Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
The thing about you Mine, is you are just so SMART! Steve On Wed, 21 Jun 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Sometimes, it is interesting to follow the "orientation" of discussion > taking place in this list. The intellectual ranks of _Analytical Marxism_ > include people like Cohen, Elster, Przeworski, Roemer and Olin Wright. > It is increasingly becoming hard for me to understand how one criticizes > Cohen's functionalism, and takes a position on Elster's or Hahnel's > application of game theory at the same time, given that both disregard the > broad conception of history, economy and society in Marx's thought... ohhh > well... life! > > Mine > >
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
Marx in volume II shows that capitalist equilibrium with growth is possible, but that it is unlikely because of the co-ordination problems between the sectors of the economy. Arrow and Debreu using neo-classical modeling techniques show something similar. That static equilibrium is possible. But that the conditions are so onerous as to be unlikely. Leontiev was correct to connect his research with Marx. There is a continuous development of the input-output model from Quesnay to Marx to Leontiev, although each of them put it to a different use than the others. Leontiev was familiar with the efforts in the Soviet Union during the 1920s to develop a model of the economy that could be used for planning purposes, and those planners drew their inspiration from Marx. Rational choice models has a long pre-history, they go back possibly to John Duns Scottus and certainly to Marcellus of Padua. The Bernoulli's were involved and Condilliac should also be consulted. Smith's contribution was actually quite small on this particular question. Rod Jim Devine wrote: > > I think that a market environment encourages individualism, but the > application of rat choice came first with Smith, not Marx. And Marx, unlike > the rat choice types, saw "preferences" as endogenous. He also clearly > rejected methodological individualism, though he saw that something like it > was the ordinary consciousness of many people within the system, shaped, > constrained, and mystified by commodity fetishism and the illusions created > by competition. > > > Leontief was wrong to credit Marx with this. Marx's volume II is a > non-equilibrium system, while the equilibrium interpretation has hobbled > Marxian political economy (showing up in absurd ways in the "transformation > problem" lit, seen for example in Sweezy's THEORY OF CAPITALIST > DEVELOPMENT). Marx did present "equilibrium conditions" for the > proportional relationship between sectors, but he did not think equilibrium > could be achieved easily. To the extent that equilibrium was achieved, it > was the result of crisis, which involved _forcible_ equilibration, which > was often quite destructive (small businesses going broke, working people > losing their livelihood, etc.) Instead of seeing the results of his > reproduction schemes as continually met -- as in input-output analysis -- > Marx saw them as regularly being broken and then violently reestablished. > An extreme crisis --- like the Great Depression -- might require an extreme > solution -- like World War II, though of course the solution's rise is not > predetermined. > > I'm afraid that Leontief wanted to link Marx to his own research, which > helped create IO theory. Back then, being associated with Marx was > prestigious, at least in some circles. > > I think we should eschew them because they weren't Marx's accomplishments. > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine -- Rod Hay [EMAIL PROTECTED] The History of Economic Thought Archive http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html Batoche Books http://Batoche.co-ltd.net/ 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
Sometimes, it is interesting to follow the "orientation" of discussion taking place in this list. The intellectual ranks of _Analytical Marxism_ include people like Cohen, Elster, Przeworski, Roemer and Olin Wright. It is increasingly becoming hard for me to understand how one criticizes Cohen's functionalism, and takes a position on Elster's or Hahnel's application of game theory at the same time, given that both disregard the broad conception of history, economy and society in Marx's thought... ohhh well... life! Mine
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
At 07:57 PM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >see Daniel Little, the Scientific Marx, who explains how Marx's analysis >in Capital depends on many rational choice presuppositions. It's not >surprising, since he was analysing a market systrem where those >presuppositions are more valid than not. I think that a market environment encourages individualism, but the application of rat choice came first with Smith, not Marx. And Marx, unlike the rat choice types, saw "preferences" as endogenous. He also clearly rejected methodological individualism, though he saw that something like it was the ordinary consciousness of many people within the system, shaped, constrained, and mystified by commodity fetishism and the illusions created by competition. >And in a a classic paper from the 30s, Wassily Leontieff credited Marx >along with Walras with being a founder of general equlibrium theory. WL >was a graet fan of CII in particuklar. Leontief was wrong to credit Marx with this. Marx's volume II is a non-equilibrium system, while the equilibrium interpretation has hobbled Marxian political economy (showing up in absurd ways in the "transformation problem" lit, seen for example in Sweezy's THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT). Marx did present "equilibrium conditions" for the proportional relationship between sectors, but he did not think equilibrium could be achieved easily. To the extent that equilibrium was achieved, it was the result of crisis, which involved _forcible_ equilibration, which was often quite destructive (small businesses going broke, working people losing their livelihood, etc.) Instead of seeing the results of his reproduction schemes as continually met -- as in input-output analysis -- Marx saw them as regularly being broken and then violently reestablished. An extreme crisis --- like the Great Depression -- might require an extreme solution -- like World War II, though of course the solution's rise is not predetermined. I'm afraid that Leontief wanted to link Marx to his own research, which helped create IO theory. Back then, being associated with Marx was prestigious, at least in some circles. >What's wrong with those accomplishments? we are to eschew them because >some use them apologetically? I think we should eschew them because they weren't Marx's accomplishments. That's enough. I can't participate in pen-l for a day, since I have participated much too much during the previous 24 hours. Maybe I'll take a week off Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine
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Justin writes: >Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that >historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of >historical materialism. Cohen's version of historical materialism may be totally based on fallacious functionalism, but his version is nothing but a formalized version of what Colletti called the "Marxism of the 2nd International" or what the Stalinists called "histomat." It's a bunch of transhistorical and thus unhistorical abstractions that say little or nothing about real human history. Its connection with Marx's ideas is weak, except for that one little introduction that Marx wrote when he was just starting his economic investigations and was still too much under the influence of Smith and Ricardo (the "preface" to the CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY) -- and which is so abstract that many authors have interpreted that preface in non-Cohen ways. Even so, Marx presents it not as a set of substantive propositions of the sort that the "Analytical Marxists" adore as much as a "guiding principle for my studies" (a heuristic, a method of analysis, a bunch of questions). And his ideas became less Cohenesque as he learned more about history and capitalism. In CAPITAL, vol. III, for example, he shifted his emphasis away from the technological determinism of his early works (the stuff that excites Cohen) to a view that it's the method of exploitation that's key to understanding any society, almost a sociological determinism. >You mistake functional explanation for teleology if you think it involves >reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander >scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness >for phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), >welfare is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in >damping social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself >functional for capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy >here; the only >uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual >operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I don't think that "welfare" can be seen in this way. Welfare does dampen social unrest (in some cases, but remember the Welfare Rights movement). But in the US, it was simply a result of the conflict between classes (seen concretely, overdetermined by racial issues, in such phenomena as the Civil Rights movement) and the competition within the capitalist class, including that between factions of the government, within (as you say) the constraints of the capitalist system. It may have stabilized the system, but the fact that it did so could only be known _after the fact_. It was not a predetermined outcome. Of course, capitalist elites fought to make it that way, but they don't always get their way. Further, what stabilized the system in the 1960s need not have done so under different conditions (say, the 1980s). Similarly, "welfare reform" may not stabilize the system. Joel Blau writes: >The other problem with functionalism is the implicit tendency to homeostasis. Whatever happens serves the function of maintaining the whole. Functionalist conceptions of welfare in capitalist society focus solely on its system-maintaining characteristics, when actually between the partial decommodification and independence from the marketplace, the reality is much more ambiguous.< This is right. Though Cohen -- following the lead of the mainstream sociologist Arthur Stinchecombe, though he doesn't cite the man [*] -- can point to various forces that encourage the welfare system to be "functional" (for example, a kind of Darwinian process), there are also mechanisms that encourage results to be dysfunctional. Capitalism is a contradictory system, not a functional-homeostatic system. For example, capitalism produced the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, which led to all sorts of problems. They might be interpreted _after the fact_ as allowing the creation of a "new stage of accumulation" that was even better for the system than the ones that preceded these crises. But that result was not predetermined. It depended on the actual, concrete, outcomes of class struggles and competition within the captialist class (including inter-national competition). The basis functionalist fallacy is to read the present as justifying the past. [*] I doubt that Cohen plagiarized. Rather, he suffers from the same disease that inflicts most NC economists, that of only reading recent literature in one's immediate specialty. This often gives an air of spurious originality. > I will send you a copy if you like. --jks I have a copy somewhere already. In fact, in moving to my new office, I created a Justin Schwarz pile of papers. But my life is too disorganized to get to it... Jim Devin
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
The other problem with functionalism is the implicit tendency to homeostasis. Whatever happens serves the function of maintaining the whole. Functionalist conceptions of welfare in capitalist society focus solely on its system-maintaining characteristics, when actually between the partial decommodification and independence from the marketplace, the reality is much more ambiguous. Joel Blau [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that > historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of > historical materialism. You mistake functional explanation for teleology if > you think it involves reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander > scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness for > phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), welfare > is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in damping > social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself functional for > capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy here; the only > uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual > operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I > will send you a copy if you like. --jks > > In a message dated 6/21/00 11:18:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > << Justin wrote: > >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms > >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of > >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal > >mechanisms > > functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the > whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in > most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or > institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. > They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the > pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded > within that society. > >>
Re: Re: Re: GT (fwd)
In a message dated 6/21/00 1:02:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << funny, like other religious followers of neo-classical bourgeois ideology, Elster, in _Making Sense of Marx_, attempts to demonstrate that Marx was indeed a founder of rational choice. I am sure Ricardo was the father of socialism then... No No Marx was indeed a spy.. >> Elster is quite right. For a more careful analyses, see Daniel Little, the Scientific Marx, who explains how Marx's analysis in Capital depends on many rational choice presuppositions. It's not surprising,s ince he was analysinga market systrem where those presuppositions are more valid than not. And in a a classic paper from the 30s, Wassily Leontieff credited Marx along with Walras with being a founder of general equlibrium theory. WL was a graet fan of CII in particuklar. What's wrong with those accomplishments? we areto schewthem because some use them apologetically? --jks
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: GT
Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I think Cohen was right that historical materialism is basically functional explanation,a nd I approve of historical materialism. You mistake functional explanation for teleology if you think it involves reference to the "purpose" of events in a "grander scheme of things." Rather it explains events in terms of their usefulness for phenomena that support them. Thus (in the dated example of my paper), welfare is functionally explained in capitalism because of its function in damping social unrest, stabilizing the capitalist state that is itself functional for capitalist reproduction. There is no suprahuman teleogy here; the only uintentions are of actual political actors, class, state, and individual operating within constraints. But read the paper, it's really quite useful. I will send you a copy if you like. --jks In a message dated 6/21/00 11:18:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << Justin wrote: >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal >mechanisms functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded within that society. >>
Re: Re: GT (fwd)
funny, like other religious followers of neo-classical bourgeois ideology, Elster, in _Making Sense of Marx_, attempts to demonstrate that Marx was indeed a founder of rational choice. I am sure Ricardo was the father of socialism then... No No Marx was indeed a spy.. Mine Doyran SUNY/Albany
RE: Re: Re: GT
Nancy works for me at the National Cancer Institute. See http://www-dccps.ims.nci.nih.gov/ARP/economics.html -Original Message- From: Jim Devine [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2000 12:17 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L:20477] Re: Re: GT At 08:57 AM 6/21/00 -0700, you wrote: >Nancy Breen (Do you remember, Nancy?) and I once met at Davis where we went to >a talk by Elster. I had never read anything by him, but understood that he >was important. The only thing I recall from the talk was the appalling number >of errors about Marx that he propogated with absolute conviction. I use Elster's MAKING HASH OF MARX as a source for common misinterpretations (ones that are often shared by bourgeois critics of Marx and dogmatic followers of the "Marxism of the 3rd International"). By collecting them all in one place, he's done the world a service. But his other work (often in game theory) is sometimes very interesting and instructive. I can't say I'm an Elsterite, but some of his work provides a starting point, if considered critically. where is Nancy these days? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Re: Re: GT
At 08:57 AM 6/21/00 -0700, you wrote: >Nancy Breen (Do you remember, Nancy?) and I once met at Davis where we went to >a talk by Elster. I had never read anything by him, but understood that he >was important. The only thing I recall from the talk was the appalling number >of errors about Marx that he propogated with absolute conviction. I use Elster's MAKING HASH OF MARX as a source for common misinterpretations (ones that are often shared by bourgeois critics of Marx and dogmatic followers of the "Marxism of the 3rd International"). By collecting them all in one place, he's done the world a service. But his other work (often in game theory) is sometimes very interesting and instructive. I can't say I'm an Elsterite, but some of his work provides a starting point, if considered critically. where is Nancy these days? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Re: GT
Nancy Breen (Do you remember, Nancy?) and I once met at Davis where we went to a talk by Elster. I had never read anything by him, but understood that he was important. The only thing I recall from the talk was the appalling number of errors about Marx that he propogated with absolute conviction. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Justin wrote: >Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms >of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of >explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal >mechanisms functional explanation isn't the same as seeing the feed-back from the whole to the parts. I don't think functional explanation is reasonable in most cases, at least in social science. We can't explain societal events or institutions in terms of their purpose in some grander scheme of things. They are instead the result of individuals "creating history" within the pre-existing society, based on the ideology that's encouraged and rewarded within that society. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine
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At the risk of tooting my own horn, I wrote a piece on MI called "Metaphysical Individualism and Functional Explanation," Philosophy of Science 1993, that I still think is quite good. In the context of the Cohen-Elster debate, I argued that: 1. Functional explanation is legitimate, but Cohen's account of it in terms of "consequence laws" is wrong; you need a mechanical account of explanation, i.e., one that regards explanation as exposing the causal mechanisms. 2. MI has two senses that are not often distinguished: the claim that the individual level of explanation is the only legitimate one, andthe claim that the individual level is a legitimate one, but not the only one. Most of the problems around MI derive from the first version, but this is utterly implausible. Whether the second version is true is an open question, but even if it is, that does not threaten functional explanation or other kinds of explanation that refer to group phenomena in an explanatory way. After all, on the second version, individualistic explanation is merely available, not required. There, now you don't have to read the piece. But you should. --jks In a message dated Wed, 21 Jun 2000 10:11:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, Jim Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: << At 04:02 AM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding somewhat Hegelian. The problem can be looked at like >this. Both the individual and the group exist with equal ontological status. >Methodological individual gives priority to the individual, while some >forms of >sociology (including some varieties of of Marxism) give priority to the group. In their THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, a book that everyone on pen-l should read, Lewins and Lewontin describe the dialectical method as follow (to paraphrase): "part makes whole, while whole makes part." That is, individual people make the structure of social relations (though not as they please) at the same time as the structure of social relations makes us who we are (how we think, what we want, etc.) though there are some biological limits to this latter determination (just as there are limits on what kinds of societies can be created). This mutual determination is a dynamic process rather than reaching an equilibrium, BTW. this dialectical view would reject _both_ methodological individualism (because it ignores the feed-back from society to the individual) and radical holism (because it ignores individual agency). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine/AS >>
Re: Re: Re: GT
At 04:02 AM 06/21/2000 -0400, you wrote: >At the risk of sounding somewhat Hegelian. The problem can be looked at like >this. Both the individual and the group exist with equal ontological status. >Methodological individual gives priority to the individual, while some >forms of >sociology (including some varieties of of Marxism) give priority to the group. In their THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, a book that everyone on pen-l should read, Lewins and Lewontin describe the dialectical method as follow (to paraphrase): "part makes whole, while whole makes part." That is, individual people make the structure of social relations (though not as they please) at the same time as the structure of social relations makes us who we are (how we think, what we want, etc.) though there are some biological limits to this latter determination (just as there are limits on what kinds of societies can be created). This mutual determination is a dynamic process rather than reaching an equilibrium, BTW. this dialectical view would reject _both_ methodological individualism (because it ignores the feed-back from society to the individual) and radical holism (because it ignores individual agency). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine/AS
Re: Re: GT
> Isn't altruism a dialectical twin of individualism? The concept of > "altruism" emerged in the English language in the mid-19th century, > according to the OED. > Yoshie Hegel (a liberal conservative) rejected social contract theory of state as means of protecting citizens from one another in favor of ethical idea reflecting altruism & mutual sympathy of members. T. H. Green (a progenitor of modern/reform liberalism) drew upon Hegel (& Kant) in rejecting early/classical liberal conception of human beings as self- seeking utility maximizers. According to Green, individuals possessing social as well as individual responsibilities are connected to other individuals via ability to care & empathize. Various theorists have since suggested that concern for interests/welfare of others is based on 'enlightened self-interest' or belief in 'common humanity.' Michael Hoover
Re: GT
G'day Sam, I've a (confused) quibble with this bit: >One of the problems of trying to bring aspects of rat choice theory into >Marxism is that the meth individualism and the more wholistic approach >of most Marxists cannot both be true simultaneosly. For example, in MI >social outcomes are explained as the effects of by-products of >individual action but social wholes are not ontologically real. If >social wholes exist then meth individualism is false. I hope to return to this theme when I've a little more time, but, at the very least, would argue that MI is a tenable predictor of action (as long as institutional context is present in the premises) for some things (like our conscious buying and selling actions) and not for others (like how we'd behave in a Pommie soccer crowd, or with our family and friends, or with a passer-by who collapses near us). I think the problem with 'altruism' is that it can manifest in MI only as an individual preference - which hides and relegates the social sense of the self that most of us actually assume to be there (and I have recently argued must ever have been there) in our very cellular constitution. That which we are as a matter of essence (not that we are exclusively that; just that it is an essential component) should be reflected in the organising principles of our society, and in a society where so much of our intercourse is captured by the exchange relation, our very being is alienated by our consciousness (hence 'the commodity fetish'). To suggest a crude formulation: people with little money are simply not able to express their humanity (their social being - lack of money where relations are mostly confined to money transactions - denies a fundamental aspect of their human being), and those with much money are probably most alienated from same (their palpably more individualistic consciousness denying said aspect of human being). It all *looks like choice* at work, and MI might well predict a lot of this, but I guess I'm saying it largely ain't. If memory serves, Adam Smith got bogged down on this 'empathy' stuff, too (his 'moral sentiments' self and his 'wealth of nations' self confonting the very mutual incompatibility Sam outlines) - not that most economists seem to remember this ... So I think Yoshie's onto something big, but still feel the thread is some way off neatly articulating the ontological solution to the confontation of the individual with the collective. Cheers, Rob.
Re: Re: GT
At the risk of sounding somewhat Hegelian. The problem can be looked at like this. Both the individual and the group exist with equal ontological status. Methodological individual gives priority to the individual, while some forms of sociology (including some varieties of of Marxism) give priority to the group. Understanding the outcome of individual situation requires a careful empirical analysis of the interaction. There is no a priori principle that can be applied. The dominant moment of the interaction will change depending upon the situation. Sometimes the group (social forces) will dominate. Other times the individual will. The longer the time period under analysis, the more likely the group will be the stronger moment. Rod Rob Schaap wrote: > So I think Yoshie's onto something big, but still feel the thread is some > way off neatly articulating the ontological solution to the confontation of > the individual with the collective. > -- Rod Hay [EMAIL PROTECTED] The History of Economic Thought Archive http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html Batoche Books http://Batoche.co-ltd.net/ 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
I guess I've got to respond to this message because Mine dug up (spurious) "evidence" to show that I said that third world people were irrational. However, I doubt that anyone has to read this message except Mine. Mine wrote: > GT is methodologically on the right. Period. The reason for this is >that the attention to micro foundations through rational choice, game >theoric models and formal modeling of neo-classical economics have tended >to obscure the importance of relations of production and the exploitative >relationship between the capitalist and the worker. GT lacks a progressive >framework to explain systemic inequalities. I wrote: >no, the problem is that GT typically assumes relative equality in "games." >It need not do so. Mine ripostes: >well, my argument is that one can not start with a relative equality >assumption to desribe a capital-labor relationship. If you do, you are >implying that capitalism is a system of equality, given that it is not. I wasn't referring to capitalism as a system of equality. If Mine reallys thinks that I do, she should read what I say for actual _content_ as much as she looks for (spurious) politically incorrectness. In any event, the topic was GT, not capitalism. I don't think GT has produced a model that reveals much if anything about capitalism, as I've said before. In two separate messages, Mine wrote: > >>While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS > argument?], supposed "neutrality" of game theory... I think that the > very assumptions of game theory--individualism, profit maximizing > agency, egoism, alturism [altruism?] in return for benefit--are > bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. > > >first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You > are not the editor here. I wrote: >Actually, I am (and an economist too). One of the frustrating things about >threads in on-line discussions is that they rapidly become >incomprehensible to the readers. >I don't see it. Whoever reads "alturism" above can perfectly understand >that it is meant "altruism", if s(he) does not suffer from an acute mental >problem of comprehension, of course... Okay perhaps I did some editing that wasn't necessary. So how does that make me racist? not to mention "disgustingly racist"? (BTW, Justin S. types really poorly too, even though he speaks English as a first language, so I sometimes correct his messages.) Mine had written: >I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing that English is my >second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, like once upon a >time you called third world people *irrational* here. << I wrote: >As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. >But the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this >conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. Mine now responds: >yuppie! goodness! how do you know I'm urban? It's too bad that that wasn't my last contribution. Actually, I wouldn't call this one a "contribution" as much as a simple defense against lying attacks (or willful misinterpretation or simple ignorance). I wrote: >More importantly, I _never_ referred to third world people as >irrational. I would like to see documentation of this totally outrageous >claim. If you have any evidence, I _will_ respond, to show that it is >spurious and libelous. Mine now writes: >I did not say that you were a racist par excellence. Yeah, but you called me "disgustingly racist." That's not the same as putting me in the same league as Adolph Eichmann (a racist par excellence), but it's the kind of thing which needs more serious justification. Not that I take such charges from you seriously, since you seem to throw words like "racist" about. In European folklore, it's called "crying wolf." Mine writes: >Once upon a time, however, you made a comment in this list which I thought >had culturally racist implications, despite your own intentions.. In the >below passage, you are labeling some people as irrational from the >standpoint of rationality you are socialized into. I don't mind quick >comments _that_ much and let them go, but when it comes to religious >labeling, I strongly disagree. Here is your post: In this infamous message, I wrote: >Non-religious folks have this kind of upbringing, training, faith in the >socialist tradition etc. Either way, there seems to be an "irrational" >component, an element of _faith_. BTW, there is nothing in this quote about the "third world," nor anything about the third world being "irrational." Religion is not the same thing as "third world." You'll note that I put the word "irrational" in quotation marks. That's because _I do not accept_ the standard meanings of the words "rational" and "irrational" but was deliberately indicating to the readers that I was using the standard meanings. Unlike the definition of "rationality" which Mine _presumes_ I was "socialized
Re: Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:McArthur grantee (fwd)
>Mine responds: >yuppie! > > >Mine, is what it has come down to? It's way over the top. Hopefully, that was meant to be a slightly less rude 'yippie', Joel - that 'u''s hanging right next door, just gasping for moments like this. Cheers, Rob.
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
>Jim Devine says: As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. >But >the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this >conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. Mine responds: yuppie! Mine, is what it has come down to? It's way over the top. Joel Blau
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee(fwd)
>> GT is methodologically on the right. Period. The reason for this is >>that the attention to micro foundations through rational choice, game >>theoric models and formal modeling of neo-classical economics have tended >>to obscure the importance of relations of production and the exploitative >>relationship between the capitalist and the worker. GT lacks a progressive >>framework to explain systemic inequalities. >no, the problem is that GT typically assumes relative equality in >"games." >It need not do so. well, my argument is that one can not start with a relative equality assumption to desribe a capital-labor relationship. If you do, you are implying that capitalism is a system of equality, given that it is not. >> >While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS > >argument?], > >supposed "neutrality" of game theory... > > >I think that >the very assumptions of game theory--individualism, profit > maximizing >agency, egoism, alturism [altruism?] in return for > benefit--are >bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. >>first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You are >>not the editor here. >Actually, I am (and an economist too). One of the frustrating things >about >threads in on-line discussions is that they rapidly become >incomprehensible to the readers. I don't see it. Whoever reads "alturism" above can perfectly understand that it is meant "altruism", if s(he) does not suffer from an acute mental problem of comprehension, of course... >>I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing that English is my >>second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, >like once upon a >>time you called third world people *irrational* here. >As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. >But >the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this >conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. yuppie! >More importantly, I _never_ referred to third world people as irrational. >I would like to see documentation of this totally outrageous claim. If >you >have any evidence, I _will_ respond, to show that it is spurious and >libelous. I did not say that you were a racist par excellence. Once upon a time, however, you made a comment in this list which I thought had culturally racist implications, despite your own intentions.. In the below passage, you are labeling some people as irrational from the standpoint of rationality you are socialized into. I don't mind quick comments _that_ much and let them go, but when it comes to religious labeling, I strongly disagree. Here is your post: http://csf.colorado.edu/pen-l/2000I/msg02544.html >Non-religious folks have this kind of upbringing, training, faith in the >socialist tradition etc. Either way, there seems to be an "irrational" component, an element of _faith_. Furthermore, you posted and wholeheartedly defended an article published in SLATE magazine by a right wing journalist who was implictly suggesting that blacks were not discriminated in the criminal justice sytem. I am sure you remember the debate. The author is well known to be relating racial inequality to black cultural patterns. Excuse me but the article was a destructive nonsense. I always take a second before posting such articles and seriously think about where the argument of the author politically goes. >You should consider an apology to the list, or at least to the >international members of the list! >An apology is appropriate only appropriate if I'd done something wrong. Fine. If somebody had warned me about an inappropriate use of language (especially with regards to racism and sexism issues), I would have automatically apologized. I don't approach criticism dogmatically. >>... I am saying that the game theoretical applications of conflict >>resolution to international relations and security studies (which I don't >>think you are aware, btw) come up with explanations and results that >>tend to promote the foreign policy interests of the US. Have you ever >>attempted to see where game theorists publish their articles in the >>majority of cases? They are the kind of journals such as _Foreign >>Affairs_, _Washington Report_ _Strategic Studies_, _Journal of Military >>Studies_, etc.. How do you assume that these people having their articles >>published in these journals are objective, given that the institutional >basis of these journals is intimately related to the US political system >>and the international political order it is trying to endorse. Once I was >>reading a game theoretical explanation of military intervention in Haiti >in one of these journals. The study was briefly talking about how to keep >>the junta in power with the US help and democratize Haiti in the mean time >without causing social conflict (revolt). The author was >constructing a >game theory of how to make democracy work in Haiti >without >>pissing off >the US as well as the junta. If this is not
Re: Re: GT
I wrote: >>Someone already pointed out that GT need not involve individualism or >>profit-maximizing or egoism. One can apply altruism in making decisions >>in the game. Yoshie writes: >Isn't altruism a dialectical twin of individualism? The concept of >"altruism" emerged in the English language in the mid-19th century, >according to the OED. The word is used in attempts to explain why an >individual cares (or should care) about anyone besides himself at all. In >other words, under capitalism, regard for others emerged as a "problem" in >need of an ethical, philosophical, or scientific explanation, whereas in >the world before capitalism (= the world where individualism as we know it >didn't exist) no one taxed his brains trying to come up with philosophical >or biological reasons why one should care about others, because it was >taken for granted -- part of social institutions -- that one did. The first part makes sense to me. I think that the concept of altruism (usually meaning self-sacrifice to help others) is impoverished. You are accurate to reject the individualism/altruism duality. People have what Elster calls "mixed motives," though his vision seems limited, too. (Actually, the individualistic homo economicus would probably be diagnosed as either being a sociopath (a.k.a., psychopath) or autistic.) The vast majority of economists don't study psychology (or sociology or political science). Whatever one thinks of Matt Rabin, he should be praised for trying to break down the economics profession's snobbery toward other fields and thus undermining the common Beckerian attitude of "economic imperialism," the view that economics biases can be applied to all fields. >So it seems to me that whether actors are conceived as profit-maximizing >or behaving altruistically, Game Theory is about individuals and their >choices in the world of Scarcity & Opportunity Costs (as conceived in >neoclassical economics). I think it's more than scarcity and oppty cost. GT represents a rudimentary effort to describe society using "rules of the game." It shows at least the possibility of conflict, which doesn't exist in textbook NC economics. BTW, when I was working on my article on Hobbes, Locke, & Rousseau (published recently in POLITICS & SOCIETY, if I may brag), I found that though the "prisoner's dilemma" game had some insights (representing the Hobbesian "war of each against all"), it had to be transcended. First, there are only two "players." I posit a large number of "agents." Second, there are only four results (a Hobbesian war where both defect, a nice result, and two cases where one person defects and the other doesn't). Instead, I posit a continuum of results from ultra-anarchy to ultra-collectivism. Third, the PD model usually ignores the endogeneity of preferences: I see the Hobbesian situation as breeding Hobbesian personalities (i.e., paranoids), just as the "civilized" result breeds public-spirit. Now that I think of it, Locke's silly assumption that in a "state of nature" everyone should -- and will -- respect everyone else's lives and properties (despite the fact that property cannot be defined without a state) is akin to the common neoclassical assumption that games are cooperative. Hey, I should call up the editors of P&S and have them call back the journal and add that insight... >Are game theorists interested in changing the game at all? I doubt >it. If we start with atomized individuals trying to survive (or help >other individuals survive) in the world as it exists now, it seems to me >that _as isolated individuals_, we -- or at least most of us, very >"altruistic" ones perhaps excepted -- don't find it in our (or other >individuals') "interest" to exert much efforts & take risks in trying to >bring about an alternative to capitalism. Working for radical social >change doesn't "pay," and we don't need Game Theory to tell us what common >sense can teach us. Struggling for the abolition of capitalism (or any >radical social movement, for that matter) only "makes sense" when we don't >start with atomized individuals. Peter Dorman (who used to be on pen-l) has used game theory to promote progressive change. >Therefore, if Game Theory isn't "reactionary," it is at least very >conservative. I dunno. It seems to me that it's a poor worker who blames the tools -- or a poor worker who lets the tools determine the work that's done. I blame capitalism, academia, and the economics hierarchy for the way in which GT has been turned into a badge of honor and a tool for rising to the top, so that people let GT take over their minds. Instead, it could have been used to get a small number of insights and then shelved. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee
Justin wrote: >The PD generates the players' second worst outcome, not the worst one. The >worst is generated by I cooperate, you defect. --jks Justin, I hope you don't mind that I edited what you said here, dropping the extraneous "L." What the "worst outcome" is depends on your perspective. The "I cooperate, you defect" outcome is the worst only from an individual's (my) perspective, whereas the "you cooperate, I defect" would be the worst from the other individual's (your) perspective. From the _social_ perspective, the worst would be "both defect." Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine ["clawww" or "liberalarts" can replace "bellarmine"]
Dawkins (was Re: GT)
Mine quotes Dawkins: >"Each individual wants as many surviving children as possible" Nowadays, very few men and fewer still women "want" as many surviving children as possible. And that's why Dawkins needs to construct humans as if we were merely vehicles for thinking & desiring genes: "We" may not want as many surviving children as possible, but "our genes" do. Duh. Dawkins, etc. do nothing but depoliticize the question of reproduction of human beings & social relations. Very anti-feminist. Yoshie
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
>G'day Mine, G'day... I wrote: >Altruism has a pragmatic connotation in cooperative game theory. You give >in order to receive. As Richard Dawkins wrote in _Selfish Gene_, the book >that is a prototype of fascism and sexism, men compete to fuck women in >order to transfer their superior genes to their offsprings. The >possibility of being fucked or selected from the pool depends on how men >are altrustic to women as well as how >much women can offer. >I think there's a lot to Dawkins' theory - and it is a theory that may or >may not be deployed to support fascism and sexism (I think Dawkins >himself >read too much and too little into his theory, especially in his first >edition), but I maintain it is not *necessarily* what you say it is. >Part of the environment within which our genes march through history is >human culture and the particular power relations of the moment - that >makes our genetic history a rather particular and complex business - but >it doesn't deny Dawkins so much as introduce a dialectical relationship >into the mix. Fine. Rob, as the author himself said in many occasions, the main purpose of Dawkin's book is to reject Marx's dialectic and instead to introduce the _primacy_ of genes in determining human behavoir. In other words, Dawkins is not saying the things you would like to attribute to him-- ie., evolution of human genetic structure throughout history. On the contrary, he is saying that social environment, history, power relations have no influence on the development of human nature. He is trying to eliminate the role of external factors to openly say that we (like other non human animals) are "machines created by genes". In the book, Dawkins goes into a deep explanation of what genes are, what they serve for and how they survive. The politically dangerous aspect of this genetic reductionism is that it sees the charecteristics human beings learn in society (competitiveness, selfishness, egoism, possessiveness, private property, rape etc..) in the human genetic make up. His argument is implicity reactionary not only because he sees human nature as fixed and unchanging but also because it ahistorically projects the charectristics of competitive market society (which he *reifies* like neo-classical economists) onto human nature to *imply* that capitalism is what we *naturally* have and it is what we are doomed to have in the future. Accordingly, he is ridiculing at the Marxist agenda of replacing capitalism with socialism or an egalitarian form of society. The man's problem is with equality. >And anyway, experience tells us that women in liberal capitalist polities >compete no less than men when it comes to the mating game (I imagine this >would be true in much, but perhaps not all, of Turkey, too). Correct, but this is not Dawkins. Dawkins is *not* saying that "liberal capitalist policies" force men and women to act in certain ways, though I would still suggest capitalism reinforces traditional sexual practices by disempowering women in the mating game. Yes, women compete no less than men, but when it comes to how women expect men to treat them in certain ways, you will see that capitalism maintains the hierarchial structure of gender relations. Regarding competition and cooperation, many anthropological studies show that these concepts gain their meanings within the form of social organization and type of society individuals live in. It also depends on which historical period we are talking about. We can not expect ancient Athenians, for example, subscribing to the notion of capitalist rationality and competitive individualism that we understand in the modern sense of the term today. They had a different societal structure and property regime.or think about hunting gathering societies; Eventhough in those societies, there was still a division of labor by sex, gender inegualities were not as systemic and cumulative as they are under capitalism. Furthermore, cross-cultural and cross-historical studies have proven variations among how these terms apply given country's situatedness with the capitalist world system. in any case, as somebody's post clarifed about what Rabin's work is and where the source of funding comes from,I see neither Rabin's work nor Dawkin's particulary useful for leftist politics..whoever thinks it is useful is mistaken and does harm to Marxism. DAwkins say: "Each individual wants as many surviving children as possible. The less he or she is obliged to invest in any one of those children, the more children he or she can have. The obvious way to achieve this desirable state of affairs is to induce your sexual partner to invest more than his or her fair share of resources in each child, leaving you free to have other children with other partners. This would be a desirable strategy for either sex, but it is more difficult for the female to achieve".
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee
The PD generates the players' second worst outcome, not the worst one. The worst is generated byL I cooperate, you defect. --jks In a message dated Sat, 17 Jun 2000 11:38:55 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << I believe Michael Ellman, in his book on Socialist Planning some twenty or more years ago, actually started off the book with the classical prisoners' dilemma, using it to show how it generated the _worst_ outcome. That came about because of the initial assumptions that individuals would seek to maximize their utility, in this instance defined as length of prison sentence. Thus, the classical prisoners' dilemma demonstrated that under such assumptions -- precisely the assumptions of standard economic thinking -- one got the _worst_ of all possible worlds! A delicious and simple demonstration of the conceit of the claims of neo-classical economic thought. There's really nothing in game theory as such that's ideological. Whatever ideology there is resides in the initial assumptions, and those initial assumptions embody the structural constraints. So it depends on how one structures the game, i.e. how one specifies those initial conditions/assumptions. For instance, in that classical prisoners' dilemma, the outcome would change if one added in an assumption of a prior commitment to solidarity arising from, say, membership in a movement for national liberation. In that case, with such a prior commitment, then the rules would be solidarity over imprisonment and, lo and behold!, the outcome would be both would not confess, resulting in the best of all possible outcomes from a straightforward utility point of view, i.e. they _both_ get the shortest sentence. Thus, the oldest and most famous of game theoretic examples illustrates that, e.g., solidarity trumps utility maximization as a strategy!! I can't think of a simpler demonstration of the utility of solidarity and the disutility of individualistic selfishness. Furthermore, in iterative prisoners' dilemma, it turns out that the best course of action is to start off assuming cooperation, not competition. As to whether the fact that unique solutions are available only for two-person (and of course 'person' here is not 'individual person') games is a weakness or not would depend upon how one simplifies the situation to assimilate it to a two-person situation. Such simplifications are common enough in physics where the n-body (n>2) problem remains unsolved, I believe. Basically, mathematical models all depend upon how one specifies initial conditions and parameters, and their use depends upon recognising the adequacy of the model to the issue at hand. It would be foolish to try and apply game theory to everything, but is there a theory of everything, superstrings notwithstanding? KJ Khoo Jim Devine wrote: >At 03:11 PM 06/17/2000 -0400, you wrote: >>I don't understand the antagonism to game theory. It is a logical >>technique--a >>tool that can be used to focus the mind on strategic decisions. It >>has the >>weakness that it can only practically discuss the interaction of >>two people, >>but surely there is nothing inherent in it that would bring out >>this scorn. > >I'm not antagonistic toward game theory, _per se_. I even studied it in >High School (back in 1967 or 1968) and thought it was pretty cool. The >problem, as with all theory, is how it's used and whether the theory is >reified or not. I've been convinced (partly by previous discussions on >pen-l) that there's nothing inherent in game theory that says that >John von >Neumann would automatically apply it to call for a preemptive unilateral >nuclear attack on the USSR. There's nothing inherent in game theory that >says that up-and-coming young economists have to prove their cojones by >using fancy techniques like game theory (GT). What I reject is the >_reduction_ of economics to such formalisms as game theory (so that >empirical research, a historical perspective, non-game theories, >philosophy, etc. aren't necessary). Even worse is _cooperative_ game >theory, which not only gets rid of the more interesting conclusions >of the >theory but represents a Panglossian "best of all possible worlds" >approach. >But we should also remember that other theories have been misused, >including Marxian theory. > >Mine quotes Ronald Chilcote: >Game theory and formal modeling have >generated mathemetical explanations of strategies, especially for >marketing >and advertising in business firms. Game theory has had an impact on >economics and it has been widely used in political science analyses of >international confrontations and electoral strategies. In fact, game >theory >has been extensively used by political scientists in the testing and >implementation of rational choice theory, which assumes that THE >STRUCTURAL >CONSTRAINTS OF SOCIETY DO NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINE THE ACTIONS OF >INDIVIDUALS AND THAT INDIVIDUALS TEND TO CHOOSE ACTIONS THAT BRING >THEM THE >BEST RESULTS.< > >I
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
At 11:28 PM 06/18/2000 -0400, you wrote: > GT is methodologically on the right. Period. The reason for this is >that the attention to micro foundations through rational choice, game >theoric models and formal modeling of neo-classical economics have tended >to obscure the importance of relations of production and the exploitative >relationship between the capitalist and the worker. GT lacks a progressive >framework to explain systemic inequalities. no, the problem is that GT typically assumes relative equality in "games." It need not do so. > >While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS > argument?], > >supposed "neutrality" of game theory... > > >I think that the very assumptions of game theory--individualism, profit > maximizing agency, egoism, alturism [altruism?] in return for > benefit--are bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. >first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You are >not the editor here. Actually, I am (and an economist too). One of the frustrating things about threads in on-line discussions is that they rapidly become incomprehensible to the readers. And frankly, I'm not talking just to you but to others who are reading this. I try to make it comprehensible to them. Further, "editing" something allows me to be more careful in my reading of it. Anyway, putting little comments in brackets like "[altruism?]" is not the same as editing. >I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing that English is my >second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, >like once upon a time you called third world people *irrational* here. As far as I am concerned, you can have any opinion of me that you want. But the fact that you're stooping to calling me names says that this conversation is over. This is my last contribution to this thread. More importantly, I _never_ referred to third world people as irrational. I would like to see documentation of this totally outrageous claim. If you have any evidence, I _will_ respond, to show that it is spurious and libelous. >You should consider an apology to the list, or at least to the >international members of the list! An apology is appropriate only appropriate if I'd done something wrong. >... I am saying that the game theoretical applications of conflict >resolution to international relations and security studies (which I don't >think you are aware, btw) come up with explanations and results that >tend to promote the foreign policy interests of the US. Have you ever >attempted to see where game theorists publish their articles in the >majority of cases? They are the kind of journals such as _Foreign >Affairs_, _Washington Report_ _Strategic Studies_, _Journal of Military >Studies_, etc.. How do you assume that these people having their articles >published in these journals are objective, given that the institutional >basis of these journals is intimately related to the US political system >and the international political order it is trying to endorse. Once I was >reading a game theoretical explanation of military intervention in Haiti >in one of these journals. The study was briefly talking about how to keep >the junta in power with the US help and democratize Haiti in the mean time >without causing social conflict (revolt). The author was constructing a >game theory of how to make democracy work in Haiti without pissing off >the US as well as the junta. If this is not ideology, what is it? This suggests that GT is so empty that it can be used to justify _anything_. Hey, that's a sustantive criticism! > >African Americans have not chosen to be discrimanated by whites. Women > >have not chosen to be beaten by men..Nobody chooses the heads of > >corporations (even in some formal sense). If there is oppression, it is > >because there has been oppression against some others' rights to equality. > > >Again, I can imagine someone could apply GT to model the way in which > >social institutions limit choice. On racism, for example, imagine a black > >person who decides whether to (a) stay with his or her community or (b) > >try > >to fit within white society. > >How can a black "choose" to fit within a white society? you'll notice that I used the phrase "try to fit." A lot of black people had lighter skin have been pretty successful at this. Even the darker-skinned types can try to fit in _culturally_. I didn't say that they would succeed. >If we start the game with this individualistic assumption, then we end up >saying that blacks are responsible for causing racism by consciously >choosing the conditions they live in. One can *not* start the game with >the assumption that blacks and whites share the same circumstances, rules >of the game and the social institutions limiting their choices. >Institutions do not limit >blacks and whites' choices equally. They discriminate... I didn't say that "blacks and whites share the same circumstances, rules of the game and the soc
Re: GT
Jim D says: >Someone already pointed out that GT need not involve individualism >or profit-maximizing or egoism. One can apply altruism in making >decisions in the game. Isn't altruism a dialectical twin of individualism? The concept of "altruism" emerged in the English language in the mid-19th century, according to the OED. The word is used in attempts to explain why an individual cares (or should care) about anyone besides himself at all. In other words, under capitalism, regard for others emerged as a "problem" in need of an ethical, philosophical, or scientific explanation, whereas in the world before capitalism (= the world where individualism as we know it didn't exist) no one taxed his brains trying to come up with philosophical or biological reasons why one should care about others, because it was taken for granted -- part of social institutions -- that one did. So it seems to me that whether actors are conceived as profit-maximizing or behaving altruistically, Game Theory is about individuals and their choices in the world of Scarcity & Opportunity Costs (as conceived in neoclassical economics). Are game theorists interested in changing the game at all? I doubt it. If we start with atomized individuals trying to survive (or help other individuals survive) in the world as it exists now, it seems to me that _as isolated individuals_, we -- or at least most of us, very "altruistic" ones perhaps excepted -- don't find it in our (or other individuals') "interest" to exert much efforts & take risks in trying to bring about an alternative to capitalism. Working for radical social change doesn't "pay," and we don't need Game Theory to tell us what common sense can teach us. Struggling for the abolition of capitalism (or any radical social movement, for that matter) only "makes sense" when we don't start with atomized individuals. Therefore, if Game Theory isn't "reactionary," it is at least very conservative. Now, here's what appeared in Randy Cohen's column "The Ethicist" in the New York Times Sunday Magazine (6.18.00): * Q. I teach business ethics for a local university. I wonder how you would respond to this classic moral dilemma: John walks into a village and finds Mary holding 15 people hostage. Mary says that she will kill them all unless John takes a gun and kills one of the hostages. All of the hostages are innocent people. What should John do? -- J. De Pauw, Arlington, VA. A. What kind of business are you preparing these kids for? Microsoft? * Isn't Game Theory at bottom as silly as the "classic moral dilemma" described above? Yoshie
Re: Re: Re: GT [was: Re: McArthur grantee
I have been on pen-l now for 8 years. Calling people racists on this list is infantile to say the least. Storm in a tea cup I hope:) Cheers, Anthony xxx Anthony P. D'Costa, Associate Professor Comparative International Development University of WashingtonTaylor Institute & South Asia Program 1900 Commerce StreetJackson School of International Studies Tacoma, WA 98402, USA University of Washington, Seattle Phone: (253) 692-4462 Fax : (253) 692-5612 xxx
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: McArthur grantee
G'day Mine, >I have not seen among game theorists any Marxists, any socialists with a >progressive agenda. Show me one? The ones who have applied a >rational-choice brand of game theory to Marxism (Elster, Perzeworski, >Roemer, Wright) have moved away from Marxism in their attemps to build >economics on micro-foundations and individual decisions. I've read some Elster, and he deploys mainstream methods (like games theory) to destroy mainstream stuff like public choice theory, transferred preferences, stability therof etc etc, doesn't he? Good work, I'd've thought! And, anyway, we don't want to react to the institutional blindness to institutional constraint (in which connection, incidentally, I think we could frame Marx as an institutionalist par excellence - as Tsuru claims) by effectively positing an absolutely determinant economic base and a helpless subject - some Marxists have gone that route, and I don't reckon it works as theory - neither explaining our lives today nor making thinkable a humanity that is as much subject as object of its history. >first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You are not >the editor here. I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing >that English is my second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, >like once upon a time you called third world people *irrational* here. You >should consider an apology to the list, or at least to the international >members of the list! Well, if Jim is disgustingly racist, you can give up on all hope here and now, Mine. If I make mistakes, I'd like them corrected - whatever the nature of my mistake. That's how we learn. It's not fair that cyberspace is dominated by American English, but it's not the fault of American English speakers either. English is my second language, too, but now I've been corrected so often, and so well, that I speak and write it rather better than my first. >Altruism has a pragmatic connotation in cooperative game theory. You give >in order to receive. As Richard Dawkins wrote in _Selfish Gene_, the book >that is a prototype of fascism and sexism, men compete to fuck women in >order to transfer their superior genes to their offsprings. The >possibility of being fucked or selected from the pool depends on how men >are altrustic to women as well how much women can offer. I think there's a lot to Dawkins' theory - and it is a theory that may or may not be deployed to support fascism and sexism (I think Dawkins himself read too much and too little into his theory, especially in his first edition), but I maintain it is not *necessarily* what you say it is. Part of the environment within which our genes march through history is human culture and the particular power relations of the moment - that makes our genetic history a rather particular and complex business - but it doesn't deny Dawkins so much as introduce a dialectical relationship into the mix. Fine. And anyway, experience tells us that women in liberal capitalist polities compete no less than men when it comes to the mating game (I imagine this would be true in much, but perhaps not all, of Turkey, too). I mean, we are, at least in part, talking about individuals engaged in competition, aren't we? You'd need strong rules and stronger enforcement to have it otherwise, I reckon (Taliban-like patriarchy. for instance). And, yeah, its those rules (especially uncodified cultural norms) that GT can miss. BTW, just to get a bit humanistic about all this, I don't reckon we're a purely cooperative species at all, myself. We're just not purely competitive, that's all. Cooperation was, I submit, how we competed as a species - and we must not confuse competition at the unconscious species level with that at individual, and often conscious, level (like the Spencerian 'social darwinists' and their latter day acolytes seem to think). >My alternative is not to use game theory as a methodological tool. >Just like socio-biology crap, game theory is inherently non Marxist, if >not anti liberal-left. I just don't find the outcomes of game theory to explain much at all about the world within which I live (on the strength of introductory economics and public choice texts, anyway), and I don't think it privileges what's most important to decision-making. So I don't like it insofar as I understand it. I'd accept non-Marxist in that sense. 'Anti-Marxist', it seems to me, remains rather moot. >How can a black "choose" to fit within a white society? If we start the >game with this individualistic assumption, then we end up saying that >blacks are responsible for causing racism by consciously choosing the >conditions they live in. One can *not* start the game with the assumption >that blacks and whites share the same circumstances, rules of the game and >the social institutions limiting their choices. Institutions do not limit >blacks and whites' choices equally. They discriminate... I agree. >>I wasn't apologizing for GT
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
MD wrote: >The argument that evil is not in the "economist but in the technique" >misses the point since it assumes that the technique of game theory is >neutral, just as it assumes that economists are neutral. >But Rod did not assume that economists are neutral. Nor did I. Again, I >think that the problem with GT arises when it excludes other ways of >understanding the world and other ways of understanding what to do. I see >nothing in GT _per se_ which indicates that its use automatically leads >to >reactionary conclusions. I have not seen among game theorists any Marxists, any socialists with a progressive agenda. Show me one? The ones who have applied a rational-choice brand of game theory to Marxism (Elster, Perzeworski, Roemer, Wright) have moved away from Marxism in their attemps to build economics on micro-foundations and individual decisions. GT is methodologically on the right. Period. The reason for this is that the attention to micro foundations through rational choice, game theoric models and formal modeling of neo-classical economics have tended to obscure the importance of relations of production and the exploitative relationship between the capitalist and the worker. GT lacks a progressive framework to explain systemic inequalities. >While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS >argument?], supposed "neutrality" of game theory... >I think that the very assumptions of game >theory--individualism, profit >maximizing agency, egoism, alturism >[altruism?] in return for benefit-- >are bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. first of all, don't correct my words or intervene in the text. You are not the editor here. I write quickly, and sometimes misuse letters. Knowing that English is my second language, you are being *disgustingly racist*, like once upon a time you called third world people *irrational* here. You should consider an apology to the list, or at least to the international members of the list! >Someone already pointed out that GT need not involve individualism or >profit-maximizing or egoism. One can apply altruism in making decisions >in >the game. I don't think it's a very good theory of altruism, but that's >another issue. Altruism has a pragmatic connotation in cooperative game theory. You give in order to receive. As Richard Dawkins wrote in _Selfish Gene_, the book that is a prototype of fascism and sexism, men compete to fuck women in order to transfer their superior genes to their offsprings. The possibility of being fucked or selected from the pool depends on how men are altrustic to women as well how much women can offer. >Game theorists do not need to conspire with the US government at the >moment, this is de passe; what they need to do is to teach the governments >about how to resolve conflicts and play the diplomacy game correctly in a >way to minimize nuclear threat >in a post-cold war era.. >This sounds as if you think that GT is a neutral tool that can be used to >preserve peace. So GT isn't all bad? NO. I am saying that the game theoretical applications of conflict resolution to international relations and security studies (which I don't think you are aware, btw) come up with explanations and results that tend to promote the foreign policy interests of the US. Have you ever attempted to see where game theorists publish their articles in the majority of cases? They are the kind of journals such as _Foreign Affairs_, _Washington Report_ _Strategic Studies_, _Journal of Military Studies_, etc.. How do you assume that these people having their articles published in these journals are objective, given that the institutional basis of these journals is intimately related to the US political system and the international political order it is trying to endorse. Once I was reading a game theoretical explanation of military intervention in Haiti in one of these journals. The study was briefly talking about how to keep the junta in power with the US help and democratize Haiti in the mean time without causing social conflict (revolt). The author was constructing a game theory of how to make democracy work in Haiti without pissing off the US as well as the junta. If this is not ideology, what is it? >Furthermore, if something _empirically_ does not happen, it does not mean >that game theory is not ideological. To argue >otherwise is very much >like saying that I do not beat my wife, so there is >no sexism.. >I don't get this. Please tell me how GT is nothing but ideological. Is >there something about GT that makes it inherently reactionary? More >importantly, what is your alternative? My alternative is not to use game theory as a methodological tool. Just like socio-biology crap, game theory is inherently non Marxist, if not anti liberal-left. >African Americans have not chosen to be discrimanated by whites. Women >have not chosen to be beaten by men..Nobody chooses the heads of >corporations (even in some formal sense). If there is op
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
Rod wrote: >I agree Jim. The evil is in the economist not in the technique.< Though I think you're saying this implicitly, it's important to make it explicit that it's not that the economists are evil, but that the institutions within which they work (capitalism, academia, the economics hierarchy) create incentives for them to act in an evil way (in terms of objective effects) while encouraging them to take on an "evil" (i.e., very individualistic, opportunistic) attitude. (There's that famous study which showed that students who took economics courses became more likely free ride in prisoners' dilemma games.) MD wrote: >The argument that evil is not in the "economist but in the technique" >misses the point since it assumes that the technique of game theory is >neutral, just as it assumes that economists are neutral. But Rod did not assume that economists are neutral. Nor did I. Again, I think that the problem with GT arises when it excludes other ways of understanding the world and other ways of understanding what to do. I see nothing in GT _per se_ which indicates that its use automatically leads to reactionary conclusions. It's akin to supply & demand, which has been used for reactionary purposes but need not be used in that way. >While I respectfully say that this is A bullshit [a BS what? a BS >argument?], I think that the very assumptions of game >theory--individualism, profit maximizing agency, egoism, alturism >[altruism?] in return for benefit-- are bombastically IDEOLOGICAL. Someone already pointed out that GT need not involve individualism or profit-maximizing or egoism. One can apply altruism in making decisions in the game. I don't think it's a very good theory of altruism, but that's another issue. I see the idea of agency as okay, since to treat people as non-agents is to not show them respect. I just don't see people as individualistic, profit-maximizing, egotistical agents having goals that are predetermined independent of society (i.e., having "given tastes"). >One can not seperate the assummptions from the technique on the fallistic >[fallacious?] assumption that game theorists will not automatically apply >their theories to engage in a nuclear attack against USSR. I was simply saying that we can't assume automatically that GT will be used for evil purposes. You seem to be saying that GT is always evil. I was saying that the link between GT and John von Neumann's conclusions from it is tenuous at best. >Game theorists do not need to conspire with the US government at the >moment, this is de passe; what they need to do is to teach the governments >about how to resolve conflicts and play the diplomacy game correctly in a >way to minimize nuclear threat >in a post-cold war era.. This sounds as if you think that GT is a neutral tool that can be used to preserve peace. So GT isn't all bad? >Furthermore, if something _empirically_ does not happen, it does not mean >that game theory is not ideological. To argue >otherwise is very much like saying that I do not beat my wife, so there is >no sexism.. I don't get this. Please tell me how GT is nothing but ideological. Is there something about GT that makes it inherently reactionary? More importantly, what is your alternative? I had written: > >But the idea that people choose actions that bring them the best results > is tautological and therefore unobjectionable as long as it's not reified.< Mine responds: >Where is the tautology here? I did not choose to live in a capitalist system. Of course you didn't. But the fact that you didn't make that choice doesn't mean that you don't make other choices. Or is there someone or something who programs you or dictates to you to make you choose which clothes to wear each day? I don't think so. Are you totally constrained in your choices or totally brainwashed? Between the issue of living under capitalism and that of what clothes to wear, there's a continuum of different situations involving less individual choice (like with capitalism, racism, etc.) and more individual choice (like with what you eat). In the middle, for example, I am highly restricted in what method you take to get to work (a car, car-pooling, bicycling, public transportation) but I do have some choice. BTW, the GT practitioners don't believe that all results in our lives are a matter of choice, since the "game" itself exists independent of the individual wills of its participants. I can imagine that someone thinks that GT can be used to construct a game to describe the dilemmas that people face under capitalism. I don't think the model would be adequate, though it might capture some elements of the way in which choices are limited by social institutions such as capitalism. The big problem is when someone thinks the GT model is adequate. I would think of capitalism as a collective action problem instead of as a game. It's bad for workers as a class (compared to running
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee (fwd)
>>The argument that evil is not in the "economist but in the technique" >>misses the point since it assumes that the technique of game theory is >>neutral, >Would you consider, first, going and reading something that Matthew >Rabin has actually written? Why don't you enlighten us about the hero's work, Brad? particulary his assumptions about how a capitalist economy should work??. Mine
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee(fwd)
>The argument that evil is not in the "economist but in the technique" >misses the point since it assumes that the technique of game theory is >neutral, Would you consider, first, going and reading something that Matthew Rabin has actually written?
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee
At 11:23 AM 06/18/2000 +0800, you wrote: >As to whether the fact that unique solutions are available only for >two-person (and of course 'person' here is not 'individual person') >games is a weakness or not would depend upon how one simplifies the >situation to assimilate it to a two-person situation. Such >simplifications are common enough in physics where the n-body (n>2) >problem remains unsolved, I believe. can't physicists deal with cases where n = infinity? After all, economists using purely formal techniques can handle the case where n = 1 (monopoly) or n = infinity (mythical perfect competition) and just barely handle n = 2 (duopoly) . Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine/AS
Re: Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthurgrantee
I am skeptical about the insights from game theory. Do you really need game theory to understand the story of the prisoner's dilemma? [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I believe Michael Ellman, in his book on Socialist Planning some > twenty or more years ago, actually started off the book with the > classical prisoners' dilemma, using it to show how it generated the > _worst_ outcome. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: GT
I was first introduced to game theory at the University of Toronto, when I heard Anatol Rappaport use the prisoners' dilemma to analysis the arms race between the US and the USSR. Individual rationality lead to the worse possible outcome, contrary to the claim of neo-classical economics that individual rationality was optimal. The prisoners dilemma is only one of many such games that demonstrate that co-operation is the optimum strategy. I also saw Jon Cohen use neo-classical methods to derive Marxist results. With all formal logical systems. The action is with the assumptions. You get from the models what you put into them. There are useful however, because they impose a discipline on the logic. Rod [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I believe Michael Ellman, in his book on Socialist Planning some > twenty or more years ago, actually started off the book with the > classical prisoners' dilemma, using it to show how it generated the > _worst_ outcome. > > That came about because of the initial assumptions that individuals > would seek to maximize their utility, in this instance defined as > length of prison sentence. > > Thus, the classical prisoners' dilemma demonstrated that under such > assumptions -- precisely the assumptions of standard economic > thinking -- one got the _worst_ of all possible worlds! A delicious > and simple demonstration of the conceit of the claims of > neo-classical economic thought. > > There's really nothing in game theory as such that's ideological. > Whatever ideology there is resides in the initial assumptions, and > those initial assumptions embody the structural constraints. So it > depends on how one structures the game, i.e. how one specifies those > initial conditions/assumptions. For instance, in that classical > prisoners' dilemma, the outcome would change if one added in an > assumption of a prior commitment to solidarity arising from, say, > membership in a movement for national liberation. In that case, with > such a prior commitment, then the rules would be solidarity over > imprisonment and, lo and behold!, the outcome would be both would not > confess, resulting in the best of all possible outcomes from a > straightforward utility point of view, i.e. they _both_ get the > shortest sentence. Thus, the oldest and most famous of game theoretic > examples illustrates that, e.g., solidarity trumps utility > maximization as a strategy!! I can't think of a simpler demonstration > of the utility of solidarity and the disutility of individualistic > selfishness. > > Furthermore, in iterative prisoners' dilemma, it turns out that the > best course of action is to start off assuming cooperation, not > competition. > > As to whether the fact that unique solutions are available only for > two-person (and of course 'person' here is not 'individual person') > games is a weakness or not would depend upon how one simplifies the > situation to assimilate it to a two-person situation. Such > simplifications are common enough in physics where the n-body (n>2) > problem remains unsolved, I believe. > > Basically, mathematical models all depend upon how one specifies > initial conditions and parameters, and their use depends upon > recognising the adequacy of the model to the issue at hand. It would > be foolish to try and apply game theory to everything, but is there a > theory of everything, superstrings notwithstanding? > > KJ Khoo > > Jim Devine wrote: > >At 03:11 PM 06/17/2000 -0400, you wrote: > >>I don't understand the antagonism to game theory. It is a logical > >>technique--a > >>tool that can be used to focus the mind on strategic decisions. It > >>has the > >>weakness that it can only practically discuss the interaction of > >>two people, > >>but surely there is nothing inherent in it that would bring out > >>this scorn. > > > >I'm not antagonistic toward game theory, _per se_. I even studied it in > >High School (back in 1967 or 1968) and thought it was pretty cool. The > >problem, as with all theory, is how it's used and whether the theory is > >reified or not. I've been convinced (partly by previous discussions on > >pen-l) that there's nothing inherent in game theory that says that > >John von > >Neumann would automatically apply it to call for a preemptive unilateral > >nuclear attack on the USSR. There's nothing inherent in game theory that > >says that up-and-coming young economists have to prove their cojones by > >using fancy techniques like game theory (GT). What I reject is the > >_reduction_ of economics to such formalisms as game theory (so that > >empirical research, a historical perspective, non-game theories, > >philosophy, etc. aren't necessary). Even worse is _cooperative_ game > >theory, which not only gets rid of the more interesting conclusions > >of the > >theory but represents a Panglossian "best of all possible worlds" > >approach. > >But we should also remember that other theories have been misused, > >including Marxian theory. > > > >Mine quotes Ron
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthurgrantee
I believe Michael Ellman, in his book on Socialist Planning some twenty or more years ago, actually started off the book with the classical prisoners' dilemma, using it to show how it generated the _worst_ outcome. That came about because of the initial assumptions that individuals would seek to maximize their utility, in this instance defined as length of prison sentence. Thus, the classical prisoners' dilemma demonstrated that under such assumptions -- precisely the assumptions of standard economic thinking -- one got the _worst_ of all possible worlds! A delicious and simple demonstration of the conceit of the claims of neo-classical economic thought. There's really nothing in game theory as such that's ideological. Whatever ideology there is resides in the initial assumptions, and those initial assumptions embody the structural constraints. So it depends on how one structures the game, i.e. how one specifies those initial conditions/assumptions. For instance, in that classical prisoners' dilemma, the outcome would change if one added in an assumption of a prior commitment to solidarity arising from, say, membership in a movement for national liberation. In that case, with such a prior commitment, then the rules would be solidarity over imprisonment and, lo and behold!, the outcome would be both would not confess, resulting in the best of all possible outcomes from a straightforward utility point of view, i.e. they _both_ get the shortest sentence. Thus, the oldest and most famous of game theoretic examples illustrates that, e.g., solidarity trumps utility maximization as a strategy!! I can't think of a simpler demonstration of the utility of solidarity and the disutility of individualistic selfishness. Furthermore, in iterative prisoners' dilemma, it turns out that the best course of action is to start off assuming cooperation, not competition. As to whether the fact that unique solutions are available only for two-person (and of course 'person' here is not 'individual person') games is a weakness or not would depend upon how one simplifies the situation to assimilate it to a two-person situation. Such simplifications are common enough in physics where the n-body (n>2) problem remains unsolved, I believe. Basically, mathematical models all depend upon how one specifies initial conditions and parameters, and their use depends upon recognising the adequacy of the model to the issue at hand. It would be foolish to try and apply game theory to everything, but is there a theory of everything, superstrings notwithstanding? KJ Khoo Jim Devine wrote: >At 03:11 PM 06/17/2000 -0400, you wrote: >>I don't understand the antagonism to game theory. It is a logical >>technique--a >>tool that can be used to focus the mind on strategic decisions. It >>has the >>weakness that it can only practically discuss the interaction of >>two people, >>but surely there is nothing inherent in it that would bring out >>this scorn. > >I'm not antagonistic toward game theory, _per se_. I even studied it in >High School (back in 1967 or 1968) and thought it was pretty cool. The >problem, as with all theory, is how it's used and whether the theory is >reified or not. I've been convinced (partly by previous discussions on >pen-l) that there's nothing inherent in game theory that says that >John von >Neumann would automatically apply it to call for a preemptive unilateral >nuclear attack on the USSR. There's nothing inherent in game theory that >says that up-and-coming young economists have to prove their cojones by >using fancy techniques like game theory (GT). What I reject is the >_reduction_ of economics to such formalisms as game theory (so that >empirical research, a historical perspective, non-game theories, >philosophy, etc. aren't necessary). Even worse is _cooperative_ game >theory, which not only gets rid of the more interesting conclusions >of the >theory but represents a Panglossian "best of all possible worlds" >approach. >But we should also remember that other theories have been misused, >including Marxian theory. > >Mine quotes Ronald Chilcote: >Game theory and formal modeling have >generated mathemetical explanations of strategies, especially for >marketing >and advertising in business firms. Game theory has had an impact on >economics and it has been widely used in political science analyses of >international confrontations and electoral strategies. In fact, game >theory >has been extensively used by political scientists in the testing and >implementation of rational choice theory, which assumes that THE >STRUCTURAL >CONSTRAINTS OF SOCIETY DO NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINE THE ACTIONS OF >INDIVIDUALS AND THAT INDIVIDUALS TEND TO CHOOSE ACTIONS THAT BRING >THEM THE >BEST RESULTS.< > >I presume that the use of ALL CAPS indicates that you don't approve of >these aspects of the theory. > >But the idea that people choose actions that bring them the best >results is >tautological and therefore unobjectionable as long as
Re: GT [was: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: McArthur grantee
I agree Jim. The evil is in the economist not in the technique. Rod Jim Devine wrote: > At 03:11 PM 06/17/2000 -0400, you wrote: > >I don't understand the antagonism to game theory. It is a logical technique--a > >tool that can be used to focus the mind on strategic decisions. It has the > >weakness that it can only practically discuss the interaction of two people, > >but surely there is nothing inherent in it that would bring out this scorn. > > I'm not antagonistic toward game theory, _per se_. I even studied it in > High School (back in 1967 or 1968) and thought it was pretty cool. The > problem, as with all theory, is how it's used and whether the theory is > reified or not. I've been convinced (partly by previous discussions on > pen-l) that there's nothing inherent in game theory that says that John von > Neumann would automatically apply it to call for a preemptive unilateral > nuclear attack on the USSR. There's nothing inherent in game theory that > says that up-and-coming young economists have to prove their cojones by > using fancy techniques like game theory (GT). What I reject is the > _reduction_ of economics to such formalisms as game theory (so that > empirical research, a historical perspective, non-game theories, > philosophy, etc. aren't necessary). Even worse is _cooperative_ game > theory, which not only gets rid of the more interesting conclusions of the > theory but represents a Panglossian "best of all possible worlds" approach. > But we should also remember that other theories have been misused, > including Marxian theory. > > Mine quotes Ronald Chilcote: >Game theory and formal modeling have > generated mathemetical explanations of strategies, especially for marketing > and advertising in business firms. Game theory has had an impact on > economics and it has been widely used in political science analyses of > international confrontations and electoral strategies. In fact, game theory > has been extensively used by political scientists in the testing and > implementation of rational choice theory, which assumes that THE STRUCTURAL > CONSTRAINTS OF SOCIETY DO NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINE THE ACTIONS OF > INDIVIDUALS AND THAT INDIVIDUALS TEND TO CHOOSE ACTIONS THAT BRING THEM THE > BEST RESULTS.< > > I presume that the use of ALL CAPS indicates that you don't approve of > these aspects of the theory. > > But the idea that people choose actions that bring them the best results is > tautological and therefore unobjectionable as long as it's not reified. > > The idea that people actually choose -- i.e. are not necessarily determined > by the structural constraints of society -- is pretty obvious. People > choose to post stuff on pen-l. They're not totally determined by their > societal environments. In any event, no-one has developed a theory of > society that's so good that it can predict individual behavior 100% of the > time. Even if such a theory could be developed, it would be a _behaviorist_ > theory (like that of BF Skinner). That's a road that leads "beyond freedom > and dignity" into the realm of authoritarianism. > > I prefer Marx's view, i.e., that individuals create society (though hardly > ever as intended) _and_ the society limits and shapes individual choices, > personalities, and the results of their actions, as a unified and dynamic > (dialectical) process. > > Game theory is only about how the results of individual actions are limited > by the structure of (a very simple) society (and how individuals make > choices within that structure). It ignores the rest of the picture, and > thus presents a very one-sided vision (or less than one-sided vision) of > the world. For example, basic GT discusses the "prisoners' dilemma" without > discussing how the cops have the power to create such a dilemma (creating > the rules of the "game"). Similarly, it ignores other police tactics, such > as the "tough cop/nice cop" routine that does the mindf*ck to the prisoner. > > >Cooperative and competitive relations in one's bargaining with allies and > opponents are emphasized by the social scientists in a fashion modeled > after the economist's attention to exchange, especially through competitive > market system< > > well, the real world has both cooperative and competitive situations, so > that GT isn't irrelevant. > > > In focusing on systemic forecasting, Jantsch (1972) identified a number > of tendencies in other social sciences. For sociology, he alluded to ways > of " guiding human thinking in systemic fashion" and he mentioned scenario > writing, gaming, historical analogy, and other techniques. For the policy > sciences, he referred to the "outcome-orinted framework for strategic > planning" known as the PLANNING-PROGRAMMING- BUDGETING SYSTEM, WHICH IS > USED BY THE US GOVERNMENT AND OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL" < > > are you saying that if the government uses something, it's bad? so if > President Clinton breathes oxygen, we should avoid it? > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
