Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4
Gary,
Thank you for the explanation. It is the best I have heard by far when I
voice this concern, so I have pondered it for a bit. I guess what you are
describing as a "cenoscopic claim" still fits what I would call an
"empirical claim," broadly speaking. As you put it: He is making an claim
about himself - which could be verified via investigation, and which we
cannot hold infallible based purely on interospection - and he is hoping
(while not quite asserting) that the claim would hold true for others.
You also state that, "In a sense, self-control *is* reasonableness —
reasoning is essentially the method of self-control." That makes me worry
that we are drifting towards vacuous statements, which was the other option
in my initial concern. If it is the case that whenever someone exercises
self-control, we will declare that such a thing could not be done except as
an attempt at reasonableness, we can be happy that our statement is true by
definition, but not much beyond that.
The latter issue makes me much more inclined towards the version in which
Peirce is making an empirical claim which I find highly suspect. When he
says "man*...* is *compelled,* to *make his life more reasonable,*" he is
not making a circular claim, and he certainly hasn't made any systematic
attempt to find exceptions, so he is probably overgeneralizing. Peirce
knows the claim must be true in general (because *everything *would fall
apart if it wasn't *generally *true), and he is content there. Thus, if
William James, for example, came back with evidence that certain people,
under such-and-such conditions, do not seem to be so compelled, Peirce
would wonder what the hell James was getting on about.
Also, for the writings that follow, though he does not state it explicitly,
Peirce will be developing principles that must be true about those
non-exceptional cases. Thus when I twitch at further clear
over-generalizations, my first question should be whether the claim would
be true for those cases in which people are enacting compulsions to make
their lives more reasonable. If the over-generalization would be true in
such cases, then I should remind myself that those are the only cases
Peirce is talking about, and be merely annoyed that he didn't tell me that
was what he was doing.
Does that seem like a reasonable understanding?
Best,
Eric
---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps
On Sun, Oct 1, 2017 at 9:25 PM, wrote:
> Eric (and list),
>
>
>
> I don’t believe that Peirce is making an empirical claim here, i.e. he is
> not claiming that his generalization is true because it is based on
> observation of a large sample of individuals. He is making a *cenoscopic*
> claim, i.e. describing his own experience and assuming that everyone else’s
> experience of self-control (if they have any) is at least vaguely similar.
> He is asking you to reflect on your own experience of self-control and
> decide for yourself whether it more or less fits his description, and
> hoping that you will go along with him on that basis.
>
>
>
> You say that there are “some people who feel compelled to make their
> lives less reasonable.” But if I understand Peirce’s concept of
> “reasonable” rightly, he would find that a contradiction in terms. Any
> attempt to *make your life* have *any* definite quality, whether you feel
> “compelled” to it or not, is an attempt at self-control, because it entails
> judging how well your past conduct has measured up to some standard and
> resolving to make your future conduct approach that standard. Making your
> life less reasonable would be like making yourself go to sleep — the harder
> you try, the further you get from your goal. In a sense, self-control *is*
> reasonableness — reasoning is essentially the method of self-control.
>
>
>
> We should also bear in mind that, in Peirce’s words, “self-control of any
> kind is purely *inhibitory*. It originates nothing” (EP2:233). We often
> think of “self-control” as if it were opposed to spontaneity of action, but
> Peirce thought of it as *harnessing* the core impulses that originate our
> activity and guiding our instinctive motivations toward actualization of
> some admirable ideal. That tends to transform a life into a continuous
> process, one that moves in some direction instead of taking a random walk.
>
>
>
> That would mean that if you are *born to be wild*, as Gene put it,
> reasonable self-control would not domesticate you but inhibit the impulses
> toward domestication that would otherwise tame you, and thus channel your
> wildness more effectively!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } We must believe in free will – we have no choice. [Isaac Bashevis
> Singer] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gat
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4
Coming in late, but I'm never quite sure what to think when Peirce starts making (seemingly) flippant claims about the universal nature of men's psychological states. At the end here, he says: "That is, the man *can,* or if you please is *compelled,* to *make his life more reasonable.* " It seems to me that such a claim is either vacuous or a false generalization. It is vacuous if, whatever someone does, we make it an a priori truism that the action is directed at making his life more reasonable. And if we are not making such an a priori move, then any concerted effort at empirical investigation will reveal that there are people who do not feel so compelled, including some people who feel compelled to make their lives less reasonable. I'd really appreciate any help with this that others could offer. Is Peirce trying to a make an empirical claim here, or not? If he is, with what evidence? If he is not, then what is it he is trying to do? Many thanks! --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Sun, Oct 1, 2017 at 6:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Gene - please see my comments below: > > > On Sun 01/10/17 6:33 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: > > Dear Edwina, > The evidence contradicts a number of your claims. > 1] Edwina: "Most tribal economies are focused around stability and > can't economically afford peripheral deviations from the hard work of their > economic mode." > GENE: It has been known for some time that hunter gather economies > traditionally require far less work than agricultural, see, for example, > Marshall Sahlins, The Original Affluent Society. Agricultural > civilizations typically radically increased work load. > > EDWINA: So what? Hunter-Gather economies require less work than > agricultural because they do not make the land produce food; they only > hunt-what-is-there; and gather-what-is-there. BUT this means that this type > of economy can only support a SMALL population; the normal band size is > about 30 people - and - they are usually migratory. See Lee and Devore's > various studies; > > 2] GENE: A simple definition of civilization is living of and from > cities. But that entails a number of attributes such as bureaucracy and > institutional division of labor, and, historically, inventions such as > kingship, literacy, etc. > Just as the domestication of animals and plants through confinement > was originally rooted in a myth of control of nature, civilization > legitimated the confinement of human beings to radically increased work > loads, greater social inequality, and reduced nutrition, through mythic > kingship and its religious faces (the Babylonian creation myth, The > Atrahasis, is a great example). I have also written on some of these issues > in different places, including my book, From the Axial Age to the Moral > Revolution. The human body was literally confined, shrinking an average > of 4 to 6 inches wherever agriculturally-based civilization broke out, old > world or new (Mummert A, Esche E, Robinson J, et al. (2011) Stature and > robusticity during the agricultural transition: Evidence from the > bioarchaeological record. Economics and Human Biology 9(3): 284–301). > > EDWINA: I don't think that the domestication of animals and plants emerged > from a 'myth of control of nature'. I think that, first, the local > environment had to include plants that could be domesticated and animals > that could be domesticated. That is, you seem to be putting the ideology > first..and actions after. Whereas, I put the objective reality of a > nature-that-is-amenable to 'making food'...first. Ideology comes later. The > environment has to be accessible to agriculture. > > As I pointed out, you can't harness a zebra to a plough. And I still > don't 'get' your definition of 'civilization' as 'living of and from > cities'. You don't get a city, i.e., a large hierarchical and specialized > population without FIRST being located in an ecological area that can > produce a surplus of food; that can support a large population; that then > becomes specialized in tasks. > > 3] GENE: The idea that humans in industrial countries have been > getting taller in the past hundred or so years is simply a return of the > human body to pre-agricultural levels with recently improved diet. > Civilization introduced a radical departure from the long-term evolutionary > tempering that constitutes the human genome. And it introduced the idea > that humans, of all creatures, could control nature, if not ourselves. We > are on the verge of the extinction of that idea. > > > EDWINA: Again, I disagree with your definition of 'civilization'. What led > to the development of agriculture, was an amenable ecology, where the local > 'flora and fauna' were able to be domesticated. Nothing to do with cities. > Agriculture doesn't require cities: you can have medium size populations > [in the hundreds, low thousand
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...
Jon, (et al.,) A bit of a tangent, but I would be interested in some elaboration on the problems you see with the behavioristic outlook. I will admit in advance that I will be looking towards any response with an eye towards whether the aspects objected to are things that I understand to be essential to behaviorism (as a philosophy of psychology), or if they are aspects I understand to be odd affections held by influential individuals in that field. Best, Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.” > | > | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3) > | > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio > n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/ > > | The object of reasoning is to find out, > | from the consideration of what we already know, > | something else which we do not know. > | > http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html > > If the object of an investigation is > to find out something we did not know > then the clues and evidence discovered > are the signs that determine that object. > > We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ... > but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ... > > People will continue to be confused about determination > so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the > behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and > sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language > biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination, > but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and > interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order. > A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about, > and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds > of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids, > stripes, or pockets. > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
Jerry, Clark, Thank you for the thoughtful replies. I have great love for Peirce and his work. But there are parts that I love less, particularly where Peirce ... seems to me to forget the parameters of his own argument. Peirce tells us what clear thinking is, while fully and responsibly acknowledging that most people do not think clearly most of the time. On that basis, if anyone thinks of anyone else's thoughts as entailing at all times the third degree of clarity, something is seriously amiss. Further, when Peirce elsewhere starts making broad pronouncements about "thought" it oftentimes seems that he is referring solely to those rare instances of clear thinking, but other times is referring to the typical thinking, or all thinking? The later is particularly suspicious. Assertions regarding the nature of *all* thinking would presumably be subject to extreme empirical scrutiny. As we have rejected traditional metaphysics, and denied any special powers of introspection, one would expect "thought" to be examined in the same way Peirce's exemplars, the early bench chemists, examined their subject matter. All the same challenges and limitations, and the same potential for novel triumph. Thus when Peirce talks about clear thinking he seems on steady ground, and when he talks about how a scientist-qua-scientists thinks about the world he seems on steady ground, but when there are no caveats regarding what "thinking" he is referring to, I get nervous. To Clark's question: While one could certainly find people who would find those assertions uncontroversial, there are problems. One can readily, for example, find individuals who (by all evidence) seem to think more readily and more commonly in words than in "images and diagrams". One can also find people with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) have lost their ability to coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot *do* language), and yet those people otherwise seem to think perfectly well. --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 3:24 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > Eric, list: > > > > Here is how I understand the nature of your thought: > > > > You consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, > you conceive the object of claiming about the nature of other people’s > thoughts to have. Then your conception of these effects, which makes you > raise your eyebrow and get twitchy, is the whole of your conception of the > object. > > > > And so, now what? What does the Jamesian maxim and not Peircean > recommend? > > > > For a Peircean would recognize that some “perversity of thought of whole > generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation”. > > ~*What Pragmatism Is * > > > > “Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of > demonstration are three: the subject, the attributes, and the basic > premisses. > > > > I say ‘must believe’, because *all syllogism*, and therefore a fortiori > demonstration, *is* *addressed* *not to the spoken word, but to the > discourse within the soul*, and though we can always raise objections to > the spoken word, to the inward discourse we cannot always object. > > > > That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof > is, if the pupil believes and accepts it, hypothesis, though only in a > limited sense hypothesis-that is, relatively to the pupil; if the pupil has > no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter, the same assumption is an > illegitimate postulate. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and > illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion, > demonstrable, but assumed and used without demonstration (*Post. An*. > I-10). > > > And therefore, “I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as > long as it is practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much > accuracy even indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any > other person, while it is far from certain that we can do so (and > accurately record what [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) > even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to > define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward > manifestations.” > > *~An Essay toward Reasoning in Security and Uberty* > > > That is, > > What is C? > > What is A? > > What is B? > > > > Hth, > > Jerry R > > On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> >> On Feb 14, 2017, at 8:41 AM, Eric Charles >> wrote: >> >> Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a >> separat
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a
separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the
nature of other people's thoughts?
"People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They
do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?
"Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied
altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness?
Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite
comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or
act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried.
Best,
Eric
---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps
On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 4:48 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Ben, list:
>
>
>
> You said,
>
> “Peirce recognized various senses of the word "syllogism." In a broader
> sense that he discussed, an abductive inference is a kind of syllogism. But
> usually by the unmodified term "syllogism" people have long meant a
> deductive categorical syllogism: major premiss, minor premiss, conclusion.”
>
>
>
> I know well from our previous discussions that you are cognizant that the
> usual meaning of the unmodified term “syllogism” can be inadequate.
>
>
>
> In dealing with syllogism in the Aristotelian sense, it is clear to me
> that Peirce was only doing what Aristotle recommended:
>
>
>
> “He may not indeed destroy the framework of the received legends-… but he
> ought to show of his own, and skillfully handle the traditional material.”
> ~Aristotle, *Poetics*
>
>
>
> In all our inquiry, what we seek is the middle term.
>
>
>
> In abduction (second figure), the middle term is C.
>
> In deduction (first figure), the middle term is A.
>
> In induction (third figure), the middle term is B.
>
>
>
> “It is a good enthymeme, not an enthymeme as such, which omits to
> formulate premises that the audience can supply for themselves...”
> ~Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion
>
>
>
> Hth,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 2:35 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
>> Jerry, we've been through this many times. The pragmatic maxim recommends
>> drawing a (pragmatically explicitative) consequent from an antecedent. The
>> CP 5.189 form of abductive inference portrays finding a (naturally simple)
>> antecedent ("A") for a consequent ("C"), going, thus, in the _*reverse*_
>> direction, hence Peirce for some time called it "retroduction."
>>
>> The pragmatic maxim says to look for conceivable practical implications.
>> Abductive inference involves looking for conceivable implicants, "impliers"
>> if you will, that one could also call practical I guess, anyway for example
>> ones that may conflict with each other as explanations, e.g., ideas of
>> various mechanisms, insofar as the ideas are new to the data and are not
>> already presented by the data. Conceivable practical antecedents, not
>> conceivable practical consequents. Then one looks to deduce, compute, etc.,
>> conceivable practical consequents _*of*_ the abduced conceivable
>> practical antecedent, towards possible tests of that antecedent (the
>> hypothetical explanation).
>>
>> Peirce recognized various senses of the word "syllogism." In a broader
>> sense that he discussed, an abductive inference is a kind of syllogism. But
>> usually by the unmodified term "syllogism" people have long meant a
>> deductive categorical syllogism: major premiss, minor premiss, conclusion.
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> On 2/12/2017 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>
>> Jerry - I'm sure you are joking. The format of a syllogism is:
>>
>> Major Premise
>> Minor Premise
>> Conclusion
>> ...with the additional format rules about 'universal', distribution,
>> negatives, etc etc..' Nothing to do with words per se.
>>
>> Words are meaningful, in my view, only in specific contexts; they gain
>> their meaning within the context...and the context operates within a format.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jerry Rhee
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky
>> *Cc:* John Collier ; Benjamin Udell
>> ; Peirce-L
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 12, 2017 2:02 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list:
>> When you say it's not the words but the format that counts; is that like
>> saying, it's not the argumentation but the argument that counts?
>>
>> For example, do you mean that it's CP 5.189 that counts and not C A B?
>> But what is CP 5.189 without C A B?
>> And what is C, A, B, without
>> syllogism, CP 5.189, growth of concrete reasonableness?
>> pragmatic maxim, CP 5.189, growth of concrete reasonableness?
>>
>> That is, if I were only to take you literally, then I could ask,
>>
>> *Among all words, is there a word?*
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry Rhee
>> p>On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 12:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky
>> wrote:
>>
>> Sorry, Jerry, I don't agree. It's not the words; it's the format that
>>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
gt; don't mean to deny her picture either. Nominalism and realism are pretty > general ideas that could get rooted in practice in disparate ways. > > I once read a web page where somebody argued that HTML markup that > complies with official, explicit HTML standards is right "by definition." > This was as if the standards themselves had not been devised according to > some more general and probably less definite idea of what standards should > be like and as if there could be no idea of HTML rightness that would > require the revision of the official, explicit standards promulgated on > individual dates in specific documents by the World Wide Web Consortium. > Now, for a while the Mozilla Firefox browser adhered to the standards in > certain cases where the standards were problematic. I don't think that the > Firefox designers denied the need for revised standards, based on a more > general idea of standards, but they didn't like the idea of rebellion by > browser designers (such rebellion does make it more difficult to design web > pages that work in all browsers). But they took this "letter of the law" > attitude to an extreme. (I'm thinking in particular of how Firefox treated > two or more directly successive hyphens in a hidden comment - IIRC, it > treated them as a hidden comment's closing tag (except the double hyphen in > the opening tag), whereas other browsers and most webpage designers treated > -->, a double hyphen followed directly by a greater-than sign, as the one > and only way to do a hidden comment's closing tag. For a while I found > myself deleting or replacing with equals-signs many strings of hyphens that > Joe Ransdell had placed between hidden-comment tags at Arisbe. Anyway, > Mozilla finally gave in and said something like "We don't have to change > our browser for this, but we will.") > > Best, Ben > > On 2/6/2017 9:58 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > > JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists > entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate > discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely > of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. > If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the > practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? > > Uh oh. > > I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list > discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just* > people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to > convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again > being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question > resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what > distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be > different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. > > - > > Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill > baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end > of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to > the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one > day while watching them. > > "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been > speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he > continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more > different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You > continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. > > "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or > generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking > up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with > each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes > points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any > two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind > bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is > collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is > *just* , he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and > doesn't correspond at all with reality." > > After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the > pickers. > > "... and?..." you ply. > > "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, > over there on the right, believes that only general
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Uh oh. I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just* people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. - Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one day while watching them. "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is *just*, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and doesn't correspond at all with reality." After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the pickers. "... and?..." you ply. "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago. Bill-on-the-left has the properties of being a singular thing, but the identity label itself is just convenient ways to refer to complex composite beings, and don't get at any sort of 'essence' at all. Those individual names are *just*, he insist, a weird linguistic device to facilitate discourse. Quite to the contrary, Jim would insist, if there is anything going on here that honest inquirers would agree about after the dust settles, it is that 'apples' were put in 'baskets', and that makes those generals real." "Huh," you insist, "that is all very fascinating, but I can detect no difference in their behavior that would correspond to such a dramatic seeming difference in thinking. Do they not both pick, and bucket, and deliver in the same manner? And wait in the same line, in the same way, to receive the same pay, with the same sullenness?" "Well yes," says the stranger, "but trust me, they are very, very different. As I said, one is a nominalist, and the other a realist in the pragmatic vein. Men with such contrasting sets of ideas couldn't be more different." "Huh," you repeat, "aside from the words and phrases they would invoke in a conversation about the specific topic you brought up, what conditions could we arrange so as to see the difference in belief manifest as clear differences in behavior? (Granting probability, and all that.) " "Well, you couldn't," says the stranger, "they are differences in belief, not differences in habit." "Ah," you reply confidently, "it is too bad your thinking is not as clear as mine. Belief is habit. As such, if there is no difference in habit between the two that would - granted probability, and all that - manifest itself under some arranged circumstances, then the two beliefs are equivalent, no matter what the words might mislead you into thinking. Thus, if you don't mind, I'll continue to think that the two people are very similar." Another long pause ensued, and the man offered, sounding less certain, "Well, I suppose they would relatively-reflexively complain differently,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
render moot, rather than have a side on. I note that while no one above has made quite so bold a statement, a few people seem to have chimed in to say that they think the distinction is of little importance. The best examples above evidencing a consequence of which side you fall on in the nominalist-realist debates are highly social examples, in which I suspect (as indicated in my reply to John) taking a side on the nominalist-realist debates is merely a smokescreen for forwarding pre-existing biases, with no logical connection to the intellectual distinction. Let us say, for example, that I believe "race" is a construct that is not "real" in any sense beyond a bunch of people happening to agree to treat people differently based on a hodge-podge of poorly correlated variables. I take it that makes me a "nominalist" with respect to race, and it is a good example, because I really do believe that. It does not follow from my thinking that racial labels are "just labels" that I think such labels have no affect, nor does it follow that I don't think other labels reflect real differences. It is primarily a statement that I am confident that the end-time-agreement will not include those particular labels, i.e., that when people come to think clearly about the issues and the dust settles from the investigations, the endeavor will be understood as vacuous. Meanwhile, I am a realist about all sorts of other things, including being an aggressive psychological realist (which I have tried not to bring out in response to some of the replies above, because I think it would be a distraction here). In that context, once you have Peirce's definition of "real", the only coherent thing the philosophical nominalist could be arguing is that there will be no end-time-agreement about what types of things are worth labeling or what any labels should be. Is that what is going on here? --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 1:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Eric, List: > > Responses inserted below. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 10:14 AM, Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jon, >> As I understand you, a nominalist would say that "possibilities" are not >> part of "real" and that "habit/law" is not part of "real". >> > > JAS: My understanding is that a nominalist would say that "possibilities" > and "habits/laws" are real *only *to the extent that they are > instantiated in *actual *things and events. Peirce would acknowledge > that they *exist *only to that extent, but that they are *real* in > themselves such that we can meaningfully refer to them as "may-bes" and > "would-bes," respectively. Remember, "real" here means "being what it is > regardless of how any person or finite group of people thinks about it" and > "the object of the final opinion, the consensus of an infinite community > after indefinite inquiry." > > >> Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled >> a deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 >> *chance* of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish? >> > > JAS: Probably not; but once you have finished shuffling the cards, there > is technically no *objective *chance involved at all; at that point, the > top card is in one of the four suits, but you simply do not know which > until you look at it. Arguably, there is no objective chance even *before > *you shuffle the cards, because the act of shuffling does not make the > arrangement of the cards *genuinely *random. It is an *epistemic *limitation > that makes it uncertain, rather than an *ontological *limitation. > > >> What if I told them it is likely organisms will exist in 2 million years >> with traits that do not exist today? >> >> What if I told them that, as a general rule, things that are heavier than >> the surrounding air sink towards the center of the earth when released? >> >> Or that, as a matter of habit, I put my right sock on before my left? >> >> I suspect that the nominalist would not be flustered by such claims, >> though they might caveat them in minor ways. >> >> If I am correct about that, then it is unclear to me what *actual* >> happening we could observe, under the circumstances of some to-be-arranged >> experiment, to distinguish which approach is correct. >> >> P.S. I an
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
John, That first bit - on *ontological misogyny*, etc. - is fascinating and clever! As a skewering of Quine et al, it seems to work well. However, for the purposes of this discussion, it might be a bit of a bait and switch. Let us assume our antagonist is a misogynist, and that he will set it upon himself to try to write women into a second-class status, no matter his starting point. Under such conditions, he may abuse the nominalist premises in exactly the ways so indicated. However, presumably he could abuse realist premises to serve the same argument, with similar effort. Women are, after all, as a "general" rule smaller than men, have poorer spatial orientation than men in landscape-sized tests, etc., etc. In both cases - constrained by either nominalist or realist logic - one could easily make similar arguments in service of misandry. Even when it comes down to nuts and bolts, I'm still confused about the critique of Quine & Co. Let it be that John has the idea that 'propositions" exist. Let it also be that Quine has the idea that "propositions" don't exist, but "sentences" exist, and sentences work in - exactly and completely, without remainder - all the ways that John thinks propositions work. In that case, doesn't Peirce come along, smack you both on the head, and point out that no matter how you want to phrase the terminology, you both have the same idea? --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 12:39 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > Eric and list, > > EC > >> My initial inclination is to say that everything you pointed to does >> seem important, but doesn't seem obviously to hinge on anything I can >> easily understand as a difference between nominalists and realists >> > > The simplest explanation I have ever read was by Alonzo Church -- > in a lecture to Quine's logic group at Harvard: > >http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm >The Ontological Status of Women and Abstract Entities > > This excerpt from Church’s 1958 lecture was preserved by Tyler Burge. > Cathy Legg posted it to her web site, from which I downloaded it. > (I really wish we had a YouTube of that lecture and the debates > between Church and Quine.) > > In my web page, I added URLs for a 1947 paper by Goodman and Quine > and a response by Church in 1951. > > For anyone who wants to see an important *practical* difference > between nominalism and realism, see the following excerpt from > Church's book, _The Calculi of Lambda Conversion_: > http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm > > Nominalists like Quine deny the distinction between essence and > accident in philosophy. In mathematics and computer science, they > extend their ideology to deny the distinction between intensions > and extensions. > > For a nominalist, a function or relation *is* a set of n-tuples. > For a realist, the _intension_ of a function or relation is a rule, > law, principle, or axiom. The _extension_ is the set of tuples > determined by that rule, law, principle, or axiom. > > Peirce would add *habit* to that list. A habit is an informal law > that could be made formal -- but only at the expense of losing its > flexibility (AKA vagueness). Peirce said that vagueness is essential > for mathematical discovery. George Polya did not cite Peirce in > his books, but he made that point very clear. > > Carnap was a nominalist who denied the reality of all value > judgments, including Truth. After talking with Tarski, he accepted > the notion of truth because it could be defined in terms of sets. > That led Carnap (1947) to define modal logic in terms of a set of > undefined things called possible worlds. > > Other nominalists, such as Kripke and Montague adopted Carnap's > method, but I believe that Michael Dunn's definition in terms > of laws (related to methods by Aristotle, Peirce, and Hintikka) > is more fundamental: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf > > Quine & Co. also deny the existence of propositions. They insist > on talking only about sentences. For a definition of proposition > that was inspired by Peirce, but stated in a way that a nominalist > could accept, see http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/proposit.pdf > > This article is a 5-page excerpt from a longer article that discusses > the philosophical issues: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf > > John > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a messag
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jon, As I understand you, a nominalist would say that "possibilities" are not part of "real" and that "habit/law" is not part of "real". Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled a deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 *chance* of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish? What if I told them it is likely organisms will exist in 2 million years with traits that do not exist today? What if I told them that, as a general rule, things that are heavier than the surrounding air sink towards the center of the earth when released? Or that, as a matter of habit, I put my right sock on before my left? I suspect that the nominalist would not be flustered by such claims, though they might caveat them in minor ways. If I am correct about that, then it is unclear to me what *actual* happening we could observe, under the circumstances of some to-be-arranged experiment, to distinguish which approach is correct. P.S. I anticipate you might accuse me of begging the question in that last part (by use of the italicized word), but I am inquiring nonetheless, as it seems a fair question for a pragmatist to ask. --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 3:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Edwina, List: > > Right--like I said, a general is a continuum with multiple different > instantiations, not a "thing" with multiple identical instantiations. A > general does not *exist *in space and time (2ns), but it is still *real *as > a range of possibilities (1ns) or a conditional necessity (3ns). In other > words, the *reality *of a quality (1ns) or a habit/law (3ns) is not > reducible to its *actual *occurrences (2ns); this is a key aspect of > Peirce's realism that a nominalist would dispute. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Jon - no, a commonality, i.e., a general, is not a 'thing' in itself >> that is 'identically' instantiated. First, as I said about 'this force', >> that it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and >> time; even if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in >> each rabbit. >> >> So, it can't be a 'thing' since it doesn't exist as itself in space and >> time. I myself have no problem with understanding it as a force or even >> 'will', since it does focus on the future. >> >> Second, of course, the instantiations are not identical; that's the power >> of semiosis, where Firstness functions to introduce novelty, and even, >> where 'the real' is networked with other organisms/realities and thus, is >> influenced by them. >> >> Jerry - my, I didn't know that you consider all biosemioticians to be >> nominalists. What's your evidence? Do you consider Jesper Hoffmeyer to be >> such? Kalevi Kull? My reading of their works denies this. They are strong >> Peirceans and focus on that level of non-individual general continuity. >> Your attempts to confine Peirce to your discipline of chemistry, I think, >> narrow his work. >> >> Edwina >> >> Edwina. >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky >> *Cc:* Eric Charles ; Peirce-L >> >> *Sent:* Sunday, January 29, 2017 2:57 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism >> >> Edwina, Eric, List: >> >> I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is >> about whether there is something *real *(hence "realism") that all >> rabbits have in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a >> *name >> *(hence "nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals simply >> because we happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. Even >> this way of putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, because it >> implies that the universal or general is a *thing *that is somehow >> *identically >> *instantiated in multiple *other *things. >> >> One of the aspects of Peirce's version of realism that I find especially >> attractive is that he instead conceived of the general as a *continuum*, >> such that its instantiations are not *identical*, even if they are only >> *infinitesimally >> *different. No matter how similar any two *actual *rabbits may seem to >> be, there is an inexhaustible range of *potential *rabbits that would be >> intermediate between them. &g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jon, With regards to the second point, on whether there might not be natural laws, I was thinking about things like "Order of nature", in which Peirce points out that: "If we could find out any general characteristic of the universe, any mannerism in the ways of Nature, any law everywhere applicable and universally valid, such a discovery would be of such singular assistance to us in all our future reasoning, that it would deserve a place almost at the head of the principles of logic. On the other hand, if it can be shown that there is nothing of the sort to find out, but that every discoverable regularity is of limited range, this again will be of logical importance." In the remainder of that essay, and elsewhere, Peirce seems clearly to believe that there *are *laws everywhere applicable and universally valid. However, he also seems unwilling to completely discount the possibility that when the indefinite community has conducted its infinite inquiry, it might be the case that every discoverable regularity *is*, in fact, of limited range. Now, one can, if one wants, define "laws of nature" as having whatever scope one wants, but my intended point was that Peirce allows that universal laws - laws of nature as classically conceived - might not exist. With regards to the first point, regarding "real", you might have me. However, I cannot be sure, because of my basic confusion regarding the distinction in question. Of what might our infinite inquirers reach agreement, which does not entail consequences? Peirce is (in no small part) trying to explicate the world as the scientist sees it, and so the agreement he is interested in is the agreement which results from inquiry, primarily experimental inquiry. That is, he is interested in the result of myriad investigations of the form "If I do X, to Y, what is the result?" As such, it would seem that being "real" and having "effects" are inseparable, because we cannot possibly reach agreement regarding things which do not have effects. We can get at the problem similarly by going back to Peirce's assertion that any two ideas with all the same consequences are the same idea. Let us posit something that has no effects detectable under any circumstances, call it "galblax". The concept of galblax that is real, and the concept of galblax that is not-real have exactly the same implications, and so any attempt to distinguishing the two concepts is incoherent. Only if the "stuff" in question has an effects, is it coherent to inquire about it, and only if we can follow the path of inquiry is it possible that a consensus be reached, which again connects "real" with "having effects". Note again that my intention is not to bring us into the weeds of the issues, but to try to understand what (people think) "nominalism" and "realism" mean in a pragmatist concept. Best, Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Eric, List: > > Actually, Peirce's definition of "real" was being such as it is regardless > of what any person or finite group of people thinks about it. Taken to the > third (pragmatic) grade of clarity, the "real" is that which *would *be > the object of the "final opinion"--the consensus of an indefinite community > after infinite inquiry. > > Where in Peirce's writings do you see him leaving open the possibility > that there might not be real laws of nature? The indispensable reality of > 3ns (abbreviation for Thirdness) was one of his bedrock principles, > although his fallibilism precluded him from holding it (or anything else) > to be *absolutely *certain. Maybe that is all you meant. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 3:58 PM, Eric Charles com> wrote: > >> Jon, >> Interesting! Dropping the answers in terms of the offending terms: >> >>- Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by >>humans? >> >> The pragmatist says "no", on account of that not being what the term >> "real" means. Real things are just those things that have effects, and >> effects are things that can, at least in principle, be detected/known. So a >> proper contemplation of what our terms mean (i.e., taking the time to get >> our ideas "clear") gives us the answer to that, without any need for >> metaphysical assertions. >> >>- Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and >>events? >> >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
ering the various sorts of facts of > great practical importance. In my own judgment, the last election cycle has > elevated this growing trend to a sort of tragic-comedy. For example, some > business leaders and politicians who have gained considerable power seem to > care little for inquiry concerning what is true. Rather, these figures seem > to be at the leading edge of what might be a larger shift in our cultural > priorities from an attentiveness to and care for such things as seeking the > truth about what justice requires in a world that is becoming more globally > connected, and about how we should respond to the best evidence we have > that burning fossil fuels is causing climate change, or how me could reduce > rather than increase the risk that aggressive actions in the international > realm might lead to the use of nuclear weapons, etc.--to more immediate > questions about how they can employ various means in the focused pursuit of > such goals as seeking more power, wealth and fame. Plato and Aristotle saw > these sorts of trends as harmful for the vitality of their classical Greek > culture. I believe that the growing prominence of these same sorts of > trends are equally harmful for the vitality of our own contemporary culture. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 6:19 PM > To: Eric Charles > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism > > Eric, List: > > Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. > > * Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by > humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. > * Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and > events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. > > In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that > some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/ > in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt p://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com<mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>> > wrote: > Oh hey, my first post to the list > > I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, > this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism > distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I > understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest > appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or > disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. > > With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the > nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The > best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that > I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic > privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it > make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a > collection, or just a collection of "reals"? > > I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at > explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue > is at argument here or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by > explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of > this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly > believe one way or the other?). > > Best, > Eric > > --- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jon, Interesting! Dropping the answers in terms of the offending terms: - Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans? The pragmatist says "no", on account of that not being what the term "real" means. Real things are just those things that have effects, and effects are things that can, at least in principle, be detected/known. So a proper contemplation of what our terms mean (i.e., taking the time to get our ideas "clear") gives us the answer to that, without any need for metaphysical assertions. - Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events? Well, Perice leaves open the possibility that there might not be. He implores us to latch onto any regularities we might think we see, and determine the scope of those regularities, for the value they provide, while leaving open the possibility that none might truly be "laws of nature" in the classic sense. So in this sense he is optimistic regarding the realist assertion that laws of nature exist and can be discovered, but is not asserting with certainty that the effort to find them will work out. Or so it seems to me.. Best, Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 8:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Eric, List: > > Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. > >- Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by >humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. >- Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and >events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. > > In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that > some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Oh hey, my first post to the list >> >> I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, >> this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism >> distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I >> understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest >> appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or >> disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. >> >> With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the >> nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The >> best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that >> I think people respond to things (without any *a priori* dualistic >> privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it >> make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a >> collection, or just a collection of "reals"? >> >> I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at >> explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue >> is at argument here or, if someone is feeling *even more* >> adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action >> which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I >> firmly believe one way or the other?). >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> --- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Supervisory Survey Statistician >> U.S. Marine Corps >> > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Oh hey, my first post to the list I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any *a priori* dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"? I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here or, if someone is feeling *even more* adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?). Best, Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
