RE: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Hi Jakob, Your below description raises two questions of general interest (though not of interest to the Mozilla root program): 1. Will DigiCert establish cross-signatures from the old/historic Symantec roots to continuing DigiCert roots and subCAs? [JR] We won’t be cross-signing from

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

s concerns. -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of wizard--- via dev-security-policy Sent: Friday, August 11, 2017 9:12 PM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: Syman

RE: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

, 2017 9:12 PM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal Steve, Thank you for responding relatively promptly (at least as compared to previous Symantec responses) to Devon's questions. However, these responses seem to imply that a side effect

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

One good thing we should be able to hope for from a change in ownership even if the personnel and equipment are the same or a great deal in common: improved management oversight. In my view the most worrying underlying problem at Symantec was the inadequate oversight. Senior management at the

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

; > Devon O'Brien via dev-security-policy > > Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 12:24 PM > > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > > Subject: [EXT] Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > > > Hello m.d.s.p., > > > > I'd just like to give

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

illa.org > Subject: [EXT] Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > Hello m.d.s.p., > > I'd just like to give the community a heads up that Chrome’s plan remains to > put up a blog post echoing our recent announcement on blink-dev [1], but > in the meantime, we are reviewi

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Hello m.d.s.p., I'd just like to give the community a heads up that Chrome’s plan remains to put up a blog post echoing our recent announcement on blink-dev [1], but in the meantime, we are reviewing the facts related to Symantec’s sale of their PKI business to DigiCert [2]. Recently, it has

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Just to be explicit: your count includes certificates which, with high probability have already been replaced, because it does not subtract names for which new certificates have been issued? I realize it may seem like I'm putting a lot of emphasis on this one number, but given that it's the basis

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On 25/07/2017 22:28, Rick Andrews wrote: ... You are correct in that most customers are indeed not prepared to deal with potential crises in the SSL system. We have all witnessed this first hand with Heartbleed, the replacement of SHA1 certificates, etc. A four month replacement window for a

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Rick Andrews via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Symantec has proposed timing changes that are consistent with the scope of > distrust of the original SubCA proposal as proposed by Google and endorsed > by Mozilla, which

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Tuesday, 25 July 2017 21:29:06 UTC+1, Rick Andrews wrote: > The details of this process would probably be best served in a separate > thread. Essentially, such a process would involve a quick assessment by the > community on the context and merits of the request by the customer You want us

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Hi Rick, Some more thoughts on your post. I continue to invite community commentary on the issues we are discussing. On 21/07/17 07:00, Rick Andrews wrote: > In our June 1 post, we stated that we would update the community after the > end of the month. Indeed. I was more referring to the

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Friday, July 21, 2017 at 12:39:54 PM UTC-7, Peter Bowen wrote: > Steve, > > I think this level of public detail is very helpful when it comes to > understanding the proposal. > > On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > 1) December 1, 2017 is the

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Friday, July 21, 2017 at 12:07:02 PM UTC-7, Alex Gaynor wrote: > On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Steve Medin wrote: > > > 1) *December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP > > respondent can provide the Managed CA solution proposed by Google, assuming > > a start date of

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Steve, I think this level of public detail is very helpful when it comes to understanding the proposal. On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy wrote: > 1) December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP >

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Steve Medin wrote: > 1) *December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP > respondent can provide the Managed CA solution proposed by Google, assuming > a start date of August 1, 2017. Only one RFP respondent initially

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On 21/07/17 07:00, Rick Andrews wrote: > In light of all of these implications, we respectfully request that Mozilla, > Google and the community consider the dates Symantec has proposed, which are > the results of our earnest and extensive efforts to implement the spirit of > the SubCA

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

On Thursday, July 20, 2017 at 12:31:56 PM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote: > Hi Steve, > > Thanks for posting this. I appreciate the level of detail provided, > which is useful in giving us a basis for discussion. It's a little > regrettable, though, that it was published a couple of weeks after we

Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Hi Steve, Thanks for posting this. I appreciate the level of detail provided, which is useful in giving us a basis for discussion. It's a little regrettable, though, that it was published a couple of weeks after we were led to expect it... One note before we start: Symantec's business dealings

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

) It is our longstanding policy not to comment on rumors or market speculation. From: Alex Gaynor [mailto:agay...@mozilla.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 10:25 AM To: Steve Medin <steve_me...@symantec.com> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

...@konklone.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 3:43 PM To: Steve Medin <steve_me...@symantec.com> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:31 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy <dev-securi

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

illa.org > Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > On 7/19/2017 8:31 AM, Steve Medin wrote: > >> -Original Message- > >> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > >> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behal

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

.org > Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > On 19/07/2017 17:31, Steve Medin wrote: > >> -Original Message- > >> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > >> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behal

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

lf Of > > Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy > > Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 4:39 PM > > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > > Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > > > > > Just for clarity: > > > > (Note:

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

017 4:39 PM >> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org >> Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal >> >> >> Just for clarity: >> >> (Note: Using ISO date format instead of ambiguous local date format) >> >> How many Symantec

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal Just for clarity: (Note: Using ISO date format instead of ambiguous local date format) How many Symantec certs issued prior to 2015-06-01 expire after 2018- 06-01, and how does that mesh with the alternative date proposed below

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

.org > Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > > Just for clarity: > > (Note: Using ISO date format instead of ambiguous local date format) > > How many Symantec certs issued prior to 2015-06-01 expire after 2018- > 06-01, and how does that mesh with the al

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

t; > > -Original Message- > > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > > bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of > > Steve Medin via dev-security-policy > > Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 2:23 PM > > To: mozilla-dev-sec

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Steve Medin via dev-security-policy Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 2:23 PM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal *Progress Update on SubCA RFP

RE: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

age- > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of > Steve Medin via dev-security-policy > Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 2:23 PM > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Subject: [EXT] Sym

Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

*Progress Update on SubCA RFP, Partner Selection, and Execution* Since June 1, Symantec has worked in earnest to operationalize the SubCA proposal outlined by Google and Mozilla and discussed in community forums. The core of this proposal is to transfer the authentication and issuance of

Re: Symantec: Update

On 20/05/17 15:26, Michael Casadevall wrote: > However, for Mozilla's purposes, is there a case where having a SCT in > certificate would either break something, or otherwise be undesirable? I believe we turned the checking on and discovered performance issues, so we turned it off. I'm not sure

Re: Symantec: Update

On 05/19/2017 10:25 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > Embedding SCTs is not the only way SCTs can be delivered - they can come > in the SSL handshake or via OCSP. Requiring them to be embedded does > have the advantage that certificates now carry an unforgeable timestamp, > and it was something I

Re: Symantec: Update

On 19/05/17 15:28, Peter Bowen wrote: > This is not accurate. They have indicated that the SSP customers have > some level of issuance capability. Oops. Well, they said that a while back, but yes indeed, since then we have discovered the above fact. Gerv

Re: Symantec: Update

On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 7:25 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 15/05/17 21:06, Michael Casadevall wrote: > >>> Are there any RA's left for Symantec? >> >> TBH, I'm not sure. I think Gervase asked for clarification on this >> point, but

Re: Symantec: Update

On 15/05/17 21:06, Michael Casadevall wrote: > Sorry, I could have been more clear here. What I'm proposing is that > after a specific TBD NotBefore date, we require SCTs to be in place on > the certificate to be trusted. Certificates from before that date > would remain trusted as-is (pending any

Re: Symantec: Update

On 05/16/2017 03:50 AM, Michael Casadevall wrote: > On 05/15/2017 06:05 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote: >> > > - A three-day grace period shall be in place from the issuance date of > a certificate to when it must be in the CT logs for validation reasons > (this is in line with other proposals here). > >

Re: Symantec: Update

On 05/15/2017 06:05 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote: > > Ok, that's much better. > Yay for reasonable courses of action. We'll see if it goes into the next proposal. >> I can see the point here, but I'm not sure I agree. Every time we keep >> digging, we keep finding more and more problems with these

Re: Symantec: Update

On 15/05/2017 22:06, Michael Casadevall wrote: On 05/15/2017 09:32 AM, Jakob Bohm wrote: This won't work for the *millions* of legitimate, not-misissued, end certificates that were issued before Symantec began SCT embedding (hopefully in the past) and haven't expired before such an early

Re: Symantec: Update

On 05/15/2017 09:32 AM, Jakob Bohm wrote: > This won't work for the *millions* of legitimate, not-misissued, > end certificates that were issued before Symantec began SCT > embedding (hopefully in the past) and haven't expired before such > an early deadline. > Sorry, I could have been more

Re: Symantec: Update

On 13/05/2017 12:27, Michael Casadevall wrote: On 05/11/2017 09:53 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: On May 10, 2017, at 11:52, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: I would appreciate people's comments on the details of

Re: Symantec: Update

On 05/11/2017 09:53 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> On May 10, 2017, at 11:52, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy >> wrote: >> >> I would appreciate people's comments on the details of the current draft. > > I don’t think

Re: Symantec: Update

On Thursday, 11 May 2017 19:08:06 UTC+2, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 11/05/17 13:02, wiz...@ida.net wrote: > > That said, it is fair point that the plan should spell out what happens if > > symantec does not cooperate. > > I think we should cross that bridge when we come to it, which I hope we

Re: Symantec: Update

On 11/05/17 13:02, wiz...@ida.net wrote: > That said, it is fair point that the plan should spell out what happens if > symantec does not cooperate. I think we should cross that bridge when we come to it, which I hope we won't. Not that I'm not prepared to cross it, but there's no point

Re: Symantec: Update

> On May 10, 2017, at 11:52, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > I would appreciate people's comments on the details of the current draft. I don’t think that this proposal goes far enough. Symantec has demonstrated that they have no

Re: Symantec: Update

Possibly this is irrelevant, but I have some concerns on how Symantec, it seems to me, is willfully mischaracterizing their certificate compliance issues in their prepared remarks to their investors yesterday.[1] It makes it sound as if there are some generic certificate industry changes that

Re: Symantec: Update

Symantec, in previous blog posts on their site, has indicated that they will support their customers [1]. That said, it is fair point that the plan should spell out what happens if symantec does not cooperate. It seems appropriate to have the plan do what it says -- scheduled phase out of the

Re: Symantec: Update

On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 2:06 PM, mono.riot--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Wednesday, May 10, 2017 at 7:59:37 PM UTC+2, Itzhak Daniel wrote: > > The next step, if Symantec wish to continue to use their current PKI in > the future, should be logging

Re: Symantec: Update

On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 07:03:16PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote: > > Instead of the removal of the roots, I suggest we either ask them > to revoke all the intermediate CAs that do not have the required > audits or that Mozilla adds them to OneCRL. Just to clarify, I believe

Re: Symantec: Update

On Wednesday, May 10, 2017 at 7:59:37 PM UTC+2, Itzhak Daniel wrote: > The next step, if Symantec wish to continue to use their current PKI in the > future, should be logging (ASAP) *all* of the certificates they issued to a > CT log, then we'll know how deep is the rabbit hole. already the

Re: Symantec: Update

On Wednesday, 10 May 2017 17:52:40 UTC+2, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 09/05/17 16:51, Gervase Markham wrote: > > * Editing the proposal to withdraw the "alternative" option, leaving > > only the "new PKI" option. > > This has now been done: > >

Re: Symantec: Update

On Tuesday, May 9, 2017 at 10:03:53 AM UTC-7, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > Do we somewhere have the official templates being used to send > reminders of the audit requirements? Unofficial templates: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Email_templates The official templates are in Salesforce, but currently

Re: Symantec: Update

On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 04:51:12PM +0100, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > Despite the fact that there appear to be > numerous under-audited and unaudited publicly-trusted sub-CAs out there, > and this fact has been known for weeks now, Symantec has not said > anything about the

Re: Symantec: Update

Hi Gervase, Thank you for the update on Mozilla's process. I have one question regarding your wording. You write"I am therefore *proposing *the following," and then you list your changes. Does this mean that the "alternative" option is officially, 100%, off the table? Or is this still an option

Symantec: Update

Hi everyone, Yesterday was May 8th, which was the day I had said we would stop discussing my proposal of what to do about Symantec and hand it over to Kathleen for a decision. This didn't happen for two reasons: I had some personal things to deal with, and also I think the proposal needs some