Re: Correction
From: Michael Pollak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [See comment at end] http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/01/pageoneplus/corrections.html The New York Times July 1, 2004 Corrections ... As Eric Umansky of Todays Papers points out, this correction fails to mention the tiny bit of context that his purported desertion was what that article was about -- the only thing it was about. They should create a new section entitled "Retractions." Michael Yes, and the NYT needs another new section called "Recalls." E.g., both the paper's Thomas L. Friedman and, it would seem, Judith Miller have been pulled out of production for retooling. Carl _ MSN Movies - Trailers, showtimes, DVD's, and the latest news from Hollywood! http://movies.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200509ave/direct/01/
Re: Correction
Maybe they could save space by having a small section of the paper reprinting the material that did not need to be retracted. On Thu, Jul 01, 2004 at 12:54:46PM -0400, Michael Pollak wrote: > > They should create a new section entitled "Retractions." > > Michael -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
Re: correction
I should have written "might not decades of support for imperialism . . by organized labor..." Michael Yates - Original Message - From: MICHAEL YATES To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, April 11, 2004 2:55 PM Subject: Re: [PEN-L] Third World Resistance and Western Intellectual Solidarity I think that millions of working people in the US are deeply troubled about the war in Iraq. But they lack any kind of progressive mindset to give this unease meaning and to guide them to action. Might note decades of support for imperialism (and its attendant racism and belief in the superiority and goodness of the US) have a lot to do with this. I wish that Petras as well as those who criticize him would begin the engage workers. Labor education is a good place to start. Michael Yates - Original Message - From: Doug Henwood To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, April 11, 2004 2:39 PM Subject: Re: [PEN-L] Third World Resistance and Western Intellectual Solidarity Sabri Oncu wrote:>Max:>>> This sort of drivel reminds me why the U.S. left>> is so insulated from political power. mbs>>As an outsider who has the chance to observe from>within, I don't think this is the reason.>>The American left doesn't have anything to offer to>the American people, most of whom are working-class.Are you two necessarily contradicting each other? Pieces like Petras'don't resonate at all with the U.S. working class, whether we like itor not. Neither do sermons about overconsumption. But I don't know ifthe leftists who say these sorts of things really care about theirlack of an audience.Doug
Re: Correction
I wrote: But this story has another implication. As I have said previously, the perfect crime is "the crime which is not a crime" since then it considered a crime, and can be prosecuted legally as such. That should obviously be: But this story has another implication. As I have said previously, the perfect crime is "the crime which is not a crime" since then it cannot be considered a crime, and cannot be prosecuted legally as such. Jurriaan As an old saying goes: "The problem is not that the rich break the law; the problem is that they need not break the law as they are the ones who make, write and judge it." Jim C
Re: Correction and the "others" on unequal exchange.
My apologies, it slipped my mind. I cannot remember everything. Yes, I agree Samir Amin's writing are also very important. He is really one of the few people considering unequal exchange theoretically and empirically in recent years. J. - Original Message - From: "E. Ahmet Tonak" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2003 8:33 PM Subject: [PEN-L] Correction and the "others" on unequal exchange. > The following reference in Jurriaan's message on unequal exchange does > not exist. The only article Anwar wrote for that book was the one on > transformation problem. However, the revised version of the Science and > Society articles on international trade and unequal exchange was later > published in an edited book by E. Nell, Growth, Profits and Property : > Essays in the Revival of Political Economy. Being from the "East," I > would also recommend Samir Amin's and many Indian Marxists' writings on > unequal exchange. > > Anwar Shaikh, ""The theory of international exchange", article in Jesse > Schwartz, "The Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism" > > Ahmet Tonak > > Jurriaan Bendien wrote: > > > I wrote: > > > > "In the meantime, wise men which consult about how to continue the system of > > exploitation for the long haul." > > > > It should be: > > > > "In the meantime, wise men will consult about how to continue the system of > > exploitation for the long haul." > > > > J. > > > > > > >
Re: Correction
In a message dated 12/14/03 7:25:48 PM Pacific Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: >The Fidel Castro article I referred to was actually by Fernando Morais, in Penthouse, December 1978 issue (a collector's item these days). Tad Szulc wrote mainly on American subversion of foreign governments as I recall, although he later also published a biography of Castro.< Comment Somewhere in the twisted corners of my mind are several articles by Tad Szulc on oil and the politics of oil from the mid and late 1970s. What every happened to this guy? I think his material ran in Penthouse or perhaps Playboy. Melvin P. Melvin P.
Re: Correction
Castro has a great sense of humor and gives great interviews. In one of the interviews you mention, he is asked whether there could be a socialist revolution in the U.S. He denies the possibility citing the undermining power of advertising on Americans' ability to desire something (for example, social revolution) and pursue unswervingly. "How can they?" I remember him asking, "When they are being told every five minutes that they want something else, and something else..." Joanna Jurriaan Bendien wrote: The Fidel Castro article I referred to was actually by Fernando Morais, in Penthouse, December 1978 issue (a collector's item these days). Tad Szulc wrote mainly on American subversion of foreign governments as I recall, although he later also published a biography of Castro. Oui magazine also featured an interview with Castro in January 1975. Playboy published an interview with Castro by Lee Lockwood (pseud.) in January 1967 and again in August 1985. Here's an excerpt from the 1985 interview: PLAYBOY: Let's end on a note of imagination. Here is something truly wonderful from your point of view: Suppose the U.S. canceled Latin America's foreign debt, as you propose, and offered substantial aid to boot - in other words, offered to treat the hemisphere with the fairness you think it deserves. What would you do then? Reassess your views? CASTRO: If the United States were to spontaneously do what you say - if such an inherently selfish, neocolonialist system were capable of that generosity - a real miracle would have taken place, and I would have to start meditating on that phenomenon. I might even have to consult some theologians and revise some of my opinions in that field. If that were to happen, I might even enter a monastery. :-) Jurriaan
Re: Correction, Re: Re:Anti-globalizationactivists...
Where it reads in my posting, (from 100 billion computing communications now to 10 trillion in 2012) 100 billion ought to be 800 billion.
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
> From: Thomas Kruse <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >In general I see a tendency to let capitalism's > >moral crimes and despoilation of the environment > >obscure the advances it brought in terms of > >productive capacity. The latter doesn't justify > >the former, but the former does not negate the > >latter either. > > > >MBS > TK: > OK, yes. But why the fetishization of "productive capacity". Here, the Well, obviously the distribution of economic well-being--the ends you refer to--is not capitalism's long suit. It's simply a matter of noting the limits but also the extent of accomplishment. > means seem much more important than the ends. Means: capactity; ends: > humans, qulaity of life, etc. (sorry for the lapse into moral philosophy). Sure. > But, one must not assume (you weren't, I suppose) that: > > - in all places in the colonies/neocolonies such "advances" were actually > occuring > - or if they were occuring they were doing ANYTHING positive for anyone > ouside of the enclaves, or even within the enclave in certain instances > - even as they did occur, they weren't bringing with them horrendous > externatilities for "the rest", that is those not "advanced" or benefitted; > in the hinterlands of the enclaves. Example: when the hinterlands > (containing ayllus, etc.) for colonial mines were reorganized to supply the > mines, the people often saw a fall in food security. I don't disagree with any of this. Without claiming any expertise, I would venture the suggestion that the diversity of outcomes in all of the terms you raise cut against a theory that capitalism uniformly loots colonial areas to make possible its survival, as per baby Marxism/Leninism. > Negate the latter (advances) no; but what the latter were good for in the > short or long run is open to question. Nor with this, though I lean to the skeptical on the 'sustainability' critique. Incidentally, I enjoyed your travelogue a great deal. MBS === Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute [EMAIL PROTECTED] 1660 L Street, NW 202-775-8810 (voice) Ste. 1200 202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC 20036 http://tap.epn.org/sawicky Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views of anyone associated with the Economic Policy Institute other than this writer. ===
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
>In general I see a tendency to let capitalism's >moral crimes and despoilation of the environment >obscure the advances it brought in terms of >productive capacity. The latter doesn't justify >the former, but the former does not negate the >latter either. > >Cheers, > >MBS OK, yes. But why the fetishization of "productive capacity". Here, the means seem much more important than the ends. Means: capactity; ends: humans, qulaity of life, etc. (sorry for the lapse into moral philosophy). But, one must not assume (you weren't, I suppose) that: - in all places in the colonies/neocolonies such "advances" were actually occuring - or if they were occuring they were doing ANYTHING positive for anyone ouside of the enclaves, or even within the enclave in certain instances - even as they did occur, they weren't bringing with them horrendous externatilities for "the rest", that is those not "advanced" or benefitted; in the hinterlands of the enclaves. Example: when the hinterlands (containing ayllus, etc.) for colonial mines were reorganized to supply the mines, the people often saw a fall in food security. Negate the latter (advances) no; but what the latter were good for in the short or long run is open to question. Tom - Tom Kruse / Casilla 5812 / Cochabamba, Bolivia Tel/Fax: (591-42) 48242 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
Bill, After I responded I realized I may have misunderstood what you and LP said. I agree the colonizer's gain could be more than offset by the victimized country's economic losses, so that we could say in net terms capitalist colonization did not contribute to the world's productive capacity. It could be true at the same time, however, that colonization contributed little to development in the colonizing nations themselves, owing to the small contribution to GNP RD cited. It seems possible on this account that industrialization could have proceeded without imperialism, or that imperialism cannot be explained without recourse to additional factors, some probably not narrowly economic. > Sure, but if you only measure the GNP returns of trade, you are > missing the big negative on the other side of the balance sheet. If > you wipe out an entire continent and only increase your GNP in nominal > terms by 2% measured by trade with exploited countries, you have not > addressed what you may have done to their capacity to compete with you > in the future. For example, I believe the Bengal region of India was > highly productive both in agriculture and in textiles, before the > British arrived. They wiped it out, and protected their textiles > and agriculture thereby. MBS == Max B. Sawicky Economic Policy Institute [EMAIL PROTECTED] Suite 1200 202-775-8810 (voice) 1660 L Street, NW 202-775-0819 (fax) Washington, DC 20036 Opinions here do not necessarily represent the views of anyone associated with the Economic Policy Institute. ===
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
> >Exploitation or theft have nothing to do with the > >extent to which colonization fueled capitalist > >development. What matters are returns in > >excess of cost. Even thievery is not possible > >without costs to the perpetrator. ... > > Sure, but if you only measure the GNP returns of trade, you are > missing the big negative on the other side of the balance sheet. If > you wipe out an entire continent and only increase your GNP in nominal > terms by 2% measured by trade with exploited countries, you have not > addressed what you may have done to their capacity to compete with you > in the future. For example, I believe the Bengal region of India was > highly productive both in agriculture and in textiles, before the > British arrived. They wiped it out, and protected their textiles > and agriculture thereby. I agree that returns to business firms' capital discount the social or environmental effects that you allude to, but the private returns are the only thing that could directly contribute to expansion in the colonizer nation. Even that is exaggerated for just the reason you cite -- the colonizer in some sense degrades productive opportunities in the future. So I still think RD's note on the low contribution of colonization to GDP in the colonizer's country is pertinent. In general I see a tendency to let capitalism's moral crimes and despoilation of the environment obscure the advances it brought in terms of productive capacity. The latter doesn't justify the former, but the former does not negate the latter either. Cheers, MBS == Max B. Sawicky Economic Policy Institute [EMAIL PROTECTED] Suite 1200 202-775-8810 (voice) 1660 L Street, NW 202-775-0819 (fax) Washington, DC 20036 Opinions here do not necessarily represent the views of anyone associated with the Economic Policy Institute. ===
Re: correction-China
It should be noted that although he technically conquered Tibet, Emperor Qianlong allowed local autonomy and left the theocracy of the Dalai Lamas in place. He also conquered Xinjiang, a conquest that would hold except for a brief period in the 20th century. Thus his expansionism was into Central Asia. He had no interest in foreign "barbarians" coming across the ocean. Barkley Rosser Barkley Rosser On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 18:08:23 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > A proviso on my China commentary (foreseeing a possible > response): > Generally early dynastic expansionism and outwardness > was focused on relatively nearby neighbors, perhaps due to > these neighbors more likely willing to acknowledge China's > self-declared position as the "Middle Kingdom". Anyway, > under the Qing's Qianlong, this extended for example to the > conquest of Tibet. But he did not want trade with the much > futher away British. When George III sent an emissary > offering goods in 1793 he famously remarked, "Our celestial > empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks > no product within its own borders. There is no need to > import the manufactures of outside barbarians." > My my. In any case, in contrast to earlier dynasties > there was an opening in the late Qing, but it was forced by > externally imposed imperialism. > Barkley Rosser > On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 17:11:26 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) > "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > As regards China, a long historical pattern there, > > drawing heavily on internal conditions but affecting its > > external relations, was the pattern of the dynastic cycle, > > tied in turn to the management of the agro-hydraulic > > infrastructure. > > Typical dynasties, at least quite a few of them, > > including the relevant Ming, lasted about 300 years. > > During their early phases they tended to be > > economically/politically/militarily dynamic, building up > > infrastructure (thus increasing agricultural production), > > and opening up to outside trade and expanding outwards > > sometimes. As the dynasty proceeds, it becomes corrupt, > > inward-looking, careless of the infrastructure. In some > > dynasties this shift coincided with an external defeat as > > with the Tang. In others it came with the death of a > > particularly vigorous emperor, as in the Qing with the > > death of Qianlong in the 1790s. With the Ming it was more > > nebulous, but the maximum point of outwardness came in the > > 1400s with this extension of trade to the East African > > coast. Frank can blame all this on the "world economy" all > > he wants, but China was and is a vast world unto itself, > > even in its period of foreign domination and humiliation > > during the late 19th and early to middle 20th century. > > Barkley Rosser > > On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 16:29:21 -0400 Ricardo Duchesne > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > Date sent: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 10:19:58 -0500 > > > > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > From: Louis Proyect <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > Subject: > > > > > > Proyect: > > > > > > > Hi, PJM0930. Do you know my friend QZX1288? > > > > > This raises an interesting question which the world-systems theorists have > > > > grappled with. That is the question of whether the European model of > > > > development was something that all societies are destined to follow as long > > > > as there is no outside interference. If Europe had not subjugated Latin > > > > America, Africa and Asia, would they have become world powers themselves? > > > > The Chinese had an enormous fleet of ocean-crossing ships in 1400. The > > > > largest ship could contain Columbus's entire fleet. The Chinese sailed to > > > > East Africa and had extensive trade in places like Dar Al-Salaam for some > > > > decades. Then the Emperor decided to call it quits. How unlike the > > > > gold-hungry Europeans! > > > > > > > > > > > > > Very interesting questions indeed. Europe dominated > > > the rest because it HAD became the major power. But China and Japan, > > > forget Africa and the Americas, were real condenders. > > > About China's fleet we have to study its technology, and also why > > > the Chinese ruling class was fearful of maritime expansion. > > > Answering this would bring us to the contrasting political and > > > geopolitical situation of these two civilizations. I hope to pick > > > these points when I read Frank's summaries. > > > > > > ricardo > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Marx argued that the > > > Asiatic Mode of Production was static, hence > > > > capitalism could not develop internally. Frank argues against this, and I > > > > will post his second installment today. But what of the hunter-gatherers? > > > > What are the interna
Re: correction-China
A proviso on my China commentary (foreseeing a possible response): Generally early dynastic expansionism and outwardness was focused on relatively nearby neighbors, perhaps due to these neighbors more likely willing to acknowledge China's self-declared position as the "Middle Kingdom". Anyway, under the Qing's Qianlong, this extended for example to the conquest of Tibet. But he did not want trade with the much futher away British. When George III sent an emissary offering goods in 1793 he famously remarked, "Our celestial empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There is no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians." My my. In any case, in contrast to earlier dynasties there was an opening in the late Qing, but it was forced by externally imposed imperialism. Barkley Rosser On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 17:11:26 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > As regards China, a long historical pattern there, > drawing heavily on internal conditions but affecting its > external relations, was the pattern of the dynastic cycle, > tied in turn to the management of the agro-hydraulic > infrastructure. > Typical dynasties, at least quite a few of them, > including the relevant Ming, lasted about 300 years. > During their early phases they tended to be > economically/politically/militarily dynamic, building up > infrastructure (thus increasing agricultural production), > and opening up to outside trade and expanding outwards > sometimes. As the dynasty proceeds, it becomes corrupt, > inward-looking, careless of the infrastructure. In some > dynasties this shift coincided with an external defeat as > with the Tang. In others it came with the death of a > particularly vigorous emperor, as in the Qing with the > death of Qianlong in the 1790s. With the Ming it was more > nebulous, but the maximum point of outwardness came in the > 1400s with this extension of trade to the East African > coast. Frank can blame all this on the "world economy" all > he wants, but China was and is a vast world unto itself, > even in its period of foreign domination and humiliation > during the late 19th and early to middle 20th century. > Barkley Rosser > On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 16:29:21 -0400 Ricardo Duchesne > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Date sent: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 10:19:58 -0500 > > > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > From: Louis Proyect <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Subject: > > > > Proyect: > > > > > Hi, PJM0930. Do you know my friend QZX1288? > > > > This raises an interesting question which the world-systems theorists have > > > grappled with. That is the question of whether the European model of > > > development was something that all societies are destined to follow as long > > > as there is no outside interference. If Europe had not subjugated Latin > > > America, Africa and Asia, would they have become world powers themselves? > > > The Chinese had an enormous fleet of ocean-crossing ships in 1400. The > > > largest ship could contain Columbus's entire fleet. The Chinese sailed to > > > East Africa and had extensive trade in places like Dar Al-Salaam for some > > > decades. Then the Emperor decided to call it quits. How unlike the > > > gold-hungry Europeans! > > > > > > > > > Very interesting questions indeed. Europe dominated > > the rest because it HAD became the major power. But China and Japan, > > forget Africa and the Americas, were real condenders. > > About China's fleet we have to study its technology, and also why > > the Chinese ruling class was fearful of maritime expansion. > > Answering this would bring us to the contrasting political and > > geopolitical situation of these two civilizations. I hope to pick > > these points when I read Frank's summaries. > > > > ricardo > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Marx argued that the > > Asiatic Mode of Production was static, hence > > > capitalism could not develop internally. Frank argues against this, and I > > > will post his second installment today. But what of the hunter-gatherers? > > > What are the internal economic forces that would spur them in the direction > > > of feudalism or capitalism? I am afraid that Engel's "Origins of the > > > Family" has caused us to adopt a very schematic understanding of social > > > development as being something like the 4 years of a college education. > > > Barbarism, Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. When you graduate from > > > socialism, you get a BA and are allowed to enter Communism. > > > > > > Louis Proyect > > > > > > > > -- > Rosser Jr, John Barkley > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: correction
Well as a matter of fact in my article I cited some examples from very technologically advanced societies that have retained "traditional feudal property arrangements" that successfully operate in the manner so described. One of the most famous are the Alpine grazing commons in Switzerland, technically owned by towns (eeek! local socialism!) in a framework dating from the 1200s. The towns regulate access, including allowing hikers to go through freely. For a variety of reasons the management system has continued to function without overexploitation happening. Elinor Ostrom, among others, has studied a variety of such "common property management systems" in technologically advanced societies, although the original model could be said to be such arrangements in "primitive" societies. BTW, I would remind folks that Marx himself initially got into analyzing capitalism by analyzing the changes in property law that were going on as capitalism was replacing feudalism in Germany, if I (and he) am not being too "Eurocentric" to bring this up (not to mention my Swiss and Icelandic in another post examples). Barkley Rosser On Wed, 28 Jan 1998 12:11:08 + "Max B. Sawicky" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > From: "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Barkley, > > Who's to say that traditional societies were more > 'ecologically conscious' only because they did not > have available to them more advanced technologies > which would have provided greater benefits from > exploiting natural resources more intensively, either > in an autarchical sense or in the sense of military > technology facilitating the formation of 'empires' > (including subjugation of neighboring ethnic groups) > that came to be associated with (cause?) similar > exploitation? Or that improvement in living standards > leading to population growth would not have generated > similar pressures to 'cash out' natural capital? > > That is not to say that such societies did not possess > discoveries which have since been lost, nor of course > to justify their casual, brutal extermination by capitalist > forces, but to say I think we're on a heavy romantic > trip here. > > Cheers, > > MBS > > > In my latest post I referred to a paper by myself as > > being in the May 1975 issue of _Land Economics_. That was > > the May 1995 issue. Among other things I noted the large > > literature showing that many traditional societies handled > > problems of managing common property resources very well in > > contrast to the standard right-wing arguments about the > > "tragedy of the commons". This point has actually been > > known since the 1975 article in _Natural Resources Journal_ > > by Richard Bishop and S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup. There is now a > > burgeoning literature on this by people like Daniel > > Bromley and others, many of them noting that colonialism > > and European capitalism broke down these arrangements. In > > many cases nationalization by post-colonial regimes did not > > improve matters and only led to continued overexploitation > > with control in the hands of corrupt urban elites. > > > > === > Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute > [EMAIL PROTECTED] 1660 L Street, NW > 202-775-8810 (voice) Ste. 1200 > 202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC 20036 > http://tap.epn.org/sawicky > > Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views > of anyone associated with the Economic Policy > Institute other than this writer. > === -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank<3.0.1.32.19980129153636.0099a9e4@pop.cc.columbia.edu>
On Thu, January 29, 1998 at 16:10:12 (+) Max B. Sawicky writes: >> Ricardo Duchesne: >> >> >Oviously the >> >notion that European capitalism developed as a result of the >> >exploitation of the Third World has been so roundly refuted I need >> >not elaborate this here. Just a handy, if incomplete, stats: At >> >most 2% of Europe's GNP at the end of 18th century took the form of >> >profits derived from commerce with Americas, Asia, Africa! (I think >> >source is K.O'Brien). > >LP replied: > >> Isn't slavery exploitation? Isn't theft of gold and silver from the veins >> of Latin America exploitation? Are you using "exploitation" in the narrow >> sense of Marxist value theory? That would be very naughty of you, if not >> even perverse. > >Exploitation or theft have nothing to do with the >extent to which colonization fueled capitalist >development. What matters are returns in >excess of cost. Even thievery is not possible >without costs to the perpetrator. ... Sure, but if you only measure the GNP returns of trade, you are missing the big negative on the other side of the balance sheet. If you wipe out an entire continent and only increase your GNP in nominal terms by 2% measured by trade with exploited countries, you have not addressed what you may have done to their capacity to compete with you in the future. For example, I believe the Bengal region of India was highly productive both in agriculture and in textiles, before the British arrived. They wiped it out, and protected their textiles and agriculture thereby. This sort of thing doesn't show up in trade flow measurements with India, needless to say. Bill
Re: correction-China
As regards China, a long historical pattern there, drawing heavily on internal conditions but affecting its external relations, was the pattern of the dynastic cycle, tied in turn to the management of the agro-hydraulic infrastructure. Typical dynasties, at least quite a few of them, including the relevant Ming, lasted about 300 years. During their early phases they tended to be economically/politically/militarily dynamic, building up infrastructure (thus increasing agricultural production), and opening up to outside trade and expanding outwards sometimes. As the dynasty proceeds, it becomes corrupt, inward-looking, careless of the infrastructure. In some dynasties this shift coincided with an external defeat as with the Tang. In others it came with the death of a particularly vigorous emperor, as in the Qing with the death of Qianlong in the 1790s. With the Ming it was more nebulous, but the maximum point of outwardness came in the 1400s with this extension of trade to the East African coast. Frank can blame all this on the "world economy" all he wants, but China was and is a vast world unto itself, even in its period of foreign domination and humiliation during the late 19th and early to middle 20th century. Barkley Rosser On Thu, 29 Jan 1998 16:29:21 -0400 Ricardo Duchesne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Date sent: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 10:19:58 -0500 > > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > From: Louis Proyect <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: > > Proyect: > > > Hi, PJM0930. Do you know my friend QZX1288? > > > This raises an interesting question which the world-systems theorists have > > grappled with. That is the question of whether the European model of > > development was something that all societies are destined to follow as long > > as there is no outside interference. If Europe had not subjugated Latin > > America, Africa and Asia, would they have become world powers themselves? > > The Chinese had an enormous fleet of ocean-crossing ships in 1400. The > > largest ship could contain Columbus's entire fleet. The Chinese sailed to > > East Africa and had extensive trade in places like Dar Al-Salaam for some > > decades. Then the Emperor decided to call it quits. How unlike the > > gold-hungry Europeans! > > > > > Very interesting questions indeed. Europe dominated > the rest because it HAD became the major power. But China and Japan, > forget Africa and the Americas, were real condenders. > About China's fleet we have to study its technology, and also why > the Chinese ruling class was fearful of maritime expansion. > Answering this would bring us to the contrasting political and > geopolitical situation of these two civilizations. I hope to pick > these points when I read Frank's summaries. > > ricardo > > > > > > > > > > Marx argued that the > Asiatic Mode of Production was static, hence > > capitalism could not develop internally. Frank argues against this, and I > > will post his second installment today. But what of the hunter-gatherers? > > What are the internal economic forces that would spur them in the direction > > of feudalism or capitalism? I am afraid that Engel's "Origins of the > > Family" has caused us to adopt a very schematic understanding of social > > development as being something like the 4 years of a college education. > > Barbarism, Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. When you graduate from > > socialism, you get a BA and are allowed to enter Communism. > > > > Louis Proyect > > > > -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: correction-China
> Date sent: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 10:19:58 -0500 > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: Louis Proyect <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Proyect: > Hi, PJM0930. Do you know my friend QZX1288? > > This raises an interesting question which the world-systems theorists have > grappled with. That is the question of whether the European model of > development was something that all societies are destined to follow as long > as there is no outside interference. If Europe had not subjugated Latin > America, Africa and Asia, would they have become world powers themselves? > The Chinese had an enormous fleet of ocean-crossing ships in 1400. The > largest ship could contain Columbus's entire fleet. The Chinese sailed to > East Africa and had extensive trade in places like Dar Al-Salaam for some > decades. Then the Emperor decided to call it quits. How unlike the > gold-hungry Europeans! > Very interesting questions indeed. Europe dominated the rest because it HAD became the major power. But China and Japan, forget Africa and the Americas, were real condenders. About China's fleet we have to study its technology, and also why the Chinese ruling class was fearful of maritime expansion. Answering this would bring us to the contrasting political and geopolitical situation of these two civilizations. I hope to pick these points when I read Frank's summaries. ricardo > Marx argued that the Asiatic Mode of Production was static, hence > capitalism could not develop internally. Frank argues against this, and I > will post his second installment today. But what of the hunter-gatherers? > What are the internal economic forces that would spur them in the direction > of feudalism or capitalism? I am afraid that Engel's "Origins of the > Family" has caused us to adopt a very schematic understanding of social > development as being something like the 4 years of a college education. > Barbarism, Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. When you graduate from > socialism, you get a BA and are allowed to enter Communism. > > Louis Proyect > >
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
> Date sent: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 13:01:13 -0600 (CST) > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: "William S. Lear" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject:Re: correction > On Thu, January 29, 1998 at 07:23:19 (EST) PJM0930 writes: > What this suggests for the Native > >Americans is that, given the fact they produced a number of > >agricultural civilizations, is that they were on the same trajectory > >as the rest of humanity but, for whatever reason, had a later start at > >it. > Numerous hunting and gathering societies over the world adopted agriculture beginning about 10,000 years ago. Only a few, however, became civilizations. Much controversy surrounds this issue. Some say 12, 10, 6, or as low as 4 were truly "pristine" civilizations. I think we can include in this list the Olmec (if not the Maya later) and the pre-Inca Mochica civilization (if not the Incas later) although these civilization lacked certain properties associated with this term. Many "secondary" civilizations evolved later, of which only Western Europe became capitalist-industrial. This is a contentious issue which brings me to Blaut and Frank: > Jim Blaut's book *The Colonizer's Model of the World* argues that > there is "psychic unity" among human cultures, i.e., there are no > "races" of "inferior" or "superior" people, and that humans everywhere > have more or less the same basic capacities (if I remember him > correctly, it's been quite a few years). This entirely reasonable > observation is different from claiming the various Indian societies > "were on the same trajectory as the rest of humanity". The Colonizer's Model challenges the notion there was something "unique" to the rise of Europe, by arguing that capitalist development was spread around many areas of the world, and that not much else differentiated Europe from the rest. The problem here is with the "much else", and the assumption that capitalism and its rise can be explained in strictly economic-class terms. (I will elaborate upon this point later once I read the summaries of Frank's recent book provided by Proyect). Now consider the dilemma Blaut finds himself: why did Europe came to dominate the rest of the Wrodl? Answer: geographical proximity of Europe to the Americas(!) gave it access to its metals and labor leading to the industrial revolution. Oviously the notion that European capitalism developed as a result of the exploitation of the Third World has been so roundly refuted I need not elaborate this here. Just a handy, if incomplete, stats: At most 2% of Europe's GNP at the end of 18th century took the form of profits derived from commerce with Americas, Asia, Africa! (I think source is K.O'Brien). ricardo > Since I think the shared trajectory part is questionable, I also see > the conclusion as questionable. I also question the claim that states > arose because of some sort of "demographic instability". Furthermore, > I question the "natural trajectory" assumption as well. > > States were not imposed by necessity. They came about by human > choice, a choice made differently by different peoples. The "natural > trajectory" to ecological destruction chosen by many of today's > societies is not inevitable. It is a choice made largely by a handful > of powerful people arrayed into still fewer dominant social > institutions. > > Also, please sign your name on your posts. I dislike discussions with > mailboxes. > > > Bill >
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
> Ricardo Duchesne: > > >Oviously the > >notion that European capitalism developed as a result of the > >exploitation of the Third World has been so roundly refuted I need > >not elaborate this here. Just a handy, if incomplete, stats: At > >most 2% of Europe's GNP at the end of 18th century took the form of > >profits derived from commerce with Americas, Asia, Africa! (I think > >source is K.O'Brien). LP replied: > Isn't slavery exploitation? Isn't theft of gold and silver from the veins > of Latin America exploitation? Are you using "exploitation" in the narrow > sense of Marxist value theory? That would be very naughty of you, if not > even perverse. Exploitation or theft have nothing to do with the extent to which colonization fueled capitalist development. What matters are returns in excess of cost. Even thievery is not possible without costs to the perpetrator. I could exploit you or steal from you and still earn meager returns. If exploitation guaranteed profit, low-wage firms would never go bankrupt, but of course they do all the time. I have to say that after one of your arrivals here you would excoriate others for substituting citations for arguments. At the time I thought this was well- taken, up to a point, but now we seem to have an accelerating ratio of footnotes to discussion which tends to narrow participation in the discussion. MBS === Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute [EMAIL PROTECTED] 1660 L Street, NW 202-775-8810 (voice) Ste. 1200 202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC 20036 http://tap.epn.org/sawicky Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views of anyone associated with the Economic Policy Institute other than this writer. ===
Re: correction-Blaut-A.G.Frank
Ricardo Duchesne: >Oviously the >notion that European capitalism developed as a result of the >exploitation of the Third World has been so roundly refuted I need >not elaborate this here. Just a handy, if incomplete, stats: At >most 2% of Europe's GNP at the end of 18th century took the form of >profits derived from commerce with Americas, Asia, Africa! (I think >source is K.O'Brien). > Isn't slavery exploitation? Isn't theft of gold and silver from the veins of Latin America exploitation? Are you using "exploitation" in the narrow sense of Marxist value theory? That would be very naughty of you, if not even perverse. Louis Proyect
Re: correction
On Thu, January 29, 1998 at 07:23:19 (EST) PJM0930 writes: >The more relevant question with concern to the environment and >hunter/gatherer societies (including native americans) is whether >their way of life is really ecologically stable. In other words, >there is the idea that the rise to agriculture is inevitable (but not >because of self-organizing complexity) but because human poplulations >over the life span of the species have proved to demographically >unstable and that agriculture and state structures arise hand in hand >as a result of the crisis. What this suggests for the Native >Americans is that, given the fact they produced a number of >agricultural civilizations, is that they were on the same trajectory >as the rest of humanity but, for whatever reason, had a later start at >it. Jim Blaut's book *The Colonizer's Model of the World* argues that there is "psychic unity" among human cultures, i.e., there are no "races" of "inferior" or "superior" people, and that humans everywhere have more or less the same basic capacities (if I remember him correctly, it's been quite a few years). This entirely reasonable observation is different from claiming the various Indian societies "were on the same trajectory as the rest of humanity". Since I think the shared trajectory part is questionable, I also see the conclusion as questionable. I also question the claim that states arose because of some sort of "demographic instability". Furthermore, I question the "natural trajectory" assumption as well. States were not imposed by necessity. They came about by human choice, a choice made differently by different peoples. The "natural trajectory" to ecological destruction chosen by many of today's societies is not inevitable. It is a choice made largely by a handful of powerful people arrayed into still fewer dominant social institutions. Also, please sign your name on your posts. I dislike discussions with mailboxes. Bill
Re: correction
PJM0930 wrote: >The more relevant question with concern to the environment and hunter/gatherer >societies (including native americans) is whether their way of life is really >ecologically stable. In other words, there is the idea that the rise to >agriculture is >inevitable (but not because of self-organizing complexity) but because human >poplulations over the life span of the species have proved to demographically >unstable and that agriculture and state structures arise hand in hand as a >result >of the crisis. What this suggests for the Native Americans is that, given >the fact they produced a number of agricultural civilizations, is that they >were on the same trajectory as the rest of humanity but, for whatever reason, >had a later start at it. > > Hi, PJM0930. Do you know my friend QZX1288? This raises an interesting question which the world-systems theorists have grappled with. That is the question of whether the European model of development was something that all societies are destined to follow as long as there is no outside interference. If Europe had not subjugated Latin America, Africa and Asia, would they have become world powers themselves? The Chinese had an enormous fleet of ocean-crossing ships in 1400. The largest ship could contain Columbus's entire fleet. The Chinese sailed to East Africa and had extensive trade in places like Dar Al-Salaam for some decades. Then the Emperor decided to call it quits. How unlike the gold-hungry Europeans! Marx argued that the Asiatic Mode of Production was static, hence capitalism could not develop internally. Frank argues against this, and I will post his second installment today. But what of the hunter-gatherers? What are the internal economic forces that would spur them in the direction of feudalism or capitalism? I am afraid that Engel's "Origins of the Family" has caused us to adopt a very schematic understanding of social development as being something like the 4 years of a college education. Barbarism, Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. When you graduate from socialism, you get a BA and are allowed to enter Communism. Louis Proyect
Re: correction
The more relevant question with concern to the environment and hunter/gatherer societies (including native americans) is whether their way of life is really ecologically stable. In other words, there is the idea that the rise to agriculture is inevitable (but not because of self-organizing complexity) but because human poplulations over the life span of the species have proved to demographically unstable and that agriculture and state structures arise hand in hand as a result of the crisis. What this suggests for the Native Americans is that, given the fact they produced a number of agricultural civilizations, is that they were on the same trajectory as the rest of humanity but, for whatever reason, had a later start at it.
Re: correction
> From: "Rosser Jr, John Barkley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Barkley, Who's to say that traditional societies were more 'ecologically conscious' only because they did not have available to them more advanced technologies which would have provided greater benefits from exploiting natural resources more intensively, either in an autarchical sense or in the sense of military technology facilitating the formation of 'empires' (including subjugation of neighboring ethnic groups) that came to be associated with (cause?) similar exploitation? Or that improvement in living standards leading to population growth would not have generated similar pressures to 'cash out' natural capital? That is not to say that such societies did not possess discoveries which have since been lost, nor of course to justify their casual, brutal extermination by capitalist forces, but to say I think we're on a heavy romantic trip here. Cheers, MBS > In my latest post I referred to a paper by myself as > being in the May 1975 issue of _Land Economics_. That was > the May 1995 issue. Among other things I noted the large > literature showing that many traditional societies handled > problems of managing common property resources very well in > contrast to the standard right-wing arguments about the > "tragedy of the commons". This point has actually been > known since the 1975 article in _Natural Resources Journal_ > by Richard Bishop and S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup. There is now a > burgeoning literature on this by people like Daniel > Bromley and others, many of them noting that colonialism > and European capitalism broke down these arrangements. In > many cases nationalization by post-colonial regimes did not > improve matters and only led to continued overexploitation > with control in the hands of corrupt urban elites. === Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute [EMAIL PROTECTED] 1660 L Street, NW 202-775-8810 (voice) Ste. 1200 202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC 20036 http://tap.epn.org/sawicky Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views of anyone associated with the Economic Policy Institute other than this writer. ===
[PEN-L:9215] Re: correction
>Why is Yugoslavia any different? It represents a perversion >>of the socialist idea. "Self-interest" was one of the guiding principles of >>the original project, a dubious one in light of the original Marxist vision >>of "from each according to their needs, to each according to their ability." >> > >This of course should be "from each according to their ability, to each >according to their need". Sorry to be picky; actually, the above is grammatically incorrect (relating "each" and "their"). No possessive pronoun is necessary; it should be: "From each according to ability; to each according to need." Blair Sandler [EMAIL PROTECTED] "It is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone, particularly in economics" -- J. M. Keynes, the Preface to the GENERAL THEORY
[PEN-L:5015] Re: correction
Gary becker may or may not have used his wife's suicide as an inspiration for yet another path breaking article. But what I find more enlightening is the fact that his wife committed suicide right after the publication of his article on the economics of marriage. I suspect she could not handle his cold-blooded description of how he picked her. As Tina Turner asked, "what's love got to do with it." Doug Orr [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5012] Re: Correction
Jim D writes > BTW, I checked my department's EconLit cd-rom and Gary Becker's > article on the economics of suicide never got published (at least > not after 1980). I guess that says something good about the > journals. On the contrary, the journals were so steeped in neoclassical ideology that Becker's result was considered trivial. If your expected net discounted future utility goes negative, _of course_ you commit suicide. Terry McDonough
[PEN-L:5011] re: Correction
While it was true that there was one utility function, daddy's, there was one utility function because daddy was the altruist and it was in everyone's interest to maximize daddy's utility. So, while the 'rotten wife' and 'rotten kids' might want to maximize their own utility to the detriment of the altruist (daddy), they were prevented from doing so because they got more out of the altruist if they made him happy. Believe me, almost my complete qualifying exam for my phd was on gary becker's household utility model. I could derive the equations in my sleep (nightmares). maggie coleman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5007] re: Correction
Barkley writes that Gary Becker's book on the family >>had the wonderful assumption that the family has a single utility function, namely that of Daddy.<< If this assumption is true, how could his wife commit suicide? The only answer is that he wanted her to die! There's no statute of limitations on murder cases, so ... in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., 7900 Loyola Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "It takes a busload of faith to get by." -- Lou Reed.
[PEN-L:5006] Re: Correction
I may be wrong, but I think that Becker's wife's suicide and his article all predated 1980. In fact, my memory is that the suicide followed by not too long his book on Economics and the Family (don't remember exact title) which came out around 1961 or so. GB is an old coot. That book had the wonderful assumption that the family has a single utility function, namely that of Daddy. H.. Barkley Rosser
