On Fri, 2003-05-09 at 23:01, Toad wrote:
>
> Nice in theory, but in practice, how do you distribute the new
> formulas?
I've been thinking this week about a simpler problem: a network
of nodes which provide the service of distributed storage and
distribution of fixed length chunks of say 1
On Sun, May 04, 2003 at 11:29:27PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 19:35, Toad wrote:
> > I am not sure that we could safely allow a get file closest to
> > this key command... it might allow some kinds of probing/mapping that
> > might lead to attacks we would want to avoid.
On Sun, May 04, 2003 at 08:09:14AM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> [If freenet-tech were "post only by members", I would gladly
> move this discussion there. But I argue that it is relevant
> here, because if my theory is correct, the routing layer of
> Freenet only needs to concern itself with
On Sun, May 04, 2003 at 08:34:55AM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 19:31, Hui Zhang wrote:
> > > How do I trust the legitimacy of a given formula?
> > > What prevents an
> > > attacker from advertising tons of false formulas for
> > > a file?
> >
> > This is a very convincing
On Sat, May 03, 2003 at 03:29:17PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> BTW in my second post which you haven't replied to yet I didn't
> make a clear distinction between files as CHK's of say 1 meg of
> apparently random data vs files (documents) as content (not random).
>
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at
On Sat, May 03, 2003 at 01:58:01PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 13:34, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> > On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 12:56, Mark J Roberts wrote:
> > > If you entangle your file with my illegal document, which is later
> > > suppressed, you have nobody to blame but
On Sat, May 03, 2003 at 01:34:09PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 12:56, Mark J Roberts wrote:
> > Edward J. Huff:
> > > Also, this idea addresses the node specialization problem by
> > > separating the routing problem from the defense against attack
> > > on specific
On Sun, 2003-05-04 at 12:20, Ian Clarke wrote:
> > Moglen points out exactly what my "legal" compression is
> > intended to make obvious: the law must treat some numbers
> > differently than others, and this is absurd.
>
> What if I send my friend a signed email saying "If you kill Oskar, I
>
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 19:35, Toad wrote:
> I am not sure that we could safely allow a get file closest to
> this key command... it might allow some kinds of probing/mapping that
> might lead to attacks we would want to avoid. On the other hand, it is
> an interesting idea.
>
Thanks for taking
On Sun, 2003-05-04 at 10:13, Mark J Roberts wrote:
> Edward J. Huff:
> > [If freenet-tech were "post only by members", I would gladly
>
> I hope I'm not coming across as hostile. I'm not trying to make you
> go away or dismiss your ideas, and if I have come across as such it
> is the fault of my
> Moglen points out exactly what my "legal" compression is
> intended to make obvious: the law must treat some numbers
> differently than others, and this is absurd.
What if I send my friend a signed email saying "If you kill Oskar, I
will pay you $20,000", and my friend, knowing that I am
Edward J. Huff:
> [If freenet-tech were "post only by members", I would gladly
I hope I'm not coming across as hostile. I'm not trying to make you
go away or dismiss your ideas, and if I have come across as such it
is the fault of my own stupidity.
> By linking many different documents to the
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 19:31, Hui Zhang wrote:
> > How do I trust the legitimacy of a given formula?
> > What prevents an
> > attacker from advertising tons of false formulas for
> > a file?
>
> This is a very convincing argument. If multiple
> versions are allowed for a single file, then it
[If freenet-tech were "post only by members", I would gladly
move this discussion there. But I argue that it is relevant
here, because if my theory is correct, the routing layer of
Freenet only needs to concern itself with efficiently moving
fixed length random files around. The current
I am not sure that we could safely allow a get file closest to
this key command... it might allow some kinds of probing/mapping that
might lead to attacks we would want to avoid. On the other hand, it is
an interesting idea.
On Sat, May 03, 2003 at 12:11:10PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> I
Edward J. Huff:
> Not at all. This is a data compression scheme which avoids
> the problem of incompressibility. Any 1 meg file can be
> represented as a CHK. (It fails only when there are hash
> collisions.)
I don't understand how this relates to compression. It doubles the
size of all
> How do I trust the legitimacy of a given formula?
> What prevents an
> attacker from advertising tons of false formulas for
> a file?
This is a very convincing argument. If multiple
versions are allowed for a single file, then it brings
the problem of inauthentic upload.
BTW in my second post which you haven't replied to yet I didn't
make a clear distinction between files as CHK's of say 1 meg of
apparently random data vs files (documents) as content (not random).
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 14:31, Mark J Roberts wrote:
>
> If the police don't know which of the set of
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 13:34, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 12:56, Mark J Roberts wrote:
> > If you entangle your file with my illegal document, which is later
> > suppressed, you have nobody to blame but yourself when your file
> > must be reinserted. It's sort of like announcing
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 12:56, Mark J Roberts wrote:
> Edward J. Huff:
> > Also, this idea addresses the node specialization problem by
> > separating the routing problem from the defense against attack
> > on specific content. The defense problem is moved out of the
> > freenet protocol to the
Edward J. Huff:
> The idea is your illegal document would have been entangled
> with other legal documents. Note of the CHK files would be
> usable by themselves (or at least, those which are wouldn't
> be used for entanglement). Every CHK would be entangled into
> lots of different documents,
I suppose maybe this belongs on the TECH list, but that list
seems to have nothing but spam, while this list doesn't.
Also, this idea addresses the node specialization problem by
separating the routing problem from the defense against attack
on specific content. The defense problem is moved out
Edward J. Huff:
> Also, this idea addresses the node specialization problem by
> separating the routing problem from the defense against attack
> on specific content. The defense problem is moved out of the
> freenet protocol to the application, removing some constraints
> and making it easier to
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