Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
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JAS- This is what I was responding to: You wrote:
"As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive
argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If
one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least
unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who affirms all
of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as
well."
You said nothing about the form of the argument; you based your
assertion only on the premises and clearly stated that if one accepts
the premises as true, then, one is 'rationally required to affirm the
conclusion'.
I merely showed you some examples where the premises were all true -
but one couldn't consider the conclusion as true. Once I had done that
- you then introduced the requirement for 'logical form'.
2] My interest in this thread is to reject the idea of an external
metaphysical agency for the Universe [aka God] and to focus instead
on the self-generating and self-organizing properties of the semiosic
process. .As outlined, for example, in Peirce's description of the
emergence of the Universe [1.412]
Edwina
On Tue 21/05/19 6:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility.
Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.
ET: Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the
premisses are true and the form of argumentation is valid. Your
examples met the first criterion, but not the second. My Semeiotic
Argumentation meets both.
ET: I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to
my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have
the right to tell me to stop having this opinion.
The double standard appears again. What precludes someone from
making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"? What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others
out of bounds? Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e.,
whose opinion about this is authoritative?
ET: I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of
the Universe etc.
In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in
this thread at all?
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Please see my responses below
On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
Edwina, List:
1] ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific content; but not religion.
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
2] ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument.
JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound. This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
3] ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign.
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Edwina, List: ET: My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative measurements and fallibility. Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's. ET: Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion. No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the premisses are true *and *the form of argumentation is valid. Your examples met the first criterion, but not the second. My Semeiotic Argumentation meets both. ET: I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. The double standard appears again. What precludes someone from making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for "reductionism"? What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others out of bounds? Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e., whose *opinion *about this is authoritative? ET: I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of the Universe etc. In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in this thread at all? Regards, Jon S. On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Please see my responses below > > On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > 1] ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have > anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They > have no scientific content whatsoever. > > JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are sciences, > so their content is scientific content; but not religion. Of course, the > line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the > topic of discussion is the Reality of God. > > EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on > objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative > measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these criteria > apply to any of the discussions we've had. > > 2] ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in > the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, > in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is > valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets > up a valid argument. > > JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the argumentation > is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true; i.e., the > argumentation as a whole is sound. This is the most basic logical > leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can certainly disagree > on whether each of the premisses is true, but someone who endorses all of > them is rationally required to endorse the conclusion, as well. > > EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you > declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I > simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion. > > 3] ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's > insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused > with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple > signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the > Universe is A single Sign. > > JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to be > considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected > constitute one Sign. Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire > Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one Sign; and > as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that "the > Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being > precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the > entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or > less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). > > EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie between > 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the Representamen is a > mediative function - an ACTION - and I ackknowledge that the Universe is > one vast ACTION of semiosis, but the nature of the representamen, as a > system of LAWS - is not homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of > matter are NOT identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite > different from the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, > 'the universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But > these laws are not identical. > > 4] ET: I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual > complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ... > > JAS:I
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Please see my responses below
On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
1] ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific content; but not religion.
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
2] ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument.
JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound. This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
3] ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign. Consequently, according to Peirce, if the
entire Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one
Sign; and as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that
"the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that
Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903),
but also that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all
thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie
between 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the
Representamen is a mediative function - an ACTION - and I
ackknowledge that the Universe is one vast ACTION of semiosis, but
the nature of the representamen, as a system of LAWS - is not
homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of matter are NOT
identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite different from
the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, 'the
universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
these laws are not identical.
4] ET: I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis
...
JAS:I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling
it "reductionism." If the entire Universe is indeed a
Sign--specifically, an Argument, a continuous "inferential process"
of semeiosis--that indicates nothing whatsoever about its
complexity. On the contrary, it reveals just how vast and complex a
Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is any simpler
than we otherwise would have suspected.
EDWINA I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right
to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you
have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. I consider
that semeiosis, i.e., the fact that the Representamen has the ability
to transform input data from an external Object [or Objects] and, via
its generative habits/laws...produce something quite unique as an
Interpretant - I consider that this freedom enables complexity.
5] ET: I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a
sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact.
JAS: I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an
external Object. However, the Sign and its Object do not interact,
since that would imply both of them acting on each other; by
contrast, Peirce explicitly affirmed that while the Object acts on
the Sign, the Sign has no effect on its Object.
CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a
Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Supplement: I put an "other" in my second paragraph. Individual signs cannot communicate using quantum entanglement. But perhaps the universe can use quantum entanglement for communication in itself, so may have an event horizon as big as itself.. Edwina, list, I agree. I too think, that a sign is an action, an event, and is therefore limited by its event horizon. Though a part of any sign is due to universal laws, but that does not connect all signs to one (not completely, because only a part of the sign is due to universal laws like efficient causation, other parts follow limitedly ranged laws, habits, needs, volitions, etc.). To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every other sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified. On the other hand it is possible to assume, that a part of any sign has the universe as event horizon, e.g. by divine interaction or communication by quantum entanglement. I think, Peirce has assumed so, when he wrote, that he does not entertain a doubt, that what is present to one mind, is present to all minds. But again, this only would apply to a (quite small) part of the sign, I think. Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms. Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored? And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law. In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. Edwina On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, All, I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved. Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr Von: "Edwina
Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Edwina, list, I agree. I too think, that a sign is an action, an event, and is therefore limited by its event horizon. Though a part of any sign is due to universal laws, but that does not connect all signs to one (not completely, because only a part of the sign is due to universal laws like efficient causation, other parts follow limitedly ranged laws, habits, needs, volitions, etc.). To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified. On the other hand it is possible to assume, that a part of any sign has the universe as event horizon, e.g. by divine interaction or communication by quantum entanglement. I think, Peirce has assumed so, when he wrote, that he does not entertain a doubt, that what is present to one mind, is present to all minds. But again, this only would apply to a (quite small) part of the sign, I think. Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms. Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored? And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law. In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. Edwina On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, All, I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved. Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever. Furthermore, because an
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Edwina, List: 1. Please reread what you quoted from CP 5.484 very carefully. It states that *semeiosis *is "an action or influence" that involves *three *subjects, one of which is a *Sign*. Hence the word "Sign" does not denote the *action*, but one of the three *subjects *involved in that action; i.e., it does not denote the *triad *or *triadic relation*, but one of its three *correlates*, as I have been saying all along. 2. Please stop calling my view "reductionism" and pretending that I invented it myself. I am *directly quoting *Peirce when I say that "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). Denying what Peirce explicitly called a "theorem" of the "science of semeiotics" is straightforwardly *disagreeing with him*, and he also went on to state *explicitly *the implication that "the body of all thought is a sign" (singular). ET: Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false conclusion ... If each of my premisses is *true*, and the form of my argumentation is *valid*--which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below--then the conclusion *must *also be true; i.e., my argumentation is *sound*. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > JAS, list > > 1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the triad is > a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action or > influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as > a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not > being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs...'semeiosis' in > Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember > rightly, meant the action of any kind of sign; and my definition on > anything that so acts the title of a 'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean > that the title of 'sign' refers to the semiosic tri-relative action'. My > emphasis on the words of 'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use > the term of Sign to refer to this tri-relative action. > > 2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not > composed exclusively of signs' is that the universe is a continuous > semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand, seem to > understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that All signs are > connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I understand Peircean > semiosis to be a continuous process but not a material reductionism of its > material results. > > It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees; > therefore, the forest is a tree'. > > Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in its > own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false > conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms [Sign]. > > Edwina > > On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises are > true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats? > > > No, and why not? Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily from > the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid. The same is > true of the other examples below. Now consider a different one--all dogs > are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then state that Rover is > an animal? Yes, because the conclusion does follow necessarily from the > premisses; the form of the argumentation is valid. My Semeiotic > Argumentation has exactly the same form as the second case, not the first > case or any of the others below; therefore, it is valid, such that the > conclusion does follow necessarily from the premisses. > >- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all dogs >are animals, and >- The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore, >- The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself = >Rover is an animal. > > So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be > obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the conclusion > is only as strong as the premisses. If one premiss is false, then the > conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; > e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign, or if Rover is not a dog. > However, anyone who affirms all of the premisses is rationally required > to affirm the conclusion, as well. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid. >> >> JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the
triad is a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an
action or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions
between pairs...'semeiosis' in Greek of the Roman period, as early as
Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of any kind of
sign; and my definition on anything that so acts the title of a
'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean that the title of 'sign' refers to
the semiosic tri-relative action'. My emphasis on the words of
'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use the term of Sign to
refer to this tri-relative action.
2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it
is not composed exclusively of signs' is that the universe is a
continuous semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand,
seem to understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that
All signs are connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I
understand Peircean semiosis to be a continuous process but not a
material reductionism of its material results.
It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees;
therefore, the forest is a tree'.
Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in
its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms
[Sign].
Edwina
On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises
are true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
No, and why not? Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily
from the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid. The
same is true of the other examples below. Now consider a different
one--all dogs are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then
state that Rover is an animal? Yes, because the conclusion does
follow necessarily from the premisses; the form of the argumentation
is valid. My Semeiotic Argumentation has exactly the same form as
the second case, not the first case or any of the others below;
therefore, it is valid, such that the conclusion does follow
necessarily from the premisses.
*Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all
dogs are animals, and
*The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
*The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
= Rover is an animal.
So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be
obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the
conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If one premiss is
false, then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the
basis of that premiss; e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign,
or if Rover is not a dog. However, anyone who affirms all of the
premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as well.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list
The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."
For example,
All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
How about:
The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.
All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?
All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
And so on...
Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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