[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-24 Thread Ian Green
PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Viking Coder Sent: Thursday, 24 May 2001 9:02 AM To: e-gold Discussion Subject: [e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness offshoresurfer wrote I don't see any problem with people knowing my account number per se, but I agree the e-gold system

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-24 Thread Ian Green
I am advocating a separate login name from the publicly-known account number not simply to foil hackers, but to prevent denial of service type attacks. Anyone at present can lock out any e-gold account he chooses simply by using the account number and typing an incorrect password a few times!

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-24 Thread Brendan_Smith
(paranoia is good!). Thanks, Brendan. BigBooster [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 24/05/01 10:06 To: e-gold Discussion [EMAIL PROTECTED] cc: Subject:[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness At 01:47 AM 05/24/2001 +0200

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-24 Thread jpm
For what it's worth, purely in my opinion, that could very easil be sniffed by a sniffer designed fo rthe purpose. The National Australia Bank Internet Banking has overcome any possibility of keyboard sniffing, as their Internet Banking program is a separate Java Internet client, and the only

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Vince Callaway
[snip] A hacker (who knew the # of one of my e-gold a/cs) planted a Trojan Horse in my computer that reported my password enabling him/her to raid my account. (He didn't know the a/c #s of any of my other e-gold a/cs, so he/she didn't touch them.) [snip] Horsefeathers. The only way

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread offshoresurfer
A hacker (who knew the # of one of my e-gold a/cs) planted a Trojan Horse in my computer that reported my password enabling him/her to raid my account. (He didn't know the a/c #s of any of my other e-gold a/cs, so he/she didn't touch them.) [snip] Horsefeathers. The necessary piece

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Viking Coder
offshoresurfer wrote I don't see any problem with people knowing my account number per se, but I agree the e-gold system only offers very basic level security. To get into my main online bank account and send money, I need: 1) A customer login number - not the same as my account number 2)

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread BigBooster
A hacker (who knew the # of one of my e-gold a/cs) planted a Trojan Horse in my computer that reported my password enabling him/her to raid my account. (He didn't know the a/c #s of any of my other e-gold a/cs, so he/she didn't touch them.) The Trojan Horse was named Kern32.exe and was loaded

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Viking Coder
I repeat, revealing your a/c # is a huge risk. It gives the hacker half of what he needs to access your a/c. You reveal your bank acct # every time you write a check. Just because I know where you live doesn't mean I'm half way to breaking into your house. The security system locks on your

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread hkkid
one. FinJan's Surfin Guard Pro is also an excellent program that detects keyboard sniffers. HK - Original Message - From: BigBooster [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: e-gold Discussion [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, May 23, 2001 6:52 PM Subject: [e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread BigBooster
At 12:38 AM 05/24/2001 +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't see any problem with people knowing my account number per se, but I agree the e-gold system only offers very basic level security. To get into my main online bank account and send money, I need: 1) A customer login number - not the

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread BigBooster
At 07:02 PM 05/23/2001 -0400, Viking Coder [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The more important lesson here is to not open every single attachment sent to you and to be sure that you are ONLY entering your passphrase at the https://www.e-gold.com site; NOT the http://www.e-qold.com site. Also make sure

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread offshoresurfer
This whole discussion about security is filled with basic errors. Everyone is confused, except Viking. Just go to a smart card model, if you want high security. It's already working on metalsavings.com, you can use it every day. I am no expert and don't claim to be. But on the basis

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread SnowDog
I don't see any problem with people knowing my account number per se, but I agree the e-gold system only offers very basic level security. To get into my main online bank account and send money, I need: 1) A customer login number - not the same as my account number 2) A permanent password

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Edwin Woudt
BigBooster [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Rather than a Payment #, e-gold could enhance the system so you use a log-in # which is different from your a/c #. This way, you never reveal your log-in # to anyone. This would make e-gold much more secure. Ok, now here is a trick: Take this log-in #:

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Edwin Woudt
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Just go to a smart card model, if you want high security. It's already working on metalsavings.com, you can use it every day. Not even the smart card model can protect you from all trojans: if you still enter and review your transactions on your normal PC, there is

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread jpm
This whole discussion about security is filled with basic errors. Everyone is confused, except Viking. Just go to a smart card model, if you want high security. It's already working on metalsavings.com, you can use it every day. I am no expert and don't claim to be. But on the basis that

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread BigBooster
At 01:47 AM 05/24/2001 +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It is a granted here that we are talking about protection from sophisticated trojans, keyboard sniffers etc. I think most of us on this list know that we should have good passphrases and should not enter them on other sites. That's not what

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Samuel Mc Kee
-Original Message- 1) A 10-digit number assigned by CompuBank, which was NOT your account number, and which only the customer knew. 2) A Password of the customer's choosing. 3) A Secret Code, (another Password) 4) A wire code, (another Password) 5) An accurate answer to a

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Viking Coder
1. Ten-digit number known only to me: 0123456789 That's the combination to my luggage! Viking Coder Worth Two Cents? http://www.2cw.org/VikingCoder --- You are currently subscribed to e-gold-list as: archive@jab.org To unsubscribe send a blank email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread SnowDog
So I set my E-Gold password to 0123456789mypasswordmyotherpasswordanotherpassword and have the exact same level of security with just one password as CompuBank had with five, _except_ for the random personal question, and that last is probably easier to compromise than the long password

[e-gold-list] Re: Open Letter to Douglas Jackson: E-gold Weakness

2001-05-23 Thread Samuel Mc Kee
I am not aguing that it's not possible, but it's not likely, and every change makes it more difficult for a scammer. Ideally, a system designed to allow the user to select his security methods would be best of all, because then the scammers would not be able to trick users into revealing