[PEN-L:3686] Re: Real Change for a Change?
First, I suspect that someone may react against me here in Norway grandly prescribing the break-up of the U.S. .Take my opinions and speculations for what they are worth. That said, some further remarks. Michael Lichter replies to me: the U.S. isn't a bunch of cobbled-together set of historical nations in the way that the ex-USSR was/Russia is. First: Then you must have some sympathy for the idea of substituting the Russian superstate with smaller nation states? Secondly: IMO it isn't a prerequisite for the establishing of a nation that the territory is clearly different from adjoining territories in culture, language, history etc. IMO an argument for not-too-large national territories is simply that the larger the unit the less democracy, and therefore also worse economics and welfare. This as a very general rule of course, with a lot of exceptions in the real world. The Taiwan/PRC example already introduced by me is an example of the above: They have milleniums of common history, similar language, culture, etc., and should by those criteria be a self-evident part of the mainland-based nation. In spite of this, IMO, they should not today be fusioned without the consent of a clear majority in both countries, expressed in a referendum after a democratic and informed discussion. (If there are Chinese or Far East researchers on this list, I am very interested in their comments). (me:) Btw, does the silence on PEN on my support for a "two-China" solution mean that all you other left-wingers support that view? If so, interesting... (Michael:) I didn't know this was an issue for anybody but the Chinese. Now, Michael, what did you intend with this remark? I choose to exclude the possibility of sarcasm, and take this up on its face value. Do you by this mean that participants on this list who are not Chinese should abstain from discussing and voicing opinions on the PRC/Taiwan issue? If so, you must mean that one shall abstain from discussing any issue that one is not able to influence, or have the right to decide. Being a political animal, I disagree enormously. (me:) Why not break up the MNC's also?? (Michael:) How? Well, in Norway our relatively small on world scale, but large in Norway, MNCs Norsk Hydro and Statoil are state-owned, so they may in principle be broken up by gvt. decision. But this is not very interesting, since they are medium-sized on a world scale, and the really large MNC's are private. I don't think it is easy to break up MNC's, but I have given a challenge to penners who disagree with me to explain why it is impossible for nations to control such MNC operations as unfettered capital flows and foreign takeovers. I am waiting for replies. If such controls are implemented worldwide, IMO it is not of any great negative importance if a corporation remains large and multinational. An increase in formal democracy is not necessarily an increase in substantive democracy. It depends on the context. Of course, but this has no bearing on our disagreement. Further, you can accuse me of imposing my "moral superiority", ... I haven't and I don't. ... but I'm not so postmodern .. Neither am I, believe me! ... that I don't have principles that can't be compromised. Of course again, don't we all have? The question of _how_ to choose how to influence wrongs in other parts of the world is not answered by your statement. in earnest non-postmodernism, Trond - | Trond Andresen ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) | | lecturer | | Department of Engineering Cybernetics | | The Norwegian Institute of Technology | | N-7034 Trondheim, NORWAY | | | | phone (work) +47 73 59 43 58 | | fax (work) +47 73 59 43 99 | | private phone +47 73 53 08 23 | | | | http://www.itk.unit.no/ansatte/Andresen,Trond | -
[PEN-L:3687] request
Hi pen-ners, would anyone be able to point me in the right direction for recent literature on the following keywords: sales tax services sector; looking for discussion of above based in tax reform to possibly include expanding sales tax to a broad-based taxing of the services sector, hopefully mentioning certain non-essential services...i have the Florida state literaturethanks in advance...melvin B.
[PEN-L:3689] rationality II
After posting a message about the near-tautology and non- falsifiable character of the "rationality" assumption in economics, I stumbled on a prima facie case of economic IRrationality that indicates that maybe the "rationality" assumption is falsifiable: at the campus stamp machine last year, it was common for people to put 30 cents in to get a 29-cent stamp and then leave the one-cent stamp in the machine for anyone to pick up. This might be seen as rational, because these days one penny isn't worth the effort. One-cent stamps might be use- ful, but not very practical, because one might need five of them to get the right postage, taking up a big segment of the envelope... This year, with the postal rate increase, people pay 35 cents to get a 32-cent stamp. The change shows up not as three one- cent stamps, but as a three-cent stamp, which currently is one of the most useful stamps around, since it fills the gap between the old 29-cent stamps and the new. But students are still leaving their change in the machine for others to pick up! This seems totally irrational. sincerely, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Doubt all." -- Rosa Luxemburg. From: "Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics" by Donald N. McCloskey, Cambridge U. Press, 1994: "At Chicago the positivism was laid on thick, and conversations with the late George Stigler in particular were likely to be terminated by a positivist edict and a sneer. One conversation with Stigler was especially eye opening to an associate professor beginning at last in 1978 to doubt the epistemological claims of positivism. Stigler was holding forth in the bar of the faculty club on the merits of behaviorist theorists of voting, in which people are said to vote according to their pocketbooks. His younger colleague, who had just read Brian Barry's devastating attack on such models (Barry 1970 and 1978) and for ten years had been teachinf first-year graduate students about the small man in the large market (following Stigler's own exposition in "The Theory of Price, 1966, appendix B, note 7, p.342), remarked that people would be irrational to go to the polls in the first place. A single voter has as much to do with the outcome of an election as a single farmer in Hills, Iowa has to do with the price of soybeans. The voter therefore appeared to have shown by entering the voting booth that he was nuts (by an economistic definition of nuttiness), and it would be strange if he voted with his pocketbook with strict rationality after he closed the curtain. The argument struck a nerve, and Stigler because as was his custom abusively positivistic, declaring loudly that all that mattered were the observable implications. To the doubting positivist the procedure seemed to throw away some of the evidence we have. Strange: throw away some of the evidence and then proceed to examine the evidence. He noticed, too, that Stigler refused to talk any more about the matter, striding off irritated by the idiocy of the young." (p. 14) Jim Craven *---** * James Craven *"Those who take the most from the table * * Dept of Economics* teach contentment. * * Clark College* Those for whom the taxes are destined * * 1800 E. McLoughlin Blvd.* demand sacrifice. * * Vancouver, Wa. 98663 * Those who eat their fill, * * (206) 699-0283 * speak to the hungry, * * [EMAIL PROTECTED] * of wonderful times to come. * * * Those who lead the country * * * into the abyss, * * * call ruling difficult, * * * for ordinary folk." * * ** * * ( Bertolt Brecht) * ** * "If there is to be hope, we must all 'betray' our country. We * * have to save each other because all victims are equal and none is * * more equal than others. It is everyone's duty to start the * * avalanche. Nowadays you have to think like a hero just to behave * * like a merely decent human being." * *(John Le Carre's character Barley Scott Blair in "The Russia House")* * MY EMPLOYER HAS NO ASSOCIATION WITH MY PRIVATE/PROTECTED OPINIONS *
[PEN-L:3690] rationality
I must register a disagreement with Jim Devine on the question of rationality in neoclassical economics. I DO think their view is non-tautological. Rationality is generally defined as adherence to Von Neuman/Morgenstern (or Friedman/Savage) expected utility, where the decision-maker selects the option that maximizes the dot product of probabilities and values of potential outcomes (all present value, of course). There is a large literature on the discrepancy between this model and real-world observed behavior, beginning with the Allais paradox and extending to Kahneman Tversky, Thaler, Frank, etc. (Simon should also be mentioned.) My personal view is that the weakness of the rationality assumption is one of the soft underbellies of neoclassical theory, particularly since "near-rational" behavior leads to significantly different outcomes (e.g. Akerlof Yellen). One of my interests is the intersection of "thick" (non-NC) rationality and strategic behavior in repeated games. I find this useful for understanding the emergence (or eclipse) of solidarity, etc. Peter Dorman
[PEN-L:3691] Re: The Chechen War
On Tue, 10 Jan 1995, D Shniad wrote: Brezhinsky was on the CBC last week, railing against the outrageous position being taken by Clinton and the Stat4e Department, which have been comparing Yeltsin's role as akin to that of Lincoln (as a nationa saver). Sounds weird, but it's hard to disagree with Brezhinsky. Sid Shniad Brzezinski--he would not thank you for spelling his Polish name in a Russian manner-- is sort of right, but for a hateful reason. He's a near-psychotic anti-Russian Polish chauvinist. He wants to see Russia destroyed. When he was Carter's national security adviser and they were discussing new nuclear targeting doctine, Zbig expressed his wish that U.S. warheads be targeted in such a way as to kill as many Russians as possible. You mean Soviets, Harold Brown (SecDef) said? No, said Zbig, I mean Russians. --Justin Schwartz
[PEN-L:3692] Re: Power and Method
three points on positivism: 1. the Marxist Rudolf Hilferding was (to my mind) a positivist, with his distinction between "Marxism as a science" and "socialism as a moral committment." 2. I think this goes to the heart of positivism: the positivists think that there's a clear distinction between "fact" and "value," so it's possible to be "value free" in one's science. The positivists think that one can separate the observer (the student) from the observed (society), treating themselves as somehow independent of society. To my mind, we are all participant-observers. 3. The positivist story (as I understand it) makes much more sense on the normative level, i.e., as a prescription for how scholars should behave, than on the positive level, i.e., as a description of how scholars actually behave. On the latter, authors such as Kuhn and Lakatos win hands down. Of course, it's well-nigh impossible to separate these two levels. But some sort of committment to non-partisan, critical, thinking is needed. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 The four seasons in California: Drought, firestorm, mudslide, and smog. Attention modern Vivaldis who want a sequel to the seismic suite!
[PEN-L:3693] Re: rationality
On Tue, 10 Jan 1995, Jim Devine wrote: Jim argues in the following that the economist's notion of rationality is tautological, so lacking in empirical content, so lacking in normative force. There's a long-standing] debate about this in philosophy which I might briefly summarize here. Carl Hempel argued that economic rationality, expressed in decision theoretic assumptions about motivation, is an empirical matter in that whether agents satisfy these assumptions (approximately) is something which can in principle be tested. Such texting can take the form of the work done by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Twersky, comparing the actual behavior of experimental subjects to their predicted behavior on DT assumptions. KT's results indicate that subjects typically do not satisfy these assumptions and have devised a "prospect theory" which they regard as a better empirical description of human decision-making. This work has also been confirmed in different ways by my old teachers Phillip Johnson-Laird at Cambridge and Robert Nisbet at Michigan. The significance of these results has been disputed by philosophers like L. Jonathan Cohen and Donald Davidson (the latter of whom did some of the pioneering psychological work in the '50s). Cohen and Davidson note some the points urged by Jim and also that we can in principle readjust which beliefs and desires we attribute to people to make their behavior come out D-T rational no matter what the evidence is. They conclude that human irrationality can not be experimentally shown or disproven. In their view, the assumption of rationality is a necessary a priori condition of treating people as responsible agents rather than things buffeted about by external causes. Note though, that they take the "tautological" or, as they see it, a priori, character of DT rationality as grounds for accepted its normative force. Indeed, for them, it is a necessary normative assumption of doing social and psychological explanation at all. In the Hempel version, such rationality has no such normative force; it's simply a way people behave and think (or not). So the logic of the debate seems to be that DT rationality is either a priori and normative or empirical and not (necessarily). I agree with Hempel for reasons which are too long to go into just now, unless people want to discuss this. --Justin people on the list may be interested in the following, which I posted to sci.econ on netnews/usenet: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John M Hall) wrote: In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Nelson) wri tes: Given that this is *SCI*.econ, what would convince me would be a formal definition of rationality that could be falsified and that could be applied in a formal model. Given that you view falsification as the necessary condition, why not accept Steve's (?) definition of purposeful behavior? This definition, hypothesis, is falsified when one person is found doing something they know will not acheive what they are attempting to accomplish. I would like to see how you would do this. The problem is that individual tastes, goals, etc. cannot be directly measured so one can't figure out what what they are "attempting to accomplish." The way economists typically get at what people are "attempting to accomplish" is by looking at what they actually do (revealed preference). So we've got a circular, unfalsifiable, argument. The "rationality" assumption is tautological (or close to being so) and if it isn't totally so, it can be protected from any kind of empirical falsification by ceteris paribus clauses. That said, there is nothing wrong with having a few tautological concepts as long as we are concious of their nature as tautological and the theory goes beyond tautology. As Lakatos points out, all theories have a "hard core" of such concepts. Just as neoclassical economics has its unfalsifiable "rationality" assumption, Marxian economics has its "labor theory of value." Even geometry has its concept of the point (among others). Once it is realized that the "rationality" assumption is tautological (or close to it), it is important to get rid of the value-laden or ideological conceptions that are inherent in the word "rational." By the standard economics definition of "rationality," Jeffrey Dahmer was a rational consumer. We cannot assume that rationality is good. The word "rationality" should be replaced by "consistency of goals" or simply "consistency." -- Jim Devine
[PEN-L:3694] Taiwan and self-determination
In spite of this, IMO, they should not today be fusioned without the consent of a clear majority in both countries, expressed in a referendum after a democratic and informed discussion. For once, Trond, I disagree with you. At least, I think the Taiwan issue is not so clear cut. The question of who gets to have veto power in such a case is to me quite murky, to say the least. For example, the British government takes the position that the electorate of Northern Ireland have veto power on the question of Irish reunification. Yet Northern Ireland is precisely the political enitity created by British colonialism to sabotage Irish independence and sovereignty. In such a case I wouldn't say that, morally at least, the electorate in the North has an absolute veto. In the case of Taiwan, this "country" only exists as a result of the events of 1948-9, the flight of the 'Nationalist' political leadership to the island (at that time no-one disputed that it was part of China -- in fact, for the Nationalists, it WAS China) and the subsequent support of that leadership by anticommunists in the West. Moreover for years the 'Nationalist' leadership excluded the indigenous population of Taiwan from any role in governing the island. The governemnt claimed to be the legitimate government of all China and its parliament, until quite recently I think, had representatives whose 'constituencies' where the various provinces of the mainland -- of course these people were not elected, but retained their pre-1949 titles. All of which is not to say that "self-determination for Taiwan" is somehow precluded by history, and indeed as I understand it there is a quite vigorous Taiwanese independence movement which opposes itself both to the mainland govt and the "Nationalist" government on the island, and defends the language, culture, etc. of the indigenous population (Maori? I can't remember.) But I certainly wouldn't say that China's too big to be democratic, therefore Taiwan should be an independent country. Certainly this is up to the Chinese. Of course Trond you also think that it is up to them, but that there is no reason why you/we shouldn't have an opinion. I guess I would say that there is no point to our having an opinion in this case, because a just resolution depends on some representative political processes weighing various factors (cultural, political, religious, historical, economic) that we're incompetent to judge or even fully undertand, and that are in any event in flux. Moreover given the history of colonialism creating polities to preserve or extend colonial power (Panama, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong...) Which is not to say that all nation-states areen't 'conceived in sin', only that we have to especially remember how some of them came about, because people in these regions certainly do. I am not a relativist, so I don't have any trouble condemning genital mutilation in Sudan or the bombing of the population of Grozny to punish them for their views; but this case is not nearly so clear-cut. I empathize to some degree with the Chinese irritation with the West on this issue. -bob naiman P.S. On pen-l silence is often not assent, but rather restraint.
[PEN-L:3695] Re: rationality
Broome and others have pointed out, very much as Jim argues, that it's always possible to redefine options in ways that can save the rationality hypothesis, even in the face of the aporia Peter mentions below. In order therefore for the hypothesis to "have any bite", as Broome puts it, there must be constraints on the interpretation of preferences. In her book Natural Reasons, Susan Hurley runs with this and argues that these constraints are, inter alia, evaluative and intersubjective. This has remarkable implications: first, formal rationality is either tautologous or incomplete and in need of a substantive rationality which rules out certain preferences as irrational; second, preferences are not subjective, since they can only be individuated by an appeal to evaluative, intersubjective standards; and, third, values cannot be reduced to preferences, as in neoclassical welfare economics, since the former are implicated in the individuation of the latter. Hurley's work lays out, persuasively, a *very* thick rationality. On Wed, 11 Jan 1995, Peter.Dorman wrote: I must register a disagreement with Jim Devine on the question of rationality in neoclassical economics. I DO think their view is non-tautological. Rationality is generally defined as adherence to Von Neuman/Morgenstern (or Friedman/Savage) expected utility, where the decision-maker selects the option that maximizes the dot product of probabilities and values of potential outcomes (all present value, of course). There is a large literature on the discrepancy between this model and real-world observed behavior, beginning with the Allais paradox and extending to Kahneman Tversky, Thaler, Frank, etc. (Simon should also be mentioned.) My personal view is that the weakness of the rationality assumption is one of the soft underbellies of neoclassical theory, particularly since "near-rational" behavior leads to significantly different outcomes (e.g. Akerlof Yellen). One of my interests is the intersection of "thick" (non-NC) rationality and strategic behavior in repeated games. I find this useful for understanding the emergence (or eclipse) of solidarity, etc. Peter Dorman
[PEN-L:3696] Canadian Government Computer Abuse
Probably all the Canadian comrades already know about this... From: "Sara Tompson" [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Fwd: clinic and privacy stuff X-Comment: N.O.W. Choice list From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kelly Bert Manning) Subject: Canadian Government Computer Abuse Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Staff working at Vancouver abortion Clinics exercised their Freedom of Information rights to see if anyone had been checking their vehicle registrations. An audit by the Insurance Corp. of BC revealed that the licence numbers of several workers had been checked through the the Canadian Police Information Computer in quick succession from a Vancouver detachment of the RCMP. An investigation is underway to see if this was an appropriate use of the system. The requests for an access audit were made after Gordon Watson, whose violent attacks on workers have been broadcast repeatedly, claimed to be paying $70 to $100 per licence number to obtain vehicle registration details from "private detectives". Mr. Watson was convicted of 1 assault. ICBC says that it has provisions for concealing the registration details of victims of violence that can be applied to abortion workers if they ask for it. This discloure occurs just 2 months after Garcon Romalis, a doctor who provided abortions, was shot while eating breakfast in his kitchen. Gordon Watson was broadcast describing this as "good shooting". The involvement of CPIC in this puts an interesting light on claims that BC's proposed mandatory central registry of prescriptions would have "CPIC type access controls to protect privacy". -- Date: 07 Jan 1995 01:34:05 -0500 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Jones) Subject: Who's Looking You Up Organization: Centre For Intelligent Machines, McGill University [repost from efc-talk] * Good Cop, Bad Cop * * Who's got access to your personal data? * "If we, just by fluke at guessing the dates to check, found three records called up in an unauthorized manner, just how much more is there? It's very scary." --- Kim Sander What happens when a police officer abuses his ability to access sensitive personal information stored in the nation's law enforcement computers? Perhaps we'll find out soon, in Delta, B.C. This tale raises issues of electronic privacy, demonstrates the utility of the utility of our freedom-of-information legislation, and finally, the influence of the media. I spoke with Kim Sander, spokesperson for "Every Woman's Health Centre" (an abortion clinic in Vancouver, BC) who filled me in on some background for the story that was on every news broadcast last night [Thursday, Jan 5]. Last August, several of the clinic staff received phone calls or mail from anti-abortion activists. They found this was rather unsettling, because they'd made a point of trying to keep personal information like address or telephone numbers private. This concern led them to the police, to whom they explained that anti-abortion activists were recording license plate numbers outside the clinic and apparently using them to track down personal information ... but the police didn't seem to do much. In September, Gordon Watson, a prominent local anti-abortion activist, stated while on the stand in a court hearing that he had gathered license plate numbers in order to "follow up on them" and he "paid good money" to get personal information about the car owners. When clinic staff asked the Crown council and police to investigate, they were told, "Give us two weeks." After two months of hearing nothing, the women filed a freedom-of-information request on November 15th with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC maintains all auto insurance and registration) seeking to find out who had been accessing their personal records. They provided 8 of their license plate numbers to be checked. The ICBC information officer explained that while daily access logs were kept, accesses were not recorded in the personal records themselves. Without specific dates to check, finding out who accessed their records would be next to impossible. So the women just guessed, based on when they'd been contacted. Those were lucky guesses. On December 6th, the information officer said that 3 out of 8 records had been accessed, and those accesses were suspicious, so he'd contacted the RCMP. The accesses originated in the Delta police department, in a suburb of Vancouver. Any cheers for the power of the FOI legislation must be tempered by the fact that the RCMP apparently sat on this issue for another month until, frustrated after what was now four months with no signs of an investigation, the women contacted the media. Apparently, it was media inquiries that sparked some action. On January 5th, the RCMP informed the Delta police that potentially inappropriate computer accesses were coming from their department. Constable Steve Parker, whose anti-abortion views were well
[PEN-L:3698] re: Taiwan and Maori?
Last I heard, the Maori were content with staying put in New Zealand rather
than undertaking an expansionist expedition over 5,000 miles to Taiwan :).
Of course, many Maori too would like their turangawaewae ("place to stand") by
regaining sovereignty over what they call Aotearoa.
Cheers,
Brent McClintock
[PEN-L:3699] Re: rationality II
The great Devine one opines: This year, with the postal rate increase, people pay 35 cents to get a 32-cent stamp. The change shows up not as three one-cent stamps, but as a three-cent stamp, which currently is one of the most useful stamps around, since it fills the gap between the old 29-cent stamps and the new. But students are still leaving their change in the machine for others to are still leaving their change in the machine for others to pick up! This seems totally irrational. Au contraire amigo! If students are leaving their stamps it is only because the marginal cost of taking the $0.03 stamp does not match the marginal benefit = $0.03. Surely, if the stamp was of greater value, say $3.00, the affluent students would not leave it behind. Hence, for some $0.03 marginal cost $3.00 the students would gladly take their stamps. The job for a neoclassical theorist -- all theorists who employ an atomistic choice theoretic methodology -- is to specify the nature of the costs (because pecuniary and psychological). Clearly a costly activity. Indeed, this energy expenditure will vary according to the height, size, diet, and weight of the student. Moreover, as Becker's 1985 JPE article indicates, the marginal price of effort is related to the individual's market opportunities, time, and home work activities. All of which will surely vary by race, class, and gender. Moreover, even under the assumptions of identical utility functions, sub- jective valuation will differ because of differences in para- metric specifications. Second, the handling and preservation costs of maintaining the three cent stamp as well as the additional effort require to lick and place two stamps ($0.29 and $0.03) instead of just one must be weighed into the balance. Third, some students will leave the $0.03 stamp as an act of charity. Thereby, creating a pareto superior redistribution of income. Fourth, leaving the $0.03 stamp behind dramatically confirms consumer surplus (at least for Loyola students). The admininstration could alleviate this issue by increasing the price of stamps to $0.35. Sorry Jim, disaffirmation of rationality is dead. Live long and prosper, patrick l mason
[PEN-L:3701] Re: rationality
Kevin Quinn lays out what makes sense (to me) very well. There's a trade-off in assertions of individual rationality. One can imagine the possibility of a totally tautological concept of rationality: John Wayne Gacy, say, has a preference for inconsistent behavior, since he likes spontaneity, surprise, and serendipity. Therefore even the consistency definition ends up being circular. But one could add "constraints on the interpretations of preferences" which allow falsification and admit the possibility of irrationality. Of course, that means that the concept might be rejected (as, I am told, psychologists have rejected behaviorism). I think that a lot of economists play a disingenuous game: they take a non-tautological version of rationality, i.e., one that assumes that people are atomistically individualistic with fixed tastes -- and all sorts of convenient ideological overtones, since this sociopathic behavior is seen as "rational," in some sense good -- but THEN defend this concept and its ideological content by invoking the tautological version. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Who'll stop the rain?" -- John Fogarty.
[PEN-L:3703] Re: Power and Method
On Wed, 11 Jan 1995 09:56:16 -0800 Justin Schwartz said: (first quoting me) 2. I think this goes to the heart of positivism: the positivists think that there's a clear distinction between "fact" and "value," so it's possible to be "value free" in one's science. The positivists think that one can separate the observer (the student) from the observed (society), treating themselves as somehow independent of society. To my mind, we are all participant-observers. Positivism is much more complex than this... I knew that, even though I have a very incomplete understanding of positivism. (Thanks for helping me make that understanding more complete.) I just think that the absolute subject/object split is the "heart" of positivism. I'm not sure whether or not one can say the same thing for logical positivism, since the difference between LP and mere P is unclear to me. (I'll have to call up my brother, the philosopher and anti-abortionist, but no: it's better to learn from Justin.) Incidentally positivists are not commited to the idea that scientific inquiry and inquirers can be somehow pulled out of their social circumstances. Max Weber,a positivist in some of these senses, though not a logical positivist, put the point by noting that the questions inquirers ask are conditioned by their values and interests, although the acceptability of the empirical answers they give, he thought, depend solely on the evidential relations between their theoretical hypotheses and the data they hope to explain. But this is simply restating the idea that the observer is assumed to be somehow separable from the observed in a different way, no? 3. The positivist story (as I understand it) makes much more sense on the normative level, i.e., as a prescription for how scholars should behave, than on the positive level, i.e., as a description of how scholars actually behave. On the latter, authors such as Kuhn and Lakatos win hands down. Of course, it's well-nigh impossible to separate these two levels. But some sort of committment to non-partisan, critical, thinking is needed. I wonder what, if it is impossible to seperate partisanship and scientific inquiry, is the point of saying that we are normatively required to do so. Isn't it rather that we don't want to licence quick inferences from our sense of how things ought to be to the way things are? The matter is exceedinbgly complicated and difficult. I think that it's almost impossible to be be "objective" or "scientific." However, it's possible to try to be scientific in the non-positivistic sense. To quote a ms. of mine: .. science is radical: it looks for the roots of social problems, seeking to find causes rather than symptoms. This common Marxist vision of science is not sufficient, however. It may be acceptable that Friedman's economics is scientific in these terms (he finds a "natural rate of unemployment" beneath the surface appearances represented by Phillips curve data). But using the criterion alone also includes astrology and the conspiracy theory of history as "scientific." Further, science is a discipline, an anti-dogmatic effort to minimize the role of faith in explanation and understanding, through logical coherence, consistency with empirical evidence, honesty, and completeness. Any conclusions are then merely new working hypotheses to be evaluated theoretically, empirically, and in practice. In this vision, science does not mean the allegiance to certain methods (mathematics, controlled experiments, etc.) as much as an openness to new questions, criticism, and debate.(here's there's a reference to Popper's "critical rationalism".) The bumper-sticker slogan "Question Authority" is thus at the center of scientific discipline. (endquote) I don't think it's possible to be non-partisan. However, one has to try to be on some level in order to avoid being fooled by one's own propaganda. By the way, Kuhn and Lakatos deny that science is socially interested. They're wrong. If normal science or the "hard core" are arbitrary in some sense, then social interest must play a role in the choice of the normal science or hard core. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante.
[PEN-L:3704] neoclassical tautoligies
I think that a lot of economists play a disingenuous game: they take a non-tautological version of rationality, i.e., one that assumes that people are atomistically individualistic with fixed tastes -- and all sorts of convenient ideological overtones, since this sociopathic behavior is seen as "rational," in some sense good -- but THEN defend this concept and its ideological content by invoking the tautological version. And we know this is true of neo-classical economics generally: take a term in general use, give it a technical definition which is quite different, then use the two interchangebly, thereby giving some very definite (and false) ideological assumptions the status of common sense. When challenged, retreat to the technical definition, disavowing the implicit claim of using the general term, say this is just a definition, justify the definition by a tautological argument. Another example: use the word "efficient" to get all the affective connotation of the word (not wasteful, wisest use, good). When questioned, point out that you simply mean "Pareto efficient" which is like the politician who when charged with being unethical says, "I broke no law." Anyone whose moral sense hasn't been deadened by the study of neoclassical economics can see that since one person having all the stuff while everybody else has nothing is a "Pareto efficient" outcome, the term bears little relation to the common sense definition of "efficient". -bob naiman
[PEN-L:3706] Economists, complexity, and power
The discussion over economists and rationality reminded me of something I've been wanting to ask the economists on the list. Is the study of complexity/chaos making any headway in mainstream economics these days? I've read a bit of the work on complexity going on in the study of biology, and it seemed to me that it was one of the few mathematical models I'd seen that could talk about politics--or more generally about how economic actors try to change the rules of the game--in a fairly sophisticated way. I was wondering because what little (nonradical) economicsI've learned has always struck me as having little to do with the real world of business--even as seen through the eyes of mainstream business journalists. Have I been missing out? Anders Schneiderman, PhD. Center for Community Economic Research University of California at Berkeley
[PEN-L:3705] Re: Your letter (fwd)
Forwarded message: Date: Wed, 11 Jan 1995 10:49:15 -0800 From: La Mujer Obrera [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Your letter URGENT LETTER FROM NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO, USA 601 N. Cotton Street, #A103 El Paso, Texas 79902 January 4, 1995 Dear Friends, For the past five months the Commission has worked to establish its mission. Its tasks and functions have evolved. Local groups and individuals have affiliated. The Commission now has a presence in almost every region in the country as well as contacts in Canada and extensive relationships in Mexico. Apart from carrying out public education, the Commission has also worked with local media. Local committees have carried out a good bit of fundraising, most of which has gone directly to support the people of Chiapas. The last intense effort was the organization and completion of a humanitarian aid caravan which in the period of one month managed to generate three tons of food, medicine and clothing and was enormously helpful to the people in Chiapas as they faced the militarization in December. The essence of the work of the Commission is to struggle for peace and democracy; to give people in the United States an independent peaceful option for information and coordinated action. It is symbolic of the EZLN's acknowledgement of the importance of international involvement and of peaceful civic action. Like the Democratic National Convention in Mexico, the existence of the Commission embodies the hope of the EZLN that peaceful civic action, in the United States, can deter and re-shape the intervention of the United States in the affairs of Mexico. What kind of intervention you say? How about the latest news about the $9 billion the USA will pledge to Mexico in order to salvage its floundering peso? How about the $6 billion floated in 1988 to help the PRI overcome its fraudulent election, again in March of 94 to survive the shock of the assassination of Colosio, and the $214 million in military sales from 1988-1994? In the name of its investments, the US inadvertently continues to support the PRI, a corrupt dictatorship which has controlled the fate of Mexico for the past 65 years. This blind support denies the Mexican people the opportunity to define their own destiny. In July of 1994 when I was named by Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos to organize for the EZLN, he pointed out to me "..if the people are interested in the success of genuine democracy in Mexico and find your work useful they will support you." Instead of commissioning a high-powered lobbyist or a public relations firm, the EZLN chose to commission a group of grassroots people with a great deal of hope, energy and commitment. Not enough to counter the power of $9 billion you say? We believe it is the strongest and the only foundation for building an alternative vision. We believe an alternative vision must be built from the ideas and actions of the people who are being victimized by economic policies which place profits over human beings. We believe that honest people of many backgrounds and in many countries are starving for an ounce of integrity, hope, and truth. It is for that reason that the EZLN has survived in Mexico and captured the imagination of those of us in the international community. We believe that the past years of "economic re-structuring" have been devastating to the world's peoples and natural resources, and that now is the time to begin to seek out an alternative. We believe that the narrow and belligerent ideology of the World Bank, the IMF, and the handful of billionaires in the world is beginning to run its course. We think that those of us with sufficient vision to believe that human beings are capable of a better world, must be about our business of creating, in the words of the EZLN, a new political morale and new political relationships. In the five months of its existence the Commission has had a consistent presence in the National Democratic Convention, has made public presentations in California, New York, and Montana, has issued three urgent action alerts, and has begun to open public relations with the United Nations, the Carter Center, and Reverend Jesse Jackson and his Rainbow Coalition. The organizing has not been difficult. With the enthusiasm and sacrifice of hundreds of volunteers all over the country the Commission has managed to cast a far-flung net of information and engagement. The financing as always, is another matter. We have many plans and needs for the New Year. We would like our newsletter to be much more frequent and well-presented. We would like to have a greater presence in the media, and make many more public presentations. We would like to establish a stronger distribution system for the videos, books, and other
[PEN-L:3708]
Dear PEN, Several people have pointed out a bit of unintentional futurism in my post giving a reference on methodology. To the point: the year is 1988, not 1998. I have NO confidence in my ability (or anybody else's) to predict publications on methodology (or anything else) into the future. Anyway, here is the reference once more: Morton G. Wenger, "Marxism and Social Research: The Muth- ology of Epistemology." Science Society, 52:2 (Summer, 1988), 133-162. Tempis fugit -- but as far as we know, in one direction only. Cheers, o/^)o ! / / /^^) / /^^! /^^) o(_/_(_ /(/ / !_(_ /!_ David Laibman [EMAIL PROTECTED] Department of Economics Editor, Science Society Brooklyn CollegeJohn Jay College, Rm. 4331 2900 Bedford Avenue 445 West 59th St. Brooklyn NY 11210 New York NY 10019 718/951-5219; -5317 Voice/FAX: 212/246-4932 FAX: 718/951-4867 Secretary, Brooklyn College Home: Chapter, Professional Staff 50 Plaza Street, #2CCongress (AFT 2334) Brooklyn NY 11238 Voice/FAX: 718/789-9565
[PEN-L:3709] Re: Economists, complexity, and power
The discussion over economists and rationality reminded me of something I've been wanting to ask the economists on the list. Is the study of complexity/chaos making any headway in mainstream economics these days? Read _The Economy as a Complex System_, a proceedings volume from the Santa Fe Institute. You'll find it your local Borders' or other well stocked book store. Cheers, Bill [EMAIL PROTECTED] WisCon, The Feminist SF Convention -- http://www.cs.wisc.edu/wiscon/
