>I still think USB has a much higher chance of a high adoption rate.
I would like to agree but the USB security container concept suffers
from major limitations in terms of supporting infrastructure. People
already have USB sticks and if these generally had been augmented
with crypto processor an
My apologies for having gone silent for a while; with Mark Surman (the
new Mozilla Foundation executive director) coming on board I've been
busy helping him get started and taking care of related
responsibilities. However I now have more time, and I'm going to be
devoting it to getting more CA
On 10/02/2008 06:11 PM, Frank Hecker:
> I've published an initial version of such a schedule at:
>
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule
>
This is absolutely fantastic, well done! I was already worried what's
happening with all the pending requests, this sounds to me organized and
doable.
> *
Eddy Nigg wrote:
> Yes, if possible, please make the announcement at Thursday's, which
> would allow for scheduling for the weekend (I review CAs indeed usually
> at weekends).
OK, if no one cares one way or the other I'll move the start of public
comments to Thursdays.
Frank
--
Frank Hecker
Kathleen Wilson and I have been discussing how to re-start the
evaluation process for T-Systems. If you recall, that request (bug
378882) got bogged down in a discussion of how to deal with situations
where the root CA doesn't actually issue end entity certificates and the
root CA's CPS doesn't
Hi All. I hope this is an acceptable question for this list; I've
searched google and the archives and not found an answer.
We use Remedy ARS (helpdesk ticketing system) and are migrating to
Microsoft ADAM (LDAP) using TLS for encryption. I am responsible for
getting Remedy to talk LDAPS which
In accordance with the schedule at
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule
I am now opening the first public discussion period for a request from
Microtec Ltd to add the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA root certificate to
Mozilla. This is bug 370505, and Kathleen has produced an information
document
Frank Hecker wrote:
> I am now opening the first public discussion period for a request from
> Microtec Ltd to add the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA root certificate to
D'oh! It's "Microsec", *not* "Microtec". I got it right everywhere
except for the subject line and the first sentence. Sigh...
Fr
Frank Hecker wrote:
> Kathleen Wilson and I have been discussing how to re-start the
> evaluation process for T-Systems. If you recall, that request (bug
> 378882) got bogged down in a discussion of how to deal with situations
> where the root CA doesn't actually issue end entity certificates and t
On 10/02/2008 10:23 PM, Frank Hecker:
>
> Kathleen thinks, and I agree, that the best way to approach this both
> with T-Systems and with other CAs in general is to ask the CA to update
> the CP/CPS for the root to include language addressing the following:
>
> * Clear requirements for subordinate
Justin Dolske wrote:
> Out of curiousity... How many (if any) such CAs are currently included
> in NSS?
It's not clear, since we've never gone back and looked at all the legacy
CAs. There are certainly a number of root CAs that authorize third
parties to run subordinate CAs and issue end entity
On 10/03/2008 03:04 AM, Justin Dolske:
> Out of curiousity... How many (if any) such CAs are currently included
> in NSS? It seems a little scary to be providing a way for these 3rd
> party CAs to become operational in Mozilla products without going
> through the Mozilla approval process. It seems
On 10/03/2008 03:38 AM, Frank Hecker:
> Remember that a lot of CAs working with enterprises outsource the
> Registration Authority function to those enterprises. In other words,
> the enterprise is ultimately responsible for doing verification of
> subscribers (e.g. when issuing certificates to emp
Matthews, Tim R wrote:
> Hi All. I hope this is an acceptable question for this list; I’ve
> searched google and the archives and not found an answer.
>
>
>
> We use Remedy ARS (helpdesk ticketing system) and are migrating to
> Microsoft ADAM (LDAP) using TLS for encryption. I am responsible
Eddy Nigg wrote:
> The principal guiding us should be the audit requirements mentioned
> above and there shall be no CA included which hasn't undergone such an
> audit, being it as part of a root or in its own rights. A root shall not
> be included in case sub-ordinate CAs exist which haven't se
On 10/03/2008 04:29 AM, Frank Hecker:
>
I turned your reply somewhat upside-down, because I want to comment
first in general terms...
>
> Well, it does matter how difficult it is to implement a policy, and I
> think we have to exercise some judgment here. At one end of the spectrum
> we have sit
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