Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Helmut, List,

Jon wrote: "Only later [than the 1903 classification] did Peirce add
trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and
Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or
normative (Final)."

J
ust so.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*



On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 9:35 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., Helmut, List:
>
> One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies
> are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant
> *themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign.  For a Dicent
> Indexical Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign
> itself are in the Category of 2ns (Existents).  Only later did Peirce add
> trichotomies according to the *nature *of each Object and
> Interpretant--phaneroscopic (Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or
> normative (Final).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, List,
>>
>> Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and
>> interpretant."
>>
>> And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote
>>
>> *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to
>> an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
>> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern
>> (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R]
>> 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological
>> problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but
>> since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is
>> a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent
>> problem is, I think, easily overcome.]
>>
>> Continuing
>>
>> HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
>> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
>> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves
>> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).
>>
>> I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in
>> this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain'
>> a relation at all (see my comment below).
>>
>> HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
>> too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
>> define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
>> written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
>>
>> I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's
>> semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial
>> involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns)
>> which involves the sign itself (1ns).
>>
>> Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own
>> tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic'
>> (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial
>> division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself.
>>
>> But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the
>> purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is
>> taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic
>> as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to
>> semiosis itself.
>>
>> As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun
>> with two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of
>> involution a sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. 
>> *The
>> first adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to
>> the object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-,
>> or legisign).
>>
>> So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written
>> dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj.,
>> dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign
>> itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign).
>> That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial
>> involution as it concerns the sign classes.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690*
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>>> Gary, List,
>>>
>>> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:
>>>
>>> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture |
>>> MS [R] 462:74
>>>
>>> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
>>> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
>>> relation 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Helmut, List:

One clarification--in the 1903 taxonomy, the second and third trichotomies
are not divisions of the (Dynamic) Object and (Final) Interpretant
*themselves*, but of their *relations *to the Sign.  For a Dicent Indexical
Sinsign, the S-FI *relation*, the S-DO *relation*, and the Sign itself are
in the Category of 2ns (Existents).  Only later did Peirce add trichotomies
according to the *nature *of each Object and Interpretant--phaneroscopic
(Immediate), ontological (Dynamic), or normative (Final).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 1:04 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Helmut, List,
>
> Helmut wrote: "Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and
> interpretant."
>
> And so, in one very limited sense, it does. You gave this quote
>
> *CSP: A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern
> (*"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R]
> 31:2, emphasis added*). *[Btw: there is an apparent terminological
> problem in this quotation as Peirce writes that 'meaning' concerns 1ns; but
> since he has just stated that the sign's "reference to an interpretant" is
> a matter of 3ns (typcially associated by him with meaning), this apparent
> problem is, I think, easily overcome.]
>
> Continuing
>
> HR: I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
> as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves
> (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).
>
> I think your comment represents a misunderstanding of 'involvement' in
> this context, one which most certainly does *not* 'functionally contain'
> a relation at all (see my comment below).
>
> HR: That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more
> too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement
> define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the
> written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
>
> I agree that it is important to understand "to involve" in Peirce's
> semeiotic. In his classification of signs *involution* is *tricategorial
> involution* whereas the interpretant (3ns) involves the object (2ns)
> which involves the sign itself (1ns).
>
> Each of these (i.e., interpretant, object, sign itself) has its own
> tricategorial designation. So, for example, the object may be 'symbolic'
> (3ns), indexical (2ns), or iconic (1ns). An analogous tricategorial
> division applies to the interpretant and to the sign itself.
>
> But *this *notion of categorial involution is offered merely for the
> purpose of the abstract analysis of each of the 10 sign classes. It is
> taken up in theoretical grammar, the first of the three divisions of logic
> as semeiotic. And it only indirectly and *very* abstractly relates to
> semiosis itself.
>
> As you wrote: HR: "the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with
> two adjectives," or as I would phrase it: *In the order of involution a
> sign class is written with two adjective followed by a noun. *The first
> adjective refers to the interpretant, the second adjective refers to the
> object, and, finally, the noun is the sign itself (i.e., quali-, sin-, or
> legisign).
>
> So, for famous example, sign class 4 (e.g., a weather vane) is written
> dicentic indexical sinsign, the interpretant in category 2ns (adj.,
> dicentic), the object also in category 2ns (adj., indexical), the sign
> itself also in category 2ns (noun, sinsign).
> That is all! There is no functionality whatsoever in categorial involution
> as it concerns the sign classes.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 12:57 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Gary, List,
>>
>> Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:
>>
>> "1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS
>> [R] 462:74
>>
>> …a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
>> interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
>> relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens
>> Dictionary "sign")
>> "1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2
>>
>> A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an
>> interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second
>> category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first
>> category concern." (same source)
>>
>> I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and
>> function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it
>> as involving the triadic 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List,

 

Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:

 

"1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74


…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens Dictionary "sign")


"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2


A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern." (same source)



I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).

That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.

Best,

Helmut




 

 22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 



Jon, Helmut, List,

 

Jon wrote:

 


JAS: [T]he Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the cenoscopic science of logic as semeiotics that "the Sign itself. . . is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled matter however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by some in, say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of reading the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions amongst semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that "the Sign itself is not a triadic relation."


 



JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.




 


I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with bent arrows works quite well. 







In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at the vertex on the right).

 

Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but for different purposes. One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert.

 

The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially in "A Neglected Argument":

 





 

 






JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions."






 


As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign.

 





JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).





 


Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I










 





















JAS: 
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.




















 


My understanding as well.



 



Best,



 



Gary



 



 
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 










 


On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:


Helmut, List:
 

No, the Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Helmut, List,

Jon wrote:

JAS: [T]he Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *
(or *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the
Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental
distinction.

I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the
cenoscopic science of *logic as semeiotics* that "the Sign itself. . . is
one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled matter
however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by some in,
say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of reading
the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions amongst
semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that
"the Sign *itself* is not a triadic relation."

JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a
*logical *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the
distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the
Sign *to *the Interpretant.


I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with bent
arrows works quite well.
[image: image.png]
In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of
determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the
triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at
the vertex on the right).

Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic
diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but* for different purposes*. One
is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert.

The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in
Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially
in "A Neglected Argument":

[image: image.png]


JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is
Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O
determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such
that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats
Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign
definitions."


As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the
directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign.

JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as
the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the
interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the
utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).


Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates
between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object
to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I

JAS:
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents
DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.


My understanding as well.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*



On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or
> *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the
> Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental
> distinction.
>
> As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical 
> *representation
> of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of
> semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant.
>
> "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's
> own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S
> relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O
> determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats
> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign
> definitions."
>
> "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the
> Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter,
> just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP
> 2:404; 1907).
>
> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S
> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok,
>> but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:
>>
>> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show
>> that there is a difference between O and I.
>>
>> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would
>> be the interpreter, not the 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I know that it comes up often, but I still strongly disagree with such an
approach as clearly inconsistent with Peirce's own terminology, and
therefore conducive to misunderstanding the concepts involved.  We should
not conflate the triadic Sign-*Relation *with the Sign *itself *as one of
that relation's three Correlates (CP 2.242, EP 2:290; 1903).
"Representamen" does not refer to a *part *of a Sign, it is either *synonymous
*with "Sign" (and thus dispensable, SS 193; 1905) or a *generalization *of
"Sign" that does not necessarily have a mental Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP
2:273; 1903).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> This has often been a topic of discussions, and I have come to
> understanding it like this:
> -"S is its representation of O as I" (I just wanted to add this more
> accurate version as supplement to my post before).
> Meaning: The sign is both the Y and one tip of it (*s*ign and *S*ign,
> representamen and sign...), there is a re-entry of the sign into the sign.
> This is possible, because it is a function and not just a spatial composite
> or ingredient. Like the "BASIC" computer command  "A= A+B+C".
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 21. August 2018 um 22:26 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> wrote:
> Helmut, List:
>
> No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or
> *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the
> Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental
> distinction.
>
> As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical 
> *representation
> of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of
> semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant.
>
> "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's
> own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S
> relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O
> determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats
> Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign
> definitions."
>
> "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the
> Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter,
> just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP
> 2:404; 1907).
>
> However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S
> represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok,
>> but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:
>>
>> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show
>> that there is a difference between O and I.
>>
>> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would
>> be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:
>>
>> -"S represents O as I".
>>
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

This has often been a topic of discussions, and I have come to understanding it like this:

-"S is its representation of O as I" (I just wanted to add this more accurate version as supplement to my post before).

Meaning: The sign is both the Y and one tip of it (sign and Sign, representamen and sign...), there is a re-entry of the sign into the sign. This is possible, because it is a function and not just a spatial composite or ingredient. Like the "BASIC" computer command  "A= A+B+C".

 

Best,

Helmut

 

21. August 2018 um 22:26 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:
 

No, the Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.

 

"S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions."

 

"S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).

 

However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

 

To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:

 

-"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show that there is a difference between O and I.

 

-"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:

 

-"S represents O as I".

 

Best, Helmut







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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or
*Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the
Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental
distinction.

As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a
*logical *representation
of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of
semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant.

"S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's
own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S
relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O
determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats
Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign
definitions."

"S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the
Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter,
just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP
2:404; 1907).

However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents
DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but
> it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:
>
> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show
> that there is a difference between O and I.
>
> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would
> be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:
>
> -"S represents O as I".
>
> Best, Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:

 

-"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show that there is a difference between O and I.

 

-"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:

 

-"S represents O as I".

 

Best, Helmut

 

 21. August 2018 um 21:09 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Edwina, Mike, List:
 

1.  Mindful of (and agreeing with) Gary R.'s request for at least a temporary moratorium on this topic, I hesitated to respond; but I decided to try clarifying my position once more, since there has been some evident misunderstanding of it.  The referenced paper and subsequent discussion are about brain activity, which is always actual, so characterizing it as action is not problematic from a Peircean perspective.  Moreover, it falls under the (idioscopic) Special Science of neurophysiology, rather than (cenoscopic) Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, or Metaphysics.  It is primarily within the latter fields that I believe carefully distinguishing the Categories from each other is especially important.

 

2.  Again, as far as I know, Peirce never proposed "the triadic spokes or Y shape" as a representation of the Sign itself; only as a representation of a triadic relation, such as the one that the Sign has with its Object and Interpretant.  I share the concern about properly capturing the mediation aspect of semiosis, but I do not see how a Y is any better than a triangle from that standpoint.

 

3.  I am also uncomfortable with characterizing the Sign as a "function" that transforms "input" (Object) into "output" (Interpretant).  For one thing, this has a deterministic connotation--in mathematics, even non-linear functions always produce the same output upon receiving the same input.  In any case, Peirce's own description was instead that the Sign communicates a Form from the Object to the Interpretant, in such a way that the Object is unaffected by the Sign and the Sign is unaffected by the Interpretant (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 8:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


John, Mike, list

1] John - thanks for the clarification of your slide #9, Cognitive Learning.

 I mistook the three slides showing brain activity to refer to the Peircean categories - and was puzzled, since Feeling/Firstness does not, according to Peirce, require a brain. As he said, 'protoplasm' feels...and this is a non-conscious, i.e., non-mental experience. My error regarding your slides.

2] With regard to your slide #4 of machine learning - I've got two points.

I can see, actually, that the triangle is an accurate image in ML, - and comment that such linearity is a key problem in ML. That's why I prefer the triadic spokes or Y shape provided by Peirce for the semiosic Sign because it rejects the linear force - which can be quite overpowering like an avalanche - and enables mediation...which is never linear. Machines have trouble with mediation!

I don't see, as does Mike, that this is related to the categories, but could be wrong, and would also appreciate your clarification.

3] At any rate, I've suggested years ago, that the semiosic triadic act is a function: f{x]=y, where 'f' is mediation. Your slide 5 shows this quite well, AND, in addition, shows the vital nature of this mediation or 'hidden layer'. What is interesting is that your hidden layer[s] is complex/multiple. My view is that this is why Thirdness has three modes: 3-3, 3-2, 3-1 - to provide complexity of organization/transformation of input to output.

My paper, presented in Dubois' conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems,  examines the complex actions of this mediation within the three modes of Thirdness and as a function...and even, puts these actions on a different spatial and temporal zone than the actions of 1ns,2ns.

Note - I've tried to attach my paper, The Sign as a WFF/well-formed formula, but this new computer doesn't have all my papers and I'm an idiot dealing with computers.

Edwina 

On Sun 19/08/18 11:08 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:

Hi John, List,

I appreciate you keep trying to get us back on target with your comments.

I think the reference Edwina brought forward is the best I've seen so
far for these arguments with respect to the neurophysiology of Thirdness
mediation. Do you agree?

I think I understand your points on slides 7-11 of your short version
http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf.

However, what stopped me in this deck is slide #4. Framing the ML
methods into the triadic triangle format you prefer (as do I) seems to
imply you are relating these ML methods to the universal 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Mike, List:

1.  Mindful of (and agreeing with) Gary R.'s request for at least a
temporary moratorium on this topic, I hesitated to respond; but I decided
to try clarifying my position once more, since there has been some evident
misunderstanding of it.  The referenced paper and subsequent discussion are
about brain *act*ivity, which is always *act*ual, so characterizing it as
*act*ion is not problematic from a Peircean perspective.  Moreover, it
falls under the (idioscopic) Special Science of neurophysiology, rather
than (cenoscopic) Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, or Metaphysics.  It is
primarily within the latter fields that I believe carefully distinguishing
the Categories from each other is especially important.

2.  Again, as far as I know, Peirce never proposed "the triadic spokes or Y
shape" as a representation of the Sign *itself*; only as a representation
of a triadic *relation*, such as the one that the Sign *has *with its
Object and Interpretant.  I share the concern about properly capturing
the *mediation
*aspect of semiosis, but I do not see how a Y is any better than a triangle
from that standpoint.

3.  I am also uncomfortable with characterizing the Sign as a "function"
that *transforms *"input" (Object) *into* "output" (Interpretant).  For one
thing, this has a deterministic connotation--in mathematics, even
non-linear functions always produce the same output upon receiving the same
input.  In any case, Peirce's own description was instead that the Sign
*communicates *a Form *from *the Object *to* the Interpretant, in such a
way that the Object is unaffected by the Sign and the Sign is unaffected by
the Interpretant (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 8:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, Mike, list
>
> 1] John - thanks for the clarification of your slide #9, Cognitive
> Learning.
>
>  I mistook the three slides showing brain activity to refer to the
> Peircean categories - and was puzzled, since Feeling/Firstness does not,
> according to Peirce, require a brain. As he said, 'protoplasm' feels...and
> this is a non-conscious, i.e., non-mental experience. My error regarding
> your slides.
>
> 2] With regard to your slide #4 of machine learning - I've got two points.
>
> I can see, actually, that the triangle is an accurate image in ML, - and
> comment that such linearity is a key problem in ML. That's why I prefer the
> triadic spokes or Y shape provided by Peirce for the semiosic Sign because
> it rejects the linear force - which can be quite overpowering like an
> avalanche - and enables mediation...which is never linear. Machines have
> trouble with mediation!
>
> I don't see, as does Mike, that this is related to the categories, but
> could be wrong, and would also appreciate your clarification.
>
> 3] At any rate, I've suggested years ago, that the semiosic triadic act is
> a function: f{x]=y, where 'f' is mediation. Your slide 5 shows this quite
> well, AND, in addition, shows the vital nature of this mediation or 'hidden
> layer'. What is interesting is that your hidden layer[s] is
> complex/multiple. My view is that this is why Thirdness has three modes:
> 3-3, 3-2, 3-1 - to provide complexity of organization/transformation of
> input to output.
>
> My paper, presented in Dubois' conference on Computing Anticipatory
> Systems,  examines the complex actions of this mediation within the three
> modes of Thirdness and as a function...and even, puts these actions on a
> different spatial and temporal zone than the actions of 1ns,2ns.
>
> Note - I've tried to attach my paper, The Sign as a WFF/well-formed
> formula, but this new computer doesn't have all my papers and I'm an idiot
> dealing with computers.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 19/08/18 11:08 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
>
> Hi John, List,
>
> I appreciate you keep trying to get us back on target with your comments.
>
> I think the reference Edwina brought forward is the best I've seen so
> far for these arguments with respect to the neurophysiology of Thirdness
> mediation. Do you agree?
>
> I think I understand your points on slides 7-11 of your short version
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf
> .
>
>
> However, what stopped me in this deck is slide #4. Framing the ML
> methods into the triadic triangle format you prefer (as do I) seems to
> imply you are relating these ML methods to the universal categories. Is
> that your intent? If so, I'd love to hear the rationale behind that.
>
> Best, Mike
>
> On 8/19/2018 8:56 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
> > On 8/18/2018 5:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> >> I can see from the images that you refer to each of these Peircean
> >> categories taking place in a different part of the brain.
> >
> > That's not what I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Mike Bergman]

Hi John, List,

I appreciate you keep trying to get us back on target with your comments.

I think the reference Edwina brought forward is the best I've seen so 
far for these arguments with respect to the neurophysiology of Thirdness 
mediation. Do you agree?


I think I understand your points on slides 7-11 of your short version 
http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf.


However, what stopped me in this deck is slide #4. Framing the ML 
methods into the triadic triangle format you prefer (as do I) seems to 
imply you are relating these ML methods to the universal categories. Is 
that your intent? If so, I'd love to hear the rationale behind that.


Best, Mike

On 8/19/2018 8:56 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

On 8/18/2018 5:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I can see from the images that you refer to each of these Peircean 
categories taking place in a different part of the brain.


That's not what I meant.  The categories are correlated with the
interconnections of different areas.

For further explanation, I'll have to refer to several diagrams.
Instead of the 117-slide long version, please download the 21-slide
short version: http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf

Slide 7 asks "What is cognition?" and summarizes the answer by
the psychologist Lawrence Barsalou.  That is useful background.
After that, slides 8 to 11 discuss the experiment of teaching
14 students about the workings of four devices:  bathroom scale,
fire extinguisher, disk brake system, and trumpet.  At different
stages of learning, they asked the students questions about those
four devices and recorded the fMRI scans of their brains while
they were answering.

Instead of showing the scans of the left sides of their brains
(which are dominated by the language processing), they showed the
scans of the right sides (which are dominated by the processes of
imagining and interpreting the images).

All 14 students had similar brain activations for the same 3 kinds
of questions about the 4 different devices.  It's significant that
all 168 patterns (14 x 3 x 4) were remarkably similar.

For my summary of the study, please review slides 8 and 9.
For the full article, the link is at the bottom of slide 8.

Then slide 10 summarizes issues about Intentionality, which is
the most characteristic aspect of Thirdness.  It quotes Brentano
and Lynn Margulis before summarizing Peirce's views.

Finally, slide 11 relates the brain scans to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
Following are three quotations from that slide, each followed
by my further commentary:

  1. "Perception is based on localized percepts or prototypes. It
     classifies phenomena by the monadic predicates of Firstness
     (fMRI image #1)."

     What is critical here is not which part of the brain lights up,
     but the fact that only one very narrow area is active.  In this
     case, its the visual cortex, which is active in both direct
     perception and in mental imagery of remembered or anticipated
     scenes.  Auditory or tactile perception would be localized in
     different, but equally narrow areas.

  2. "Long-distance connections in the parietal lobes support dyadic
     relations that connect all sensory and motor modalities.  They
     represent the structures of Secondness (image #2)."

     By long-distance, I mean crossing from one lobe to another.
     In image #2, the visual cortex is still active, but there is
     more activation in related areas, especially the parietal lobes,
     which  relate the visual aspects various to kinds of patterns.
     The tactile and motor areas are also active.  This kind of
     activity would be characteristic of dyadic relations that
     relate structural aspects of the four devices.

  3. "The frontal lobes process the mediating Thirdness in reasoning,
     planning, causality, and intentionality (image #3)."

     The frontal lobes, which are the most active, involve the most
     complex reasoning.  The frontal lobes are also adjacent to the
     tactile and motor areas that are also involved in reasoning
     about how the four devices work.

Mike B

The full paper without charge [on "Gradual Progression from Sensory
to Task-Related Processing in Cerebral Cortex"]
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/30/E7202.full.pdf


This paper is consistent with the one about the four devices.
Note that image #1 in slide 11 of vrshort.pdf would be the first
area to become active when someone is looking at the device.
Then images #2 and #3 would become active when thinking about
tasks that use the device.

John




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[John F Sowa]

On 8/18/2018 5:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I can see from the images that you refer to each of these Peircean 
categories taking place in a different part of the brain.


That's not what I meant.  The categories are correlated with the
interconnections of different areas.

For further explanation, I'll have to refer to several diagrams.
Instead of the 117-slide long version, please download the 21-slide
short version: http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf

Slide 7 asks "What is cognition?" and summarizes the answer by
the psychologist Lawrence Barsalou.  That is useful background.
After that, slides 8 to 11 discuss the experiment of teaching
14 students about the workings of four devices:  bathroom scale,
fire extinguisher, disk brake system, and trumpet.  At different
stages of learning, they asked the students questions about those
four devices and recorded the fMRI scans of their brains while
they were answering.

Instead of showing the scans of the left sides of their brains
(which are dominated by the language processing), they showed the
scans of the right sides (which are dominated by the processes of
imagining and interpreting the images).

All 14 students had similar brain activations for the same 3 kinds
of questions about the 4 different devices.  It's significant that
all 168 patterns (14 x 3 x 4) were remarkably similar.

For my summary of the study, please review slides 8 and 9.
For the full article, the link is at the bottom of slide 8.

Then slide 10 summarizes issues about Intentionality, which is
the most characteristic aspect of Thirdness.  It quotes Brentano
and Lynn Margulis before summarizing Peirce's views.

Finally, slide 11 relates the brain scans to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
Following are three quotations from that slide, each followed
by my further commentary:

 1. "Perception is based on localized percepts or prototypes. It
classifies phenomena by the monadic predicates of Firstness
(fMRI image #1)."

What is critical here is not which part of the brain lights up,
but the fact that only one very narrow area is active.  In this
case, its the visual cortex, which is active in both direct
perception and in mental imagery of remembered or anticipated
scenes.  Auditory or tactile perception would be localized in
different, but equally narrow areas.

 2. "Long-distance connections in the parietal lobes support dyadic
relations that connect all sensory and motor modalities.  They
represent the structures of Secondness (image #2)."

By long-distance, I mean crossing from one lobe to another.
In image #2, the visual cortex is still active, but there is
more activation in related areas, especially the parietal lobes,
which  relate the visual aspects various to kinds of patterns.
The tactile and motor areas are also active.  This kind of
activity would be characteristic of dyadic relations that
relate structural aspects of the four devices.

 3. "The frontal lobes process the mediating Thirdness in reasoning,
planning, causality, and intentionality (image #3)."

The frontal lobes, which are the most active, involve the most
complex reasoning.  The frontal lobes are also adjacent to the
tactile and motor areas that are also involved in reasoning
about how the four devices work.

Mike B

The full paper without charge [on "Gradual Progression from Sensory
to Task-Related Processing in Cerebral Cortex"]
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/30/E7202.full.pdf


This paper is consistent with the one about the four devices.
Note that image #1 in slide 11 of vrshort.pdf would be the first
area to become active when someone is looking at the device.
Then images #2 and #3 would become active when thinking about
tasks that use the device.

John

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