Am Freitag, 21. Dezember 2012, 21:56:16 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > That still allows anarchist groups to interconnect (they just need to hide
> > their decision making structures, but not that they are in the group).
>
> Well, if the authorities seize your node, they will have your friends from
On Thursday 20 Dec 2012 22:36:55 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 20. Dezember 2012, 17:31:30 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > > The question is which trail. E-Mails are open to global surveillance.
> > > Connections not necessarily (they are much more work to track all the
> > > time).
>
Am Donnerstag, 20. Dezember 2012, 17:31:30 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > The question is which trail. E-Mails are open to global surveillance.
> > Connections not necessarily (they are much more work to track all the
> > time).
> If you are targeted as an individual, they can tell who your friends
On Tuesday 18 Dec 2012 18:01:41 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
> Am Dienstag, 18. Dezember 2012, 13:26:20 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > > I don’t think that this is strictly necessary. If your friend runs a
> > > corrupted build, you have a problem anyway. Another layer of security
> > > might be nic
On Tuesday 18 Dec 2012 15:22:19 Juiceman wrote:
> On Dec 18, 2012 8:26 AM, "Matthew Toseland"
> wrote:
> >
> > On Tuesday 18 Dec 2012 02:49:36 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
> > > Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 19:32:18 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > > > - HTTPS ensures that the executable hasn't bee
Am Dienstag, 18. Dezember 2012, 13:26:20 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > I don’t think that this is strictly necessary. If your friend runs a
> > corrupted build, you have a problem anyway. Another layer of security
> > might be nice, anyway, though: Don’t make it too easy for people to
> > infiltrat
On Dec 18, 2012 8:26 AM, "Matthew Toseland"
wrote:
>
> On Tuesday 18 Dec 2012 02:49:36 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
> > Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 19:32:18 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > > - HTTPS ensures that the executable hasn't been tampered with.
However, the
> > > friend providing it may
On Tuesday 18 Dec 2012 02:49:36 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
> Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 19:32:18 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> > - HTTPS ensures that the executable hasn't been tampered with. However, the
> > friend providing it may be malicious, computer illiterate, or running a
> > corrupted
Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 19:32:18 schrieb Matthew Toseland:
> - HTTPS ensures that the executable hasn't been tampered with. However, the
> friend providing it may be malicious, computer illiterate, or running a
> corrupted build they got from another friend. Trusting your friend is not
> nec
Am Freitag, 14. Dezember 2012, 13:40:53 schrieb Robert Hailey:
> Couldn't we programmatically detect:
> (a) that the port is not forwarded, or
> (b) if their IP has recently changed, or
> (c) if they are a low-uptime node
>
> ...and deny/warn/hide the invite feature if that is not the case?
I thin
On Friday 14 Dec 2012 19:40:53 Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On 2012/12/14 (Dec), at 1:32 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>
> > Invites can be very simple, if we make several dubious assumptions:
> > - The inviter is port forwarded, their IP doesn't change before the invite
> > is used
>
> Couldn't we p
On 2012/12/14 (Dec), at 1:32 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Invites can be very simple, if we make several dubious assumptions:
> - The inviter is port forwarded, their IP doesn't change before the invite is
> used
Couldn't we programmatically detect:
(a) that the port is not forwarded, or
(b) i
Invites can be very simple, if we make several dubious assumptions:
- The inviter is port forwarded, their IP doesn't change before the invite is
used, and they are online at the time the invite is used.
Hence:
- The invite is IP, port, password. MUST be exchanged out of band, but it's
short eno
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