Re: Fwd: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

2019-08-18 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
On Sun, 18 Aug 2019, 07:18 Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy, < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 05:58:56PM +, Doug Beattie via > dev-security-policy wrote: > > Shouldn’t the large enterprises that see a value in identity (as > > does GlobalSign) drive

Re: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

2019-08-16 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
Thanks Tim, well written and I completely agree! In this thread Issues have been raised about that EV validation is not perfect and that criminals can obtain an EV certificate (if they reveal their identity). I also agree that the validation can be improved, but as Tim stated, that doesn't mean

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-02 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
I did do some testing on EKU chaining in Go, but from my understand this works the same for Microsoft: An OCSP responder certificate with Extended Key Usage OCSPSigning, but an issuing CA without the EKU (result: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage)

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-02 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
On Thu, 2 Jul 2020 at 16:41, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 10:34 AM Paul van Brouwershaven via > dev-security-policy wrote: > >> I did do some testing on EKU chaining in Go, but from my understand this >> works the same for Microsoft: >> > &

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-02 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
When validating the EKU using `Test-Certificate` Windows states it's invalid, but when using `certutil` it's accepted or not explicitly checked. https://gist.github.com/vanbroup/64760f1dba5894aa001b7222847f7eef When/if I have time I will try to do some further tests with a custom setup to see if

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-06 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
> > Some tests were performed by Paul van Brouwershaven > > https://gist.github.com/vanbroup/84859cd10479ed95c64abe6fcdbdf83d. > > As mentioned, those tests weren’t correct. I’ve provided sample test cases > to several other browser vendors, and heard back or demonstrated that > they’re

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-06 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
openssl (Ubuntu & MacOS): Accepts the response ocspcheck (MacOS): Accepts the response Output and script located on: https://gist.github.com/vanbroup/84859cd10479ed95c64abe6fcdbdf83d On Mon, 6 Jul 2020 at 12:09, Dimitris Zacharopoulos wrote: > On 6/7/2020 11:39 π.μ., Paul van Brouwersha

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-03 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
For those who are interested, in contrast to the direct EKU validation with Test-Certificate, certutil does validate the OCSP signing EKU on the delegated OCSP signing certificate but doesn't validate the certificate chain for the OCSP signing EKU. Full test script and output can be found here:

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-02 Thread Paul van Brouwershaven via dev-security-policy
Thanks for raising this issue Ryan, I'm trying to update http://revocationcheck.com/ to cover this issue. From my understanding: The OCSPnocheck extension is only required for a delegated OCSP responder certificate as it can't provide answers for itself. For a CA certificate in (CA signed