Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.


John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, Clark:

On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.


>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of 
>part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as 
>"scaling" in physics.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 

A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a 
grammatical structure?

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept 
of the structure of an atom introduced into science?  philosophy?

[John Collier] If an atom is a noun then it is a second, and there is no reason 
why it can't have a structure. Atomness, though, is iconic, and cannot signify 
a structure in itself.

If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?

[John Collier] No, see my last interjection.

In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently 
require a metaphysical view of all nouns?

[John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here by 
your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term.

If a unit is a firstness, then:

The union of units unifies the unity.    

Is this logically  True?  or False?   
What is your reasoning for your conclusion?

[John Collier] Clark will have to address this. I find it very obscure.

Best,
John

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