Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
In a message dated 3/4/2002 11:57:49 AM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77 by Davies, Daniel -clip- And whatever else one thinks about Cohen's work, I think he has to be right that Marx had a theory of history, and that this theory of history was materialsit and based on the productive forces. 'course, I never understood dialectics, so I may be talking out of my hole. ^ CB: Doesn't _The Manifesto of the Communist Party_ make it pretty clear that Marx's theory of history is rooted in the relations of production aspect of the forces of production, the division of labor, and the class struggle? History is a history of class struggles, not technological innovations. Since producers are part of the forces of production, it is their development that is in the forces of production that makes history, and historical revolutions. What compels classes to struggle or what defines the context in which classes struggle throughout history? Many things is a good answer. How does one delineate one period of history from another or rather I fall on the side of the equation that gives predominance to "man" as he is materially active identified on the basis of a specific technology. Perhaps I have been in the factory to long. Marx Capital states: "It is one of the civilizing aspects of capital that it enforces this surplus-labour in a manner and under conditions which are more advantageous to the development of the productive forces, social relations, and the creation of the elements for a new and higher form than under the precedingforms of slavery, serfdom, etc. Thus it gives rise to a stage, on the one hand, in which coercion and monopolization of social development (including its material and intellectual advantages) by one portion of society at the expense of the other are eliminated; on the other hand, it creates the material means and embryonic conditions, making it possible in a higher form of society to combine this surplus-labour with a greater reduction of time devoted to material labor in general. For, depending on the development of labor productivity, surplus-labour may be large in a small total working-day, and relatively small in a large total working-day. If the necessary labour-time = 3 and the surplus-labour = 3, then the total working-day = 6 and the rate of surplus-labour = 100%. If the necessary labour = 9 and the surplus-labor = 3, then the total working-day = 12 and the rate of surplus-labour only = 33 1/3 %. In that case, it depends upon the labor productivity how much use-value shall be produced in a definite time, hence also in a definite surplus labor-time. The actual wealth of society, and the possibility of constantly expanding its reproduction process, therefore, do not depend upon the duration of surplus-labour, but upon its productivity and the more or less copious conditions of production under which it is performed. In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite." I read the statement "The actual wealth of society, and the possibility of constantly expanding its reproduction process, therefore, do not depend upon the duration of surplus-labour, but upon its productivity and the more or less copious conditions of production under which it is performed," with emphasis on productivity as in instruments i.e. technology, as distinct from duration or intensifying the biological human energy or lengthening the work day. Or "expanding . . . reproduction process" revolves on the axis of technological innovation that comes from the mind of humanity. I understand the statement "Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with
Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
In a message dated Tue, 5 Mar 2002 11:51:56 AM Eastern Standard Time, Charles Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77 by Waistline2 05 March 2002 12:09 UTC CB: Doesn't _The Manifesto of the Communist Party_ make it pretty clear that Marx's theory of history is rooted in the relations of production aspect of the forces of production, the division of labor, and the class struggle? History is a history of class struggles, not technological innovations. Since producers are part of the forces of production, it is their development that is in the forces of production that makes history, and historical revolutions. Melvin: What compels classes to struggle or what defines the context in which classes struggle throughout history? Many things is a good answer. How does one delineate one period of history from another or rather I fall on the side of the equation that gives predominance to man as he is materially active identified on the basis of a specific technology. Perhaps I have been in the factory to long. Marx Capital states: It is one of the civilizing aspects of capital that it enforces this surplus-labour in a manner and under conditions which are more advantageous to the development of the productive forces, social relations, ^ CB: Here's a reference to relations of production. Like any opposition, at some point, forces and relations of production interpenetrate. ^ and the creation of the elements for a new and higher form than under the precedingforms of slavery, serfdom, etc. Thus it gives rise to a stage, on the one hand, in which coercion and monopolization of social development (including its material and intellectual advantages) by one portion of society at the expense of the other are eliminated; on the other hand, it creates the material means and embryonic conditions, making it possible in a higher form of society to combine this surplus-labour with a greater reduction of time devoted to material labor in general. For, depending on the development of labor productivity, surplus-labour may be large in a small total working-day, and relatively small in a large total working-day. If the necessary labour-time = 3 and the surplus-labour = 3, then the total working-day = 6 and the rate of surplus-labour = 100%. If the necessary labour = 9 and the surplus-labor = 3, then the total working-day = 12 and the rate of surplus-labour only = 33 1/3 %. In that case, it depends upon the labor productivity how much use-value shall be produced in a definite time, hence also in a definite surplus labor-time. The actual wealth of society, and the possibility of constantly expanding its reproduction process, therefore, do not depend upon the duration of surplus-labour, but upon its productivity and the more or less copious conditions of production under which it is performed. In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite. I read the statement The actual wealth of society, and the possibility of constantly expanding its reproduction process, therefore, do not depend upon the duration of surplus-labour, but upon its productivity and the more or less copious conditions of production under which it is performed, with emphasis on productivity as in instruments i.e. technology, as distinct from duration or intensifying the biological human energy or lengthening the work day. Or expanding . . . reproduction process revolves on the axis of technological innovation that comes from the mind of humanity. I understand the statement Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange
RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
CB: Doesn't _The Manifesto of the Communist Party_ make it pretty clear that Marx's theory of history is rooted in the relations of production aspect of the forces of production, the division of labor, and the class struggle ? History is a history of class struggles, not technological innovations. Since producers are part of the forces of production , it is their development that is in the forces of production that makes history, and historical revolutions. One of the problems is that the categories relations of production and forces of production overlap. The division of labor, for example, is both a relationship among producers (part of the RofP) and promotes the productivity of labor (part of the FoP). JD
Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
CB: Doesn't _The Manifesto of the Communist Party_ make it pretty clear that Marx's theory of history is rooted in the relations of production aspect of the forces of production, the division of labor, and the class struggle ? History is a history of class struggles, not technological innovations Since producers are part of the forces of production , it is their development that is in the forces of production that makes history, and historical revolutions That's one strand in Marx The other one is represented most famously by the 1859 Preface to the CoPE, where Marx sets out the forces thesis, which he also stated as early as 1847 in The Poverty of Philosophy (the hand nmill gives you the feudal lord, the steam mill the industrial capitalist) Cohen may overdo the claim that Marx is _consistently_ committed to the forces thesis, but his book establioshes with scholarly rigor that Marx was often committed to it You have to read the book carefully, it's as important a piece of Marxist analysis as has been published in the last 50 years Personally I think that Marx never thought through the tensions between what have come to be called the class struggle/relations of production account, articulated by Fisk, Miller, and Brenner, and the forces of production account, articulated by Cohen and Wright Levine and Sober (among others) jks jks _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorermsncom/intlasp;
Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
Marx's idea of social forces may be grounded more in common sense than in some deep theory One other factors that I see in his understanding of the transition to socialism runs as follows: people will see the tremendous social forces (capabilities or potential) of capitalist production alongside the actual performance, leading to great dissatisfaction and a readiness to make a change This raises some deep questions about how to understand Marx's theory of transition to socialism on the productive forces interpretion of historical materialism Unsurprisingly the best discussion of it is in GA Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense Sober Wright Levine have some useful discussion in Reconstructing Marxism as well The problem with Charles's view is that psychologically, it depends on people contrasting what they have with a guess about what they might have, rather than what they have with what they had It's a well-established fact in psychology that people care a lot more about keeping what they have than getting something they don't Example from everyday life: if you buy something, say a CD player, and you lose it or it breaks, you are typically willing to replace it for what you paid, even thought you would not have bought it for twice the price Translating this into the transition problem, people are less willing to buy (pay the price for) a risky transition to socialism to get things they might like but have never had than they are to fight to keep what they have already won--and we see they are not as willing to do that as we might hope Cohen's theory, btw, is that that what people might get throug the transition is more free time Personally, I do not think the fettering of productive forces view is a plausible psychological basis for the transition It may be a necessary condition for a stable socialist revolution We do have to note, however, that the 20th century revolutions mainly occured in poorer countries where capitalism certainly had not exhausted its potential to develop the PF, nor was it obviously fettering them However, with the big exception of China, to the extent that we wantto say China is still socialist in some sense (debatable), those revolutions did not prove stable However those revolutions were brought about by outrage at injustice in war-weakened states with strong communist movements, not by any perceptions that the PF were being fettered In other words, the class struggle theory of HM is a more plausible account of revolutions Milton Fisk's The State and Justice is the best story about this I remain very skeptical of any attempt to give precise numerical calculations for any part of Marx's theory Marx does use rough, back of the envelope, calculations from time to time They seem appropriate This is too vague to be useful Marx was, as Leonteiff and others have noted, a great mathematical economist despite his limited math skills But as with moth math econ, the numerical examples are just examples of how the algebra in the models works You haveto plug in, to the extenr feasible, real world numbers derived from empirical research to determine, eg, whether the rate of profit is really falling and if so by how much Recasting Marx in algebraic, mathematical, or precise numerical form, seems a bit foreign to his overall project, which his understanding the nature of capitalist society and the weaknesses that will lead to the creation of a socialist state Why are these incompatible? Understanding can be mathematical as well as verbal Some people find math easier to follow Marx himself had a penchant for Hegelizing verbal explanations, which are far from clear He also did attempt very seriously to get the math right as far he could, which was not very given his training jks ¯ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorermsncom/intlasp;
RE: Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
But, in any case, I believe that attention in recent years by economic historians has been given to the role of countless thousands of very small innovations each year (rather than focus on the big-deal innovations) as having been key for technological progress in capitalism. I tend to go along with this, in part because the big-deal innovations appear randomly and, if Schumpeter is to be believed, due to the efforts of the heroic individual. Not much consistent with Marx here. This may or may not be true, but I don't think it's what Scumpeter said; IIRC, a Schumpeterian theory of innovation is one in which innovations are institutionalised and brought about by the RD departments of big corporations. Bell Labs, not James Watt, are the classic Schumpterian innovation story. dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should not be interpreted as a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. The information on which this communication is based has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful business purposes. ___
RE: Re: RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
(hoping this will do as a tentative reply to Eric too) Recasting Marx in algebraic, mathematical, or precise numerical form, seems a bit foreign to his overall project, which his understanding the nature of capitalist society and the weaknesses that will lead to the creation of a socialist state. The idea was not so much to give a precise or numeric quantification of the productive forces but rather to show that the phrase productive forces could in principle be operationalised in some non-question-begging way. I say non-question-begging, because my problem with Jim and Eric's idea of the productive forces (set out extremely clearly in Eric's chained-GDP concept of their measurement), is that if you're going to say that productive means productive of things which are desired by human beings at that particular point in history, then I don't see how historical materialism can get off the ground. ie, if the state of the production forces can only be given a meaning which is dependent on the state of history, how can it be the basis of a theory of history? And whatever else one thinks about Cohen's work, I think he has to be right that Marx had a theory of history, and that this theory of history was materialsit and based on the productive forces. 'course, I never understood dialectics, so I may be talking out of my hole. dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should not be interpreted as a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. The information on which this communication is based has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful business purposes. ___
RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
This does seem like an interesting fundamental disagreement on the meaning of the productive forces. We've basically got two views here: 1) Charles' and mine, that production is a physical process. As Charles said, one measure of the productive forces which allows the term to be given sense independently of any assumptions about social relations would simply be the physical concept of work (roughly speaking, the ability to transfer energy). You could envision a theory in which state of development of the productive forces was measured by the highest temperature to which one million randomly selected members of the human race, socially organised in any which way, could raise a metric tonne of water from 0 degrees Centigrade in one hour; this would obviously be a bit of a strange definition, but it has the advantage of, as far as I can tell, being monotonically increasing in whatever the underlying variable of human development might be. On this view, the invention of fire would be a big step forward for the productive forces, the wheel, inclined plane and lever a few more, electricity another one, and nuclear energy another big one (anything that helps you get energy from one place to another basically). My half-baked ramblings about the complexity of arbitrary physical objects were an attempt to suggest that it's possible to keep the flavour of the energy transfer view of the productive forces, while making it a bit more realistic in terms of matching actual human development. On this view, precision tools would have been a step forward, as would computers, etc. If the development of the productive forces is at the level where the most complex object you can produce is a cell-phone (with complex hopefully to be defined in some objective way along the lines of Shannon's information theory; one measure might be the maximum surface area of an object which could be repeatably produced and placed into a one foot cube.), then an improvement in silicon technology which allows you to produce a *smaller* cell-phone is an increase in the productive forces (because you could also use this increase to produce non-cellphone objects which were previously inaccessible if you wanted to), whereas the use of economies of scale or a more efficient cellphone design which allows you to produce *cheaper* cellphones is not an increase in the productive forces (because it doesn't allow you to change your mind and produce anything you couldn't produce before). I like this view because it allows the questions of technology, organisation of production and consumption to be separated analytically. But I also see the case for: 2) Eric's (and Jim's?) view, that technology, organisation of production and consumption can't be separated in this way, and that because production has to be production of goods that people want, it can't be measured outside the context of a particular social organisation. I think (would be interested in comments) that this might actually go so far as to imply that measurement of the state of the productive forces might only be possible using market prices, along the lines of Kuznets' GDP concept. This emphasises the idea that the value of an arbitrary physical object is determined socially. So it all seems to come down to the question of whether the productive forces are to be understood as the forces producing value or the forces producing things. I don't know enough about Marx to be sure about this one, but I think Cohen's version of historical materialism is based on something like 1) above. dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should not be interpreted as a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. The information on which this communication is based has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful business purposes. ___
RE: RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
As Daniel suggests, my understanding of the problem of measuring the state and growth of the productive forces is more in line with #2 below. #1 is along the lines of a gedanken experiment: how well can someone produce (fill in the blank with the name of some physical item) now, compared to a hundred years ago? The problem with that experiment is that it's hard to do in practice (which is what matters). This is especially difficult if you consider that Daniel's gedanken experiment might be saying that nowadays we are much more able to contribute to global warming than we used to be. That is, external costs benefits are crucial even if we think about physical productivity. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine -Original Message- From: Davies, Daniel [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 7:35 AM To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' Subject: [PEN-L:23342] RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77 This does seem like an interesting fundamental disagreement on the meaning of the productive forces. We've basically got two views here: 1) Charles' and mine, that production is a physical process. As Charles said, one measure of the productive forces which allows the term to be given sense independently of any assumptions about social relations would simply be the physical concept of work (roughly speaking, the ability to transfer energy). You could envision a theory in which state of development of the productive forces was measured by the highest temperature to which one million randomly selected members of the human race, socially organised in any which way, could raise a metric tonne of water from 0 degrees Centigrade in one hour; this would obviously be a bit of a strange definition, but it has the advantage of, as far as I can tell, being monotonically increasing in whatever the underlying variable of human development might be. On this view, the invention of fire would be a big step forward for the productive forces, the wheel, inclined plane and lever a few more, electricity another one, and nuclear energy another big one (anything that helps you get energy from one place to another basically). My half-baked ramblings about the complexity of arbitrary physical objects were an attempt to suggest that it's possible to keep the flavour of the energy transfer view of the productive forces, while making it a bit more realistic in terms of matching actual human development. On this view, precision tools would have been a step forward, as would computers, etc. If the development of the productive forces is at the level where the most complex object you can produce is a cell-phone (with complex hopefully to be defined in some objective way along the lines of Shannon's information theory; one measure might be the maximum surface area of an object which could be repeatably produced and placed into a one foot cube.), then an improvement in silicon technology which allows you to produce a *smaller* cell-phone is an increase in the productive forces (because you could also use this increase to produce non-cellphone objects which were previously inaccessible if you wanted to), whereas the use of economies of scale or a more efficient cellphone design which allows you to produce *cheaper* cellphones is not an increase in the productive forces (because it doesn't allow you to change your mind and produce anything you couldn't produce before). I like this view because it allows the questions of technology, organisation of production and consumption to be separated analytically. But I also see the case for: 2) Eric's (and Jim's?) view, that technology, organisation of production and consumption can't be separated in this way, and that because production has to be production of goods that people want, it can't be measured outside the context of a particular social organisation. I think (would be interested in comments) that this might actually go so far as to imply that measurement of the state of the productive forces might only be possible using market prices, along the lines of Kuznets' GDP concept. This emphasises the idea that the value of an arbitrary physical object is determined socially. So it all seems to come down to the question of whether the productive forces are to be understood as the forces producing value or the forces producing things. I don't know enough about Marx to be sure about this one, but I think Cohen's version of historical materialism is based on something like 1) above. dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should
Re: RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
Marx's idea of social forces may be grounded more in common sense than in some deep theory. One other factors that I see in his understanding of the transition to socialism runs as follows: people will see the tremendous social forces (capabilities or potential) of capitalist production alongside the actual performance, leading to great dissatisfaction and a readiness to make a change. I remain very skeptical of any attempt to give precise numerical calculations for any part of Marx's theory. Marx does use rough, back of the envelope, calculations from time to time. They seem appropriate. Recasting Marx in algebraic, mathematical, or precise numerical form, seems a bit foreign to his overall project, which his understanding the nature of capitalist society and the weaknesses that will lead to the creation of a socialist state. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
Hari wrote, In some instances, say the discovery of iron and its smelting and malaeabilty etc- this may be a single discovery that itself spawns a whole set of subsequent developments Is that not the overall intent of Mar Engels in this views on what came to be known as historical materialism? Certainly a number of critical technological innovations can be identified in recent centuries But I think that this perspective is not part of Marx and Engels' view of the advance of the forces of produciton I think it has a more recent origin, perhaps with J Schumpeter Historical materialism (of the economistic variety) doesn't require a varying rate of technological progress; it simply requires an advance in the FoP and that at some critical point the advance of the FoP the existing SRP come into contradiction with the FoP But, in any case, I believe that attention in recent years by economic historians has been given to the role of countless thousands of very small innovations each year (rather than focus on the big-deal innovations) as having been key for technological progress in capitalism I tend to go along with this, in part because the big-deal innovations appear randomly and, if Schumpeter is to be believed, due to the efforts of the heroic individual Not much consistent with Marx here But the thousands of small innovations appearing within a capitalist economy are due to the workings of competition and the profit-motive (and the desire to exploit workers more) on any every day basis but capitalists big and small The economic system of capitalism--and not heroic individuals--lead to the relentless technological advance in capitalism (But even the above simplifies the analysis of technological advance in capitalism) Eric
Re: RE: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
dd writes, You could envision a theory in which state of development of the productive forces was measured by the highest temperaturebut it has the advantage of, as far as I can tell, being monotonically increasing in whatever the underlying variable of human development might be AND I like this view because it allows the questions of technology, organisation of production and consumption to be separated analytically I think that the theoretical separation you speak of does not require that we actually quantify the rate at which the FoP are advancing Such distinctions already exist, I think, at the level of theory without recourse to actual quantification of the level and growth rate of the FoP But, say, we did have a non-arbitrary metric for the level and rate of growth of the FoP What would we do with it? What would it tell us (particularly if the measure was built to be monotonically increasing)? Further, if you did measure the FoP by, say, something related to energy--why should be believe that the real FoP--whatever they are--are well-proxied by this energy measure? I think (would be interested in comments) that this might actually go so far as to imply that measurement of the state of the productive forces might only be possible using market prices, along the lines of Kuznets' GDP concept I go along with Michael P and Jim D in believing that one doesn't need to quantify the amount of the FoP in order to find it to be a helpful concept But, in any case, one needed rely on market prices to develop a measure of output and/or the growth of the FoP One could in t=0 _randomly_ select a reasonable number of goods and services, weighting them all by 1 Then one could take some arbitary measure of productivity at t=0 Then, we could seek how in t=1 the aggregate productivity increased That is, we would start with Q11 + Q21 + + Qn1 which is the simple total of the level of productivity in t=1 of the n randomly selected goods and services and this would be compared with the total of Q12 + Q22 + + Qn2 The rate of grow in the measure can be used to determine the rate of growth over the period of time considered Through the wonders of random selection the rate of growth determined by this method should have an expected value of the true rate of rate of the whole economy without reference to prices (particularly important as not all economies use prices) Well, at least I think this above would work Eric
Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
On 2002.03.01 10:54 PM, "Hari Kumar" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A number of comments discuss the fact the the societal values placed upon 'productive forces' varies and thus there is no single barometer of that, as put by Eric here: "Productive forces must produce "what people want." And what people want changes over time and cannot be tracked by "arbitrary physical objects." Eric goes on to say: " If one class becomes convinced that the existing tools, machines, and equipment fail to produce "what they want," then they might come to see that the existing forces of production are insufficient for their needs. And, perhaps, they might act to alter both the forces of production and the social relations of production (recognizing that FoP and SRP codetermine each other)." And someone sue the analogy of cell phones. Am I again being too naive by asking whether to focus on a single commodity like a cell phone misses the more general point - that a technical advance capable of making a cell phone is then automatically linked and plays into a host of related technical advnces- computers/stellites/recordign information/ etc? Does not one particular technical advance - precipitate or move in tandem with - a host of related such techncial forces that - pushes the overall societal 'capability'? I think that the itnerpretation of producitve forces innovation leading to societal relatiosn innovation - is refletion of a nodal point that is not simply related to one single invention/productive advnace - but a cacapity within a society to develop a range of innovations. In some instances, say the discovery of iron and its smelting and malaeabilty etc- this may be a single discovery that itself spawns a whole set of subsequent developments. Is that not the overall intent of Mar Engels in this views on what came to be known as historical materialism? A cell phone can come go. (I wish the desire to have them would go frankly and make the world quieter) but the technology behind it goes one... There are I believe, numeorus examples within the realm of biological history that relate to the leap frog effect of a whole series of scientific advances that in toto- represent a dialectical leap. Hari I'm sure there are logical connections missing in the previous paragraph but the basic idea is okay, I think. It underlines the importance that ideology at least idea shave in determing so-called "material" reality/facts. Eric MIYACHI TATSUO Psychiatric Department KOMAKI MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL JOHBUSHI,1-20 KOMAKI CITY AICHI Pre JAPAN 0568-76-4131 [EMAIL PROTECTED] In capitalist society that anyone can't argue "Productive forces must produce "what people want" Instead, capital produce in its own for profit,not in order to human needs. See huge commodities unnecessary See "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844" "This estrangement manifests itself in part in that the sophistication of needs and of the means (of their satisfaction) on the one side produces a bestial barbarisation, a complete, crude, abstract simplicity of need, on the other; or rather in that it merely reproduces itself in its opposite. Even the need for fresh air ceases to be a need for the worker. Man returns to a cave dwelling, which is now, however, contaminated with the pestilential breath of civilisation, and which he continues to occupy only precariously, it being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him any day $B!=(J a place from which, if he does not pay, he can be thrown out any day. For this mortuary he has to pay. A dwelling in the light, which Prometheus in Aeschylus designated as one of the greatest boons, by means of which he made the savage into a human being, ceases to exist for the worker. Light, air, etc. $B!=(J the simplest animal cleanliness $B!=(J ceases to be a need for man"
Re: Re: Question to Various comments in In Digest 77
MIYACHI TATSUO wrote, In capitalist society that anyone can't argue Productive forces must produce what people want Instead, capital produce in its own for profit,not in order to human needs My point was that productive forces can't be defined except by reference to what people want and need and these wants/needs change over time This is different from claiming that in capitalism production is for need I claimed the former but not that latter Implied is that no objective--ahistorical--measure of the FoP can exist that is meaningful Eric
