Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: We were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may
use for testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1ns, 2ns,
or 3ns.


Again, according to Peirce, there are *ten different respects* by which a
sign can be classified as an instance of 1ns/2ns/3ns (or
possible/existent/necessitant). Again, none of them directly corresponds to
naming a monadic/dyadic/triadic relation.

JFS: The test is not a method of communication by means of sentences. It is
a method for determining the structure of a sign.


Here is your original claim (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00080.html).

JFS: And there are six kinds of reference that a sign may have to its
interpretants. Each kind corresponds to one of the six basic question words
... In short, that is the distinction between Peirce's 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What, When,
or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word How. And
the triadic relations of 3ns answer questions to the word Why.


This approach explicitly requires questions that start with specific words
to have answers that correspond to specific relational valencies. Setting
aside the fact that I have provided various counterexamples demonstrating
the absence of such a definitive alignment, dialogue (real or imagined) is
obviously essential to your proposed "test," although not necessarily
between two *different *people. "Moreover, signs require at least two
Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although
these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, they must
nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity
of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" (CP
4.551, 1906). "All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant
appeals to your deeper self for his assent" (CP 6.338, 1907).

As I pointed out in my initial reply, the external (dynamical or final)
interpretant of a sincere (not rhetorical) question is *not *the answer
given (actually or ideally) as another sign, but an interpreter's
*exertion *in giving that answer. Hence, the only interpretant that
*might *correspond
to the type of question being asked is the *immediate *interpretant.
However, we agree that for *who* and *what *questions, the initial word
functions as a *pronoun *denoting the blank in a rheme that the utterer is
asking the interpreter to fill. Similarly, *when*, *where*, *how*, or *why *at
the beginning of a question functions as a substitute for a *prepositional
phrase*--e.g., "on Valentine's Day," "in the eye," "by receiving it,"
"because a spark ignited it"--which Peirce likewise characterizes as
an *indexical
*sign (CP 2.290, EP 2:16, 1895). As such, the first word of a question is
always *designative *and thus belongs to its immediate *object*, not its
immediate *interpretant*.

Instead, I suggest that the logical relations represented by the syntax of
the relevant proposition as a general *type *(pure/continuous predicate),
along with the punctuation marks or voice inflections that are incorporated
into an individual *token *as qualitative *tones *to reflect the fact that
it is being posed as a question (not stated as an assertion), serve as the
immediate interpretant. After all, the intention of someone asking a
question is to obtain an answer, and "So far as the intention is betrayed
in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2).

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 9:31 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I completely agree with the following paragraph:
>
> JAS>  Put another way, a who or what question is often a *rheme*, such
> that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___
> retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his
> wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word
> that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of
> the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent.
>
> But your paragraph is a discussion of a dialog between two two persons:
>  an inquirer and an respondent.  One of them is uttering a sentence
> (complete or partial) and the other is interpreting it.
>
> But Helmut and I were not talking about a dialog between two people.  We
> were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for
> testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1-ness, 2-ness, or
> 3-ness.  Those are two totally different activities.  The test is not a
> method of communication by means of sentences.  It is a method for
> determining the structure of a sign.
>
> John
>

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, John, List,

 

The answer "A brooch" looks like a rheme, but as an answer it is a proposition, as "he gives her" is just omitted for the reason, that both know this opening. A triadic proposition, I think, if not already is an argument, at least involves a "because". For example if you say; "He gives her a brooch" involves, that he is able of giving something, because he has a brooch. "Egbert has a cat and a dog" involves, that the "and" can be said, because "a cat" has already been mentioned, so "a dog" can be added.


 

Best, Helmut

 

16. Februar 2024 um 03:47 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



John, List:
 

At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would not have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic.

 

If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the dyadic proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the triadic proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch.

 

Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent.

 

In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog retrieved the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He gave it to his wife."

 

A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye."

 

Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition.

 

Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition.

 


These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation.


 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa  wrote:



I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences.

 

JAS> 

        JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. 



JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made.




 

The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer.

 

By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic answer to a dyadic question.  That includes more information than was requested.  In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on question to get the reason why.

 

The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

I completely agree with the following paragraph:

JAS>  Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the 
answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" 
becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The 
man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, 
but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is 
supplied by the respondent.

But your paragraph is a discussion of a dialog between two two persons:  an 
inquirer and an respondent.  One of them is uttering a sentence (complete or 
partial) and the other is interpreting it.

But Helmut and I were not talking about a dialog between two people.  We were 
talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for testing 
a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1-ness, 2-ness, or 3-ness.  
Those are two totally different activities.  The test is not a method of 
communication by means of sentences.  It is a method for determining the 
structure of a sign.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 2/15/24 9:47 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, 
What, When, Where, How, and Why)

John, List:

At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I 
think that Peirce would not have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns 
by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why 
questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic.

If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a 
logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, 
you are asserting the dyadic proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I 
ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a 
logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, 
you are asserting the triadic proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch.

Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer 
fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" 
becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The 
man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, 
but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is 
supplied by the respondent.

In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or 
triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog retrieved the 
book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He gave it to his wife."

A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the 
man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is 
only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what 
today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, 
"Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this 
just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to 
"The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye."

Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" 
and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously 
asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate 
Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are 
obviously asserting a triadic proposition.

Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you 
shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a 
monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and 
you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously 
asserting a dyadic proposition.

These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural 
languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from 
someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the 
context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human 
semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic 
conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, 
namely, quality/reaction/mediation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
I have to shovel snow right now, but I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing
why I think that Peirce would *not *have agreed with distinguishing 1ns,
2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how,
and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic.

If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from
a *logical
*standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a *monadic *relation,
you are asserting the *dyadic *proposition that your dog retrieved the
book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A
brooch," then from a *logical *standpoint, you are not merely uttering the
name of a *monadic *relation, you are asserting the *triadic *proposition
that the man gave his wife a brooch.

Put another way, a who or what question is often a *rheme*, such that the
answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the
book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___"
becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that
begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the
inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent.

In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or
triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog *retrieved *the
book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He *gave *it to his wife."

A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did
the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day,"
this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February
14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here.
If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the
eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit
the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye."

Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are
you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are
obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man
celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch,"
then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition.

Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are
you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously
asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a
brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are
obviously asserting a dyadic proposition.

These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of
natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted
from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the
context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of
human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own
paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in
phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two
> sentences.
>
> JAS>
> JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to
> her.
>
> JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer
> (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the
> transfer was made.
>
>
> The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own
> admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your
> criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a
> completely different question that would require a completely different
> answer.
>
> By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic
> answer to a dyadic question.  That includes more information than was
> requested.  In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated
> less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on
> question to get the reason why.
>
> The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested
> information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a
> why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[John F Sowa]

I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences.

JAS>
JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.
JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer 
to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was 
made.

The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, 
the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why 
did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different 
question that would require a completely different answer.

By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic answer 
to a dyadic question.  That includes more information than was requested.  In 
the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated less information, 
and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on question to get the 
reason why.

The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested 
information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a 
why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 2/15/24 2:56 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, 
What, When, Where, How, and Why)

John, List:

It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced 
below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only Gary 
as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious 
interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider replying 
to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best of it and move 
on.

I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest opinion, 
and my preceding claim was not mistaken.

JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer to 
a question that begins with the word "Why"?

JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.

JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer 
to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was 
made.

The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, 
the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why 
did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different 
question that would require a completely different answer.

JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question 
that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of 3ns?

JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it.

JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred, but 
it does not say why.

The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only stipulation; 
and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a genuine example of 
3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might ask additional questions 
that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is irrelevant.

Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is red. 
This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion.

Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely on 
the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why 
questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious misunderstanding 
of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you reiterated for the 
umpteenth time in another thread late last night ...

JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to be 
careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other than an 
exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her 
ideas are what Peirce intended.

Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would have 
agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be explained as 
the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let alone that he would 
have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it unobjectionable for me to 
say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination 
for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have 
been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested my 
solution"? (For the record, I would never actually say such a thing--we should 
not ascribe sentiments to him without exact quotations, any more than 
intentions.)

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
Jon, List,

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my 
previous note (co

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[John F Sowa]

Jerry, Jon, List,

Helmut had an excellent suggestion:  Every why-question can be answered with a 
because-answer.  Therefore, every instance of Thirdness can be explained in 
sentence that contains the word 'because'. See my comments below and Helmut's 
original note below that.

If you find my original explanation hard to understand, you might find Helmut's 
point easier to accept.  But either explanation is based on the fact that in 
any instance of Thirdness, the third item C is the reason or intention or goal 
or purpose that explains the dyadic relationship between A and B.

Again, I repeat:   I cannot say for certain that Peirce would be delighted with 
this explanation, but he was always looking for simpler and more convincing 
ways of explaining his basic principles.

That is the primary reason why he found Lady Welby's correspondence so 
important:  She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand.  
Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for 
his abstract ideas.  That is the primary difference between his 
Kantian-influenced phenomenology and his later, more concrete phaneroscopy.

There is more to say about these issues.  In particular, the emphasis on the 
explanatory role of C is critical for analyzing Peirce's writings in his last 
decade.

John


From: "John F Sowa" 

Helmut,

Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'.   That's another way to explain the 
3-way connection that answers a why-question,  In general, every instance of 
thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is 
related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed 
to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, 
 Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers.

For your question:  The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be 
reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram.   To avoid going to 
my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil 
and paper

First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D.

Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections.  Start by 
drawing two dots:  Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on 
the right to C and D.  You now have two two-way connections.

Now draw a line that connects both of the dots.  As a result, the left dot has 
three connections:  A, B, and the dot on the right.  And the dot on the right 
also has three connections:  C, D, and the dot on the left.

You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and 
E to a middle dot that has three connections:  the first to the A, B pair, the 
second to the C, D pair, and the third to E.

For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F,

For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections.  Use the 
procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections.  
Then keep going for as many connections as you need.

John
_

From: "Helmut Raulien" 
John, List,

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being 
the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". 
Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, 
just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer 
can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, 
subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It 
only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, 
because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors 
to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, 
rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three.

BTW, I have two questions:

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is 
irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

Best, helmut
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) are discovered in the
primal positive science of phaneroscopy (quality/reaction/mediation) and
diagrammatized in the hypothetical science of mathematics
(monadic/dyadic/triadic relations).

I do not know whether anyone has posted a mathematical proof of Peirce's
reduction thesis on the Internet. Robert Burch wrote an entire book to
present his (
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Peircean_Reduction_Thesis.html?id=MK-EIAAJ)
and provides a very brief summary in his SEP entry about Peirce (
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#red), while Sergiy
Koshkin purports to demonstrate it even more rigorously in a recent paper (
https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/article/886447). Personally, I find Peirce's own
diagrammatic demonstration to be simple and persuasive enough--relations of
any adicity can be built up of triads, but triads cannot be built up of
monads or dyads despite involving them (EP 2:364, 1905).

[image: image.png]

I likewise noticed that the Commens website (http://www.commens.org/) was
down for a while, so I was using the 12/31/23 Internet Archive version (
https://web.archive.org/web/20231231054741/http://www.commens.org/), but it
came back up a couple of days ago.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 1:37 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again!
> John, List,
> The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself
> being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just
> say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am".
> Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something
> (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the
> secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of
> inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness
> can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two
> sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean
> categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three.
> BTW, I have two questions:
>
> -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad
> is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?
>
> -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong
> with my computer, or with the website?
>
> Best, helmut
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[John F Sowa]

Helmut,

Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'.   That's another way to explain the 
3-way connection that answers a why-question,  In general, every instance of 
thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is 
related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed 
to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, 
 Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers.

For your question:  The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be 
reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram.   To avoid going to 
my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil 
and paper

First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D.

Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections.  Start by 
drawing two dots:  Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on 
the right to C and D.  You now have two two-way connections.

Now draw a line that connects both of the dots.  As a result, the left dot has 
three connections:  A, B, and the dot on the right.  And the dot on the right 
also has three connections:  C, D, and the dot on the left.

You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and 
E to a middle dot that has three connections:  the first to the A, B pair, the 
second to the C, D pair, and the third to E.

For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F,

For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections.  Use the 
procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections.  
Then keep going for as many connections as you need.

John

From: "Helmut Raulien" 
Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again!
John, List,

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being 
the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". 
Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, 
just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer 
can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, 
subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It 
only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, 
because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors 
to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, 
rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three.

BTW, I have two questions:

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is 
irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

-I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with 
my computer, or with the website?

Best, helmut
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon

> On Feb 14, 2024, at 12:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> There are indeed six classes of signs according to their dyadic relations 
> with their two external interpretants (immediate is internal), but they have 
> nothing to do with "the six basic question words.”

Thanks for pointing back to the metaphysics of Peircian categories!  I re-read 
this text for the first time in at least two decades and now find it to be 
profound.  

Because, if you read this text from the modern views of categorical logics, it 
clarifies the semantic of his materially oriented metaphysical conjectures as 
sources of the syntactical elements of logic.  Profound indeed.
I will have more to say about this later, perhaps even attempt to address 
Edwinia tensions with her internal conundrums with her concepts of semiosis!  
:-)

WRT John Sowa’s argument asserting some formal? connnections between the 
interrogatives and the Peircian metaphysics, I would make a much stronger 
argument.  

That is, a logician would be hard put to relate CSP’s concept of Being in the 
sense of his categories/ relations/ correlations with these six interrogatives. 
Formally, both classical logics as well as modal logics are difficult if not 
impossible to assert the format of representations of truth consequences 
implied by Peircian categories. I would invite our meta-physicians to take a 
serious look at the tensions implicit in John’s Sowa’s assertions. 

BTW, Edwinia, I am curious if you have a rationalization for QM that coheres 
with CSP’s categories?

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced
below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only
Gary as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious
interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider
replying to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best
of it and move on.

I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest
opinion, and my preceding claim was *not *mistaken.

JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer
to a question that begins with the word "Why"?

JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.

JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer
(answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the
transfer was made.


The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own
admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your
criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a
completely different question that would require a completely different
answer.

JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a
question that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of
3ns?


JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it.

JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred,
but it does not say why.


The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only
stipulation; and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a
genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might
ask *additional
*questions that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is
irrelevant.

Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is
red. This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your
criterion.

Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely
on the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why
questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious
misunderstanding of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you
reiterated for the umpteenth time in another thread late last night ...

JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to
be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other
than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that
his or her ideas are what Peirce intended.


Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would
have agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be
explained as the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let
alone that he would have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it
unobjectionable for me to say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the
logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign
classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby
or some other correspondent had suggested my solution"? (For the record, I
would never actually say such a thing--we should not ascribe sentiments to
him without exact quotations, any more than intentions.)

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for
> my previous note (copied at the end).
>
> But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted
> as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".
>
> I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is
> an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my
> previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in
> order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some
> sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look
> beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to
> indicate.
>
> If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example
> of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found
> in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a
> why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or
> implicit.
>
> And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for
> clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim
> that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I
> believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating *MY
> OPINION* about his reaction.
>
> And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a
> competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank
> them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my
> mistake below:
>
> JFS> Can 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again!

 



John, List,

 

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions:

 

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

 

-I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website?

 

Best, helmut

 

 
 

15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 



Jon, List,

 

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end).

 

But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".

 

I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. 

 

If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. 

 

And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction.

 

And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below:

 

JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'?


 

JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"


 

Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never appropriate.  And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim:

 

JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. 

 

John

 

 


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

 


Gary:
 

As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar.

 

JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all.

 




JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.




 

Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves.

 




JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.




JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test.



 

I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

 

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions:

 

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

 

-I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website?

 

Best, helmut

 

 
 

15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 



Jon, List,

 

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end).

 

But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".

 

I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. 

 

If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. 

 

And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction.

 

And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below:

 

JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'?


 

JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"


 

Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never appropriate.  And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim:

 

JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. 

 

John

 

 


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

 


Gary:
 

As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar.

 

JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all.

 




JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.




 

Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves.

 




JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.




JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test.



 

I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[John F Sowa]

Jon, List,

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my 
previous note (copied at the end).

But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as 
an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".

I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an 
example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous 
notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in order to show an 
example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely 
words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the 
examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate.

If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of 
Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a 
sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a 
why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit.

And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for clear 
criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim that he 
would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe".  I 
was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating MY OPINION about his 
reaction.

And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a 
competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them 
for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below:

JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the 
answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody 
find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question 
that begins with the word 'Why'?

JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, 
"Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the 
word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"

Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But insults 
are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right to state your 
opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never appropriate.  And by the way, 
you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim:

JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my 
counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Gary:

As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my 
recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative 
grammar.

JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to 
me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with 
his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be 
interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might 
eventually send it to the List after all.

JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be 
explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.

Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily 
see that for themselves.

JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been 
delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.

JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 
'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that 
connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that 
simple test.

I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or 
anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious 
misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. So much for not 
putting words in his mouth, claiming to know what he intended, or (in this 
case) attributing specific sentiments to him without exact quotations. Just 
imagine how JFS would have reacted if I had said in my post, "I realize that 
Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten 
trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been 
delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested this 
solution."

JAS: On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns, 
because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between its 
object and its interpretant.

JFS: That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of answers.

Exactly--there is no distinction between the three kinds of answers that 
corresponds to Peirce's three categories. All signs, including every answer to 
every question, are examples of 3ns. Qualities and reactions are examples of 
1ns and 2ns, respectively, not any answers to any questions.

JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness 

[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

JFS: And there are six kinds of reference that a sign my have to its
interpretants.


Although Peirce discusses "reference to an interpretant" in his
groundbreaking early paper, "On a New List of Categories" (CP 1.553-559, EP
1:5-10, 1868), as far as I can tell, he *never *uses that phrase in any
subsequent writings, including the extensive late texts about semeiotic.
Instead, he consistently affirms that a sign *denotes *(refers to) its
object and *signifies *its interpretant.

There are indeed six classes of signs according to their dyadic relations
with their two external interpretants (immediate is internal), but they
have nothing to do with "the six basic question words." Instead, the
division according to "the Nature of the Influence of the Sign"--i.e., its
relation to its final interpretant (S-FI)--is rheme/dicent/argument, later
generalized to seme/pheme/delome (CP 8.373, EP 2:490, 1908 Dec 25); and the
one according to "the Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant" (S-DI)
is suggestive/imperative/indicative (CP 8.371, EP 2:490), based on whether
the sign is presented/urged/submitted.

CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic
interpretant in three ways:
1st, an argument only may be *submitted *to its interpretant, as something
the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged.
2nd, an argument or dicent may be *urged *upon the interpretant by an act
of insistence.
3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the
interpretant for *contemplation*. (CP 8.338, 1904 Oct 12)


In other words, the logical order of determination for these two
trichotomies in sign classification is S-FI then S-DI, resulting in six
classes--presented rheme (suggestive seme), presented dicent (suggestive
pheme), presented argument (suggestive delome), urged dicent (imperative
pheme), urged argument (imperative delome), and submitted argument
(indicative delome).

Incidentally, this is another reason why I argue that the logical (not
temporal or causal) order of determination for the three interpretant
trichotomies in sign classification (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23) is final
(destinate), then dynamical (effective), then immediate (explicit)--since
we know for sure that S-FI comes before S-DI, it makes sense that FI
likewise comes before DI. I already made my case in another thread that DI
must come before II (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00061.html), so the
resulting sequence conforms to the principle that the genuine correlate
(FI) logically determines the degenerate correlate (DI), which logically
determines the doubly degenerate correlate (II). If we add the principle
that trichotomies for relations always come *after *the trichotomies for
the correlates that they involve, then we obtain the following logical
order of determination for all ten trichotomies in Peirce's late taxonomies
(CP 8.343-345, EP 2:482-483, 1908 Dec 24).

   1. DO - Nature or Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object
   (abstractive/concretive/collective)
   2. IO - Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object
   (descriptive/desginative/copulative)
   3. S - Mode of Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign (tone/token/type)
   4. DO-S - Dyadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object
   (icon/index/symbol)
   5. FI - Purpose of the Final Interpretant (gratific/actuous/temperative
   for producing feeling/action/self-control)
   6. DI - Nature or Mode of Being of the Dynamical Interpretant
   (sympathetic/percussive/usual for feeling/exertion/sign)
   7. II - Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant
   (hypothetic/categorical/relative)
   8. S-FI - Nature of the Influence of the Sign (seme/pheme/delome
   generalizing rheme/dicent/argument)
   9. S-DI - Manner of Appeal to the Dynamical Interpretant
   (suggestive/imperative/indicative for presented/urged/submitted)
   10. DO-S-FI - Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance
   (abducent/inducent/deducent for instinct/experience/form)

Note that none of these explicitly divides signs according to whether they
denote monadic/dyadic/triadic relations. On the other hand, the
paradigmatic cases of these are quality/reaction/mediation, and *all *the
trichotomies are divisions into those three phaneroscopic categories
(1ns/2ns/3ns), or rather the corresponding universes
(possibles/existents/necessitants; EP 2:478-479, 1908 Dec 23).

JFS: The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What,
When, or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word
How. And the triadic relations of 3ns answer questions to the word Why. In
summary, all examples of 3ns are answers to Why-questions.


On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns,
because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between
its object and its interpretant. Moreover, any answer to a
who/what/when/where question can be analyzed as an implied proposition that
includes a dyadic or triadic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, List,

I am not denying the fact that interpretants, as defined by Peirce, exist, and 
I am not denying that Peirce's 3-way distinction is good.

But you said that you had not studied the kinds of details that the linguists 
observe and specify.

My claim is that any theory that does not dig deeply into those details is 
useless.   And by "those", I mean every kind of detail that is studied and 
analyzed by EVERY ONE of the cognitive sciences:  philosophy, psychology, 
linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.

Any serious theory of interpretants must include ALL POSSIBLE INFLUENCES from 
any and every branch of cognitive science.  The kind of generic theory that 
Peirce attempted is too weak to make any specific predictions in any particular 
case.

I believe that Lady Welby had a good intuitive sense of the need for 
considering every possible influence, but she did not have the formal training 
in math & logic that Peirce had.  If you examine the development of Peirce's 
ideas in the decade after he began their correspondence (from 1903 to the end), 
you can see how Peirce was moving away from more abstract universal definitions 
to a more concrete focus on details.

The first step was a move from a phenomenology based on Kant's abstractions to 
a phaneroscopy that paid more attention to Welby's focus on concrete details.  
But that shift made the task far more complex.  It's essential to focus on the 
concrete details of every method of observation.

That is why Peirce was groping.  He could no longer make broad generalizations, 
and every attempt to state a generalization forced him to consider how it would 
affect every detail of every branch,

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John, list

I continue to  either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I 
should use - to your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply don’t 
see how the semiosic process can function - and it IS a function - without the 
necessary role of the Interpretants. How can you have a semiosic triadic 
function without the third relation - the relation that provides meaning to the 
original stimulus?  That third relation, the meaning[s] is provided by the 
Interpretant Relations.  And I emphasize the plural ecrus the simple one-node 
site [ the single interpretant or signified] such as is found in Saussure or 
….is simply not enough to explain the complexity of the development of 
information.

If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number of 
different ‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones of semiotic 
processes.

The first cut’ so to speak, is simple:  ontological - the separation of 
external and internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg 
Cut and the Concept of Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified Theory of 
Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ; 125-147.
Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ]

This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the 
representamen from the external world - as Peirce has written, such that the 
Immediate Object and the Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this 
‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant and Final Interpretant 
are external.

Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex as 
one that is externalized.
But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs 
[which are hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three 
Interpretant Relations] that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be in 
any of the three categories - as related to the other Relations in the semiotic 
triad.

The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and 
inserts a ‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and moves 
it into common observance. This is the basis of most of our interactions with 
the world.  BUT - medically, psychologically, and informationally- this 
external meaning is intimately connected to the data produced within the 
internal Immediate Interpretant. After all- the Dynamic relies for its ‘base’ 
on that Immediate input.

And the final - as I’ve said before …brings in communal values and habit 
generation.

That is- there are obviously THREE sites/nodes where information is processed, 
from the internal and possibly isolate form, to the externally reactive and 
available-to-others …to the development of habits of dealing with this original 
input data. Information development requires this complexity.

My point is that all three developments from the original object-input are 
vital aspects of the path of informational development, where data moves into 
information within both the individual and the community.

Again - I am either misunderstanding your point or being dumb..… but I consider 
the three - ie- all three - Interpretants to be vital in the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I continue to  either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I 
should use - to your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply don’t 
see how the semiosic process can function - and it IS a function - without the 
necessary role of the Interpretants. How can you have a semiosic triadic 
function without the third relation - the relation that provides meaning to the 
original stimulus?  That third relation, the meaning[s] is provided by the 
Interpretant Relations.  And I emphasize the plural ecrus the simple one-node 
site [ the single interpretant or signified] such as is found in Saussure or 
….is simply not enough to explain the complexity of the development of 
information. 

If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number of 
different ‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones of semiotic 
processes.

The first cut’ so to speak, is simple:  ontological - the separation of 
external and internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg 
Cut and the Concept of Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified Theory of 
Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ; 125-147.
Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ]

This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the 
representamen from the external world - as Peirce has written, such that the 
Immediate Object and the Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this 
‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant and Final Interpretant 
are external. 

Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex as 
one that is externalized. 
But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs 
[which are hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three 
Interpretant Relations] that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be in 
any of the three categories - as related to the other Relations in the semiotic 
triad.  

The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and 
inserts a ‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and moves 
it into common observance. This is the basis of most of our interactions with 
the world.  BUT - medically, psychologically, and informationally- this 
external meaning is intimately connected to the data produced within the 
internal Immediate Interpretant. After all- the Dynamic relies for its ‘base’ 
on that Immediate input.

And the final - as I’ve said before …brings in communal values and habit 
generation.  

That is- there are obviously THREE sites/nodes where information is processed, 
from the internal and possibly isolate form, to the externally reactive and 
available-to-others …to the development of habits of dealing with this original 
input data. Information development requires this complexity. 

My point is that all three developments from the original object-input are 
vital aspects of the path of informational development, where data moves into 
information within both the individual and the community. 

Again - I am either misunderstanding your point or being dumb..… but I consider 
the three - ie- all three - Interpretants to be vital in the generation of all 
matter and life. How else is a community to interact with each other, without 
the observation of the constantly produced  Dynamic Interpretants? How else are 
habits to develop within this community except by the absorption of these 
Dynamic Interpretants within the Final Interpretant?

Edwina



> On Feb 9, 2024, at 1:46 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> As a logician and mathematician, Peirce understood the methods of precise 
> reasoning in lengthy deductions.  But as a linguist and engineer, he also 
> understood the issues of continuity or synechism.
> 
> In ordinary language, every word has a broad range of meanings.  The senses 
> listed in a dictionary are a small finite set of the the continuum.  Peirce 
> understood that very well in his work for the Century dictionary and 
> Baldwin's dictionary.  
> 
> I have quoted and cited professional lexicographers, who admit "I don't 
> believe in word senses."  Lady Welby said something very  similar, and Peirce 
> agreed.
> 
> You don't need to know or apply any linguistic theory to realize that the 
> issues are so complex that trying to build a theory on top of Peirce's three 
> words is extremely difficult.   As Short said, Peirce was "groping". 
> 
> I'm not saying that Peirce's writings on the subject are wrong.  But I am 
> claiming that if Peirce himself couldn't develop a solid coherent theory, I 
> don't trust anybody else's attempts.
> 
> Question:  Can anybody find a practical version of interpretant theory that 
> is written for anybody other than Peirce scholars?   In short, can it be used 
> for any practical purpose?   What kind of applications would be possible? 
> 
> I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done 
> 

[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, List,

As a logician and mathematician, Peirce understood the methods of precise 
reasoning in lengthy deductions.  But as a linguist and engineer, he also 
understood the issues of continuity or synechism.

In ordinary language, every word has a broad range of meanings.  The senses 
listed in a dictionary are a small finite set of the the continuum.  Peirce 
understood that very well in his work for the Century dictionary and Baldwin's 
dictionary.

I have quoted and cited professional lexicographers, who admit "I don't believe 
in word senses."  Lady Welby said something very  similar, and Peirce agreed.

You don't need to know or apply any linguistic theory to realize that the 
issues are so complex that trying to build a theory on top of Peirce's three 
words is extremely difficult.   As Short said, Peirce was "groping".

I'm not saying that Peirce's writings on the subject are wrong.  But I am 
claiming that if Peirce himself couldn't develop a solid coherent theory, I 
don't trust anybody else's attempts.

Question:  Can anybody find a practical version of interpretant theory that is 
written for anybody other than Peirce scholars?   In short, can it be used for 
any practical purpose?   What kind of applications would be possible?

I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done 
as well or better without a theory of interpretants.  I have written a lot 
about applications of Peirce's theories in computer science, computational 
linguistics, and artificial intelligence.  But I have never found a use for 
interpretants.  Many other authors have found important applications of 
Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their publications.  But I have 
never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants.  Can anybody find any published 
examples?  By anybody for any practical purpose?

That reminds me of the parody:  "This theory is so perfectly general that no 
practical application is possible".

John


,From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John

I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
interpretants.

The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the 
Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge 
base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If he doesn’t 
share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is quite 
different from the utterer’s intended meaning.

We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
intonation …

I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants.

My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop a 
thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
behaviour will be common to all members of the local species.

As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes.

Edwina
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

John

I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
interpretants. 

The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the 
Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge 
base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If he doesn’t 
share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is quite 
different from the utterer’s intended meaning. 

We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
intonation …

I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. 

My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop a 
thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. 

As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes. 

Edwina

> On Feb 8, 2024, at 6:21 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I was just copying what Short said.  If you don't have it, I'll send you the 
> PDF of his entire book.
> 
> All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of 
> interpretants.  I don't deny that.  But there is no information about how 
> anybody can determine how the utterer can express the content of the phaneron 
> as a linguistic sign, and how the listener can interpret the uttered sign.  
> The critical issue for both of them is the context which may be much more 
> difficult to determine than the words in the utterance.
> 
> In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, 
> "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis".   You don't have to 
> read the whole thing because the early examples show why context is so 
> overwhelmingly important in determining the interpretant.  Just look  below 
> for an example from page 9 of 
> 
>  
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effects_in_intelligence_analysis_How_can_mathematics_help
> 
> Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about 
> determining the interpretant.  And examples like that can be repeated 
> endlessly.   Devlin's article is one source, but any detailed analysis of 
> language in context will turn up endless numbers of examples.
> 
> John
> __
>  
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" " style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(0, 102, 
> 147); text-decoration: underline; user-select: 
> auto;"> 
> 
> John, list
> 
> I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the 
> interpretants’. I find his outlines clear and coherent  and are all through 
> his writings- in that it is logical and obvious that the triad includes not 
> merely a single interpretant but several - and these several are basic and 
> functional.  That is- the notion of not merely one but three Interpretants 
> is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis
> _
> 
> Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" 
> by Keith Devlin.  The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD.  And the 
> context is in italics.   Without the context, it's impossible to determine 
> the interpretant of the sentence.
> 
> HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
> being picked up.
> 
> This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the
> nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a 
> parking
> meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he has always had to be
> picked up to reach that 

[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[John F Sowa]

Edwina,

I was just copying what Short said.  If you don't have it, I'll send you the 
PDF of his entire book.

All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of 
interpretants.  I don't deny that.  But there is no information about how 
anybody can determine how the utterer can express the content of the phaneron 
as a linguistic sign, and how the listener can interpret the uttered sign.  The 
critical issue for both of them is the context which may be much more difficult 
to determine than the words in the utterance.

In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, 
"Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis".   You don't have to 
read the whole thing because the early examples show why context is so 
overwhelmingly important in determining the interpretant.  Just look  below for 
an example from page 9 of 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effects_in_intelligence_analysis_How_can_mathematics_help

Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about determining 
the interpretant.  And examples like that can be repeated endlessly.   Devlin's 
article is one source, but any detailed analysis of language in context will 
turn up endless numbers of examples.

John
__

From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John, list

I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the 
interpretants’. I find his outlines clear and coherent  and are all through his 
writings- in that it is logical and obvious that the triad includes not merely 
a single interpretant but several - and these several are basic and functional. 
 That is- the notion of not merely one but three Interpretants is, I feel, 
basic to the Peircena semiosis
_

Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" 
by Keith Devlin.  The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD.  And the 
context is in italics.   Without the context, it's impossible to determine the 
interpretant of the sentence.

HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
being picked up.

This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the
nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a parking
meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he has always had to be
picked up to reach that high.

WIFE: Did you take him to the record store?

Since he put a penny in a meter that means that you stopped while he was with
you. I know that you stopped at the record store either on the way to get him or
on the way back. Was it on the way back, so that he was with you or did you stop
there on the way to get him and somewhere else on the way back.

HUSBAND: No, to the shoe repair shop.

No, I stopped at the record store on the way to get him and stopped at the shoe
repair shop on the way home when he was with me.

WIFE: What for?

I know of one reason why you might have stopped at the shoe repair shop. Why did
you in fact?

HUSBAND: I got some new shoe laces for my shoes.

As you will remember I broke a shoe lace on one of my brown Oxfords the other
day so I stopped to get some new laces.

WIFE: Your loafers need new heels badly.

Something else you could have gotten that I was thinking of. You could have 
taken
in your black loafers which need heels badly. You’d better get them taken care 
of
pretty soon.

A number of things are obvious about this particular exercise. First, the 
original
conversation is remarkably everyday and mundane, and concerns an extremely
restricted domain of family activity. Second, the degree of detail given in the 
subsequent
‘explanations’ or ‘elaborations’ of what each person said seems quite arbitrary.
It is easy to imagine repeating the exercise over again, this time providing 
still further
explanation. And then it could be repeated a third time. Then a fourth. And so 
on,
and so on, and so on. Apart from boredom or frustration, there does not seem to 
be
any obvious stopping point.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Michael, List:

Thanks for the confirmation. Unfortunately, although I acknowledge again my
relative ignorance about linguistics as a *special *science, unless I am
badly misunderstanding what that online chapter outlines, there are some
major discrepancies with Peirce's semeiotic as a *normative *science.

MS: Corresponding to Peirce’s fundamental tripartition into Sign, Object,
and interpretant, all linguistic entities are *signa *(signs) comprised by
(1) a material or perceptible *signans*, (2) an intelligible or
translatable *signatum*, and (3) an *interpretant *(rule) governing the
relation between signans and signatum. ... The interpretant has no material
or perceptible shape of its own apart from the signans to which it stands
as its evaluative correlate vis-à-vis the conjugate signatum. The absence
of corporality in an interpretant of a linguistic sign is totally expected,
since *all *interpretants, qua values, inhere totally in the conceptual
side of phenomena ...
In exactly the same way that signification results from the patterned
conjunction of signata and signantia via the mediation of the all-important
Third, the interpretant, so all of linguistic content is rendered manifest
in the structure of language by series of interpretants that have the form
‘If content A, then expression B.’


These excerpts seem to be saying that (1) a linguistic sign is *comprised *of
a sign token (signans), its object (signatum), and its interpretant; (2) an
interpretant of a linguistic sign is *never *a physical manifestation,
*always* a strictly conceptual phenomenon; and (3) the *interpretant *mediates
between the sign token and its object. By contrast, Peirce explicitly and
consistently maintains instead that (1) a sign, whether linguistic or
otherwise, is one *correlate *of a genuine triadic relation, whose other
two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant; (2) an interpretant
can be *either* another sign, a physical event, or a qualitative feeling;
and (3) the *sign *mediates between its object and its interpretant. For
example ...

CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
(CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)

CSP: I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the
Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a
Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536, 1906)


CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the
interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates
of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign.(EP
2:410, 1907)


Accordingly, if it is true that "Markedness in language is the epitome of
the relationship between sign and object" (post quoted below), then it is
false that "markedness and interpretant are synonymous where the structure
of the linguistic sign is concerned" (linked online chapter). Instead, I
suggest that markedness corresponds to the fact that every linguistic sign
is a *symbol *(vs. index or icon) and thus "refers to the Object that it
denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which
operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object"
(CP 2.249, EP 2:292, 1903). This rule or law *itself *is not the symbol's
interpretant--it describes the habit by means of which the symbol *determines
*its interpretant, which is its *effect *on an interpreter.

Regards,

Jon

On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:49 PM Michael Shapiro  wrote:

> Yes, it does, Jon.
>
> M.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 2:04 PM
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>
>
> Michael, List:
>
> I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online
> chapter from your 1983 book, *The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic*,
> is still a good summary of your relevant views.
>
> https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 12:43 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F Sowa]

Michael, Jon, Edwina, Gary, List,

First, I apologize to everybody about my use of "RIP" about anything Peirce 
wrote.  I agree with Edwina that the three-way distinction is important, but I 
must emphasize that the amount of research in the cognitive sciences during the 
past century is immense.  As the article by Atkin shows,  Peirce was unsure of 
how to continue, there is no consensus among Peirce scholars about how to 
continue, and Peirce himself was asking Welby for her advice.

I also thank Jon for the link to a chapter of Michael's 1983 book.  The link 
below points to one chapter, but it's possible to use that link to go forwards 
or backwards to download the entire book.  So far, I have only downloaded and 
read that chapter.  And it shows the vast amount of linguistic issues that must 
be considered.

But that chapter is already 41 years old.  I'd like to ask Michael for any 
links to more recent writings, by himself or others, that would show ongoing 
research on the issues that Peirce began to explore.

In summary, I don't want to discourage anybody from studying Peirce's writings. 
 It's important to note that his writings on mathematical logic and semeiotic 
are fundamental.  Many of the points he made are still at the forefront of 
research in the 21st century.  But beyond his three-way distinction about 
interpretants, his writings on that subject are tentative and incomplete.

Michael's 1983 book shows how much more was known in linguistics, and I'd like 
to ask Michael for some pointers to more recent writings by himself or others 
on this topic

John
__

From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Michael, List:

I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online 
chapter from your 1983 book, The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic, is 
still a good summary of your relevant views.

https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Michael, List:

I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online
chapter from your 1983 book, *The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic*,
is still a good summary of your relevant views.

https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 12:43 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> I too hope that Michael might summarize at least some relevant aspects of
> his work in 'markedness' for the List, or at least offer a few excerpts
> from his several books and papers which take up the topic. Having read some
> of Michael's work on markedness, its connection to meaning in Peirce's
> sense seems to me patent as this excerpt from the Wikipedia article,
> "Markedness," suggests.
>
> The work of Cornelius van Schooneveld, Edna Andrews
> , Rodney Sangster, Yishai
> Tobin and others on 'semantic invariance' (different general meanings
> reflected in the contextual specific meanings of features) has further
> developed the semantic analysis
>  of
> grammatical items in terms of marked and unmarked features. Other
> semiotically-oriented work has investigated the isomorphism of form and
> meaning with less emphasis on invariance, including the efforts of Henning
> Andersen, Michael Shapiro, and Edwin Battistella. Shapiro and Andrews have
> especially made connections between the semiotic of C. S. Peirce
>  and markedness, treating it
> "as species of interpretant" in Peirce's sign–object–interpretant triad.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness
>
>
> I do not know Edna Andrew's work in this area.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
> On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:25 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
>> Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your
>> discussion?
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
>>
>> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to
>> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or
>> more of my books, the latest being *The Logic of Lasnguage* (New York:
>> Springer, 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship
>> between sign and object.
>>
>>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

I too hope that Michael might summarize at least some relevant aspects of
his work in 'markedness' for the List, or at least offer a few excerpts
from his several books and papers which take up the topic. Having read some
of Michael's work on markedness, its connection to meaning in Peirce's
sense seems to me patent as this excerpt from the Wikipedia article,
"Markedness," suggests.

The work of Cornelius van Schooneveld, Edna Andrews
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edna_Andrews>, Rodney Sangster, Yishai Tobin
and others on 'semantic invariance' (different general meanings reflected
in the contextual specific meanings of features) has further developed
the semantic
analysis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_analysis_(linguistics)> of
grammatical items in terms of marked and unmarked features. Other
semiotically-oriented work has investigated the isomorphism of form and
meaning with less emphasis on invariance, including the efforts of Henning
Andersen, Michael Shapiro, and Edwin Battistella. Shapiro and Andrews have
especially made connections between the semiotic of C. S. Peirce
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._S._Peirce> and markedness, treating it
"as species of interpretant" in Peirce's sign–object–interpretant triad.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness


I do not know Edna Andrew's work in this area.

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:25 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your
> discussion?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
>
> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to
> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or
> more of my books, the latest being *The Logic of Lasnguage* (New York:
> Springer, 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship
> between sign and object.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Edwina Taborsky 
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
> To: Edwina Taborsky 
> Cc: John F Sowa , Peirce List ,
> CG 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>
>
> Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic
> process, in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction
>
> That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the
> Immediate acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external
> interaction will be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its
> representamen. And indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by
> other input happening at the same time.
>
> Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
>
> The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal
> experience of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important
> - if we think of a disease - it would confine the infection to one
> individual. If we think of another situation - it would confine the
> sensation of the experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria].
>
> The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external
> response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak,
> who treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that
> they might react to. .
>
> The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
>
> An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys.
> This one individual might only feel a subjective internal response
> [Immediae Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit].
> But - it might instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would
> scream]. This would act as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who
> would recognize it as an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the
> monkey is understood, always, as an Alarm.
>
> That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they
> are, is vital.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> John, list
>
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence
>
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show
> how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation
> of his commentary.
>
>
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence:
>
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just
> useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants
> helped discover that insight?
>
>
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is,
>
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your discussion?

Edwina

> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
> 
> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to 
> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or more 
> of my books, the latest being The Logic of Lasnguage (New York: Springer, 
> 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship between 
> sign and object.
> -Original Message-
> From: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
> To: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Cc: John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>, Peirce List 
> mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>, CG 
> mailto:c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> 
>  
> Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic 
> process, in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction  
>  
> That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
> acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction 
> will be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. 
> And indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input 
> happening at the same time.
>  
> Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
>  
> The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal 
> experience of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - 
> if we think of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. 
> If we think of another situation - it would confine the sensation of the 
> experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 
>  
> The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
> response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who 
> treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they 
> might react to. .
>  
> The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
>  
> An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. 
> This one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
> Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
> instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would 
> act as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who would recognize it as 
> an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, 
> always, as an Alarm.
>  
> That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they 
> are, is vital.
>  
> Edwina
> 
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
> 
> John, list
>  
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.
>  
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?
> 
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
>  
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
> an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
> sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
> human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
>  
> Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
> same time..
>  
> 3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
> mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
> three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
>  
> 3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
>  
> with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
> action that generates a potentiality for change; 
>  
> and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
> individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
> actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
>  
> ….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
> generality where new laws are developed. 
>  
> That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
> develop. An exam

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Michael Shapiro]

To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to 
recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or more 
of my books, the latest being The Logic of Lasnguage (New York: Springer, 
2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship between sign 
and object.
-Original Message-
From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
To: Edwina Taborsky 
Cc: John F Sowa , Peirce List , CG 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic process, 
in that it enables complex adaptationwithin interaction   
That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction will 
be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. And 
indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input happening 
at the same time.
 
Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
 
The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal experience 
of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - if we think 
of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. If we think of 
another situation - it would confine the sensation of the experience to one 
individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 
 
The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
response to the input data and brings in local observers, so to 
speak, who treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something 
that they might react to. .
 
The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
 
An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. This 
one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would act 
as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys.who would recognize it as 
an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, 
always, as an Alarm.
 
That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they are, 
is vital.
 
Edwina
On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
John, list 
1] I dont know what you mean by His Commentaryin 
your sentence But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen 
him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and 
formulation of his commentary.

 
2] And I dont know what you mean by that insight in your 
sentence: 
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped discover 
that insight?



3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
 
3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
human; an owl can see better; aetc etc]
 
Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
same time..
 
3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see 
Peirces three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
 
3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
 
with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
action that generates a potentiality for change; 
 
and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
actual existentiallythat affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
 
.and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
generality where new laws are developed. 
 
That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
develop. An example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a hard 
shell [DO]; and what little it can extract from this shell [ IO] is 
processed by its digestive system [Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 1ns] 
, which, possibly lacking in nutrients from this small amount produces only a 
small nutrition result, [II] , but this small result forces the  birds 
body to develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, these 
chemicals act to strengthen its beak[DI]..and this reaction  becomes 
common among the local bird population [FI].
 
My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that 
includes all three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the 
capacities of the three categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive 
systems. 
 
Edwina
 
 
 
 
 

On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa mailto:s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

jects are 
>> extremely valuable.  I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront 
>> of 21st C cognitive science in those areas.  That is a conclusion of my 
>> recent article, of which I recently sent the completed Section 7 to these 
>> lists.
>> 
>> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show 
>> how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation 
>> of his commentary.
>> 
>> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
>> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
>> discover that insight?
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>> Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
>> To: John F Sowa 
>> Cc: Peirce List , CG 
>> 
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>> 
>> John, list
>> 
>> I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
>> play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
>> singular meanings of terms is not very functional.
>> 
>> I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems 
>> - 
>> 
>> I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
>> Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find 
>> in other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of 
>> ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical 
>> interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts 
>> of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - 
>> the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I 
>> personally find this very functional in explaining both biological systems 
>> and societal systems. . 
>> 
>> Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process 
>> to be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, 
>> both physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree 
>> with Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; 
>> and indeed, is a vast semiosic process. 
>> 
>> So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the 
>> interactional information functionality of an external relation of the sign 
>> vehicle  to its environment [ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. 
>> And then, the internal nature of the dats from this DO - which is commonly 
>> quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie, the Immediate Object. 
>> Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and analyzing 
>> it. 
>> 
>> And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the 
>> individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic 
>> Interpretent as the Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the 
>> acknowledgment by Peirce that there could be a commonly developed 
>> interpretation of these stimuli.  That is - the role of the individual 
>> within the community. 
>> 
>> And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three 
>> categories, which increases the complexity of the semiosic function. 
>> 
>> - I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation 
>> from the data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign 
>> vehicle and the development of new Habits [held within the representamen of 
>> the sign-vehicle. ].   That is - the fact that there are three 
>> interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception of the input data 
>> , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as 
>> expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger 
>> collective result - does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE 
>> REPRESENTAMEN?
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>> 
>>> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
>>> 
>>> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the 
>>> branches of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or 
>>> useful applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling 
>>> with the ideas up to the end.  
>>> 
>>> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
>>> because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
>>> convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Indeed, importance and usefulness are in the eye of the beholder, and
predictive success is only one measure. As you rightly point out, the
burden of justification is on anyone who would attempt to disparage,
discourage, or even foreclose further investigation of any given matter,
not on those who wish to continue pursuing it.

In this case, if triadic semiosis is a real phenomenon, such that the
universe is not reducible to dyadic reactions and monadic qualities, then
the importance and usefulness of a theory of interpretants--the *effects *of
signs, whether possible (immediate), actual (dynamical), or ideal
(final)--should be obvious to anyone. After all, pragmatism--the most
famous product of Peirce's thought--falls under the third branch of the
normative science of logic as semeiotic, namely, speculative rhetoric (or
methodeutic), "the science of the essential conditions under which a sign
may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it signifies,
or may, as a sign, bring about a physical result" (EP 2:326, 1904).

Moreover, if the entire universe is conceived as one immense sign, a
semiosic continuum--"a vast representamen ... working out its conclusions
in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903), and thus "perfused with
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394,
1906)--then *every event* can be analyzed as the interpretant of a sign.
From that standpoint, what could be *more *important or useful than a
theory of interpretants?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:22 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List,
>
> JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing
> interpretants."
> JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)."
> and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the
> theory to make useful predictions about anything."
>
>
> I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on
> interpretants -- which he worked on until near the end of his life and
> which many scholars see as an* integral* aspect of his semeiotic -- have
> not been fully developed is no reason to think that may not be in the
> future; and no reason for those who remain interested in the possibility of
> their development to cease their inquiry.
>
> "[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full
> understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims
> that it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort
> and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017).  [I would especially
> recommend: Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A
> response to Hilpinen” GR]. *Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society*.
> 28:3, 489–504.]
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot
>
>
> And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of
> all three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and
> societal systems." I agree.
>
> My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them
> and which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is
> to "block the way of inquiry."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.

2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?


3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 

3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…

Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
same time..

3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]

3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 

with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
action that generates a potentiality for change; 

and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 

….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual generality 
where new laws are developed. 

That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
develop. An example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a hard 
shell [DO]; and what little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is processed 
by its digestive system [Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 1ns] , which, 
possibly lacking in nutrients from this small amount produces only a small 
nutrition result, [II] , but this small result forces the  bird’s body to 
develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, these chemicals act 
to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction  becomes common among the local 
bird population [FI].

My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that 
includes all three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the 
capacities of the three categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive 
systems. 

Edwina






> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are 
> extremely valuable.  I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 
> 21st C cognitive science in those areas.  That is a conclusion of my recent 
> article, of which I recently sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.
> 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.
> 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
> To: John F Sowa 
> Cc: Peirce List , CG 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> 
> John, list
> 
> I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
> play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
> singular meanings of terms is not very functional.
> 
> I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems - 
> 
> I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
> Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find 
> in other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of 
> ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical 
> interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts 
> of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - 
> the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I 
> personally find this very functional in explaining both biological systems 
> and societal systems. . 
> 
> Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process 
> to be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, 
> both physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree 
> with Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and 
> indeed, is a vast semiosic pro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F Sowa]

Gary,

I believe that the word 'interpretant' is a good label for the way humans and 
other living things interpret a sign.

I also believe that his theories of semeiotic and his classification of signs 
and sign types are extremely valuable.

But I would ask you, please identify any notable Peirce scholar who said that 
Pierce's incomplete theories about how to go beyond the first step are integral 
to his semeiotic.

My point is that his inability to complete those theories is a warning sign.   
If he couldn't complete them and the best Peirce scholars can't show how to 
complete them, I have strong doubts about any  claims that go farther.

I am not saying that anybody should stop talking about any topic that Peirce 
chose to write about.  But I am just saying that all Peirce did was to label 
the first step.  For mathematics and mathematical logic, Peirce learned how to 
go infinitely far.  But for commonsense reasoning, his recommendations could 
just go one step at a time.

See that file Section7.pdf, which I circulated a few days ago.

Can anybody say more?

John


From: "Gary Richmond" 
Sent: 2/2/24 5:22 PM

John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List,

JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants."
JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)."
and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to 
make useful predictions about anything."

I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on interpretants 
-- which he worked on until near the end of his life and which many scholars 
see as an integral aspect of his semeiotic -- have not been fully developed is 
no reason to think that may not be in the future; and no reason for those who 
remain interested in the possibility of their development to cease their 
inquiry.

"[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full 
understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims that 
it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort and 
attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017).  [I would especially recommend: 
Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A response to Hilpinen” 
GR]. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 28:3, 489–504.]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot

And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of all 
three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and societal 
systems." I agree.

My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them and 
which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is to "block 
the way of inquiry."

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,

Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches 
of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or useful 
applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling with the 
ideas up to the end.

Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for the citation 
and quotations from the Stanford article.  Conclusion:  Neither Peirce nor 
anybody  else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about 
anything.

In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- 
just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say 
anything useful.

Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and 
focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest 
developments in cognitive science.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John, list

Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ can 
be in any one of the three modal categories.

That’s how I see it.

Edwina

On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce 
wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what 
Peirce himself had intended.

On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F Sowa]

Edwina,

I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are 
extremely valuable.  I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 
21st C cognitive science in those areas.  That is a conclusion of my recent 
article, of which I recently sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.

But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
commentary.

Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped discover 
that insight?

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
To: John F Sowa 
Cc: Peirce List , CG 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

John, list

I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
singular meanings of terms is not very functional.

I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems -

I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find in 
other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ 
view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical interactions or 
puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and 
even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - the concept of habit 
formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally find this 
very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. .

Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to 
be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both 
physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with 
Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and 
indeed, is a vast semiosic process.

So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional 
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle  to its 
environment [ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the 
internal nature of the dats from this DO - which is commonly quite different 
from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie, the Immediate Object. Then, the 
Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and analyzing it.

And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the 
individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent 
as the Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by 
Peirce that there could be a commonly developed interpretation of these 
stimuli.  That is - the role of the individual within the community.

And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three 
categories, which increases the complexity of the semiosic function.

- I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation 
from the data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign 
vehicle and the development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the 
sign-vehicle. ].   That is - the fact that there are three interepetants, 
moving from the immediate local perception of the input data , to an external 
objective result [ does the effect of the input data as expressed...have any 
functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result - does this 
function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?

Edwina

On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,

Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches 
of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or useful 
applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling with the 
ideas up to the end.

Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for the citation 
and quotations from the Stanford article.  Conclusion:  Neither Peirce nor 
anybody  else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about 
anything.

In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- 
just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say 
anything useful.

Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and 
focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest 
developments in cognitive science.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John, list

Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List,

JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing
interpretants."
JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)."
and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory
to make useful predictions about anything."


I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on
interpretants -- which he worked on until near the end of his life and
which many scholars see as an* integral* aspect of his semeiotic -- have
not been fully developed is no reason to think that may not be in the
future; and no reason for those who remain interested in the possibility of
their development to cease their inquiry.

"[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full
understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims
that it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort
and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017).  [I would especially
recommend: Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A
response to Hilpinen” GR]. *Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society*.
28:3, 489–504.]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot


And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of
all three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and societal
systems." I agree.

My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them
and which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is to
"block the way of inquiry."

Best,

Gary Richmond




On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
>
> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the
> branches of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or
> useful applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling
> with the ideas up to the end.
>
> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on
> interpretants because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful
> system.  He couldn't convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of
> this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford article.
> Conclusion:  Neither Peirce nor anybody  else ever developed the theory to
> make useful predictions about anything.
>
> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong
> -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do
> or say anything useful.
>
> Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP),
> and focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest
> developments in cognitive science.
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
> John, list
>
> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis,
> I think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three
> Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is
>  Individual External, and the last one is Collective External.  And- each
> of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories.
>
> That’s how I see it.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even
> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.
> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what
> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories
> are what Peirce himself had intended.
>
> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>
> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study
> this topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that
> show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen
> to be.
>
> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But
> since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that
> their interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
>
> John
> ___
>
> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in
> terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one
> piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At
> various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the
> division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
> emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as
> intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective
> and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce
> scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate,
> dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they 
play a vital role.  I think, however,  that attempting  to find exact and 
singular meanings of terms is not very functional.

I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems - 

I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the 
Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’  is extremely difficult to find in 
other scientific  or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ 
view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical interactions or 
puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and 
even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - the concept of habit 
formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally find this 
very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. . 

Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to 
be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both 
physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with 
Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and 
indeed, is a vast semiosic process. 

So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional 
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle  to its 
environment [ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the 
internal nature of the dats from this DO - which is commonly quite different 
from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie, the Immediate Object. Then, the 
Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and analyzing it. 

And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the 
individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent 
as the Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by 
Peirce that there could be a commonly developed interpretation of these 
stimuli.  That is - the role of the individual within the community. 

And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three 
categories, which increases the complexity of the semiosic function. 

- I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation 
from the data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign 
vehicle and the development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the 
sign-vehicle. ].   That is - the fact that there are three interepetants, 
moving from the immediate local perception of the input data , to an external 
objective result [ does the effect of the input data as expressed...have any 
functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result - does this 
function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?

Edwina

> On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
> 
> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the 
> branches of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or useful 
> applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling with the 
> ideas up to the end.  
> 
> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
> because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
> convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for the 
> citation and quotations from the Stanford article.  Conclusion:  Neither 
> Peirce nor anybody  else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions 
> about anything.
> 
> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- 
> just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or 
> say anything useful.
> 
> Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and 
> focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest 
> developments in cognitive science.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> John, list
> 
> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
> think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
> Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
> and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ 
> can be in any one of the three modal categories.
> 
> That’s how I see it.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>> 
>> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
>> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
>> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what 
>> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are 
>> what Peirce himself had intended.
>> 
>> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,

Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches 
of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or useful 
applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling with the 
ideas up to the end.

Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants 
because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system.  He couldn't 
convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of this note for the citation 
and quotations from the Stanford article.  Conclusion:  Neither Peirce nor 
anybody  else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about 
anything.

In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- 
just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say 
anything useful.

Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and 
focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest 
developments in cognitive science.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

John, list

Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ can 
be in any one of the three modal categories.

That’s how I see it.

Edwina

On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce 
wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what 
Peirce himself had intended.

On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this 
topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how 
incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.

I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But since 
Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their 
interpretation is what Peirce had intended.

John
___

As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in 
terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of 
work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points 
in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants 
as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and 
logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and 
communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions 
of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other 
divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, 
however, some dissenters from this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above 
as follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be 
a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere 
feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, 
which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three 
kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” 
interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .

Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action 
(CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 
.491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for 
more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency 
seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests 
that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a 
subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his 
own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical 
trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three 
interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes 
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct 
trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, 
especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. 
However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Supplement: My looking for a simple generator of the theory is not intended, because I would like it. In fact i think, that simple explanations are dangerous. Autocrats and conspiracy theorists frequently use them. The technical term is complexity reduction. If a complex matter is said to have a simple cause, like a generator formula, this gives me the creeps. So you are more than welcome to refute it. Popper said, a hypothesis is only valid, if it still is falsifiable. Cosmologists saw a symmetry between matter and antimatter, but then, relievingly, discovered a symmetry break. On one hand, we feel better, if we can understand the world better due to a theory, on the other hand, an explaining theory does not only demagify the image of the world, makes it dull and boring, but also may destroy the world, if people follow it. I see some relevance in identifying the categories- in some context- with composition, determination, classification, and thus building a bridge to systems theory. But i hate it, and think, I will do something completely different.
 

 



Jon, List,

 

 we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the interpretant into

 

-immediate, dynamical, final

 

-emotional, energetic, logical

 

-intentional, effectual, communicational.

 

Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?

 

And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants



Helmut, List:
 




HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?




 

There are not more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to agree with this "received view."

 

One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are orthogonal to the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the actual effect of a sign on an interpreter--its dynamical interpretant--is either a feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my Semiotica paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants are the corresponding effects of signs in general.

 

Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's intentions. Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and achievement may coincide more often than not."

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




John, List,

 

I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s appleman).

 

From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three interpretants?

 

I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of dividing it i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that would warrant such an
interpretation. Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of
representing or (more generally) mediating establishes that any one sign is
determined by its two objects (genuine = dynamical, degenerate = immediate)
and determines its three interpretants (genuine = final, degenerate =
dynamical, doubly degenerate = immediate). Again, I understand
the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the concrete
manifestations of the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants in *human *
semiosis.

I also discuss the intentional/effectual/communicational interpretants in
my *Semiotica *paper (link below). Peirce evidently changed his mind about
the first of these soon after introducing them (EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9)--"I
have thus omitted the *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is
betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as
it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it
is in no sense the interpretant of *that *sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). In
other words, since the intentional interpretant is "a determination of the
mind of the utterer," it cannot be an interpretant of the sign being
analyzed; instead, it must be the dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign
of the same object. On the other hand, since the effectual interpretant is
"a determination of the mind of the interpreter," it clearly corresponds to
the dynamical interpretant of the sign being analyzed; and since the
communicational interpretant is "a determination of that mind into which
the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
communication should take place," I argue that it must be *internal *to the
sign being analyzed and thus corresponds to the immediate interpretant. The
final interpretant is absent here, because this is an analysis of a
discrete "event of semiosis" as an *ens rationis* prescinded from the real
and continuous process.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:24 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
>  we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the
> interpretant into
>
> -immediate, dynamical, final
>
> -emotional, energetic, logical
>
> -intentional, effectual, communicational.
>
> Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?
>
> And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in
> which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.
>
> Best, Helmut
> *Gesendet:* Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
> *Von:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *An:* "Peirce-L" 
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> Helmut, List:
>
>
> HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?
>
>
> There are *not *more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of
> naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce
> scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into
> immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
> relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin,
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to
> agree with this "received view."
>
> One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are *orthogonal *to the
> immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP
> 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the *actual *effect of
> a sign on an interpreter--its *dynamical *interpretant--is either a
> feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my *Semiotica
> *paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (
> https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only
> texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various
> manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these
> are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as
> "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final
> interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of signs in general.
>
> Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's *intentions*.
> Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am
> merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his
> own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (
> https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal),
> "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the
> study of what the author achieved. 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

 we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the interpretant into

 

-immediate, dynamical, final

 

-emotional, energetic, logical

 

-intentional, effectual, communicational.

 

Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?

 

And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants



Helmut, List:
 




HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?




 

There are not more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to agree with this "received view."

 

One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are orthogonal to the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the actual effect of a sign on an interpreter--its dynamical interpretant--is either a feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my Semiotica paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants are the corresponding effects of signs in general.

 

Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's intentions. Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and achievement may coincide more often than not."

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




John, List,

 

I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s appleman).

 

From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three interpretants?

 

I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.

 

Like this, there are three times three interpretants.

 

Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.

 

Best, Helmut





_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATE

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?


There are *not *more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of naming
them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce scholars have
to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic,
and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous
with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to agree
with this "received view."

One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are *orthogonal *to the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP
4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the *actual *effect of a
sign on an interpreter--its *dynamical *interpretant--is either a feeling,
an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my *Semiotica *paper,
"Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12),
after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce employs the specific
terminology of emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his
various manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me
that these are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely
experience as "modifications of consciousness," while the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of
signs in general.

Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's *intentions*. Like
other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am merely
offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his own
words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (
https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal),
"Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the
study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to
be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may
be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous
and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and
achievement may coincide more often than not."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> John, List,
>
> I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted
> somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it
> is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very
> complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s
> appleman).
>
> From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness
> has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and
> with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three
> interpretants?
>
> I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has
> two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of
> dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also
> categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and
> secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts
> are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.
>
> Like this, there are three times three interpretants.
>
> Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

 

I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s appleman).

 

From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three interpretants?

 

I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.

 

Like this, there are three times three interpretants.

 

Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 01. Februar 2024 um 00:37 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" , "CG" 
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants



I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.

 

On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

 

Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.

 

I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what Peirce had intended.

 

John

___

 

As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view.

In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as follows:

In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)

. . .

 

Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).

How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst the emotional/energeti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I 
think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three 
Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is  Individual External, 
and the last one is Collective External.  And- each of these three ’nodes’ can 
be in any one of the three modal categories.

That’s how I see it.

Edwina

> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what 
> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are 
> what Peirce himself had intended.
> 
> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
> 
> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this 
> topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show 
> how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
> 
> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But since 
> Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their 
> interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
> 
> John
> ___
> 
> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in 
> terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece 
> of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various 
> points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of 
> interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, 
> energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, 
> effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As 
> Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests 
> that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are 
> archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these 
> categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view.
> 
> In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies 
> above as follows:
> 
> In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, 
> be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than 
> mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something 
> besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term 
> these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the 
> “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
> . . .
> 
> Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from 
> action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical 
> interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See 
> Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). 
> Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view 
> since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include 
> the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, 
> claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions 
> the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate 
> claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and 
> (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be 
> treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).
> 
> How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, 
> especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. 
> However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, 
> Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when 
> trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from 
> different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the 
> intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological 
> experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct 
> division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce’s projected 
> sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional classifications imposed 
> by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more on this discussion 
> see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 
> 2004).
> 
> 
>  
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> 

[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F Sowa]

I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even 
Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.  
Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce 
wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what 
Peirce himself had intended.

On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this 
topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how 
incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.

I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But since 
Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their 
interpretation is what Peirce had intended.

John
___

As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in 
terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of 
work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points 
in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants 
as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and 
logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and 
communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions 
of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other 
divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, 
however, some dissenters from this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above 
as follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be 
a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere 
feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, 
which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three 
kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” 
interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .

Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action 
(CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 
.491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for 
more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency 
seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests 
that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a 
subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his 
own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical 
trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three 
interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes 
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct 
trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, 
especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. 
However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, 
Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when trying 
to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different 
angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the 
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological 
experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct 
division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce’s projected 
sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional classifications imposed 
by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more on this discussion see, 
Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 2004).


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina,
I strongly agree.  And as I wrote in the thread
"Tree structure", I believe that the best way to analyze and
explain the issues is to illustrate them with actual examples.  He used
more examples in his lectures and letters to actual people.  But his MSS
to himself had very few examples to illustrate the often very complex
issues.

ET> I'd agree that what Auke is outlining is a very
important area of discussion - namely, the nature of the Interpretants in
the semiosic process.
Yes.  And showing the differences by examples
is much clearer than an abstract discussion by itself.   Just note how
widely people quote Peirce's examples, such as his comments about the word
'the'.
John



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[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

I'd agree that what Auke is outlining is a very important area of
discussion - namely, the nature of the Interpretants in the semiosic
process.

We each have different areas of interest - from the terminological
to the linguistic to mathematics..etc. My particular interest is in
the evolutionary and adaptive capacities of mind/matter within the
real world of biology and societal systems. I consider such actions
to be carried out within the Peircean semiosic framework.

Evolutionary adaptation, takes place within complex - not simple - 
interactions, and this requires both stability of type 
[habits/Thirdness] and also, a high degree of freedom in non-linear
dynamics; i.e., in processing multiple inputs of data from diverse
sources. This requires, I think, a complex interpretive process that
can develop complexity of habits and morphologies from what appear to
be simple even unrelated local interactions. It requires different
phases of information processing where a system can switch between
various 'information input contents' [decide which is relevant; which
is noise] and move rapidly to interact and adapt to the real world. 

Therefore, I think it is constructive to consider that Peirce's
multiple terms for this - what I see as a very complex process of
interpretation - are not just substitute terms 'for a simple
three-step interpretive process' - but are outlines of a wide ranging
complex interpretive infrastructure that actually enables life to
exist as adaptive and robust. 

Edwina

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