Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

I did not say that the Hopi way of taking about time is objectionable. I said 
that I consider it incorrect to consider that because the Hopi view time in a 
particular manner and have words for this view, that this does not mean that 
they would not understand the SAE way of thinking about time. That is - I 
reject the dominance of sociolinguistics or the dominance of 
words-over-the-mind. 

Edwina

> On Feb 19, 2024, at 10:58 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, List,
> 
> Peirce's writings and Jon's article about "temporal synechism" do not 
> conflict with the following sentence:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> There is a major difference between Newtonian time, time in Einstein's 
> special relativity, time in general relativity, and time in many variations 
> that physicists have proposed in the past century.   Nobody know what 
> theories may be developed in the future.   But it's doubtful that any of them 
> will make any noticeable difference in the way that different cultures talk 
> about time.
> 
> Edwina said that she considered the Hopi way of talking about time as 
> objectionable.  I admit that it's different from SAE, which is closer to my 
> way of thinking.  But I believe that there is a one-to-one mapping between 
> Hopi times and SAE times -- at least at a level that is humanly perceptible 
> without special instruments. 
> 
> And I can't see any conflict with anything Peirce wrote.  Those examples just 
> show that different people think in different ways.  I can't see any reason 
> for objecting.
> 
> John  
> 
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> John, List:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean 
> Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).
> 
> JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question 
> "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the 
> reason that explains why the first and second are related.
> 
> This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as mediation, and 
> it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted 
> previously.
> 
> CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational 
> agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as 
> third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as 
> second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law 
> according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7)
> 
> Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third 
> (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are 
> related, reflecting the intelligibility of that relation. Nevertheless, this 
> answer does not require a verb that names a triadic relation; and although it 
> provides a reason for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's 
> goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have 
> been entirely accidental, not the result of any goal/purpose/intention at all.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>  
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[John F Sowa]

Jon, Edwina, List,

Peirce's writings and Jon's article about "temporal synechism" do not conflict 
with the following sentence:

JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
different theories about time.

There is a major difference between Newtonian time, time in Einstein's special 
relativity, time in general relativity, and time in many variations that 
physicists have proposed in the past century.   Nobody know what theories may 
be developed in the future.   But it's doubtful that any of them will make any 
noticeable difference in the way that different cultures talk about time.

Edwina said that she considered the Hopi way of talking about time as 
objectionable.  I admit that it's different from SAE, which is closer to my way 
of thinking.  But I believe that there is a one-to-one mapping between Hopi 
times and SAE times -- at least at a level that is humanly perceptible without 
special instruments.

And I can't see any conflict with anything Peirce wrote.  Those examples just 
show that different people think in different ways.  I can't see any reason for 
objecting.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:
JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
different theories about time.

I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean 
Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).

JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question 
"Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the 
reason that explains why the first and second are related.

This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as mediation, and it 
is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted previously.

CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational 
agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as 
third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as 
second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according 
to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7)

Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third 
(spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are related, 
reflecting the intelligibility of that relation. Nevertheless, this answer does 
not require a verb that names a triadic relation; and although it provides a 
reason for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's goal, 
purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have been 
entirely accidental, not the result of any goal/purpose/intention at all.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and
different theories about time.


I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean
Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).

JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question
"Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the
reason that explains why the first and second are related.


This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as *mediation*,
and it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted
previously.

CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational
agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark,
as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an
explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an
intelligible law according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7)


Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the
third (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are
related, reflecting the *intelligibility *of that relation. Nevertheless,
this answer does not require a verb that names a *triadic *relation; and
although it provides a *reason *for what happened, it does not identify a
rational agent's goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the
explosion might have been entirely accidental, not the result of *any
*goal/purpose/intention
at all.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 3:05 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon, List,
>
> I'm sorry for not responding sooner to this note.  But now that I finished
> the article on phaneroscopy, I'm moving on to the the article on Delta
> graphs.  I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week.
>
> In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and
> different theories about time.  The important point about Thirdness is that
> the Third is always an abstract reason (or theory) for relating the first
> and second.That is why the most direct way to formalize any instance of
> Thirdness is to clarify and determine that reason.  And the starting point
> for any such determination is to ask a question.
>
> The method of asking questions is as old as Socrates.  Aristotle adopted
> and systematized the questions -- every one of his 10 categories is the
> answer to a question.  The medieval Scholastics, which Peirce studied in
> detail, developed many systematic methods for asking questions.  If you
> search for "question" in CP, you'll get over 1500 answers.  I haven't
> checked every one, but the ones I did check usually lead to the initial
> stages of an investigation of some sort.
>
> As for time, questions about time do not rule out an open-ended variety of
> answers,  In fact, Einstein's questions about time were the starting point
> of his theory of relativity.  Peirce also asked questions about time and
> space that indicated options that were distinctly different from Newton's
> assumptions.  They were closer to Einstein's, but there was much more work
> to do -- as Einstein and others showed.
>
> There is much more to say about these issues.  But the method of asking
> "Why?" to begin an investigation of Thirdness is consistent with Peirce's
> method of beginning any kind of investigation.  Just look at the many
> occurrences of the word "question" in CP.
>
> There are also 332 instances of 'why' and 1193 instances of 'how' in CP.
> As just one example of both, note CP 2.717:
>
> "The distinction between the 'Why' of hypothesis and the 'How' of
> induction is not very great; both ask for a statistical
> syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known
> conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic
> inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed
> the explanatory syllogism."
>
> Note that Peirce wrote "the 'why' of hypothesis'.  Since  every hypothesis
> is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any Thirdness
> would lead to a proposition.  That proposition is the reason that explains
> why the first and second are related.  Therefore, CP 2.717 justifies my
> claim about asking a question Why about any instance of Thirdness. It is
> the beginning of an investigation to determine the reason, goal, purpose,
> or intention that relates the first and second.  QED (Quite Easily Done).
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Jon, List,

I'm sorry for not responding sooner to this note.  But now that I finished the 
article on phaneroscopy, I'm moving on to the the article on Delta graphs.  
I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week.

In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different 
theories about time.  The important point about Thirdness is that the Third is 
always an abstract reason (or theory) for relating the first and second.
That is why the most direct way to formalize any instance of Thirdness is to 
clarify and determine that reason.  And the starting point for any such 
determination is to ask a question.

The method of asking questions is as old as Socrates.  Aristotle adopted and 
systematized the questions -- every one of his 10 categories is the answer to a 
question.  The medieval Scholastics, which Peirce studied in detail, developed 
many systematic methods for asking questions.  If you search for "question" in 
CP, you'll get over 1500 answers.  I haven't checked every one, but the ones I 
did check usually lead to the initial stages of an investigation of some sort.

As for time, questions about time do not rule out an open-ended variety of 
answers,  In fact, Einstein's questions about time were the starting point of 
his theory of relativity.  Peirce also asked questions about time and space 
that indicated options that were distinctly different from Newton's 
assumptions.  They were closer to Einstein's, but there was much more work to 
do -- as Einstein and others showed.

There is much more to say about these issues.  But the method of asking "Why?" 
to begin an investigation of Thirdness is consistent with Peirce's method of 
beginning any kind of investigation.  Just look at the many occurrences of the 
word "question" in CP.

There are also 332 instances of 'why' and 1193 instances of 'how' in CP.  As 
just one example of both, note CP 2.717:

"The distinction between the 'Why' of hypothesis and the 'How' of induction is 
not very great; both ask for a statistical
syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known 
conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic 
inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed the 
explanatory syllogism."

Note that Peirce wrote "the 'why' of hypothesis'.  Since  every hypothesis is 
stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any Thirdness would 
lead to a proposition.  That proposition is the reason that explains why the 
first and second are related.  Therefore, CP 2.717 justifies my claim about 
asking a question Why about any instance of Thirdness. It is the beginning of 
an investigation to determine the reason, goal, purpose, or intention that 
relates the first and second.  QED (Quite Easily Done).

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Sent: 2/13/24 7:08 PM

John, list

I’m not a fan of the Whorf-Sapir sociolinguistics hypotheses…Objective reality 
exists, regardless of how we talk about it - and I maintain that its influence 
can be far stronger than words ie - Secondness has its own way of intruding on 
our words. And mathematics has nothing to do with sociolinguistic relativism.

As for time - I tend to follow Matsuno’s analysis [Koichiro Matsuno] with his 
three types of time: present, perfect and progressive, which can be compared 
with Peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. …and Peirce has written about the temporal and 
spatial nature of these three categories extensively [ ie, no need for 
quotations].

Yes, 3ns includes continuity -of its habits - but, I don’t see this type of 
continuity as the same as the continuous semiosic functions of the universe.  
Imagine what our universe would be, if it stopped transforming x into y via its 
mediative  process?….But, a habit in 3ns can and does change…

Edwina

On Feb 13, 2024, at 4:40 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Jon,

Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is 
important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about 
time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating 
theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.

For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .

The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the 
long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not obvious. 
 It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of thinking about 
time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity.

And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that Cantor 
formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.

JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures 
us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the 
idea of a true continuum

I admit 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Erratum: I meant to write at the end of my post "Tom Short in his book on
Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that "the intentionality of
thought is a special case of significance" which hardly equates it with
3ns" (not "intentionality," of course). GR

On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 7:31 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, List,
>
> JFS: More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>
> And not only today but in Peirce's day as well. Peirce referred to
> Cantor's  conception as a "pseudo-continuum," a "bottoms-up" approach. It's
> too bad that a contemporary mathematician hasn't written a paper explaining
> the virtues of Peirce's top-down approach. Of course on List and in his
> *Transactions* paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum," Jon Alan Schmidt has
> argued for Peirce's alternative "top-down" conception. In light of the
> current discussion, I reread JAS's paper and can heartily recommend it to
> anyone wishing to understand the "top-down" vs "bottom-up" distinction. See:
>
> Peirce's Topical Continuum: A “Thicker” Theory
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt 
>
> *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
> * 56 (1):62-80 (2020)   Copy
>  BIBTEX
> Abstract
> Although Peirce frequently insisted that continuity was a core component
> of his philosophical thought, his conception of it evolved considerably
> during his lifetime, culminating in a theory grounded primarily in topical
> geometry. Two manuscripts, one of which has never before been published,
> reveal that his formulation of this approach was both earlier and more
> thorough than most scholars seem to have realized. Combining these and
> other relevant texts with the better-known passages highlights a key
> ontological distinction: a collection is bottom-up, such that the parts are
> real and the whole is an ens rationis, while a continuum is top-down, such
> that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis. Accordingly, five
> properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for Peirce’s topical
> continuum: rationality, divisibility, homogeneity, contiguity, and
> inexhaustibility.
>
> I'd also like to take this opportunity to join those on the list who
> question your insistence that 3ns = intentionality. I haven't anything to
> add to what Edwina, Mike, and now Jon has written except to note that even
> Tom Short in his book on Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that
> "the intentionality of thought is a special case of significance" which
> hardly equates it with intentionality.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 4:40 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum
>> is important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking
>> about time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of
>> formulating theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
>>
>> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
>>
>> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and
>> the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not
>> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of
>> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and
>> continuity.
>>
>> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that
>> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>>
>> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability
>> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our
>> having the idea of a true continuum
>>
>> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But
>> the languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century
>> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or
>> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about
>> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way
>> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about
>> continuity.
>>
>> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in
>> SAE (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by
>> no means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of
>> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
>>
>> John
>> _
>>
>> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>>
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in
>> phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow
>> of time, which he calls "the continuum *par excellence*, through the
>> spectacles of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

JFS: More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.

And not only today but in Peirce's day as well. Peirce referred to
Cantor's  conception as a "pseudo-continuum," a "bottoms-up" approach. It's
too bad that a contemporary mathematician hasn't written a paper explaining
the virtues of Peirce's top-down approach. Of course on List and in his
*Transactions* paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum," Jon Alan Schmidt has
argued for Peirce's alternative "top-down" conception. In light of the
current discussion, I reread JAS's paper and can heartily recommend it to
anyone wishing to understand the "top-down" vs "bottom-up" distinction. See:

Peirce's Topical Continuum: A “Thicker” Theory

Jon Alan Schmidt 

*Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
* 56 (1):62-80 (2020)   Copy   B
IBTEX
Abstract
Although Peirce frequently insisted that continuity was a core component of
his philosophical thought, his conception of it evolved considerably during
his lifetime, culminating in a theory grounded primarily in topical
geometry. Two manuscripts, one of which has never before been published,
reveal that his formulation of this approach was both earlier and more
thorough than most scholars seem to have realized. Combining these and
other relevant texts with the better-known passages highlights a key
ontological distinction: a collection is bottom-up, such that the parts are
real and the whole is an ens rationis, while a continuum is top-down, such
that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis. Accordingly, five
properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for Peirce’s topical
continuum: rationality, divisibility, homogeneity, contiguity, and
inexhaustibility.

I'd also like to take this opportunity to join those on the list who
question your insistence that 3ns = intentionality. I haven't anything to
add to what Edwina, Mike, and now Jon has written except to note that even
Tom Short in his book on Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that
"the intentionality of thought is a special case of significance" which
hardly equates it with intentionality.

Best,

Gary Richmond





On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 4:40 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is
> important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about
> time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating
> theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
>
> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
>
> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and
> the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not
> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of
> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and
> continuity.
>
> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that
> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>
> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability
> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our
> having the idea of a true continuum
>
> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But
> the languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century
> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or
> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about
> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way
> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about
> continuity.
>
> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in
> SAE (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by
> no means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of
> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
>
> John
> _
>
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in
> phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow
> of time, which he calls "the continuum *par excellence*, through the
> spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so
> that "to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of
> oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic
> weights. The one asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning
> the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642,
> 1908). Here are a few more quotations about this.
>
> CSP: To imagine time, time is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I’m not a fan of the Whorf-Sapir sociolinguistics hypotheses…Objective reality 
exists, regardless of how we talk about it - and I maintain that its influence 
can be far stronger than words ie - Secondness has its own way of intruding on 
our words. And mathematics has nothing to do with sociolinguistic relativism.

As for time - I tend to follow Matsuno’s analysis [Koichiro Matsuno] with his 
three types of time: present, perfect and progressive, which can be compared 
with Peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. …and Peirce has written about the temporal and 
spatial nature of these three categories extensively [ ie, no need for 
quotations].

Yes, 3ns includes continuity -of its habits - but, I don’t see this type of 
continuity as the same as the continuous semiosic functions of the universe.  
Imagine what our universe would be, if it stopped transforming x into y via its 
mediative  process?….But, a habit in 3ns can and does change…

Edwina

> On Feb 13, 2024, at 4:40 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon,
> 
> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is 
> important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about 
> time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating 
> theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
> 
> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:  
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
> 
> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the 
> long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not 
> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of 
> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity.
> 
> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that 
> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
> 
> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability 
> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our 
> having the idea of a true continuum 
> 
> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But the 
> languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century 
> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or 
> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about 
> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way 
> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about 
> continuity.
> 
> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in SAE 
> (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by no 
> means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of 
> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
> 
> John
> _
>  
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our 
> conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he 
> calls "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we 
> envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is 
> continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, 
> meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one 
> asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight 
> of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few 
> more quotations about this.
> 
> CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive 
> the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something 
> forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] 
> time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and 
> cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me 
> it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time 
> is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)
> 
> CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the 
> fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as 
> continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a 
> quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; 
> in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)
> 
> CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to 
> be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, 
> is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous 
> time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading 
> in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely 
> immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is 
important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about 
time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating 
theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.

For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .

The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the 
long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not obvious. 
 It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of thinking about 
time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity.

And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that Cantor 
formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.

JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures 
us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the 
idea of a true continuum

I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But the 
languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century 
philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or continuity 
or the relations between them.  And the different theories about continuity 
among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way people talk about 
time implies the way they must formulate theories about continuity.

The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in SAE 
(Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by no means 
universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of thinking about, 
talking about, and representing time and continuity.

John
_

From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Helmut, List:

According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our 
conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he calls 
"the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage 
every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is continuous is 
just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, meaning that that 
shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one asserts no more of 
Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, 
just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few more quotations about 
this.

CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive 
the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something 
forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] 
time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and 
cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me 
it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is 
directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)

CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the fact 
that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as 
continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a 
quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; in 
any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)

CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be 
tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is 
that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, 
strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a 
gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate 
present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a 
continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in 
this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true 
continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n, c. 1902)

Although Peirce acknowledges in the second passage that our direct 
perception/experience of time might be an illusion, he nevertheless suggests in 
the other two that its inescapability assures us of its reality, and that this 
is the only way to account for our having the idea of a true continuum at all. 
Moreover, right before the statement that I quoted at the end of my last post, 
he makes the case at greater length that we could not even imagine true 
continuity unless there were something in reality that corresponds to it.

CSP: I will submit for your consideration the following metaphysical principle 
which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable element sui 
generis seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, 
yet must really be [in] nature somewhere, since nothing else could have 
produced even the false appearance of such an element sui generis. ...
In the same 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

the arguments in your Peirce-quotes are Ockham´s razor plus an analogy to Anselm´s proof of God. Both figures are not by everybody agreed to being valid. But I believe in continuum, I guess. I think, physicists donot quibble, whether the continuous fields- and waves- theory is the better one, or the discontinuous quantums-theory, but say, that both are needed for explanations. And: Quantums are blurred either in space or velocity (Heisenberg). Blurring requires a continuum, i guess. Must be. I hope for a continuum too, because I tend towards panentheism, meaning, if God´s realm is continuous, ours is too, as both overlap, otherwise it would be hard to achieve a connection with God, like it is e.g. said to be so by Gnosticism. So I believe in continuum, though I am not sure, exactly which of Peirce´s methods of fixating belief have fixated mine.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Dienstag, 13. Februar 2024 um 19:58 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)



Helmut, List:
 

According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he calls "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few more quotations about this.

 




CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)

 
CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)


CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n, c. 1902)



 

Although Peirce acknowledges in the second passage that our direct perception/experience of time might be an illusion, he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the idea of a true continuum at all. Moreover, right before the statement that I quoted at the end of my last post, he makes the case at greater length that we could not even imagine true continuity unless there were something in reality that corresponds to it.

 




CSP: I will submit for your consideration the following metaphysical principle which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable element sui generis seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, yet must really be [in] nature somewhere, since nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such an element sui generis. ...

In the same way, the very fact that there seems to be 3ns in the world, even though it be not where it seems to be, proves that real 3ns there must somewhere be. If the continuity of our inward and outward sense be not real, still it proves that continuity there really is, for how else should sense have the power of creating it?

Some people say that the sense of time is not in truth continuous, that we only imagine it to be so. If that be so, it strengthens my argument immensely. For how should the mind of every rustic and of every brute find it simpler to imagine time as continuous, in the very teeth of the appearances,--to connect it with by far the most difficult of all the conceptions which philosophers have ever thought out,--unless there were something in their real being which endowed such an idea 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in
phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow
of time, which he calls "the continuum *par excellence*, through the
spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so
that "to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of
oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic
weights. The one asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning
the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642,
1908). Here are a few more quotations about this.

CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly
perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is
something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that
the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in
contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible
conception. But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief
is that the flow of time is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)

CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the
fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived
as continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a
quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion;
in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)

CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate,
to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical
conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a
strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the
future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that
thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an
immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are
thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way
only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP
8.123n, c. 1902)


Although Peirce acknowledges in the second passage that our direct
perception/experience of time might be an illusion, he nevertheless
suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures us of its
reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the idea
of a true continuum at all. Moreover, right before the statement that I
quoted at the end of my last post, he makes the case at greater length that
we could not even imagine true continuity unless there were *something *in
reality that corresponds to it.

CSP: I will submit for your consideration the following metaphysical
principle which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable
element *sui generis* seems to be in nature, although it be not really
where it seems to be, yet must really be [in] nature somewhere, since
nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such an
element *sui generis*. ...
In the same way, the very fact that there seems to be 3ns in the world,
even though it be not where it seems to be, proves that real 3ns there must
somewhere be. If the continuity of our inward and outward sense be not
real, still it proves that continuity there really is, for how else should
sense have the power of creating it?
Some people say that the sense of time is not in truth continuous, that we
only imagine it to be so. If that be so, it strengthens my argument
immensely. For how should the mind of every rustic and of every brute find
it simpler to imagine time as continuous, in the very teeth of the
appearances,--to connect it with by far the most difficult of all the
conceptions which philosophers have ever thought out,--unless there were
something in their real being which endowed such an idea with a simplicity
which is certainly in the utmost contrast to its character in itself. But
this something must be something in some sense like continuity. Now nothing
can be like an element so peculiar except that very same element itself. ...
The extraordinary disposition of the human mind to think of everything
under the difficult and almost incomprehensible form of a continuum can
only be explained by supposing that each one of us is in his own real
nature a continuum. (NEM 4:344-345, 1898)


Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 9:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> ontologically, in reality, a continuum cannot be built up from
> infinitesimally small points. But infenitesimality can only be infinitely
> iterated towards in reality, if there already is a real continuum. So I see
> a tautology. Just imagine, that there would not be a real continuum: Then
> we nevertheless could get the idea of a continuum out of a line, which in
> reality consists of aligned, in this case not infinitesimally small points.
> Now we might say: If we are able to have the idea of 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

ontologically, in reality, a continuum cannot be built up from infinitesimally small points. But infenitesimality can only be infinitely  iterated towards in reality, if there already is a real continuum. So I see a tautology. Just imagine, that there would not be a real continuum: Then we nevertheless could get the idea of a continuum out of a line, which in reality consists of aligned, in this case not infinitesimally small points. Now we might say: If we are able to have the idea of a continuum, then there must be one. This argument is similar with Anselm´s proof of God. Ok, our world may be pixeled or quantized, but God´s realm is continuous. My Ockham´s-razor-argument in my last post neither is a proof for a real continuum, and whether Anselm´s proof is a proof, I don´t know. I sense platonism in the idea, that we cannot get an idea of something that does not exist. I am not totally convinced anymore about the reality of continuum. The question seems quasi-theological to me. 

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 20:57 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)



Helmut, List:
 

According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but 3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always involves 2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always involves 1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and/or 2ns.

 

For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898).



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut






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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP
1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are
prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from
discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission
"consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present
without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP
2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but
3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always
*involves
*2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always *involves *1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns
cannot be *built up* from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be *built up* from 1ns and/or
2ns.

For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but
it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous
whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which
are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are
deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire
universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities
(1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole
universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this
Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of
Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of
the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by
> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical
> or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So
> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it
> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness,
> because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be
> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from
> continuity, to logically handle it.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry, List:

JLRC: First, thanks to JAS for his well crafted initial post and an a
direct inquiry to him if those are the only relevant citations to the
intermingling of grammatical semantics with CSP’s notion of a copulant.


As it turns out, the passage about descriptive/designative/copulant that I
cited as EP 2:484-485 is also CP 8.350-352, and Peirce goes on in the
subsequent text to discuss why this trichotomy for the mode of presentation
of the immediate object must come *before *the one for the mode of
apprehension or presentation of the sign
itself--potisign/actisigns/famisign or tone/token/type--in the order of
determination for sign classification (EP 2:485-488, CP 8.353-361). As far
as I know, there is only one other place where he mentions copulants.

CSP: If the Immediate Object is a Possible, that is, if the Dynamoid Object
is indicated (always more or less vaguely) by means of its Qualities, etc.,
I call the Sign a *Descriptive*; if the Immediate [Object] is an
Occurrence, I call the Sign a *Designative*; and if the Immediate Object is
a Necessitant, I call the sign a *Copulant*; for in that case the Object
has to be so identified by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a
necessitation. My name is certainly a temporary expedient. (EP 2:480, SS
84, 1908 Dec 23)


This simply lays out the same trichotomy without much elaboration. In R 795
(no date), Peirce similarly gives it as
descriptives/designatives/copulatives.

JLRC: Secondly, I ask, is everyone conflating the subtle distinctions
between CSP’s usage of continuants and mathematical continuity?


I am not sure exactly what you mean by this. Peirce describes continuants
as a subset of copulants--in fact, "the only *pure* Copulants"--and
presumably calls them that because they are signs that represent continuous
predicates. As Bellucci explains, "they are analyzable only into parts that
are homogeneous with the whole" (*Peirce's Speculative Grammar*. p. 338), a
key aspect of Peirce's late topical conception of mathematical continuity.
Bellucci then provides a nice summary of the logical principle that I
outlined upon starting this thread.

FB: When everything which can be given in a collateral observation, whether
a predicate-descriptive or a subject-designative, is hypostatically
abstracted from the proposition, what remains is a pure form of connection
of the elements so abstracted. A continuous predicate is an immediate
object of the proposition only in the sense that it is what remains when
all its immediate objects are hypostatically abstracted from it, i.e., only
in the sense that it represents the manner in which the proposition's
objects are put together. (ibid)


However, I suggest that instead of being an immediate *object *of the
proposition in this peculiar sense, the continuous predicate itself is the
immediate *interpretant *of the proposition, especially in light of
Peirce's late taxonomies where the trichotomy according to the nature or
mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is
hypothetic/categorical/relative (e.g., EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25; also earlier
versions in the Logic Notebook, R 339). These terms directly correspond to
the three kinds of propositions (CP 2.325, EP 2:284, 1903), which are
distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in
Existential Graphs (R 481:10, no date)--none in Alpha for a hypothetical
proposition ("any proposition compounded of propositions," CP 2.271, EP
2:299, 1903), one in Beta for a categorical proposition ("not concerned
with the identity of more than one individual," ibid), and two or more in
Beta for a relative proposition ("concerned with the identity of more than
one individual," ibid)--and thus the *syntax *that diagrammatically
embodies the general logical relations between its objects as denoted by
those lines (for indefinite individuals) and the names connected to them
(for general concepts).

Incidentally, this is one reason why I argue that the logical order of
determination for the three interpretant trichotomies in sign
classification (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23) is final (destinate), then dynamical
(effective), then immediate (explicit). The one for the nature or mode of
being of the dynamical interpretant is sympathetic/percussive/usual (EP
2:490, 1908 Dec 25) based on whether the *actual *effect of the sign on an
interpreting quasi-mind is a feeling, an exertion, or another sign (cf. CP
4.536, 1906). The sheet of assertion is a strictly *logical *quasi-mind, so
it can *only *be determined to another sign, namely, an EG that is
explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be
represented by such an EG, the hypothetic/categorical/relative trichotomy
for the immediate interpretant must come *after *the
sympathetic/percussive/usual trichotomy for the dynamical interpretant. If
it were the other way around, as some scholars advocate, then *only *relative
propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List, I think, continuity means a gradient without steps. By looking at the gradient with a microscope, we see steps (e.g. quantums). By looking at the inner and outer edges of the steps, we see, that they are rounded (e.g. due to the Heisenbergean blurredness), so continuous again. By looking at these roundings, we see steps again (e.g. due to superstrings), and so on. Maybe this is so, maybe not. Maybe by experimental observations like these, we cannot tell, whether continuity or discreteness is more fundamental in terms of the smallest scale. But logically, I guess, that continuity is more fundamental, because it is easier to imagine, that a sharp-seeming edge is in fact rounded, than to imagine, that a rounding in fact has steps. The latter idea is more complicated, and refuting it is solely justified as application of Ockham´s razor. A gradient, like a rounding, is one thing, but steps are many things. The idea of one thing is easier than the idea of many things. But all in all, I have talked about my head and neck, because I am not so sure anymore about what I have written in my last post: Prescission may be interpolation too??

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 18:31 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative within continuity. But what is continuity? 

 

I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, Nature, God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a ‘rational action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more complex networked discreteness, operative within evolving habits-of-formation [and chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of the realities of both 2ns and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, importantly, the indexicality of locality. 

 

If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this ‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps in..and….

 

Edwina

 

On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both Firstness and Secondness. . 

 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 

 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

 

Edwina

 

 

 

Again, my understanding of this is that 




On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 



Mike:
 

I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative 
within continuity. But what is continuity? 

I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie 
discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, Nature, 
God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a ‘rational 
action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more complex 
networked discreteness, operative within evolving habits-of-formation [and 
chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of the realities of both 2ns 
and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, importantly, the 
indexicality of locality. 

If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we 
have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming 
into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as 
Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this 
‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. 
After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps in..and….

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by 
> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or 
> actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So 
> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it 
> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because 
> a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be 
> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from 
> continuity, to logically handle it.
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Peirce-L" 
> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing 
> Semiotic Project)
> List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
> establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
> established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
> Firstness and Secondness. . 
>  
> Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
> free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
> basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
> of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
> 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not 
> the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by 
> the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 
>  
> As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
> ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
> potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. 
> ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 
>  
> Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to 
> .
>  
> Edwina
>  
>  
>  
> Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
>  
> Mike:
>  
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon
>  
>  
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  > wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>>  
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>>  
>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism 
>> suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in 
>> philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both Firstness and Secondness. . 

 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 

 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

 

Edwina

 

 

 

Again, my understanding of this is that 




On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 



Mike:
 

I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.

 

Regards,

 

Jon






 






 


On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:



Hi Jon,

To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)

Best, Mike

On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:



Mike:
 

I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.

 

However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:



Hi Jon,

Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say I suspect Edwina does as well):

 

What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.

One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
Firstness and Secondness. . 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the 
same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the 
universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which 
I see as continuity/synechism. 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

Edwina



Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Mike:
> 
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  > wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>> Mike:
>>> 
>>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>>> 
>>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought 
>>> synechism suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime 
>>> importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he 
>>> also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity 
>>> governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, 
>>> EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already 
>>> outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, 
>>> and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 
>>> 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman >> > wrote:
 Hi Jon,
 
 Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say 
 I suspect Edwina does as well):
 
 
> What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, 
> if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
 Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on 
 evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs 
 the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.
 One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their 
 too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis 
 as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal 
 categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of 
 Nature and its manifestations.
 
 Best, Mike
 
>> -- 
>> __
>> 
>> Michael K. Bergman
>> 319.621.5225
>> http://mkbergman.com 
>> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
>> __ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike:

I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have
said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my
understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire
universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities
(1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their
dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in
discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.

Regards,

Jon

On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the
> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be
> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the
> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>
> Best, Mike
> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Mike:
>
> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake
> to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy,
> and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the
> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of
> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>
> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought *synechism
> *suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in
> philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I
> carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole
> domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This
> has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the
> categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from
> 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from
> 1ns and 2ns.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say
>> I suspect Edwina does as well):
>>
>> What I *can *say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines
>> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the
>> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if
>> it is not composed exclusively of signs."
>>
>> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on
>> evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the
>> classical. These are a focus of my current studies.
>>
>> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their
>> too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis
>> as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal
>> categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of
>> Nature and its manifestations.
>>
>> Best, Mike
>>
> --
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Edwinia, Mike

First, thanks to JAS for his well crafted initial post and an a direct inquiry 
to him if those are the only relevant citations to the intermingling of 
grammatical semantics with CSP’s notion of a copulant.
I strongly suspect a deeper meaning is to be found in other manuscripts. I 
would suggest that extension of trichotomy to ’n’ other semantic terms (scores, 
hundreds of different names) demands further attachments of meanings or 
augmentations to the notions of copulant <—> predicate illations and 
illationships. Just a feeling.

Edwinia and Mike:

The following comments are motivated by subtle “differences that make a 
difference” between the vernacular scientific usages in the 19th Century and 
current (21 st century) partitions of disciplinary languages into various 
‘levels’ of semiotic meanings (as given by the imaginative but perhaps not 
meaningful jargon “inter-theoretic modalities of reasoning”.) 

 I presuppose that “The Proper Way in Logic” was a bit hasty and the intended 
meaning was “A Proper Way…)

I believe that both of you are missing, relative to 21st Century logic, the 
crucial distinctions in CSP’s text that motivated the historical developments 
of Russell / Quine notions of relational logics in the first half of the 20 th 
Century.  (As a remote yet pertinent aside, according to R. Cook), the symbolic 
logics used today, can be separated into four dialects: mathematics, computer 
science, formal logics and linguistics (see, for example, the book by 
Skardowska, Logic - Language -Ontology (2022), but that is a topic for another 
day.)

The modal logics of modern form (see, Non-Classical Logics by Graham Preist and 
Relevant Logics by Stephen Read.) are remote from these citations.  The reason 
they are is very simple. 

The developments of symbolic logics introduced a “sound and complete” set of 
symbols to relate the object language to the interpretant language(s).  The 
relationships between subject and predicate are symbolically remote from CSP’s 
assertions about the linguistic consequences of the antecedents of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness as adjectives.

Furthermore, among the principle reasons I  invested years in the construction 
of the logics of chemistry was because of the foundational differences between 
the copula and the predicate in vernacular English that ascribes meanings to 
chemical sentences. 

The citations unearthed by Jon are vaguely in the neighborhood of current 
molecular-biological usage of material illations respecting empirical causal 
measurements and consistencies.  Minor, but significant editorial changes could 
conjoin CSP’s texts to modern chemical grammars describing chemical structures.

Secondly, I ask, is everyone conflating the subtle distinctions between CSP’s 
usage of continuants and mathematical continuity?  This remains one of the 
modern dilemmas in distinguishing quanta theories of science (QM) from 
continuous variables of physical semiotics (such as thermodynamics.)

Looking forward to future developments of Jon’s unearthings.

Cheers

Jerry 



 

> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Mike list
> 
> I agree with your comments. Synechism is the functionality of Thirdness [the 
> becoming governed by laws} 5.4] - and isn’t the penultimate, because, just as 
> you say - the world requires the discrete and discontinuousness of 
> ontological Secondness [entropy] and also- the chance functions of Firstness. 
> 
> Indeed, Peirce in his critique of Hegel, considered that Thirdness “is an 
> essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, 
> since this category [which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit] 
> can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to 
> work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being 
> of feeling on which to act” 5.436….and Peirce continues that he differs from 
> Hegel’s  ‘absolute idealism’. By which “it is sundered by its vigorous denial 
> that the third category [which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking] 
> suffices to make the world “…and Pierce also rejects Hegels’ rejection of 
> ’the first two stages [ ie 1ns and 2ns].
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
>> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:14 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Jon,
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> Best, Mike
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>> Mike: 
>>> 
>>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>>> hypothetical science of mathematics and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mike list

I agree with your comments. Synechism is the functionality of Thirdness [the 
becoming governed by laws} 5.4] - and isn’t the penultimate, because, just as 
you say - the world requires the discrete and discontinuousness of ontological 
Secondness [entropy] and also- the chance functions of Firstness. 

Indeed, Peirce in his critique of Hegel, considered that Thirdness “is an 
essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, 
since this category [which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit] 
can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to 
work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of 
feeling on which to act” 5.436….and Peirce continues that he differs from 
Hegel’s  ‘absolute idealism’. By which “it is sundered by its vigorous denial 
that the third category [which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking] 
suffices to make the world “…and Pierce also rejects Hegels’ rejection of ’the 
first two stages [ ie 1ns and 2ns].

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:14 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Jon,
> 
> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>> 
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>> 
>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism 
>> suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in 
>> philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I 
>> carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole 
>> domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This 
>> has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the 
>> categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 
>> 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 
>> 1ns and 2ns.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> 
>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman > > wrote:
>>> Hi Jon,
>>> 
>>> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say I 
>>> suspect Edwina does as well):
>>> 
>>> 
 What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
 semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
 entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if 
 it is not composed exclusively of signs."
>>> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on evolution, 
>>> emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the classical. 
>>> These are a focus of my current studies.
>>> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their too 
>>> literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis as a 
>>> Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal categories 
>>> to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of Nature and 
>>> its manifestations.
>>> 
>>> Best, Mike
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>> https://cspeirce.com   and, just as well, at 
>> https://www.cspeirce.com  .  It'll take a while 
>> to repair / update all the links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu  . 
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>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> -- 
> __
> 
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225
> http://mkbergman.com 
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __ 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Mike Bergman]

Hi Jon,

To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires 
the discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage 
left.)


Best, Mike

On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Mike:

I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a 
mistake to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's 
philosophy, and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded 
in both the hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal 
positive science of phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as 
an organizing principle.


However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought 
/synechism /suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime 
importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since 
he also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that 
continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of 
it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I 
have already outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded 
from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be 
built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:

Hi Jon,

Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you
(dare I say I suspect Edwina does as well):


What I /can /say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who
confines semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with
Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is
"perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."

Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on
evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the
quantum vs the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.

One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is
their too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even
elevating semiosis as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have
found the universal categories to be a more robust grounding to
generalize to the entirety of Nature and its manifestations.

Best, Mike


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com   and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com  .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go topeirc...@list.iupui.edu  .
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--
__

Michael K. Bergman
319.621.5225
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike:

I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to
treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and
that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the
hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of
phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.

However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought *synechism
*suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in
philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I
carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole
domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This
has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the
categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from
3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from
1ns and 2ns.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say
> I suspect Edwina does as well):
>
> What I *can *say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines
> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the
> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if
> it is not composed exclusively of signs."
>
> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on
> evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the
> classical. These are a focus of my current studies.
>
> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their
> too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis
> as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal
> categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of
> Nature and its manifestations.
>
> Best, Mike
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary, Jon, List,

As Peirce frequently pointed out, he had a solid understanding of all the 
methods of reasoning from the ancient Greeks to the medieval Scholastics to the 
methods from the Renaissance to the early 20th C.

In general, the "proper way" depends very much on the theorem proving 
algorithms.  Peirce did not invent the method of transforming a sentence to 
make 'is' the verb that connects subject and predicate.  That method was 
invented by Aristotle and systematized by Boethius.  It was widely used in 19th 
c textbooks,
which were the ones that everybody, including Peirce, had studied .

For the differences between Plato and Aristotle, see slides 13 to 24 of 
https://jfsowa.com/talks/patolog1.pdf .  For Aristotle's syllogisms and the 
methods for transforming sentences to make 'is' the main verb, see slides 25 to 
32.   The remainder of patolog1 discusses other patterns of logic from the 
middle ages to modern times, including those by Frege and Peirce.  For more 
about modern methods, including Peirce's influence on them, see patolog2, 3, 4, 
and 5.

Fundamental principle:  The methods of transforming formal logics are 
reversible.  Anything represented in one format can be translated back and 
forth without loss of information.  But transformations to and from natural 
languages and other formats -- formal, informal, linguistic, or graphic -- can 
lose information (or even worse DISTORT or CORRUPT Information).

When Peirce wrote anything on logic, he assumed that his readers were familiar 
with the kind of material summarized in patolog1.pdf.  It's helpful to read 
that in order to distinguish Peirce's innovations from his sources and his 
assumptions about his readers.   Modern methods of reasoning often transform 
the logic to different formats to adapt them to various algorithms.  Those 
transformations are reversible (provided that both formats have equal 
expressibility).

Re dicisigns:  Stjernfelt emphasized the trichotomy of rheme, dicisign, and 
argument because he was developing methods of reasoning with sources in natural 
languages.

But Peirce moved to the more general triad of seme, pheme, and delome, which 
allow diagrams and images as representations.  He made that switch in 1904-5 
when he was mapping images in the phaneron to existential graphs.  Note that he 
continued to use the term 'phemic sheet' up to the end.  But he never used the 
word 'dicisign' after he introduced the word 'pheme'.  That is an indication of 
the way his theories were developing.  And I believe that his correspondence 
with Lady Welby had a strong influence on that development.

John
___

From: "Edwina Taborsky" 

Gary, list

Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current 
research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’  - which, very often, 
doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic 
framework of morphological formation,  information generation, transmission and 
transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of 
matter and mind] …is extensive. I’d say that these are all analyses well within 
the notion of the dicisign- ie, the concept that information generation, 
processing etc is not dependent on language or even consciousness but is a 
basic process in the biological and physico-chemical realms. ..operative within 
sensate rather than symbolic networking. And - I’d say that these fit the 
definition of a dicisign propositional interaction, where meanings 
[Interpretants]  are in direct or factual connection to the object. The problem 
is - as noted - this research doesn’t use Peircean terminology!

Edwina

On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:

Edwina, List,

ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and 
artificial worlds.

Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the literature. 
Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of which I knew.

My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. I 
wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything 
possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in 
consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"  the dicisign 
being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called Stjernfelt's book 
"an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and criticizes theories 
and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, 
biosemiotics etc."

So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields 
other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular 
matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond 
logic as we generally think of it.

Btw, here is another book I'd 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Mike Bergman]

Hi Jon,

Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I 
say I suspect Edwina does as well):


What I /can /say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that 
the entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with 
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on 
evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs 
the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.


One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their 
too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating 
semiosis as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the 
universal categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the 
entirety of Nature and its manifestations.


Best, Mike

On 2/11/2024 2:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Gary, List:

It has been several years since I read /Natural Propositions/, so I 
will not be able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's 
more recent book includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees 
dancing. What I /can /say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who 
confines semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with 
Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is 
"perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." I 
take the additional step, fully consistent with his overarching 
synechism though never explicitly expressed in his writings, of 
conceiving it as a /semiosic continuum/--an ongoing inferential 
process whose parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless and 
until they are deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of 
propositions is one such purpose; after all ...


CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe
itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by
being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible
to determining an interpretant which would be the /perfect Truth/,
the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901)


If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every 
sign is to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe 
itself that has the structure of a proposition, then the importance of 
understanding the structure of a proposition should be obvious. 
Moreover ...


CSP: A /state of things/ is an abstract constituent part of
reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to
represent it. There is but one /individual/, or completely
determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A /fact
/is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it
can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term
"simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a
comparative expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)


Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded 
from reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed 
Existential Graph on the otherwise blank sheet that represents the 
entire continuum of true propositions within the universe of 
discourse. In both cases, the whole is ontologically prior to its 
parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts and the sheet of 
assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than an argument 
is built up of discrete propositions.


CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a
motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the
very essence of it. ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that
nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and
an Instant is a fiction, or /ens rationis/), but Positions are
either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else
(what is the better view), are /entia rationis/ (i.e. fictions
recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented
for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so
likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the
essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest,
or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are
either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are
artificial creations intended to render the description of
Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order
serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295, 1906)


The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well 
as monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are 
degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis--"The one 
intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism," 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I am unaware of anyone who "confines semiosis to the biological realm”!! Never 
heard of such a thing!  But, of course, there are many who confine semiosis to 
the human mind realm - and many who reject the operation of semiosis within the 
physicochemical realms.

As I’ve said - my point is that there are many researchers who are actually 
examining the semiotic function within non-human realms - but are not using 
Peircean terms.  The difficulty, as I’ve said, of accessing and deciphering the 
Peircean texts - as well as the isolationism of the Peircean community - has, I 
think, led to this separation. 

I think it would be instructive for Peirceans to actually explore the work 
being done in biological, physico-chemical and AI areas and see how- using 
different terms from Peirce - there are strong correlations to Peirce in their 
arguments. The additional emphasis in their work on material, concrete 
examples, is, I feel, extremely helpful in moving Peircean analysis from the 
purely argumentative and hypothetical into the pragmatic realism that, after 
all, was Peirce’s basic agenda.

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 3:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary, List:
> 
> It has been several years since I read Natural Propositions, so I will not be 
> able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's more recent book 
> includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees dancing. What I can say is 
> that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological 
> realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast 
> representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
> exclusively of signs." I take the additional step, fully consistent with his 
> overarching synechism though never explicitly expressed in his writings, of 
> conceiving it as a semiosic continuum--an ongoing inferential process whose 
> parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless and until they are 
> deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of propositions is one 
> such purpose; after all ...
> 
> CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a 
> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The 
> purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other 
> signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which 
> would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may 
> use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901)
> 
> If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every sign is 
> to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe itself that has the 
> structure of a proposition, then the importance of understanding the 
> structure of a proposition should be obvious. Moreover ...
> 
> CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a 
> nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one 
> individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of 
> reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that 
> it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," 
> here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 
> 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)
> 
> Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded from 
> reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed Existential Graph on 
> the otherwise blank sheet that represents the entire continuum of true 
> propositions within the universe of discourse. In both cases, the whole is 
> ontologically prior to its parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts 
> and the sheet of assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than an 
> argument is built up of discrete propositions.
> 
> CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built 
> up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... 
> Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact 
> Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens 
> rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of 
> small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. 
> fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for 
> the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought 
> (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) 
> cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential 
> process; and propositions are either roughly described states of 
> Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the 
> description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second 
> order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295, 
> 1906)
> 
> The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary, List:

It has been several years since I read *Natural Propositions*, so I will
not be able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's more
recent book includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees dancing. What
I *can *say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis
to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire
universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs." I take the additional step, fully
consistent with his overarching synechism though never explicitly expressed
in his writings, of conceiving it as a *semiosic continuum*--an ongoing
inferential process whose parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless
and until they are deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of
propositions is one such purpose; after all ...

CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The
purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant
which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at
least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c.
1901)


If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every sign
is to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe itself that
has the structure of a proposition, then the importance of understanding
the structure of a proposition should be obvious. Moreover ...

CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of
such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but
one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the
all of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of
things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the
term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative
expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)


Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded from
reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed Existential Graph
on the otherwise blank sheet that represents the entire continuum of true
propositions within the universe of discourse. In both cases, the whole is
ontologically prior to its parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts
and the sheet of assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than
an argument is built up of discrete propositions.

CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is
built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of
it. ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an
exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens
rationis*), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of
small range, or else (what is the better view), are *entia rationis* (i.e.
fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented
for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise,
Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of
Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but
inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states
of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the
description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second
order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295, 1906)


The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well as
monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are degenerate
outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis--"The one intelligible theory
of the universe is that of objective idealism," but as a *process *ontology
instead of a *substance *ontology in which "matter is effete mind" (CP
6.25, EP 1:293, 1891). This is just what we would expect in accordance with
Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences.

CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of
logical [i.e., semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but
as truths of being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has
an explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical
explanation, is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of
all being is One; and so far as different subjects have a common character
they partake of an identical being. (CP 1.487, c. 1896)


The common character that all subjects of propositions have is
*intelligibility*, that is, being representable--capable of serving as
dynamical objects of general signs by virtue of belonging to one of the
three Universes of Experience--and thus likewise being of the nature of a
sign, since "Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a
representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, list

Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current 
research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’  - which, very often, 
doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic 
framework of morphological formation,  information generation, transmission and 
transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of 
matter and mind] …is extensive.

 I’d say that these are all analyses well within the notion of the dicisign- 
ie, the concept that information generation, processing etc is not dependent on 
language or even consciousness but is a basic process in the biological and 
physico-chemical realms. ..operative within sensate rather than symbolic 
networking. And - I’d say that these fit the definition of a dicisign 
propositional interaction, where meanings [Interpretants]  are in direct or 
factual connection to the object. The problem is - as noted - this research 
doesn’t use Peircean terminology!

Edwina

> On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
> and artificial worlds.
> 
> Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the 
> literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of 
> which I knew.
> 
> My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. 
> I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything 
> possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in 
> consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"  the 
> dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called 
> Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and 
> criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, 
> anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."
> 
> So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields 
> other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular 
> matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond 
> logic as we generally think of it.
> 
> Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's 
> influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.
> 
> Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life 
> Vinicius Romanini (Editor), Eliseo Fernández 
> 
>  (Editor)
> 
> The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by 
> distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.
> 
> Table of Contents
> 
> Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N. 
> Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A. 
> Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics; 
> R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and Biosemiotics; E. 
> Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life; M. Hulswit, V. 
> Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the Intelligible: Peircean 
> Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. 
> Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean Informational Perspective: 
> Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da Silveira, M.E. Quilici 
> Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other Legisigns: More than a mere 
> Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J. Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols 
> and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry; J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a 
> Living Process; V. Romanini.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
>> Gary R,list
>> 
>> I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
>> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
>> and artificial worlds.
>> 
>> A few quick examples: 
>> 
>> Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
>> February
>> 
>> "Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
>> (Igamberdiev, 2023 
>> ).
>> 
>> "What is the nature of the various types of information that different 
>> living beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform 
>> their regulatory systems? This information is the result of the simultaneous 
>> existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these patterns. In 
>> this context, information is an emergent property of the interaction of two 
>> categories of entities, patterns and receptors.
>> 
>> This duo of conditions, thermodynamic openness and the need for homeostatic 
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of
the focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological,
physic-chemical and artificial worlds.


Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the
literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of
which I knew.

My question, however, *specifically* pointed to Stjernfelt's work on
dicisigns. I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing
everything possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at
all, in consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"
the dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called
Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and
criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology,
anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."

So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields
other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular
matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend
beyond logic as we generally think of it.

Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's
influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.

Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life Vinicius Romanini
(Editor), Eliseo Fernández

 (Editor)

The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by
distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.

*Table of Contents*

Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N.
Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A.
Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for
Biosemiotics; R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and
Biosemiotics; E. Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life;
M. Hulswit, V. Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the
Intelligible: Peircean Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human
Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean
Informational Perspective: Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da
Silveira, M.E. Quilici Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other
Legisigns: More than a mere Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J.
Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry;
J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a Living Process; V. Romanini.
Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R,list
>
> I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the
> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical
> and artificial worlds.
>
> A few quick examples:
>
> *Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems
> 2024 February*
>
> "Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
> (Igamberdiev,
> 2023
> 
> ).
>
> "What is the nature of the various types of information that different
> living beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform
> their regulatory systems? This information is the result of the
> simultaneous existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these
> patterns. In this context, information is an emergent property of the
> interaction of two categories of entities, patterns and receptors.
>
> This duo of conditions, *thermodynamic openness and the need for
> homeostatic regulatory systems*, are inherent to all forms of life that
> we know."
> ———
> *Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .*
> *Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. *
>
> This article actually references Peirce.
> ——
>
> *The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021
> R.Skern Mauritzen*
>
>
> *-*
>  The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of
> informational processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is
> on information processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics
> is all about. [And there are other journals tha examine information
> processing]...
>
> As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the
> same outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many
> Peircean scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like
> fervour,  on the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the
> fact that the same objective processes are being outlined in many papers -
> but- using different terms.
>
> It is no secret that the difficulty of both accessing Peircean texts AND
> the obscure terminology [AND, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R,list

I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the focus 
in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and 
artificial worlds.

A few quick examples: 

Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
February

"Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
(Igamberdiev, 2023 
).

"What is the nature of the various types of information that different living 
beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform their 
regulatory systems? This information is the result of the simultaneous 
existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these patterns. In 
this context, information is an emergent property of the interaction of two 
categories of entities, patterns and receptors.

This duo of conditions, thermodynamic openness and the need for homeostatic 
regulatory systems, are inherent to all forms of life that we know."
———
Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .
Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. 

This article actually references Peirce.
——

The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021 R.Skern 
Mauritzen

-
 The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of informational 
processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is on information 
processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics is all about. [And 
there are other journals tha examine information processing]...

As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the same 
outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many Peircean 
scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like fervour,  on 
the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the fact that the same 
objective processes are being outlined in many papers - but- using different 
terms.

It is no secret that the difficulty of both accessing Peircean texts AND the 
obscure terminology [AND, I’ll add, the isolationism of the Peircean scholarly 
set]  has hindered the widespread use of Peircean theories. But -once past 
these Walls  - it is clear that the Peircean analysis is a fundamental outline 
of both the natural and human worlds of information processing.  

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 12:23 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify 
> Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:
> 
> JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical 
> nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must 
> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and 
> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the 
> proposition.
> 
> Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move of 
> Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural 
> Propositions." In his extraordinary book, Natural Propositions: The Actuality 
> of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at his word, so to 
> speak, and generalizes the meaning of proposition well beyond the 
> logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which biosemioticians 
> naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know what lasting impact 
> -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, as far as I can tell, 
> it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. This antipathy was 
> suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering at Roosevelt 
> University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius Romanini to read a 
> paper he himself could not deliver since officials refused to allow him to 
> board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his Italian, rather than his 
> Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several Peircean-inspired 
> biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at every turn.
> 
> Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in Natural Propositions that Peirce's 
> generalization of the logical concept of proposition to dicisign as to 
> include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of the greatest 
> consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our specie's 
> intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not necessarily 
> require human language, thought, and logic -- not human consciousness -- 
> whatsoever. 
> 
> I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable 
> interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most 
> interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the 
> generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into the 
> natural world. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> 
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify
Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:

JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the
*indexical *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since
one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand
them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of
the proposition.


Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move
of Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural
Propositions." In his extraordinary book, *Natural Propositions: The
Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns*, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at
his word, so to speak, and generalizes the meaning of *proposition* well
beyond the logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which
biosemioticians naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know
what lasting impact -- if any -- his book has had in that community since,
as far as I can tell, it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking.
This antipathy was suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering
at Roosevelt University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius
Romanini to read a paper he himself could not deliver since officials
refused to allow him to board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his
Italian, rather than his Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several
Peircean-inspired biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at
every turn.

Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in *Natural Propositions* that
Peirce's generalization of the logical concept of *proposition* to
*dicisign *as to include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of
the greatest consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our
specie's intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not
necessarily require human language, thought, and logic -- not human
consciousness -- whatsoever.

I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable
interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most
interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the
generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into
the natural world.

Best,

Gary Richmond


On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in
> Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking.
>
>
> Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late
> 1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and
> decisively. Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the 
> *indexical
> *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must
> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and
> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of the
> proposition. By contrast, standard first-order predicate logic goes the
> other way, throwing everything possible into the predicate and leaving only
> quantified variables as the subjects. Peirce himself endorses that approach
> in some earlier writings.
>
> CSP: The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the whole substance of
> the Dicisign into the Predicate. (CP 2.318, 1903)
>
>
> CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after
> all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains
> a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or
> otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be
> prescribed. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)
>
> CSP: Take the proposition "Burnt child shuns fire." ... On this view, the
> predicate is, "is either not a child or has not been burned, or has no
> opportunity of shunning fire or does shun fire"; while the subject is "any
> individual object the interpreter may select from the universe of ordinary
> everyday experience." (CP 5.473, 1907)
>
>
> "Cain killed Abel" becomes "there exists an *x* and there exists a *y*
> such that *x* is Cain and *y* is Abel and *x* stands in the relation of
> killing to *y*." It is an interesting historical fact that the usual
> abbreviated notation for such formulations is derived from one developed by
> Peirce--for these two examples, ∀*x* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ S*x*) = ∀*x* ((C*x* ∧
> B*x*) → S*x*) and ∃*x *∃*y *(C*x* ∧ A*y* ∧ K*xy*). Still, notice how
> compact the natural language expressions are, by virtue of utilizing syntax
> that iconically matches the flow of causation instead of spelling
> everything out with symbols. Likewise, as Frederik Stjernfelt observes on
> pages 138 and 172 of his 2022 book, *Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in
> Peirce*, EGs are more iconic than the corresponding algebraic expressions
> in the specific sense that each indefinite individual--now a line of
> identity instead of a variable--always appears *exactly 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary, List:

GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in
Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking.


Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late
1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and
decisively. Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes
the *indexical
*nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must
already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and
leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of the
proposition. By contrast, standard first-order predicate logic goes the
other way, throwing everything possible into the predicate and leaving only
quantified variables as the subjects. Peirce himself endorses that approach
in some earlier writings.

CSP: The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the whole substance of the
Dicisign into the Predicate. (CP 2.318, 1903)


CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after
all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains
a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or
otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be
prescribed. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)

CSP: Take the proposition "Burnt child shuns fire." ... On this view, the
predicate is, "is either not a child or has not been burned, or has no
opportunity of shunning fire or does shun fire"; while the subject is "any
individual object the interpreter may select from the universe of ordinary
everyday experience." (CP 5.473, 1907)


"Cain killed Abel" becomes "there exists an *x* and there exists a *y* such
that *x* is Cain and *y* is Abel and *x* stands in the relation of killing
to *y*." It is an interesting historical fact that the usual abbreviated
notation for such formulations is derived from one developed by Peirce--for
these two examples, ∀*x* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ S*x*) = ∀*x* ((C*x* ∧ B*x*) → S*x*)
and ∃*x *∃*y *(C*x* ∧ A*y* ∧ K*xy*). Still, notice how compact the natural
language expressions are, by virtue of utilizing syntax that iconically
matches the flow of causation instead of spelling everything out with
symbols. Likewise, as Frederik Stjernfelt observes on pages 138 and 172 of
his 2022 book, *Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in Peirce*, EGs are more
iconic than the corresponding algebraic expressions in the specific sense
that each indefinite individual--now a line of identity instead of a
variable--always appears *exactly once*, instead of at least twice; in
these cases, four and three times, respectively.

[image: image.png]

Technically, in "burnt child shuns fire," shunning is a *dyadic *relation
whose additional correlate is fire. That makes the algebraic notation ∀*x* ∀
*y* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ ¬F*y* ∨ S*xy*)) = ∀*x* ∀*y* ((C*x* ∧ B*x* ∧ F*y*) → S
*xy*). Throwing everything possible into the predicate, there are now two
subjects (lowercase letters) and four predicates (uppercase letters).
Throwing everything possible into the subject, there are six subjects--four
general concepts (names) and two indefinite individuals (lines of
identity)--and a single pure/continuous predicate (syntax).

[image: image.png]

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 4:12 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it.
> This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of
> times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of
> the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge.
>
> CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more
> ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject
> whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
> proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
> interpreter is requisite. ... The result is that everything in a
> proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving
> the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses
> (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___ to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is
> at once ___ and ___ ,' etc.
>
>
> It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic,"
> which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. But it becomes
> understandable that "a proposition may have any number of subjects but
> can have but one predicate which is invariably general, namely, a *pure *
> or *continuous *predicate that cannot be analyzed further and expresses
> the logical relations between the subjects."
>
>
> As to your question: JAS: "Where do these different constituent signs
> within a proposition fit into Peirce's late taxonomies?
>
> You answered: JAS: They are distinguished in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it.
This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of
times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of
the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge.

 CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more
ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject
whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
interpreter is requisite. ... The result is that everything in a
proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving
the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses
(as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___ to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is
at once ___ and ___ ,' etc.


It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic,"
which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. But it becomes
understandable that "a proposition may have any number of subjects but can
have but one predicate which is invariably general, namely, a *pure *or
*continuous *predicate that cannot be analyzed further and expresses the
logical relations between the subjects."


As to your question: JAS: "Where do these different constituent signs
within a proposition fit into Peirce's late taxonomies?

You answered: JAS: They are distinguished in his trichotomy according to
the mode of presentation of the *immediate* object, as he explains in
another late 1908 writing."

This will require a bit more study on my behalf. But this summary sentence
is clear enough:

JAS: When a proposition is expressed linguistically in a sentence, the
subjects that denote its objects are either *descriptive* names or
*designative* pronouns or gestures, while the pure/continuous predicate
that signifies its interpretant is often a *copulant* sign.


Equally clear is the question of "a sentence like "Cain killed Abel," which
includes no words except those serving as its subjects," Peirce's answer,
given in this lovely passage, explains it quite nicely (within the context
of the entire quotation, of course).

CSP: What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of
causation*. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in
Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and
that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making
acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of
causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired
that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the
syntax of every tongue.


Finally, the whole matter is tied up in your concluding paragraph which
begins with this idea.

JAS: Pure/continuous predicates are sometimes conveyed entirely by *syntax*,
which in natural languages tends to reflect "the flow of causation."


In conclusion: Jon,  I did not expect such a complete response to my
request for an explication of this comment in your last post:

JAS: *The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign* to
be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
recognition that *every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
denotes one of its objects*, while *its syntax is the pure predicate that
iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
relations*. (I've added the emphasis I put in this quotation as a kind of
"more iconic" diagram for the purpose of studying your post today. GR).

Again, much appreciated. Thank you for taking the time and making the
effort to explain at length that which was succinctly -- albeit abstractly
-- posited in that single sentence I just added emphasis to above. As
usual, quotations and examples proved extremely helpful.

Best,

Gary Richmond



On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 2:40 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> GR: However, this passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be
> entirely clear.
>
>
> I am happy to elaborate, although it is mostly a matter of providing
> rather extensive excerpts from the various relevant passages that I merely
> cited at the end of my last post. I apologize for the resulting length of
> this one, but so many exact quotations should preclude anyone from getting
> the wrong impression that I am attributing views to Peirce without
> demonstrating that he explicitly states them in his own words--repeatedly,
> in fact.
>
> JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be
> understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
> recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
> denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that
> iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
> relations.
>
>
> Francesco 

[PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary, List:

GR: However, this passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be
entirely clear.


I am happy to elaborate, although it is mostly a matter of providing rather
extensive excerpts from the various relevant passages that I merely cited
at the end of my last post. I apologize for the resulting length of this
one, but so many exact quotations should preclude anyone from getting the
wrong impression that I am attributing views to Peirce without
demonstrating that he explicitly states them in his own words--repeatedly,
in fact.

JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be
understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that
iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
relations.


Francesco Bellucci discusses this analysis of a proposition in two papers,
"Peirce's Continuous Predicates" (
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.49.2.178) and "Peirce
and the Unity of the Proposition" (
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.50.2.201), as well as
section 8.4 of his comprehensive book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic
as Semiotics*. I have been pondering it anew over the last few weeks, ever
since I pointed out on the List that any Existential Graph (EG)
representing a proposition involving a genuine triadic relation must
include at least four different names--for the relation itself (such as
giving or representing/mediating) and its three correlates (such as
gift/giver/recipient or sign/object/interpretant). This demonstrates a
logical principle that Peirce spells out in several late 1908 writings.

CSP: I term anything named in the assertion a Subject, and although I do
not always express myself so accurately, I regard everything to which the
assertion relates and to which reference can be removed from the predicate,
although what is referred to be a quality, relation, state of things, etc.
as a Subject. Thus one assertion may have any number of Subjects. Thus, in
the assertion "Some roses are red," i.e. possess the color redness, the
color redness is one of the Subjects; but I do not make "possession" a
Subject, as if the assertion were, "Some roses are in the relation of
possession to redness," because this would not remove relation from the
predicate, since the words "are in" are here equivalent to "are subjects
of," that is, are related to the relation of possession of redness. For to
be in relation to X, and to be in relation to a relation to X mean the same
thing. If therefore I were to put "relation" into the subject at all, I
ought in consistency to put it in infinitely many times, and indeed this
would not be sufficient. It is like a continuous line: no matter what one
cuts off from it a line remains. So I do not attempt to regard "A is B" as
meaning "A is identical to something that is B." I call "is in the relation
to" and "is identical with" Continuous Relations, and I leave such in the
Predicate. The Predicate is that part of the assertion which is signified
as the logical connexion between the Subjects. (R 611, 1908 Oct 28)

CSP: I consider my theories of scientific reasoning to be of high
importance, and also my idea (obtained by logical analysis), that the
division of all logical terms into those of valencies 1, 2, and > 2, where
'valency' refers to the fact that, in existential graphs, every predicate
has either a single connexion with one subject (as in "it rains" where the
predicate is the present phenomenon and the subject is *rain* or
*pluviation*); or secondly, it is a dyadic relative between two subjects
and has valency = 2, as Napoleon was mortal, where Napoleon and Mortality
are the two subjects, or finally, it connects more than two subjects, as
the word *and* does when expressing as is usual *coidentity*, as in
'Napoleon was mortal and mendacious.' ... A proposition can be separated
into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one. But the proper way in
logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient
knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral
experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite. ... The result is
that everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into
the subjects, leaving the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such
as 'is,' 'possesses (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___
to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is at once ___ and ___ ,' etc. A *Pure Predicate *should
be 'continuous' or 'self-containing' as '*A* is coexistent with *B*' =
'*A* coexists
with something that coexists with *B*,' and '*A* possesses the character *ρ*'
= '*A *possesses the character of possessing the character *ρ*' and '*A* stands
in the relation *λ* to *B*' = '*A* stands in the relation of being in the
relation of standing in it to the relation *λ*