Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
List, John: 3.418. "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under which it suits our purposes to state the fact." On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collierwrote: > Jerry, > > I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of > firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking > about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You > aren’t talking about Peirce, here when you say things like > > > > > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when > we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. > > > > Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. > > > > Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views on > firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion). > > > Basically, John, your response is irrelevant to what I am saying. By way of background, I have had a lifelong interest in metaphysics and the relations between the sciences and metaphysics. Obviously, my interest is closely related to medicine and the biological sciences where the science of physics can contribute by contributing utterly simplistic calculations of the relevant but relative units for particular situations (identities.) The physical units, in and of themselves, are given biological meaning only by the union of them. Back to the issue at hand. Metaphysics, as an mode of human thinking and communication, must start with words, words with meaning for the author, either as utterances or symbolic expressions on a 'sheet of assertion' or another media. No one individual (such as physicist) can impose, for humanity as a whole, a particular meaning on the starting units, or the union of such starting units, or, more generally, on part-whole relatives and part-whole relations. More directly, a metaphysical proposition may be stated in many different languages and symbol systems. Thus, the mereology of metaphysical propositions may draw upon terms and symbols as desired by the author of metaphysical propositions. Further, a metaphysics without part-whole relations (scaling) and identity can hardly be a metaphysics AT ALL as neither emergence or evolution could be relatives. Frankly, I interpret your metaphysics, after reading your posts for more than a decade on this and other list serves as well as personal conversations from time to time, your metaphysics is merely the science of physics (unless you have had a recent epiphany.) >From my perspective, you capture the essence of being with your defense of the >phrase, "It's from bits". CSP is clear enough about meaning of a fact or a unit of measure: 3.418. "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under which it suits our purposes to state the fact." Let's just agree to disagree, John. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
Jerry, List: I believe my metaphysics are those of C.S. Peirce. Peirce's pope-positivism is also assumed explicitly in our book, Every Thing Must Go, which does take modern physics as a starting point. So perhaps I have made my ideas clear, and the resulting argument is pretty straight-forward. Most metaphysical problems, especially of the sort you are concerned with, are dissolved on this approach, which was certainly Peirce's intention. As I said in my response to Franklin, you can take the negation of some of Peirce's central claims, and get other results. I have yet to see a clear statement of either your objections to the Peircean position, or what you consider to be an alternative. Starting by stating explicitly which parts of Peirce's methodology you reject might help me here. I have been using Peircean methodology more and more explicitly since my PhD thesis (1984), which uses Peirce's pragmatic maxim (a version of it - he had many versions that are presumably equivalent at some level - much like Kant's categorical imperative) and his positivist motives. I have been minimizing my metaphysical commitments for some time, though I spent a period as a raving Platonist when I was an undergraduate, probably under the influence of reading too much B. Russell rather naively. This is a Peirce list, after all. But I think that it is actually a relevant question which of Peirce's basic assumptions (all thought is in signs, objectivity requires that differences in meaning are determined by differences in expectations of possible experience, there is an identifiable set of external object to which some of our signs pick out that are mostly accessible through sensory observations - some exceptions involving evaluation of outcomes, but still involving observation and possible observations) one can coherently give up. Assuming we disagree, and I am not convinced there is any meaningful basis for the apparent disagreement, and I don't yet see what it is, I proposed some possibilities recently of where we disagree, like rationalism of a form that rejects the Pragmatic Maxim, or Peirce's empirical criterion for cognitive significance, or both. (Rationalism I take to be, as is traditional, that there are synthetic a priori truths, i.e., truths discoverable and justifiable by reason that are not the results of definitions and/or methodological commitments). Unlike the Logical Positivists, I don't think it is possible or wise to try to eliminate metaphysics entirely. Their program collapsed in its own terms. But it is best to keep it minimal. I think the alternative produces unclear ideas of an especially convoluted (involuted?) sort. However that may be, I am still not at all clear what our different presuppositions are, let alone what the basis of the difference might be. My metaphysics is not just physics, but a physics supported but not implied position called Structural Realism in the philosophical literature. Actually, I have a slightly more restrictive form that Cliff Hooker and I call Dynamical Realism. Being more restrictive means that it requires additional argument, the arguments being distinctly metaphysical and not physical. It is the starting point for many of my recent papers that have something like "A dynamical approach to ..." in the title. My scientific background (I did research in government, business and academics) is in planetary science, which is mostly the study of inorganic dynamical systems, so it is my touchstone for scientific methodology (arguably the notion of complexly organized systems originated in a lab in the building that held most of my classes, run by Lorenz - planetary dynamics is another source). John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 7:13 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: John Collier Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity. List, John: 3.418. "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under which it suits our purposes to state the fact." On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collierwrote: Jerry, I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You aren't talking about Peirce, here when you say things like [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to
RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
Dear Franklin, List members: I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without accepting this argument I lay out. Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the defeater requirement). Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no contradiction between his views about experience, and the physical, and at least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. In order to make our ideas clear we need to make reference to this external component, on pain of subjectivism, psychologism, and making distinctions in thoughts that have no distinction in their objects. So Peirce’s prope-postivism also takes us back to the Pragmatic Maxim, that thought is all in signs, and his notion of the basis of experience. Obviously there are some assumptions here, and one could reject any one of them (accept subjectivism, or psychologism, or other forms of antirealism, as examples), which many philosophers do. But the assumptions are made deeply in Peirce’s philosophy. I think he was right about this. I could give a bunch of references to Peirce’s writings that support my interpretation, but this is long enough already and I have to go shopping. I hope it is at least close to sufficient to respond to your worry. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 2:26 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
John, You said: The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference > in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with > Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it > that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. I've been trying to figure this one out for myself, but am having some trouble, in particular with the "idea that the physical is just what we can experience." Would you be willing to clarify how you mean this? Is physical opposed to mental, and thus the mental is not something we can experience? And/or the spiritual? Or would you include mental and/or spiritual as subdivisions of the physical? My sense of physicalism, aside from your characterization, is that it's the idea that what is real is whatever physics discovers or says is real, which is quite different from what you are suggesting. I hope that you can understand my concern. After all, clearly an idealist could just as easily say that what is mental is whatever we can experience, and I think you can understand that idea. What's the point of calling all of experience one or the other? -- Franklin On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collierwrote: > Jerry, > > > > I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of > firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking > about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You > aren’t talking about Peirce, here when you say things like > > > > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise > when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. > > > > Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical > perspective. > > > > Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views > on firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion). > > > > Unless you understand this you are going to be asking questions without > an answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with > my physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). > The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference > in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with > Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it > that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. Basically, > you err, as I see it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in > meaning, however much it might seem to. It violates Peirce’s > prope-positivism, which he uses to deflate a lot of metaphysics. > > > > Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of > experience Peirce uses, or both, in order to save your distinction. But > then you aren’t talking about Peirce’s firsts when you say they have > structure. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
List, John: On Dec 6, 2015, at 8:04 AM, John Collier wrote: > Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to > something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or > we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to > Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity > test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given > up. Now that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is > objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences > alone without making it depend on psychology rather than objective > conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity > in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred to has to be > of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see to have a > propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an external aspect > in order to support objective differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by > setting aside a class of experiences that are of external things. The child, > he says, learns to recognize that not all things are under his control, but > must be at least in part caused by external influences, so some experience is > composed of signs of the external. This is a very early and necessary > abduction. Membership in this class of supposed externally based experiences > (which Peirce often just identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further > evidence (there are illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most > extreme case – and dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ > examples – though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, > but Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere > possibility – Well said! While several phases are open to refinement, the paragraph captures several of CSP's philosophical positions in a rhetorical sense. The units of thought which ground CSP's trichotomy are readily categorized from the assertion: Meaning has to be referenced to something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given up . Roughly speaking, the external objectivity test (thing - representation - form) was the then nascent science of chemistry. Like mathematics, chemistry used highly abstract symbols to relate invisible objects to one-another, but the logical meaning of chemical symbols was obscure in 19 th Century. CSP was aware that certain mathematical indices were EXACT physical representations of physical measurements and that broad classes of such mathematical calculations were consistent with one-another. (Today, we refer to the logical terms of molecular weight and molecular formula. These are generic terms, that can be applied to any chemical identity.) One of the big "open questions" that CSP studied throughout his life was the question: What is a molecule? Clearly, each chemical element is a relative of every other chemical element. As a collection, the concept of "table of elements" was used to express the relatedness of all elements. The relatedness of all elements was a fact based on analysis of molecules and the difference in the quali-signs of molecules and the fact that certain molecules (Water, Carbon Monoxide, Carbon Dioxide, Methane, Ammonia) could be made from elements. Thus, CSP sought to develop a logic of relatives that was consistent with his knowledge of mathematical calculations of molecular weight and molecular formula, the chemical table of elements, and the diagram as he understood it as a molecular formula. In CSP 3.416, "A relation is a fact about a number of things" is a wide-ranging assertion about his beliefs about his objectivity of facts. It should (must) be contrast with the definitions of relations as variables or as sets. Sections 3.415-3.424 deserve careful reading in this context of his objectivity. Section 3.468-3.483 shows directly the role of chemical relatives, taken as objective facts of chemical relations, are extended into his logic of relatives and his notion of graph theory. Can one conclude that CSP referenced the meaning of objectivity, the meaning of objects and meaning of logic to the nascent generalizations of the consequences of physical measurements expressed in chemical symbols? The union of these units of thought give a unity to a substantial fraction of CSP's claims for realism and the objectivity of the sciences. The three trichotomies, which ground his system of signs, offer substantial support for a recursive system of objective logic consistent with chemical relatives and chemical relations. The critical
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
John, I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I feel as though asking this question might be somehow perceived as obnoxious, but I confess that I have a sincere desire to understand how you think about it; since what you've had to say seems to imply, so far as I can tell, that you would probably admit that you experience external minds (like my mind), but that you also have to admit that you think of the experience of my mind as of something physical, not mental (i.e., not referring to illusions, dreams, etc.), since it is something external to you. Have I ascertained your point of view rightly on this, or am I guilty of warping your meaning in some unfortunate way? -- Franklin On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 9:04 AM, John Collierwrote: > Dear Franklin, List members: > > > > I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out > now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit > subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce > scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in > Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not > impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without > accepting this argument I lay out. > > > > Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to > something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or > we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to > Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the > objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has > to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental > experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to > mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than > objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for > objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred > to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see > to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an > external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning. > Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of > external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all > things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by > external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the > external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this > class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just > identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are > illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and > dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – > though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but > Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere > possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist > epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they > are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we > can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the > defeater requirement). > > > > Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of > definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine > defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not > what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) > since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics > tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has > been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is > safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study > effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical > has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually > leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of > idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no > contradiction between his views about experience, and the physical, and at > least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is > neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have > reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental > experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, > mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. > In order to make our ideas
RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
Jerry, I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You aren't talking about Peirce, here when you say things like [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce's views on firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion). Unless you understand this you are going to be asking questions without an answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with my physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with Quine's idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it that the last is also Peirce's view, and he is no materialist. Basically, you err, as I see it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in meaning, however much it might seem to. It violates Peirce's prope-positivism, which he uses to deflate a lot of metaphysics. Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of experience Peirce uses, or both, in order to save your distinction. But then you aren't talking about Peirce's firsts when you say they have structure. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: Friday, 04 December 2015 11:32 PM To: John Collier Cc: Peirce-L; Clark Goble Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity. List, John: On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote: Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to explain. See interspersed comments. The message was only questions, with one except. What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine. I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without relations. Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, featureless. [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities, Well... FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate. But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his arguments. Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in various forms of diagrams / mereology. To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms / formal logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use. CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that is recursive. In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) premises for constructing consistent arguments. The index is the central term in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices. The construction of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately connected to the indices. It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of the sin-sign into rhema The proposed self-consistency of the sentences (propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns. Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1. In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics such that recursive calculations would be consistent, complete and decidable. As I have previously noted
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
List, John: On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote: > Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to > explain. See interspersed comments. > The message was only questions, with one except. What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine. > > I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in > itself without relations. Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, featureless. > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when > we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. > [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices > (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence > seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, > construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in > dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or > horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into > qualities, Well... FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate. But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his arguments. Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in various forms of diagrams / mereology. To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms / formal logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use. CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that is recursive. In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) premises for constructing consistent arguments. The index is the central term in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices. The construction of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately connected to the indices. It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of the sin-sign into rhema The proposed self-consistency of the sentences (propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns. Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1. In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics such that recursive calculations would be consistent, complete and decidable. As I have previously noted here, I have used these semantics for pragmatic purposes. Rather clumsy, to say the least! [JLRC] If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a structure? Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this relation? > > [John Collier] No, see my last interjection. Is a molecule divisible? Or, is it a context dependent question? > [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here > by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term. I phrased this question is such a way as to be consistent in multiple symbol systems. If I understand your physical perspective, then I can easy understand why you answer in this way. Cheers Jerry > John Collier > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM > To: Peirce-L > Cc: Clark Goble > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union > of units unify the unity. > > List, Clark: > > On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > > I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in > itself without relations. > > > From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, > of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and > as "scaling" in physics. > > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when > we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. > > A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? > a grammatical structure? > > [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's
RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to explain. See interspersed comments. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Clark Goble Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity. List, Clark: On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote: I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without relations. >From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of >part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as >"scaling" in physics. [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a grammatical structure? [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities, If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept of the structure of an atom introduced into science? philosophy? [John Collier] If an atom is a noun then it is a second, and there is no reason why it can't have a structure. Atomness, though, is iconic, and cannot signify a structure in itself. If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a structure? Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this relation? [John Collier] No, see my last interjection. In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently require a metaphysical view of all nouns? [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term. If a unit is a firstness, then: The union of units unifies the unity. Is this logically True? or False? What is your reasoning for your conclusion? [John Collier] Clark will have to address this. I find it very obscure. Best, John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
List, Clark: On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in > itself without relations. > >From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of >part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as >"scaling" in physics. A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a grammatical structure? If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept of the structure of an atom introduced into science? philosophy? If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a structure? Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this relation? In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently require a metaphysical view of all nouns? If a unit is a firstness, then: The union of units unifies the unity. Is this logically True? or False? What is your reasoning for your conclusion? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .