Re: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Dimitris Zacharopoulos via dev-security-policy
Forgive my ignorance, but could you please explain what was your ultimate goal, as "an attacker", what were you hoping to gain and how could you use this against Relying Parties? I read your email several times but I could not easily find a case where your fake address creates any serious

Re: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 10:39 PM Tim Hollebeek wrote: > I'm glad you added the smiley, because in my experience CAs have rarely, > if ever, have had any discretion in such matters. That does not match reports from multiple former employees of various CAs. Nor do we (DigiCert) particularly

RE: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
I'm glad you added the smiley, because in my experience CAs have rarely, if ever, have had any discretion in such matters. Nor do we (DigiCert) particularly want to, to be honest. I prefer clear, open, and transparent validation rules that other CAs can't play games with. Whitelisting and

RE: SHA-1 exception history

2018-09-27 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
> On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:52:27 + > Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > > My personal impression is that by the time they are brought up here, > > far too many issues have easily predicted and pre-determined outcomes. > > It is probably true that many issues have predictable

Re: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Yes, it would be work, but would result in consistent and reliable information, and already reflective of the fact that an EV certificate needs to identify the jurisdictionOfIncorporation and it's incorporating documents. Or are we saying that OV doesn't need to make sure it's actually a valid and

Re: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy
A whitelist of QGIS sounds fairly difficult. And how long would it take to adopt a new one? In some states you're going to have an authority per county. It'd be a big list. On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 5:35 PM, Ian Carroll via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >

Re: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Ian Carroll via dev-security-policy
On Wednesday, September 26, 2018 at 6:12:22 PM UTC-7, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > Thanks for raising this, Ian. > > The question and concern about QIIS is extremely reasonable. As discussed > in past CA/Browser Forum activities, some CAs have extended the definition > to treat Google Maps as a QIIS (it

Re: SHA-1 exception history

2018-09-27 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 14:52:27 + Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy wrote: > My personal impression is that by the time they are brought up here, > far too many issues have easily predicted and pre-determined outcomes. It is probably true that many issues have predictable outcomes but I

Re: Visa Issues

2018-09-27 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Visa has filed a bug [1] requesting removal of the eCommerce root from the Mozilla root store. Visa has also responded to the information requested in the qualified audits bug [2], but it's unclear if or when they will respond to the issues list presented in this thread. Two weeks have passed

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
A few additional points: First off, thank you Rob and James for calling out unacceptable list behavior. Personal attacks will not be tolerated from anyone on this list. On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 10:26 AM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:17 AM Jeremy Rowley > wrote: > >> Oh – I

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:17 AM Jeremy Rowley wrote: > Oh – I totally agree with you on the Google inclusion issue. Google meets > the requirements for inclusion in Mozilla’s root policy so there’s no > reason to exclude them. They have an audited CPS, support a community > broader with certs

RE: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
Maybe Jake’s opinion is not being discarded as readily as I supposed. However, Jake’s last message left me disturbed that he didn’t feel listened to. Apologies if I’m overblowing the issue, which are definitely hypothetical at this point. I did want Jake to feel like his input is an important

RE: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
Oh – I totally agree with you on the Google inclusion issue. Google meets the requirements for inclusion in Mozilla’s root policy so there’s no reason to exclude them. They have an audited CPS, support a community broader with certs than just Google, and have operated a CA without problems in

RE: Concerns with Dun & Bradstreet as a QIIS

2018-09-27 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
> The question and concern about QIIS is extremely reasonable. As discussed in > past CA/Browser Forum activities, some CAs have extended the definition to > treat Google Maps as a QIIS (it is not), as well as third-party WHOIS services > (they’re not; that’s using a DTP). It's worth noting that

Re: SHA-1 exception history

2018-09-27 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
Speaking for myself ... My personal impression is that by the time they are brought up here, far too many issues have easily predicted and pre-determined outcomes. I know most of the security and key management people for the payment industry very well [1], and they're good people. The

Re: Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy
Richard, Unfortunately Gerv is no longer with us, so he cannot respond to this accusation. Having been involved in many discussions on m.d.s.p and with Gerv directly, I am very sure Gerv deeply owned the decisions on StartCom and WoSign. It was by no means Ryan telling Gerv or Mozilla what to

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
It is unfair that somebody attacked me in the WoSign sanction discussion, but no body say any word for this! Why? Due to Ryan is famous person and I am nobody? Best Regards, Richard Wang On Sep 27, 2018, at 18:24, James Burton mailto:j...@0.me.uk>> wrote: Richard, Your conduct is totally

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
On Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:02:45 +0100 Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy wrote: > Thinking back to, for example, TSYS, my impression was that my post on > the Moral Hazard from granting this exception had at least as much > impact as you could expect for any participant. Mozilla declined to >

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread James Burton via dev-security-policy
Richard, Your conduct is totally unacceptable and won’t be tolerated. You must read the forum rules regarding etiquette. Also I suggest you apologise to Ryan. James On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 10:33, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Richard,

Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
Richard, You might like to familiarize yourself with the Mozilla Forum Etiquette Ground Rules: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/forums/etiquette/ Note this in particular: "Be civil. No personal attacks. Do not feel compelled to defend your honor in public. Posts containing personal attacks

RE: AC Camerfirma's CP & CPS disclosure

2018-09-27 Thread Ramiro Muñoz via dev-security-policy
Hi Wayne All problems have already been resolved from our side and we wait for the PIT audit planned for the next week. We will be able to provide the PIT before October 31th. Best regards Ramiro Muñoz Muñoz AC Camerfirma SA. CTO, Exploitation Manager, CISA. +34 619 746 291 ·

RE: Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
Sorry, I don't agree with this point. Ryan Sleevi is the Mozilla Module Peer that gave too many pressures to the M.D.S.P community to misleading the Community and to let Mozilla make the decision that Google want. There are two facts to support my opinion: (1) For StartCom sanction, Mozilla

RE: Re: Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

2018-09-27 Thread Richard Wang via dev-security-policy
Hi Ryan, Thanks for your point out the link "https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues'. I think I need to say more words about "misleading" and "lie". I like to expose some FACTs to show the public, to let public know who is misleading and lie. For the initiate WoSign issues email in