Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

3.418.  "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to 
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under 
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."


On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:


> On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier  wrote:
> Jerry,
> 
> I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
> firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
> about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
> aren’t talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like
>  
> 
>  
> 
> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when 
> we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 
> 
>  
> 
> Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.
> 
>  
> 
> Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views on 
> firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).
> 
> 
> 
Basically, John, your response is irrelevant to what I am saying.
 
By way of background, I have had a lifelong interest in metaphysics and the 
relations between the sciences and metaphysics. Obviously, my interest is 
closely related to medicine and the biological sciences where the science of 
physics can contribute by contributing utterly simplistic calculations of the 
relevant but relative units for particular situations (identities.)  The 
physical units, in and of themselves, are given biological meaning only by the 
union of them.

Back to the issue at hand. Metaphysics, as an mode of human thinking and 
communication, must start with words, words with meaning for the author, either 
as utterances or symbolic expressions on a 'sheet of assertion' or another 
media. 

No one individual (such as physicist) can impose, for humanity as a whole, a 
particular meaning on the starting units, or the union of such starting units, 
or, more generally, on part-whole relatives and part-whole relations. 

More directly, a metaphysical proposition may be stated in many different 
languages and symbol systems. Thus, the mereology of metaphysical propositions 
may draw upon terms and symbols as desired by the author of metaphysical 
propositions. Further, a metaphysics without part-whole relations (scaling) and 
identity can hardly be a metaphysics AT ALL as neither emergence or evolution 
could be relatives.

Frankly, I interpret your metaphysics, after reading your posts for more than a 
decade on this and other list serves as well as personal conversations from 
time to time, your metaphysics is merely the science of physics (unless you 
have had a recent epiphany.)

>From my perspective, you capture the essence of being with your defense of the 
>phrase, "It's from bits". 

CSP is clear enough about meaning of a fact or a unit of measure:

3.418.  "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to 
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under 
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."

Let's just agree to disagree, John.

Cheers

Jerry 


 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry, List:



I believe my metaphysics are those of C.S. Peirce.  Peirce's pope-positivism is 
also assumed explicitly in our book, Every Thing Must Go, which does take 
modern physics as a starting point. So perhaps I have made my ideas clear, and 
the resulting argument is pretty straight-forward. Most metaphysical problems, 
especially of the sort you are concerned with, are dissolved on this approach, 
which was certainly Peirce's intention. As I said in  my response to Franklin, 
you can take the negation of some of Peirce's central claims, and get other 
results. I have yet to see a clear statement of either your objections to the 
Peircean position, or what you consider to be an alternative. Starting by 
stating explicitly which parts of Peirce's methodology you reject might help me 
here. I have been using Peircean methodology more and more explicitly since my 
PhD thesis (1984), which uses Peirce's pragmatic maxim (a version of it - he 
had many versions that are presumably equivalent at some level - much like 
Kant's categorical imperative) and his positivist motives.  I have been 
minimizing my metaphysical commitments for some time, though I spent a period 
as a raving Platonist when I was an undergraduate, probably under the influence 
of reading too much B. Russell rather naively.



This is a Peirce list, after all. But I think that it is actually a relevant 
question which of Peirce's basic assumptions (all thought is in signs, 
objectivity requires that differences in meaning are determined by differences 
in expectations of possible experience, there is an identifiable set of 
external object to which some of our signs pick out that are mostly accessible 
through sensory observations - some exceptions involving evaluation of 
outcomes, but still involving observation and possible observations) one can 
coherently give up. Assuming we disagree, and I am not convinced there is any 
meaningful basis for the apparent disagreement, and I don't yet see what it is, 
I proposed some possibilities recently of where we disagree, like rationalism 
of a form that rejects the Pragmatic Maxim, or Peirce's empirical criterion for 
cognitive significance, or both. (Rationalism I take to be, as is traditional, 
that there are synthetic a priori truths, i.e., truths discoverable and 
justifiable by reason that are not the results of definitions and/or 
methodological commitments). Unlike the Logical Positivists, I don't think it 
is possible or wise to try to eliminate metaphysics entirely. Their program 
collapsed in its own terms. But it is best to keep it minimal. I think the 
alternative produces unclear ideas of an especially convoluted (involuted?) 
sort. However that may be, I am still not at all clear what our different 
presuppositions are, let alone what the basis of the difference might be.



My metaphysics is not just physics, but a physics supported but not implied 
position called Structural Realism in the philosophical literature. Actually, I 
have a slightly more restrictive form that Cliff Hooker and I call Dynamical 
Realism. Being more restrictive means that it requires additional argument, the 
arguments being distinctly metaphysical and not physical.  It is the starting 
point for many of my recent papers that have something like "A dynamical 
approach to ..." in the title. My scientific background (I did research in 
government, business and academics) is in planetary science, which is mostly 
the study of inorganic dynamical systems, so it is my touchstone for scientific 
methodology (arguably the notion of complexly organized systems originated in  
a lab in the building that held most of my classes, run by Lorenz - planetary 
dynamics is another source).



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]

Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 7:13 PM

To: Peirce-L

Cc: John Collier

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.



List, John:



3.418.  "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to 
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under 
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."





On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:







On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier  wrote:



Jerry,

I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
aren't talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like





[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.



Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.



Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Dear Franklin, List members:

I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out now. It 
is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit subtle. I left 
it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce scholars It appears 
in several places in slightly different forms in Peirce’s writings. I would 
argue that it is very difficult if not impossible to accept many of Peirce’s 
more systematic ideas without accepting this argument I lay out.

Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to 
something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in  one sense), or we 
go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to Peirce). 
Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity test. 
Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given up. Now 
that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is objective, but 
meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences alone without 
making it depend on psychology rather than objective conditions. Other than for 
logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity in things that are external, 
the experience ultimately referred to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would 
include emotions, which I see to have a propositional or cognitive component) 
that also must have an external aspect in order to support objective 
differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of 
experiences that are of external things. The child, he says, learns to 
recognize that not all things are under his control, but must be at least in 
part caused by external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of 
the external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this 
class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just 
identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are 
illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and 
dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – though 
Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but Peirce would 
require an additional reason for doubt over the mere possibility – a “defeater” 
in terms of contemporary pragmatist epistemology), but the basic way to check 
membership is whether or not they are at least in part not under our control. 
This needs to be tested, as we can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in 
general (or we violate the defeater requirement).

Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of definitions 
floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine defines the physical 
as that which is accessible through the senses (not what physics tells us is 
physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) since there are the 
afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics tells us is physical is a 
good place to start, but of course physics has been wrong, so this is more of a 
control than a criterion. I think it is safe to say, though, that everything 
that science has been able to study effectively so far has a physical basis. I 
would think that the physical has a number of signs, and that there is a 
consilience that eventually leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce 
was, in fact, a kind of idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there 
is presumably no contradiction  between his views about experience, and the 
physical, and at least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, 
but that is neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument 
that I have reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or 
mental experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, 
mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. In 
order to make our ideas clear we need to make reference to this external 
component, on pain of subjectivism, psychologism, and making distinctions in 
thoughts that have no distinction in their objects. So Peirce’s prope-postivism 
also takes us back to the Pragmatic Maxim, that thought is all in signs, and 
his notion of the basis of experience.

Obviously there are some assumptions here, and one could reject any one of them 
(accept subjectivism, or psychologism, or other forms of antirealism, as 
examples), which many philosophers do. But the assumptions are made deeply in 
Peirce’s philosophy. I think he was right about this.

I could give a bunch of references to Peirce’s writings that support my 
interpretation, but this is long enough already and I have to go shopping. I 
hope it is at least close to sufficient to respond to your worry.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 2:26 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Franklin Ransom]

John,

You said:

The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist.


I've been trying to figure this one out for myself, but am having some
trouble, in particular with the "idea that the physical is just what we can
experience." Would you be willing to clarify how you mean this? Is physical
opposed to mental, and thus the mental is not something we can experience?
And/or the spiritual? Or would you include mental and/or spiritual as
subdivisions of the physical? My sense of physicalism, aside from your
characterization, is that it's the idea that what is real is whatever
physics discovers or says is real, which is quite different from what you
are suggesting. I hope that you can understand my concern. After all,
clearly an idealist could just as easily say that what is mental is
whatever we can experience, and I think you can understand that idea.
What's the point of calling all of experience one or the other?

-- Franklin


On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of
> firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking
> about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You
> aren’t talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like
>
>
>
> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise
> when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.
>
>
>
> Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical
> perspective.
>
>
>
> Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views
> on firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).
>
>
>
> Unless you understand  this you are going to be asking questions without
> an answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with
> my physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe).
> The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. Basically,
> you err, as I see it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in
> meaning, however much it might seem to. It violates Peirce’s
> prope-positivism, which he uses to deflate a lot of metaphysics.
>
>
>
> Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of
> experience Peirce uses, or both, in  order to save your distinction. But
> then you aren’t talking about Peirce’s firsts when you say they have
> structure.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

On Dec 6, 2015, at 8:04 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to 
> something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in  one sense), or 
> we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to 
> Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity 
> test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given 
> up. Now that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is 
> objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences 
> alone without making it depend on psychology rather than objective 
> conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity 
> in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred to has to be 
> of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see to have a 
> propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an external aspect 
> in order to support objective differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by 
> setting aside a class of experiences that are of external things. The child, 
> he says, learns to recognize that not all things are under his control, but 
> must be at least in part caused by external influences, so some experience is 
> composed of signs of the external. This is a very early and necessary 
> abduction. Membership in this class of supposed externally based experiences 
> (which Peirce often just identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further 
> evidence (there are illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most 
> extreme case – and dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ 
> examples – though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, 
> but Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere 
> possibility –

Well said!

While several phases are open to refinement, the paragraph captures several of 
CSP's philosophical positions in a rhetorical sense.

The units of thought which ground CSP's trichotomy are readily categorized from 
the assertion: 

 Meaning has to be referenced to something, and that something cannot be 
internal (mental in  one sense), or we go in circles (which is acceptable to 
some philosophers, but not to Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is 
that it fails the objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or 
his realism has to be given up .


Roughly speaking, the external objectivity test (thing - representation - form) 
was the then nascent science of chemistry.  Like mathematics, chemistry used 
highly abstract symbols to relate invisible objects to one-another, but the 
logical meaning of chemical symbols was obscure in 19 th Century.  

CSP was aware that certain mathematical indices were EXACT physical 
representations of physical measurements and that broad classes of such 
mathematical calculations were consistent  with one-another.
(Today, we refer to the logical terms of molecular weight and molecular 
formula. These are generic terms, that can be applied to any chemical identity.)

One of the big "open questions" that CSP studied throughout his life was the 
question: What is a molecule?
Clearly, each chemical element is a relative of every other chemical element.  
As a collection, the concept of "table of elements" was used to express the 
relatedness of all elements. 
The relatedness of all elements was a fact based on analysis of molecules and 
the difference in the quali-signs of molecules and the fact that certain 
molecules (Water, Carbon Monoxide, Carbon Dioxide, Methane, Ammonia) could be 
made from elements.

Thus, CSP sought to develop a logic of relatives that was consistent with his 
knowledge of mathematical calculations of molecular weight and molecular 
formula, the chemical table of elements, and the diagram  as he understood it 
as a molecular formula.

In CSP 3.416, "A relation is a fact about a number of things" is a wide-ranging 
assertion about his beliefs about his objectivity of facts.  It should (must) 
be contrast with the definitions of relations as variables or as sets. 

Sections 3.415-3.424 deserve careful reading in this context of his objectivity.

Section 3.468-3.483 shows directly the role of chemical relatives, taken as 
objective facts of chemical relations, are extended into his logic of relatives 
and his notion of graph theory. 

Can one conclude that CSP referenced the meaning of objectivity, the meaning of 
objects and meaning of logic to the nascent generalizations of the consequences 
of physical measurements expressed in chemical symbols?

The union of these units of thought give a unity to a substantial fraction of 
CSP's claims for realism and the objectivity of the sciences.

 The three trichotomies, which ground his system of signs, offer substantial  
support for a recursive system of objective logic consistent with chemical 
relatives and chemical relations.
The critical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Franklin Ransom]

John,

I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've
had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in
experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience
external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I feel
as though asking this question might be somehow perceived as obnoxious, but
I confess that I have a sincere desire to understand how you think about
it; since what you've had to say seems to imply, so far as I can tell, that
you would probably admit that you experience external minds (like my mind),
but that you also have to admit that you think of the experience of my mind
as of something physical, not mental (i.e., not referring to illusions,
dreams, etc.), since it is something external to you. Have I ascertained
your point of view rightly on this, or am I guilty of warping your meaning
in some unfortunate way?


-- Franklin


On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 9:04 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> Dear Franklin, List members:
>
>
>
> I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out
> now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit
> subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce
> scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in
> Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not
> impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without
> accepting this argument I lay out.
>
>
>
> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to
> something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in  one sense), or
> we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to
> Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the
> objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has
> to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental
> experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to
> mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than
> objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for
> objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred
> to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see
> to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an
> external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning.
> Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of
> external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all
> things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by
> external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the
> external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this
> class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just
> identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are
> illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and
> dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples –
> though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but
> Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere
> possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist
> epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they
> are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we
> can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the
> defeater requirement).
>
>
>
> Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of
> definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine
> defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not
> what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me)
> since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics
> tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has
> been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is
> safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study
> effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical
> has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually
> leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of
> idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no
> contradiction  between his views about experience, and the physical, and at
> least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is
> neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have
> reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental
> experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical,
> mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least.
> In order to make our ideas 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry,

I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
aren't talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce's views on 
firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).

Unless you understand  this you are going to be asking questions without an 
answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with my 
physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). The 
physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference in 
meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with Quine's 
idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it that the last 
is also Peirce's view, and he is no materialist. Basically, you err, as I see 
it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in meaning, however much 
it might seem to. It violates Peirce's prope-positivism, which he uses to 
deflate a lot of metaphysics.

Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of 
experience Peirce uses, or both, in  order to save your distinction. But then 
you aren't talking about Peirce's firsts when you say they have structure.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 December 2015 11:32 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce-L; Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, John:


On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:


Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.

Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, 
featureless.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

Well...
FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate.

But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his 
arguments.
Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in 
various forms of diagrams / mereology.  To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the 
critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms  / formal 
logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use.

CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related 
terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The 
goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that 
is recursive.  In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) 
premises for constructing consistent arguments.   The index is the central term 
in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices.  The construction 
of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately 
connected to the indices.  It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. 
 That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of 
the sin-sign into rhema  The proposed self-consistency of the sentences 
(propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns.

Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of 
legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new 
qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1.

In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises 
augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine 
terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics 
such that recursive calculations  would be consistent, complete and decidable.

As I have previously noted 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John: 


On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
> explain. See interspersed comments.
> 
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.

> 
> I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
> itself without relations.

Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, 
featureless.

> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when 
> we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

> [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
> (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
> seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
> construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in 
> dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or 
> horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into 
> qualities,

Well...
FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate.

But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his 
arguments.
Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in 
various forms of diagrams / mereology.  To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the 
critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms  / formal 
logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use.

CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related 
terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The 
goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that 
is recursive.  In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) 
premises for constructing consistent arguments.   The index is the central term 
in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices.  The construction 
of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately 
connected to the indices.  It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. 
 That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of 
the sin-sign into rhema  The proposed self-consistency of the sentences 
(propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns. 
 
Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of 
legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new 
qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1.  

In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises 
augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine 
terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics 
such that recursive calculations  would be consistent, complete and decidable.

As I have previously noted here, I have used these semantics for pragmatic 
purposes. Rather clumsy, to say the least!

[JLRC]  If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?
> 
> [John Collier] No, see my last interjection.

Is a molecule divisible?   Or, is it a context dependent question?
 
> [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here 
> by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term.

I phrased this question is such a way as to be consistent in multiple symbol 
systems.  If I understand your physical perspective, then I can easy understand 
why you answer in this way. 


Cheers

Jerry






> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> 
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Cc: Clark Goble
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union 
> of units unify the unity.
> 
> List, Clark:
> 
> On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
> 
> 
> I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
> itself without relations.
> 
> 
> From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, 
> of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and 
> as "scaling" in physics.
> 
> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when 
> we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 
> 
> A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? 
> a grammatical structure?
> 
> [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.


John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, Clark:

On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.


>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of 
>part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as 
>"scaling" in physics.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 

A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a 
grammatical structure?

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept 
of the structure of an atom introduced into science?  philosophy?

[John Collier] If an atom is a noun then it is a second, and there is no reason 
why it can't have a structure. Atomness, though, is iconic, and cannot signify 
a structure in itself.

If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?

[John Collier] No, see my last interjection.

In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently 
require a metaphysical view of all nouns?

[John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here by 
your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term.

If a unit is a firstness, then:

The union of units unifies the unity.    

Is this logically  True?  or False?   
What is your reasoning for your conclusion?

[John Collier] Clark will have to address this. I find it very obscure.

Best,
John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Clark:

On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:

> I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
> itself without relations.
> 

>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of 
>part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as 
>"scaling" in physics.

A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a 
grammatical structure?

If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept 
of the structure of an atom introduced into science?  philosophy?

If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?

In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently 
require a metaphysical view of all nouns?

If a unit is a firstness, then:

The union of units unifies the unity.

Is this logically  True?  or False?   
What is your reasoning for your conclusion?


Cheers

Jerry




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