possible real
pairwise elections being
equally likely at the time of voting, in Abd's scenario it
probabilistically makes no difference what
rating the voter gives B.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to win instead of B, or by not voting B min if
that causes B to win instead
of A.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
be a version of ASM Elimination
that uses the voters'
original approval cutoffs while they make some distinction among
remaining candidates and
thereafter interprets the voters' ballots as approving all but the
lowest ranked of the remaining
candidates.
Chris Benham
Forest W Simmons wrote
ballots
'approve' none of the candidates, and (b) the cutoff is never moved to a
position where it distinguishes
between candidates given the same rank?
Chris Benham
Forest W Simmons wrote:
Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs.
The candidate with Maximum Minimal Reactionary Approval wins
exactly does this version of MMP work?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
there are
majority-strength cycles.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Chris Benham
Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Peter Barath,
your proposal is very similar to Mike Ossipoff's subcycle rule.
Please read:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-June/000494.html
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com
Brian Olson wrote:
I'm trying to understand the details of this procedure.
On Apr 16, 2007, at 12:03 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-
Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination:
1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking
be elected with 0% probability.//
Referring to this definition, while A and B remain uneliminated A will
always be considered to be more 'approved'
than B and of course A pairwise beats B, so B will always be ordered
below A and so must at some point be
eliminated.
Chris Benham
//
election
minus the
number of ballots on which the pairwise defeated alternative is approved
on your list of most promising measures of defeat strength..?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, BC,
BD). Also ABC only expresses 3 (AD, BD,CD).
In a way what I said maybe wasn't ridiculous, but it wasn't and isn't
what I intend/ed. I'll re-think it.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
criterion X.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
actual votes with equal-ranking
where the voter intended strict ranking, even though
the the used method would have allowed the intended strict ranking.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
on these ballots must not increase the probability
that the winner comes from S./
A simpler way to word this would be: /You should never be able to help
your favorites by lowering one of them./
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http
(in this field of more than 3 candidates) makes an arbitrary
choice between D or DA or
DAB for his 'cast ballot'.
Chris Benham
Mike,
--- Michael Ossipoff [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I share the Venke (similar to Woodall's) approach that the criteria
should assume that the voters intend
Condorcet. (This is the same set of cast ballots as in
the defection backfires because of too
many defectors example).
Chris Benham
I
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
scores, perhaps weighting
them unequally. And if anyone likes it I'm open to a suggestion for a name.
Chris Benham
Hi.
This is the definition of MAMPO:
1. A candidate's opposition score is equal to the greatest number of
votes against him in any pairwise contest.
2. The voter ranks; those ranked
will
attract a lot of new voters with more courage and sense than your LO2E
progressives.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that I reject the candidate
withdrawal option (in say IRV) and
Asset Voting: I am only interested in single-winner methods where the
result is purely determined
(as far as possible) by voters voting, and not by the machinations of
candidates/parties.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing
to
second preference and maybe thereby causing it to fall out of the set
of possible winners. It probably has other problems regarding
Independence
properties, and I can't see any use for it.
Chris Benham
The Possible Approval Winner criterion looks actually quite natural
in the sense
-approved candidate till someone is unbeaten.
Yes, that is doubtless the best way: elect the Schwartz winner.
If I’ve misunderstood DMC’s rules, tell me the correct DMC rules.
No, looks like my mistake. I'll give some reply to the rest later.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing
?!.
PAW tries to be a generalisation of Plurality, and less arbitrary
because it doesn't talk about top preferences.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
with more than three
candidates in the Smith/Schwartz set.
For public political elections that for me is not a practical worry,
whereas Definite Majority applies in
many relatively common-place 3-candidate scenarios.
Chris Benham
Dear Chris,
you wrote:
TACC having that curious
the resorting or the definitively defeated version of DMC with
absolute majority size defeats only.
Jobst,
Does this meet FBC/SF?
Because I think something that fails Condorcet and Irrelevant Ballots
and presumably Definite
Majority would want to.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list
(Ranking) criterion which implies compliance with PAW. The DM(R) set is
{C}, because interpreting ranking (above bottom or equal-bottom) as approval,
both
A and B are pairwise beaten by more approved candidates.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
votes than A has
above-bottom preference votes.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
preferrers have to at least truncate for A not to be alone
in the Smith set.
When the ballot-style allows voters to rank among unapproved candidates
ASM and DMC
are my co-equal favourites, and when it doesn't I prefer ASM.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins
Chris Benham
.
Start with the approval winner A and apply the function f repeatedly
until the output equals the input. This fixed point of f is the
method winner.
Is there any chance that someone who understands this will translate it
into plain English?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list
benefit by changing her strategy while the other players keep
their strategies unchanged, then
that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the
Nash Equilibrium.
*http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/nash.html
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list
present SFC?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
their
incentive to ignore the middle slot
will be increased, making the method (even) more like Approval, not less.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of the Participation
criterion that captures one of IRV's problems versus Condorcet might be of
some use/interest.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of Winning Votes and Approval versus Margins and IRV.
My stab at making it clearer and more technical:
If more than half the voters vote X over Y and it is possible to
complete truncated ballots in a way to
make X the CW, then Y must not win.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list
[EM] Condorcet and Participation
*Markus Schulze * [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:markus.schulze%40alumni.tu-berlin.de
/Sun Oct 5 02:48:02 2003/
* Previous message: [EM] lower preferences
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-October/011029.html
*
prefer it if more and more 9s are
allowed. There is some
reason to believe (in fact, precisely the sort of reason Benham speaks of) that
about six 9s
may be desirable.
I can see how by this trick you achieve Strong FBC and your special
version of Clone Independence (ICC).
Chris Benham
,A49.401
Apart from that, I gather that Range with fewer available ratings
slots also qualifies as Range Voting, so
of course in that case it is even more difficult for the voter to
express infinitesimal preferences.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:00 PM 1/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
By this definition Range fails ICC because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow
? There is MCA, ER-Bucklin(Whole), one or two Kevin Venzke
methods and what else?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kevin,
Interesting. What (if any) harm would be done by applying this to the
three candidates remaining
after the rest have been IRV-style eliminated?
Is there any actual criterion that this method meets but IRV doesn't?
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
Here's an attempt at a method
for this method
because I don't like single-winner
methods that fail Independence from Irrelevant Ballots (IIB) without
meeting FBC.
Sorry about that,
Chris Benham
Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a new 3-slot method, and if people like it I'm open
to suggestions for a name
of the Unacceptables).
MTR has a saleability problem in that it uses a pairwise mechanism as
part of its algorithm (MDD), but then fails both Condorcet and
Condorcet Loser . I think MDE's algorithm is more natural and more
appealing to say IRV supporters.
I'm interested in any comments or corrections.
Chris
tell.
There is thus always a
balance on how much one needs to protect against strategic voters
since all such changes in the methods (in most cases) make the
achieved utility with sincere votes a bit worse.
I think DMC strikes a good balance.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing
, B28, C45. A has the lowest score
and so wins.
IRV eliminates B and likewise elects A.
28: A
27: BA
45: CB (20 of these are sincere A!)
BACB Simmons scores: A27, B45, C28. A has the lowest score
and so wins.
IRV eliminates B and likewise elects A.
Chris Benham
election
A (the sincere CW), while your
suggestion easily elects
the Burier's candidate B.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
) because of its
tremendous Burial resistance
and simplicity.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
It easily elects A. Schulze (like the other Winning Votes defeat
dropper methods) elects B.
It meets my No Zero-Information Strategy criterion, which means that
the voter with no idea how others will vote does best to simply rank
sincerely.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list
ranking all the candidates, if
necessary at random; whereas the IRV voter does best to
rank sincerely.
I think of DSC as just FPP that has been minimally improved to meet
Clone-Winner and Majority for Solid Coalitions.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com
Chris Benham wrote:
38: A
19: BCD
17: BDC
10: CB
03: CD
10: DC
03: DB
My example here of DSC failing both DMT and Condorcet Loser works, but
not quite what I meant to type:
38: A
19: BCD
17: BDC
10: CD
03: CB
10: DC
03: DB
(I've corrected it below as well).
Chris Benham
Tim
Approval (in the case of MTR, with extra burial opportunities and a
random-fill
incentive).
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
opinion
better than Approval or any other 3-slot method.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/DMC
I might have some PR suggestions in a later message.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
good results in
the zero-info. case with strategic voters.
Say sincere ratings are:
48: A10B4C0
47: B10C6A0
04: C10B4A0
B is the Condorcet and big sincere ratings winner, but if these voters
all use the best 0-info. Range/Approval strategy
C the sincere ratings loser (SU worst) wins.
Chris
Warren Smith wrote:
Yes to Chris Benham; I independently came up with a very similar IRV
FAVS-violation example
and posted it on
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2716
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2708
To Scott Ritchie, yes, I just invented the name FAVS
mathematical elegance, this vulnerability to
Pushover strategy is the reason why I care about
methods failing mono-raise.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
election.
Basically, something like If a group of voters share the same
preferences, then their optimal strategy should be to vote in exactly
the same way.
Scott,
Are you referring to 0-info. strategy, or to informed strategy?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http
Scott Ritchie wrote:
On Wed, 2006-12-13 at 21:06 +1030, Chris Benham wrote:
Scott Ritchie wrote:
I was thinking about corporate elections today, and how under some
voting systems an individual would want to strategically vote by
submitting multiple, different ballots. I soon
for a
while--till someone pointed out the bizarre paradoxes that it's subject to:
Some people move from another state to your state, causing your state to
lose a seat.
Mike,
Can you (or anyone) explain or give a demonstration of how this
LR/Hamilton apportionment method
could do that?
Chris
think it takes more than three candidates for this to
differ from E.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
versus IRV requires continually hammering Favourite
Betrayal
Criterion, ultimate simplicity and huge bang for buck, and Minimal
Defense.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ry much need real-world examples, theory will
only take us so far.
If we can't make this assumption then there is no guarantee that Range
will outperform a majoritarian method in terms of expected value.
We can certainly be sure majoritarian methods will outperform Ra
uot; is {R} so R wins.
Example 4. Some of the large party voters think C is good but
majority of them think C is no good.
15: LCR
30: LCR
14: RCL
26: RCL
15: CL=R
Initial approvals: L45, C44, R40
CR, CL, LR, so initial DM set is {L,C}.
Initial top preferences: L45, R40, C15.
C is eliminated and L wins (agreeing with your method).
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to just refer to the ballot style, which has
been previously on EM called a dyadic ballot.
Chris Benham
Juho wrote:
On Nov 3, 2006, at 19:50 , Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Nov 2, 2006, at 1:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
Juho, --- Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Example 1. Large party
Criterion properly applies (i.e., is desirable) to binary
elections. It gets dicey when there are more than two choices.
CB: Why on earth is that, in your book? Strength of preference is
all-important when there are three candidates, but not two?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:34 PM 10/27/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
That is, healthy group decision process follows certain general
principles. The Majority Criterion neglects an important part
Dear friends,
I thought you might be interested in knowing about an amazing bargain --
right now Amazon.com is offering my book 10 Steps to Repair American
Democracy for only $2.99. Yes, you read that correctly, only $3! I
thought it must be a mistake, but one person I know just bought 40
element?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the fact that it fails Minimal Defense.
49: A
24: B
27: CB
Here it elects A.
46: AB
44: BC (maybe was BA or B)
10: C
Here I like the fact that it elects A. Meeting both MD and the
anti-burial property (Dominant Mutual Third Burial Resistance?)
would force the method to elect C.
Chris Benham
Warren,
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and
winning votes
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Warren,
I have two main points in reply to your "DH3 pathology"
anti-Condorcet
argument.
DH3 scenario with strategic votes by the A- and B-voter
Warren,
BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the Smith set
and elect some nonmember.
How can it possibly do that?
Chris Benham
Warren Smith wrote:
Sorry, my last email was in error: BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the Smith
set
and elect some nonmember.
wds
election-methods mailing list
here (in effect) just truncating?
Chris Benham
Warren Smith wrote:
Sorry, for some reason, the hyperlink in my previous post was omitted.
Let me try again:
http://rangevoting.org/WinningVotes.html
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I've been advised that this is important and recently released.
http://www.cev.ie/htm/report/download_second.htm
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Will Your Vote
Count in 2006?
By
Steven Hill
Special to
washingtonpost.com's
Think Tank Town
Tuesday, August 1, 2006; 11:56 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080100561.html
Watching
Mexico live through a controversial presidential
election was like
that a candidate with more than half the first
preference votes will be eliminated. (The other version has a majority
stopping rule).
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that).
As I understand it, Kuhlman's Correlated Instant Borda Runoff was
conceived of as way of decloning
Borda. IRV is already Clone Independent, and so doesn't need decloning!
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Independence from Irrelevant Ballots.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kevin,
Yes I am sure you are right, thanks. Probably then I'll stick with
MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole) as
my favourite FBC method.
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Chris,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin, Warren, other FBC freaks,
I've recently had an idea for a FBC
the Droop quota.
(4) Repeat the above three steps until all the seats are filled.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
From: Steven Hill, New America Foundation
Dear friends, I have an oped in yesterday's San Jose Mercury News about
Citizens' Assemblies as a vehicle for political reform. I thought you would
find it interesting. Please forward to your lists and others interested.
Thanks,
Steven Hill
In
otherwise all three candidates qualify.
I bring this up for jurisdictions which for some reason want to keep
having two election rounds, each with the voters
giving simple binary inputs. Do you think the French will like it?
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http
and
unfair advantage.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, LR11, MR20, FL9.
None have a quota so we eliminate FL, which gives FR10, LR11, MR29.
MR now has a quota so is the last candidate elected.
In the IRV election the elimination order is R, FL, FR, MR, ML, L.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com
ate FL, which gives FR10, LR11, MR29.
MR now has a quota so is the last candidate elected.
In the IRV election the elimination order is R, FL, FR, MR, ML, L.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
below).
Chris Benham
Chris Benham wrote:
Warren Smith wrote:
Arguably STV multiwinner elections are still of interest for single-winner
purposes since the FIRST winner is a single-winner IRV winner.
This seems to imply that multi-winner STV meets "
Condorcet(wv) method you refer to here
elects B.
This looks a lot like vulnerability to offensive order-reversal (aka
Burial strategy) to me.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
methods that fail Irrelevant Ballots (in the same spirit
as the "Blank Ballots Criterion").
But combining FBC with Majority for solid coalitions and Smith(Gross)
in my view makes it an ok package, better than MDDA.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
subclass of elections - then
things
could still be bad, albeit in a different way.
I agree with this, but MDDA is being promoted for public political
elections with a lot winning-probability information
and a lot of strategic voters (who are happy to truncate and
Compromise-compress).
Chris
of
discarding outliers as in Olympic scoring.
Chris Benham
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
without regard to what the other voters do, can force his election."
I don't know about you, but I personally regard WMW as a more-desirable critrion for
a voting system to obey, than Anderson 1994's MW criterion.
Chris Benham:
Are there any methods actually *fail* this criter
the other voters do, can force his
election.
I don't know about you, but I personally regard WMW as a more-desirable
critrion for
a voting system to obey, than Anderson 1994's MW criterion.
Warren,
Are there any methods actually *fail* this criterion? Borda perhaps?
Chris Benham
discussing the contents of his book.
http://www.podcast.net/show/6336
I found it very interesting.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kevin,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a crit :
This is my proposed clear definition:
"An 'approval vote' is one that makes some approval distinction among
the candidates. It is sincere if
(1)the voter sincerely prefers all the approved candidates (or single
cand
can make it impossible for
well-informed
strategists to sometimes have an advantage, but it irks me that WV has
non-obvious fairly sophisticated strategy for "zero-information" voters
(random-fill and if you have a big ratings gap, equal-rank above it).
Chris Benham
Election-methods ma
, then the candidate
with
greatest approval wins.
This is an arbitrary complication that would cause the method to fail
Majority Favourite and Irrelevant Ballots.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
)
and the MinMax (Winner's Exclusive Approval)?
By the latter I mean measuring the defeat strength by the number of
ballots that approve the pairwise winner and not the pairwise loser,
as advocated by James Green Armytage.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
of the candidates you prefer
more will win. And so on.
This strategy seems sane to me, and probably right for voters who only
have a ranking.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
for public office elections if we insist on
Condorcet
and Mono-raise.
Chris Benham
.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
:
If the ballot constrains me to equally help a set of candidates
(which I nominate) to defeat any non-member candidates, I put Bush
in that set. I prefer Bush to any candidate that I don't approve.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to precisely define I approve of Bush:
If the ballot constrains me to equally help a set of candidates
(which I nominate) to defeat any non-member candidates, I put Bush
in that set. I prefer Bush to any candidate that I don't approve.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see
(i.e. to random-fill). In addition
to that, if above-bottom
equal-ranking is allowed, then if the voter has a sufficiently large
gap in his/her sincere ratings he/she should equal-rank above that gap.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
, as opposed to the consistency
of method A as judged using method B, which is kind of an unfair pre-biased way to judge A.
Voting methods don't have any feelings or rights, so therefore this
alleged unfairness doesn't matter.
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http
last must not change the
winner.
But so far I think the main weak version is more useful. (BTW, plump in this context
means bullet-vote)
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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