Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular/Singular/Individual

[John F Sowa]

On 1/19/2017 10:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:

consider the following sentence:

   "I think that Tom believes Superman is real, but
Mary knows he's just a character in a story."

This sentence would have four UoDs:  (1) the world that includes
Tom, Mary, and me; (2) the UoD of my thought;  (3)the UoD of Tom's
belief, and (4) the UoD of Mary's knowledge.


I forgot to mention the universe of discourse of the story.
A translation of that sentence to a version of logic would
require five UoDs.

You could map them to a single UoD that consisted of the union
of all five -- but you would need to add some notation for keeping
track of the different domains and the propositions about them.

I discussed these issues in the following articles:

Laws, facts, and contexts: Foundations for multimodal reasoning
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/laws.htm

Worlds, models, and descriptions
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf

From existential graphs to conceptual graphs
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf

Five questions on epistemic logic
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Benjamin Udell]

They're Chiasson's quotes (with at least one rephrashing by her) of 
Peirce from a passage in:


Peirce, Charles S. (1905 April), "What Pragmatism Is", /The Monist/ , v. 
XV, n. 2, pp. 161–181 
https://books.google.com/books?id=j6oLIAAJ=PA161-IA22 . Oxford 
PDF http://monist.oxfordjournals.org/content/monist/15/2/161.full.pdf . 
Reprinted (CP 5.411–437), (Charles S. Peirce, Selected Writings 
180–202), (The Logic of Interdisciplinarity 230–244). Internet Archive 
Eprint 
https://archive.org/stream/monistquart15hegeuoft#page/161/mode/1up . 
Arisbe 
Eprinthttp://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm 
 .


Best, Ben


On 1/9/2017 4:08 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

List, Jerry R.,:

I am curious about the origin of the quotes:



   ‘almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is
  meaningless gibberish’




  ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being
  reached.’  Or else, claimed Peirce,




  ‘the conception that is reached is absurd.’”



These are very powerful claims that separate the conceptualization of 
reality / pragmaticism from vast domains of philosophy and theology.


Historically, this brings the relationships between the 
conceptualization of a mathematical variable and physical claims about 
nature / natural catalogues of categories into question.


So, what is the meaning of these assertions (if any?) in terms of 
modern day science?


More specifically, my comment is a reflection on the use and abuse of 
the term “ontology” in philosophy. In particular, it should be noted 
that the chemical table of elements (TOE), the present day ur-source 
of scientific catalogues of categories (ontologies) was a foundation 
for many aspects of CSP logical development of signs / symbols. 
Although the modern day TOE has undergone further developments in form 
and structure, the rational for it’s ontological existence remains 
unchanged for over a century and is scientifically and philosophically 
non-problematic. The TOE is firmly established as the ontological 
origin of (non-prime) matter.  The extension of TOE by chemical 
illations to compounds and biochemical “handedness” is standard 
textbook stuff. The logical form of this extension is not a universal 
or recursive application of a variable, but is, the reference subset 
of TOE members, a step-by-step construction of emergent identities.


in other words, chemical “universals” do not exist in the sense of 
physical or mathematical variables because each chemical element is 
indivisible. The name of a legisign is an identity that associates 
quali-signs with indices and hence with dicisigns and the illations 
that generate the legisign.  This tautology is constructed without 
invoking the concept of prime matter.


In short, how are these CSP - induced conundrums resolved by physical 
philosophy?  mathematical philosophy?


In particular, is that modern physics, with its focus on Kantian a 
priori and mathematical variables of energy and mass, problematically 
lacks meta-physical ground?   Is this one aspect of CSP’s adoption of 
the Hegelian view of “chemism”?  (see, “Real Process” by John W. 
Burbidge, 1996) and with its intrinsic reliance on the copulative logic of

" sin-sign <—> qualisign “   and “sin-sign <—> legisign”?

Thus, it appears to me that this thread goes far deeper than it first 
appears.

 The phrase



  ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being
  reached.’



is a novel and deep critique of the tautological usage of physical 
units in a philosophy of physics grounded in the  Kantian a priori of 
space and time.  In my opinion, it also describes the abstract nature 
of mathematical set theory as it manifests itself in Husserlian 
phenomenology.


Cheers

Jerry


On Jan 7, 2017, at 8:52 PM, Jerry Rhee  > wrote:


Dear list:


  In “ Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking”, Chiasson
  follows up a section on Scotus, (thisness, whatness, universals,
  general laws, qualitative essences) with the following:


  “Do you understand what Peirce meant when he said that ‘almost
  every proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless
  gibberish’?...When Peirce writes that the propositions are
  meaningless gibberish, he follows up this claim by saying that
  these propositions are ‘made up of words that define each other
  with no conception being reached.’ Or else, claimed Peirce, ‘the
  conception that is reached is absurd.’”


  Best,


  Jerry R


On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
 > wrote:


Jon A., List:

Thanks for that.  I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and
found it quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is
when Baldwin's /Dictionary / appeared in print.  Rosa Mayorga
pointed to a considerably earlier passage from a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jerry R.,:

I am curious about the origin of the quotes:

>  ‘almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless 
> gibberish’

> ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being reached.’  
> Or else, claimed Peirce,

> ‘the conception that is reached is absurd.’”

These are very powerful claims that separate the conceptualization of reality / 
pragmaticism from vast domains of philosophy and theology.

Historically, this brings the relationships between the conceptualization of a 
mathematical variable and physical claims about nature / natural catalogues of 
categories into question.

So, what is the meaning of these assertions (if any?) in terms of modern day 
science?

More specifically, my comment is a reflection on the use and abuse of the term 
“ontology” in philosophy. In particular, it should be noted that the chemical 
table of elements (TOE), the present day ur-source of scientific catalogues of 
categories (ontologies) was a foundation for many aspects of CSP logical 
development of signs / symbols. Although the modern day TOE has undergone 
further developments in form and structure, the rational for it’s ontological 
existence remains unchanged for over a century and is scientifically and 
philosophically non-problematic. The TOE is firmly established as the 
ontological origin of (non-prime) matter.  The extension of TOE by chemical 
illations to compounds and biochemical “handedness” is standard textbook stuff. 
The logical form of this extension is not a universal or recursive application 
of a variable, but is, the reference subset of TOE members, a step-by-step 
construction of emergent identities. 

in other words, chemical “universals” do not exist in the sense of physical or 
mathematical variables because each chemical element is indivisible. The name 
of a legisign is an identity that associates quali-signs with indices and hence 
with dicisigns and the illations that generate the legisign.  This tautology is 
constructed without invoking the concept of prime matter. 

In short, how are these CSP - induced conundrums resolved by physical 
philosophy?  mathematical philosophy?

In particular, is that modern physics, with its focus on Kantian a priori and 
mathematical variables of energy and mass, problematically lacks meta-physical 
ground?   Is this one aspect of CSP’s adoption of the Hegelian view of 
“chemism”?  (see, “Real Process” by John W. Burbidge, 1996) and with its 
intrinsic reliance on the copulative logic of
" sin-sign <—> qualisign “   and “sin-sign <—> legisign”?

Thus, it appears to me that this thread goes far deeper than it first appears.
 The phrase 

> ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being reached.’ 

is a novel and deep critique of the tautological usage of physical units in a 
philosophy of physics grounded in the  Kantian a priori of space and time.  In 
my opinion, it also describes the abstract nature of mathematical set theory as 
it manifests itself in Husserlian phenomenology.

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Jan 7, 2017, at 8:52 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> Dear list:
> 
>  
> In “Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking”, Chiasson follows up a 
> section on Scotus, (thisness, whatness, universals, general laws, qualitative 
> essences) with the following:
>  
> “Do you understand what Peirce meant when he said that ‘almost every 
> proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless gibberish’?...When 
> Peirce writes that the propositions are meaningless gibberish, he follows up 
> this claim by saying that these propositions are ‘made up of words that 
> define each other with no conception being reached.’  Or else, claimed 
> Peirce, ‘the conception that is reached is absurd.’”
>  
> Best,
> Jerry R
> 
> On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
> Jon A., List:
> 
> Thanks for that.  I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it quite 
> helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's Dictionary 
> appeared in print.  Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier passage 
> from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in 
> her book, From Realism to "Realicism":  The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders 
> Peirce.
> 
> Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose 
> subject and predicate are general terms.  And, therefore, it is not merely 
> the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory, but 
> also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate reality.  
> But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of 
> that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere ideal boundary 
> of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of that which can be 
> only in one place at one time.  It will be convenient to call the former 
> singular 

Re: OFFLIST Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Benjamin Udell]

Jon S., Gary R., Jon A., list,

As promised in my previous message, here is the first off-list response 
that I made to Jon S.'s messages in this thread to peirce-l:


Jon S.,

You've out-researched me! I'm not sure what to say on-list at this 
point. I found some backup for some of your claims. I found that, as you 
said, indeed Peirce says that particular and universal propositions are 
general propositions, it's in CP 2.271 (from "Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations" 1903),


§10. Kinds of Propositions
271. A Dicent Symbol, or general proposition, is either /Particular/ or 
/Universal/.


I've found elsewhere that Peirce tended to regard 'general' and 
'universal' as being mostly alternate terms for the same thing.,


It may take me a while to muster a response.,

Best, Ben,

On 1/7/2017 8:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


Jon A., List:

Thanks for that.  I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found 
it quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's 
/Dictionary/ appeared in print.  Rosa Mayorga pointed to a 
considerably earlier passage from a draft of "Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in her book, /From Realism to 
"Realicism":  The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce/.


Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both
whose subject and predicate are general terms.  And, therefore, it
is not merely the case, as we saw before, that universals have
reality on this theory, but also that there are nothing but
universals which have an immediate reality. But here it is
necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of
that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere
ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider
sense of that which can be only in one place at one time.  It will
be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an
individual … Now a knowledge that cognition is not wholly
determined by cognition is a knowledge of something external to
the mind, that is the singulars.  Singulars therefore have a
reality.  But singulars in general is not singular but general. 
We can cognize any part of the singulars however determinate, but

however determinate the part it is still general.  And therefore
what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so only
in their generality; but singulars in their absolute
discrimination or singularity are mere ideals … In short, those
things which we call singulars exist, but the character of
singularity which we attribute to them is self-contradictory.

With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are
certain general terms whose objects can only be in one place at
one time, and these are called individuals.  They are generals
that is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither time
nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one
date. (W2:180-181; 1868)

Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a 
general, which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything 
real is singular, so nothing real is general--effectively 
self-refuting.  He defined an individual as a collection of singulars 
joined across places and times, which is thus general when taken as a 
whole.  Furthermore, /absolute/ singulars are "mere ideals," such that 
(ironically) an individual is really a /continuum/ as Peirce came to 
understand that concept decades later.  Consequently, anything that we 
cognize /about/ individuals is /necessarily/ general, rather than 
singular. This suggests to me the following argument for realism.


P1.  All singulars are absolutely determinate.
P2.  No objects of thought are absolutely determinate.
C1.  Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars.
P3.  If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of
thought are generals.
C2.  Therefore, all objects of thought are generals.
P4.  Some objects of thought are real.
C3.  Therefore, some generals are real.

My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of 
terms, so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in 
order to deny the conclusion.  Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that 
we can ascertain that an object of thought has or does not have every 
conceivable predicate; but those are infinite, and our minds are 
finite, so this is impossible.  Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that 
we have no genuine knowledge of reality--i.e., that it consists 
entirely of incognizable "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely 
the view for which Peirce frequently criticized nominalists, because 
it blocks the way of inquiry.


Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey > wrote:



Here is one page:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Benjamin Udell]

List, Jon S., Gary R.,

Gary R., Jon S., and I began discussing the subject of this thread a few 
days ago off-list, and we've agreed that the off-list parts should be 
brought on-list. Below is the part that preceded the thread's appearance 
at peirce-l. Next, I'll send the peirce-l thread plus an off-list reply 
that I made, and Jon S. can add his off-list reply, then I'll add my 
next one, etc.


Best, Ben

On 1/7/2017 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon, Ben,

Jon, I'm forwarding this off-list message Ben sent. I'm sure you'll 
find it of interest--it certainly refreshed my memory of some of the 
discussion of the topic we've had on peirce-l. Maybe we can get Cathy 
to sound in as well? Ben, perhaps you could Bcc her if this comes up 
in on- or off-list discussion. Again, I think an on-list discussion 
might prove most productive, and might be an excellent topic to begin 
the new year!


Hope you are both experiencing a good start of 2017.

Best,

Gary

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

-- Forwarded message --
From: Benjamin Udell >
Date: Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 12:34 PM
Subject: Re: generality/universality
To: Gary Richmond >


Hi, Gary. We could pursue it on list or off, either way is fine with me.

Terms are divided into general and singular (also into concrete and 
abstract; a general term can be concrete and can be abstract. Some 
have regarded all singulars as concrete, some have admitted abstract 
singulars).


However, when speaking of qualities, etc., Aristotle called them by a 
Greek word (I guess 'katholikos') usually translated as "universal" 
and meaning that they are true of more than one object, at least two. 
A more nuanced sense would be the quantity of a quality or the like 
that _/could/_ be true of more than one thing, even if it happens not 
to be (whereas there can't be more than one Socrates). Anyway, "true 
of at least two things" doesn't sound very "universal" in the 
English-language sense but that's the tradition still adhered to by 
some philosophers. Some even call "particular" that which Peirce and 
others call "individual" or "singular" but that's in speaking not of 
terms but of things.


Propositions are divided into the universal ("All F is G"), the 
(comparatively vague) particular ("Some F is G"), and the singular 
("This F is G" or "Socrates is G"). Peirce classified mixed-quantity 
propositions according to the first one ("Some person is loved by all 
people" he called "particular". I guess an argument for that would be 
that even a seemingly plain particular such as "Something is red" 
could be construed as implying "Something is such that all who can see 
things in color would see it as red" or some such statement more 
carefully qualified).


Cathy Legg once made a remark with a few details about "universal" and 
"general" coming from two different contexts in logic, but I doubt 
that I can find it soon.


Peirce made a three-way distinction among:
  (1) the vague, the indefinite, such as a quality as contemplated 
without reaction or reflection,

  (2) the individual, determinate, and
  (3) the general.
Said trichotomy
(A) is based by him in his three respective phenomenological categories:
  (1) Firstness, quality of feeling (more as quality of a /sensation/ 
than of an /affect/ such as pleasure or pain), essentially monadic, 
except that he came to distinguish sensation as having a place and 
date, unlike feeling per se;
  (2) Secondness, reaction/resistance, essentially dyadic 
(individuals, brute facts, etc.); and
  (3) Thirdness, representation/mediation, essentially triadic (rules, 
habits, norms, dispositions, etc.);

and
(B) reflects three traditional affirmative logical quantities for 
propositions, respectively:

  (1) the existential particular (/*Some*/ food is good),
  (2) the singular (/*This*/ food is good), and
  (3) the hypothetical universal (/*All*/ food is good). This 
hypotheticality (as in "each thing is, IF food, THEN good") is 
important in Peirce, since he usually treated Thirdness as involving 
conditional necessities, conditional rules, etc.


In 1868 Peirce made a distinction (to which he did not always adhere 
terminologically, e.g., starting in 1903 in the word "sinsign"):
/Singular individuals/, or /singulars/ for short, "occupy neither time 
nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one date" 
(i.e., point-instants).
/General individuals/, or /individuals/ for short, do occupy time and 
space and "can only be in one place at one time."
(See "Questions on Reality" 1868 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm 
.)


Best, Ben

On 1/7/2017 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Hi, Ben,

I'm 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:


In “Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking”, Chiasson follows up a
section on Scotus, (thisness, whatness, universals, general laws,
qualitative essences) with the following:   “Do you understand what Peirce
meant when he said that ‘almost every proposition of ontological
metaphysics is meaningless gibberish’?...When Peirce writes that the
propositions are meaningless gibberish, he follows up this claim by saying
that these propositions are ‘made up of words that define each other with
no conception being reached.’  Or else, claimed Peirce, ‘the conception
that is reached is absurd.’”   Best, Jerry R

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jon A., List:
>
> Thanks for that.  I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it
> quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's 
> *Dictionary
> *appeared in print.  Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier
> passage from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for
> Man" in her book, *From Realism to "Realicism":  The Metaphysics of
> Charles Sanders Peirce*.
>
> Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose
> subject and predicate are general terms.  And, therefore, it is not merely
> the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory,
> but also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate
> reality.  But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in
> the sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere
> ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of
> that which can be only in one place at one time.  It will be convenient to
> call the former singular and the latter only an individual … Now a
> knowledge that cognition is not wholly determined by cognition is a
> knowledge of something external to the mind, that is the singulars.
> Singulars therefore have a reality.  But singulars in general is not
> singular but general.  We can cognize any part of the singulars however
> determinate, but however determinate the part it is still general.  And
> therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so only
> in their generality; but singulars in their absolute discrimination or
> singularity are mere ideals … In short, those things which we call
> singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to
> them is self-contradictory.
>
> With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain
> general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these
> are called individuals.  They are generals that is, not singulars, because
> these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point
> and can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868)
>
> Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a general,
> which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything real is
> singular, so nothing real is general--effectively self-refuting.  He
> defined an individual as a collection of singulars joined across places and
> times, which is thus general when taken as a whole.  Furthermore, *absolute
> *singulars are "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual is
> really a *continuum *as Peirce came to understand that concept decades
> later.  Consequently, anything that we cognize *about *individuals is 
> *necessarily
> *general, rather than singular.  This suggests to me the following
> argument for realism.
>
> P1.  All singulars are absolutely determinate.
> P2.  No objects of thought are absolutely determinate.
> C1.  Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars.
> P3.  If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of thought
> are generals.
> C2.  Therefore, all objects of thought are generals.
> P4.  Some objects of thought are real.
> C3.  Therefore, some generals are real.
>
> My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of
> terms, so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in order
> to deny the conclusion.  Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we can
> ascertain that an object of thought has or does not have every conceivable
> predicate; but those are infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is
> impossible.  Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine
> knowledge of reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of incognizable
> "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the view for which Peirce
> frequently criticized nominalists, because it blocks the way of inquiry.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Here is one page:
>>
>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals
>>
>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, list:

Jon, list:



Consider this usage selected by Kennedy:



“Peirce showed that historians are in error when they talk of judging
testimony by balancing probabilities because “in a scientific sense, there
are no ‘probabilities’ to be judged.”  Probability, Peirce wrote, “is the
ratio of the frequency of occurrence of a specific event to a generic
event.”  A testimony “is neither a specific event, nor a generic event, but
an individual event.”



Peirce further pointed out that what people were justifying by claiming
Balancing Likelihoods was really simply relating “what they prefer to do”
to what they don’t prefer. ... “Likelihood is merely a reflection of our
preconceived ideas.”



Also this from Peirce’s criticism of Hume’s definition of miracles:



“…a statement is only a law of nature if it is true, general (or
universal), and contingent. It must be general to be a law, and it must be
contingent to be a law of nature rather than a law of logic (‘all bachelors
are unmarried’ is true and general, but not a law of nature!).”



Now consider:



All generals are universalsAll G (M)
are U (P)

*All particulars are generals**All P
(S) are G (M)*

Therefore, all particulars are universalsAll P (S) are U (P)



Vs.



All universals are generals

*All singulars (individual events) are universals*

Therefore, all singulars are generals



___





Hth,

Jerry R

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 5:54 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine
> of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> List:
>
> I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his
> opposition to various forms of nominalism.  He seems to have consistently
> preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone
> ever tried to figure out why?  In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism:  Its
> Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be
> that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's *katholou*,"
> or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most,"
> and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ...
> but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51).
>
> On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular,"
> while "general" is opposed to "singular."  All of these identify types of
> propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is
> indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and
> particular (some).  Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type
> of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically,
> individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality.
>
> Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be
> appreciated.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
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