Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
Dear John, list - There are several issues here with which I do not agree. 1) I do not think it makes any sense to say that sun and earth communicate. There is a large-scale interaction of different physical processes between the two. But there is arguably physical interaction between any two particles in the cosmos. To me it generalizes the notion of communication into insignificance to make it so wide. And what is more, it does not add anything to our understanding of the sun-earth relationship to call it communication, signs, etc. 2) The existing interaction between sun and earth is not a dyadic relation only. To Peirce (but not only to him), all physical processes are to some degree governed by law - which is thirdness. So the identification of physics with secondness is less than obvious. 3) I think cognition is broader than communication. Cognition, I would say, requires one organism and an environment. Communication at least two organisms and an enviorment - and the ability to cognize what is communicated to you. To speak about cognition and communication without organisms seem empty and gratuitous to me. 4) In a special sense you can say there are signs and communication in the physical world. For biology is but one tiny, very special subset of the physical world. And that subset is semiotic. So semiotics lies as a possibility in the physical world. But so do bubble gum, presidents and fundamentalism. So it is not a very strong ontological claim. Best F Den 07/09/2014 kl. 14.30 skrev Frederik Stjernfelt mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> : Den 05/09/2014 kl. 04.59 skrev "Deely, John N." mailto:jnde...@stthom.edu>>: Sun and earth do communicate, but resulting directly dyadic rather than triadic relations, and with no involvement of cognition. The point can be generalized: communication is broader than cognition. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
Dear Jerry - The figures in Diagrammatology are quotes from standard textbook accounts of chemotaxis in E. Coli. So, the terminology in those figures is not mine (nor Peirce's). In Peircean terminology, I will consider the signs processed in the E.Coli detection of carbohydrates as symbols - for the reason they are general (they categorize a range of carbohydrates) and future-oriented (they are stably repeated over time). They involve iconic aspects (the shape of active site on the molecules categorized), just like they involve indexicality (in the shape of the actual, momentaneous connection between the molecule and the receptor). This complex symbol has the character of a natural proposition because it both identifies an object in time and space - and describes it (by categorization). Such information is summarized by the comparison of several such signs to establish the carbohydrate gradient. This Dicisign then forms one premiss of the conclusion: swim in the direction of that carbohydrate gradient. Communication? I would rather say cognition. I think cognition in its simplest form involves only one organism and its environment. Communication, I think, involves at least two organisms in an enviroment - a narrower notion of communication than identifying it with semiotic process tout court (or, even broader, with physical interaction). Best F Den 05/09/2014 kl. 05.50 skrev Jerry LR Chandler mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>>: Frederik: On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. Perhaps you are seeking to express a more metaphysical argument about the relationships among the basic sciences? In Diagrammatology, p. 208, figure 29, entitled “Receptor-motor coupling", you index several nominal objects which are a consequence of chains of reasoning about natural objects. These objects can all be viewed as exact consequences of third-order cybernetical relations encoded by the E coli genome (DNA) and embodied in material codes. BTW, do you refer to these objects as signs? symbols? or icons? Do you consider these indexes given in Figure 29 to be parts of biological “communication processes”? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
> On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:36 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> Edwina, Pansemiotics carries the connotation of panpsychism. Physiosemiosis >> has no such connotation. And the term “pansemiosis” carries just the >> opposite of what you attribute, namely, the idea that the universe IS >> composed exclusively of signs. > > While I tend to read Peirce in terms of pansemiotics, I’d also recognize that > this borderline panpsychism is extremely controversial. It is well worth > doing what we can to separate Peirce’s semiotics from his ontological > commitments. However as I take you to be saying later, it’s hard to say the > universe is just signs (thirdness) since Peirce in various places obviously > sees firstness and secondness. That was very poorly written on my part. Apologies. I meant to say that while I tend to read Peirce as verging on panpsychism, it’s quite controversial. As I later noted in that paragraph Peirce can’t really be a pansemiotician since that neglects firstness and secondness. However I think that his ontology is such that the three categories are basic ontologically. That claim (which I think Kelly Parker argues is a basic neoplatonic stance as well) is no less controversial than true panpsychism. While I think it is fruitful to think of basic ontology in terms of the three categories as fundamental, I think it’s very important and helpful to separate Peirce’s consideration of general semiotics from his ontology. If only to avoid the huge negative connotations anything smacking of panpsychism has in most philosophy departments. That said I think any physical phenomena will always be analyzable in terms of the three categories at a natural level. At which point it’s probably better to talk about quasi-minds and virtuality rather than bringing in the more controversial terms of cognition from biology. I’m not sure insects really have cognition but it’s worth talking like they do in many cases. Exactly how to make sense of mind in biology is far from clear to me. And talk of observers in physics is often taken as an ontological scandal some interpreters were involved in. I think Peirce’s approach is fruitful in that it avoids the need to engage with such considerations. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
Frederik: > On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > > Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study > cognition and communication processes - biology does. Perhaps you are seeking to express a more metaphysical argument about the relationships among the basic sciences? In Diagrammatology, p. 208, figure 29, entitled “Receptor-motor coupling", you index several nominal objects which are a consequence of chains of reasoning about natural objects. These objects can all be viewed as exact consequences of third-order cybernetical relations encoded by the E coli genome (DNA) and embodied in material codes. BTW, do you refer to these objects as signs? symbols? or icons? Do you consider these indexes given in Figure 29 to be parts of biological “communication processes”? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
(I’ll combine a bunch of short replies to various people) > On Sep 4, 2014, at 8:59 PM, Deely, John N. wrote: > > Sun and earth do communicate, but resulting directly dyadic rather than > triadic relations, and with no involvement of cognition. The point can be > generalized: communication is broader than cognition. No higher order cognition for sure. I’d say that the relation still isn’t dyadic since it is mediated though. > Edwina, Pansemiotics carries the connotation of panpsychism. Physiosemiosis > has no such connotation. And the term “pansemiosis” carries just the opposite > of what you attribute, namely, the idea that the universe IS composed > exclusively of signs. While I tend to read Peirce in terms of pansemiotics, I’d also recognize that this borderline panpsychism is extremely controversial. It is well worth doing what we can to separate Peirce’s semiotics from his ontological commitments. However as I take you to be saying later, it’s hard to say the universe is just signs (thirdness) since Peirce in various places obviously sees firstness and secondness. > If there is any physiosemiosis, that is as much a part of semiotics as > biosemiosis is. It is a question of the range or extentof the action of signs > in the physical realm of things whether living or not. Per se, the question > of physiosemiosis, thus, is “the final frontier” (to borrow an expression > from StarTrek) of semiotic investigation. Per se, this “final frontier” > question has NOTHING to do with so-called, or mis-called, “pansemiotics”. > Semiosis may be a process present throughout the physical universe, living or > not; but semiosis is NOT the only process thus present (which is what the > name “pansemiosis” or “pansemiotics” implies). I think the problem is that when we speak of an interpretant we immediately think of a human like cognition and interpretation. While there are similarities with general hermeneutics and interpretation I think Peirce was aiming at something more broad. As such it’s probably best to simply jettison talk of human-mind and explicitly say we’re speaking more broadly. That has many benefits. First it allows semiotics to make sense of physics without all the problem of “observers” or the nonsense that quasi-mystical interpretations of QM give. It also does justice to Continental concerns about phenomenology whether it be a saturated phenomena, traces, the unconscious or whatever. Semiotics is pervasive and is more broad than conscious phenomena or interpretation. This also avoids some of the limits I think that philosophy of language in the analytic tradition constantly finds itself in due to how it artificially limits the topic. (For instance things like “body language” or unconscious interpretations) > The question of physiosemiosis is a question of to what extent is the action > of signs simply co-terminous with the realm of living things. (to perhaps put > it in Frederik’s framework: are there natural dicisigns beyond the frontiers > of life?) The question properly phrased cannot be, as Frederik below > suggests, properly “rephrased as pansemiotics versus biosemiotics”. Well said. I think it makes sense to talk about signs in non-living systems. Primarily because it seems that life is near a continuum in terms of mind with humans having significant cognition; apes, dolphins and others having a fair bit, on down to various types of insects and then down to microscopic “life.” It’s not clear to me where one draws the line on what is or isn’t cognition. Without making a slippery slope fallacy, it seems worth considering whether we should bother drawing the line when speaking broadly. (Obviously there are practical considerations that make the line useful in certain contexts) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions & cognition
Sun and earth do communicate, but resulting directly dyadic rather than triadic relations, and with no involvement of cognition. The point can be generalized: communication is broader than cognition. From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 15:02 To: Frederik Stjernfelt; Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. and On Sep 4, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote: My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes, while physics, including QM, does not. This observation, of course, only holds for the present state - as sciences evolve, it may be proved wrong by further developments in physics. You might also state my view by saying that biology constitutes the semiotic part of physics. This is what I’m still not sure about. Certainly if one uses a Hamiltonian form then there’s less sign process. But it seems to me the Newtonian form of mechanics and the Feynman form of QM are inherently a sign process just as in biology. Further it is all about communication with forces being the interactions between particles. Likewise even classic E&M seems to be a semiotic process, although certainly one can conceive of it as an equation that evolves. Not criticizing, just trying to figure out what you mean. Do you think that say a Feynman diagram isn’t a communication process? Perhaps not cognition in a normal sense, but in the Peircean sense (where he saw mind operative in chemical processes like crystal formation) it seems to be. However even if you are just requiring cognition or quasi-cognition (say with insects or microbiology) I’m not sure but what you don’t have virtual cognition in many forms QM takes. (I’m not saying the observer is a real cognition - I tend to see it as an accidental artifact - but it does seem to end up meaning QM takes a form similar to biology) Now I fully agree that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian forms of mechanics and quantum mechanics aren’t really sign oriented. But I bet more people *think* and *talk* in terms of the more Newtonian conception (in terms of math/signs) even if the other forms of calculating are pretty common. Sorry, not trying to take things down a tangent, just very curious as to this point. I think Peirce tended to adopt more biological conceptions and apply them to physical ones whereas especially in the 19th century that was far less common. While it is a tangent, it seems to be a tangent with important implications for the main topic. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
