; and let me now add that determination in this context is
also logical, not causal. To say that the final interpretant
determines the dynamical interpretant is merely to affirm that if the
final interpretant is a possible, such that the sign is a gratific,
then the dynamical interpretant can only be a possible, such that the
sign is also a sympathetic; and if the dynamical interpretant is a
necessitant, such that the sign is a usual, then the final
interpretant can only be a necessitant, such that the sign is also a
temperative (cf. EP 2:481, 1908).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary F, Auke, list
I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see
that the 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's
a terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus
on terms ignores this actuality.
My interest is in this semiosic process, as a continuous adaptive
transformative action - which is embodied, not merely in the brain,
but in matter [matter is effete mind]. To me, that's what Peirce is
talking about - and to confine analysis of his work to terms, to me
at least, utterly ignores this fact.
I also agree with Auke's comment asking why, if Peirce - as JAS
insists - uses only three Interpretants - then why did Peirce use
other terms for the actions of interpretation? Surely his focus on
clarification meant that he developed them for an explanatory
function.
I also reject JAS's inserting the Final interpretant as 'first' in
the trichotomy. This suggests an apriori causal determination and I
think that Peircean semiosis, with its specific capacities for
change, adaptation and evolution, rejects such a determinism. I
therefore agree with Gary F with his comment about the different
temporal phases. I'm using Matsuno's terms [which I've previously
referred to] - but, the point is, that Firstness is atemporal so to
speak, occurring in the Present tense. Secondness is in the Perfect
tense...with a clear perimeter between 'the previous second and this
second'. Thirdness or continuity is in the Progressive tense - with a
continuity of action but no 'presentness or perfectness' amd therefore
has no sense of linearity. Thus - it is not deterministic - and the
Final Interpretant IF, IF, it's in a mode of Thirdness certainly
can't be temporally 'first' but is instead, an underlying
force-of-continuity [habit].
Edwina
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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