choose a small value of alpha, and it
> won't influence the community distribution much either.
>
> FWS
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what
there the Scorched Earth Party makes interesting reading.
After reading you might look up DHMO in Wikipedia, or do a search with
Yahoo or Google, or go to
http://people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek/platideas/platidea3b.html
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/da
rityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Thu, 29 Mar 2007 02:52:20 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:14 AM 3/29/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>
>>The real topic here is whether new legislator terms start the
>>instant someone gets enough proxies filed, or seats change with
>>enough advance notice
dy of manageable size, while leaving the
> voting power in the hands of the public, but, normally, exercised
> through proxies who can become informed regarding the business of the
> assembly. The everyday citizen is not required to follow all this,
> except to the extent that he or
Abd has started a related thread: Path to a Proxy Legislature
On Wed, 28 Mar 2007 12:32:53 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:07 AM 3/28/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 27 Mar 2007 11:32:01 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>
>>> Sorry. He referred to
On Tue, 27 Mar 2007 11:32:01 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:10 AM 3/27/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>>What Ketchum is doing is to elect a legislature by proxy, and
>>>apparently to maintain the variable voting power of proxies, but he
>>>would retain
On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 22:20:47 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:52 PM 3/26/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 10:08:03 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>
>>>What Ketchum has done is to connect floor rights with voting power,
>>>rigidly.
On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 22:01:11 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:50 PM 3/26/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 10:23:10 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>
>>>Proxy voting is not normal for legislatures.
>>>
>>
>>Hooray!
On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 10:08:03 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:51 AM 3/26/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Responding to Abd with a clarification on time:
>
>
>>If a change in proxies means a legislator loses floor rights
>>tomorrow, tomorrow is when those changes
On Mon, 26 Mar 2007 10:23:10 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 02:51 AM 3/26/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> if we imagine Trees by Proxy as proposed by Ketchum, and then we add to
> it the following provisions:
>
>>> (1) Voters may vote directly at any assembly by showi
all about what the *assembly* decides. And with proxy voting as
> the norm and direct voting allowed, it would seem that we would have
> the best aspects of direct democracy and representative democracy combined.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Da
On Sun, 25 Mar 2007 17:33:03 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 11:41 PM 3/24/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> I accept Abd's suggestion to discard his words whenever they conflict
> with my goals.
>
And would discard less if he could recognize the goal of this thread:
&
proxy voting would not be allowed. These
> would be questions that are called, in Robert's Rules, Questions of
> Privilege. An example would be a motion to turn up the thermostat
> These questions affect the personal rights of present participants,
> and so proxy voting wouldn&#x
t Free
Associations (or other uses Abd may promote).
>
> At 03:27 AM 3/24/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Anyone interested in understanding what I am offering here had best
>>ignore anything Abd offers here:
>> He offers Free Associations, Asset voting, and Dele
legislature. While we both
got proxies from the same source, there are enough differences in the way
they are used that you get nothing but headaches if you mix Abd's ideas
with mine.
On Sat, 24 Mar 2007 01:07:54 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 09:36 PM 3/23/2007, Dave Ketch
ailable. Let's see
> what the different concepts are good for and in under what conditions
> they can be used.
>
> Juho
>
> On Mar 23, 2007, at 21:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>
>>I started the Trees by Proxy thread March 18, in response to
>&g
pretend to have all the details sorted out - it has been less
than a week since your post inspired me.
DWK
On Fri, 23 Mar 2007 19:33:24 +0200 Juho wrote:
> On Mar 23, 2007, at 7:56 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> I suggest you look at Trees by Proxy as a better base for your though
On Fri, 23 Mar 2007 11:23:05 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:56 AM 3/23/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> I suggest you look at Trees by Proxy as a better base for your thoughts.
>>
>> It provides for electing legislatures, such as boards of trustees or
>> el
ut it.
>>
>
> It seems that what we are looking for is a political system that
> allows people to influence and not get e.g. the feeling that whatever
> way they vote, the professional politicians (and potentially also
> lobbyists) will promote their own goals, never mind
y ballot fully ranks the candidates, the method is
> identical to beatpath, just as MMPO is identical to ordinary MinMax in
> that context.
>
> I wonder if this method preserves the FBC property of MMPO.
>
> Any thoughts?
>
> Forest
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clar
>B, and saying this plus A>Z and B>Z is
beyond Approval's abilities, so I must ask for a more powerful method such
as Condorcet.
As to the strategizers who would attack based on what others might do
based on expected voting, I wish them no luck.
DWK
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]peop
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 15:18:14 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 03:47 AM 3/21/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
This one line of Abd's does not fit, for what follows is my words as
quoted by him.
>>On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 23:52:45 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Back to my previous
On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 23:52:45 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 06:01 AM 3/20/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Thanks.
>>
>>While our thoughts on proxy are similar, I see what I am trying as
>>being far from Free Association.
>
>
> Think about it a whil
Thanks.
While our thoughts on proxy are similar, I see what I am trying as being
far from Free Association.
DWK
On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 01:39:59 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 03:32 PM 3/18/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Abd has good ideas under the labels Assets and Delegabl
On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 00:25:27 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 03:20 AM 3/17/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Offer me true Approval - the one that differs from Plurality only in
>>permitting over votes - and we have something understandable and,
>>occasionally, usef
sal.)
Number of layers vs size of layers is a topic for discussion. I accepted
numbers that Juho offered as useful in discussing concepts. Doubtful that
we have developed anyone prepared to sign up as an expert.
DWK
>
> Juho
>
>
> On Mar 18, 2007, at 10:59 , Dave Ketchum wr
; representatives at personal level, and electing your top level
> representatives directly but knowing them only via TV. To me the
> additional layer of representatives and negotiations that you discussed
> represents in some sense adding one step in this hierarchy.
>
> Di
- something to debate another day.
DWK
On Sat, 17 Mar 2007 00:17:36 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 12:41 AM 3/16/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>I care:
>> Whether my Plurality thoughts are easy to express when those are my
>>thoughts - often happens when votin
ewer than half of the ballots. But
> this can happen only if X is also ranked on fewer than half of the
> ballots. Which means that X is also beaten by trunc. In other words,
> if trunc is uncovered, then trunc is the beats all candidate.
>
> Forest
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]pe
led variation in backing when desired).
Write-ins - not a method, but an ability that BETTER give as good control
as would be expected from Plurality (some discussions of Range offer
either MORE or LESS control than Plurality offers).
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/dav
h-SU methods include range voting, Brian Olson's IRNR system, and
> range+top2runoff,
> and Benham's MCA system (a 3-slot approval-like method).
>
> Approval Voting using "zero info strategy" is found in net in current
> IEVS scenarios to have better SU than
> eve
ctions alone, or convert to something better than IRV.
>
> Thanks,
> - Jan
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Thu, 22 Feb 2007 08:28:40 +0200 Juho wrote:
> On Feb 22, 2007, at 5:50 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>STAY AWAY from US Presidential elections. The Electoral College
>>offers too many complications to live with for this effort.
>
>
> Ok, let it be UK then, electing a
On Wed, 21 Feb 2007 17:33:36 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 02:04 PM 2/14/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> Plurality NEEDS Primaries to avoid having multiple related
>>candidates competing. While other methods may also use
>>primaries, primaries pro
t; minmax(winning votes) to fail as a result of strategic voting is. I
> don't consider counter strategies yet since I'm mostly interested in
> seeing how possible/probable successful strategic manipulation is in
> the first place.
>
> Juho
>
>
> P.S. One more
And there are also the simplicity and understandability
> benefits. Looks pretty good for me. (Maybe someone else can list the
> bad points of minmax(margins). I maybe wrote this mail with only rosy
> colours since that was the request.)
>
> Although it is a common habi
AM showed that with 3
candidates and 35A obviously deserving to lose to 65B, IRV happily awarded
the win to A.
What can you trick Condorcet into that is nearly this bad?
When it gets this bad even voters might notice!
...
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
D
at least one voter.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
>
>
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.co
ed to, but
> there’s no reason to.
>
> You don’t want a Republocrat, but if it appears that one is going to
> win, then you want to try to make it Kucinich.
>
> I re-emphasize that it would be very unlikely for power truncation or
> ARLO to actually be needed in an SSD, CSSD o
.
>
> When a definite answer isn’t desired, it’s enough to just get answers
> from the various methods used. When a definite answer is desired from a
> multi-mode poll, then I suggest Voter’s Choice, which we’ve used in past
> multi-mode polls.
>
> Mike Oss
For true ties, flipping a coin is as good and cheaper.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work f
Approval). But programming
> equal ranking is trickier, if you are using issue space analysis to
> determine votes. At what level of preference do you decide to rank
> equally? Or what other factors influence the use of equal ranking? It
> is actually a *lot* more complex.
>
>
have always been
> about how much a method penalizes sincere voting. That’s the subject of
> all of my defensive strategy criteria.
>
>
>
> If yes, then range is definitely better than Condorcet methods for the
> purpose of generating Condorcet winners; if no, they are t
On Thu, 01 Feb 2007 08:10:49 -0500 Michael Poole wrote:
> Dave Ketchum writes:
>
>
>>>>Are there ways to improve DREs so that they can be made secure and
>>>>fully auditable? NIST and the STS do not know how to write testable
>>>>requirements to
On Wed, 31 Jan 2007 21:35:31 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> At 12:28 AM -0500 2/1/07, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Step back, and think of the many places where we use computers BECAUSE, if
>>designed and built to provide a service, they are the best way to get it
>>done su
E ACT (HAVA) LOBBYIST LIST
...
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
s
> not about public elections, it is about an election method, in the
> abstract. This election has three candidates and three voters. It's a
> *test* election, to show properties of ranked methods.
>
> At 11:01 PM 1/25/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>Assuming this is
three.
>
> You are testing a three-candidate election against a two-candidate
> one. That is necessary for ICC, actually. But it is meaningless with FB.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-
in which range is superior to EVERY
> pure-rank-ballot voting
> method, and using two of the most important voting criteria AFB and ICC.
>
> Remaining Open question: what happens if we permit rank order votes to
> have EQUALITIES in them?
> Are ICC and AFB still incompatible or d
ength defeats. In MDE those voters should simply not middle-rate
> any of the candidates (certainly none of the Unacceptables).
>
> MTR has a saleability problem in that it uses a pairwise mechanism as
> part of its algorithm (MDD), but then fails both Condorcet and
> Condo
s a minor point, and
> knowing how each candidate views his opponents in the race would be
> important information for voters.
>
> I'd be interested in any arguments against or suggestions for this (and
> other) preference-filling options.
>
> Michael Rouse
--
[EM
>>lack of first preferences.
>
>
> Actually A is in the tie also, isn't he? A is undefeated except by
> E and F.
>
> Kevin Venzke
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-6
l have a CW, there won't be any LNHarm problems.
>
> Also, you can modify this proof to make a similar demonstration about
> Condorcet and (my interpretation of) FBC.
>
> Kevin Venzke
-
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
mes down to whether LNH or
> monotonicity are more important in our elections. I know many people
> will bullet vote - probably more than in a hypothetical national
> election - if the voting system fails LNH. However, monotonicity is
> also a concern...
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
general.)
>
>
>>You also use the word "loops" in a manner I do not understand.
>>
>
> I don't know how but I think I referred to artificial intentionally
> generated circular preferences every time.
>
> Juho Laatu
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]peo
ballot might look e.g. a+b>c=d>e-f>g-h-i.
>
> Just for your consideration. Different ballot styles may have an impact
> on strategies too.
>
> Juho Laatu
>
>
> On Dec 15, 2006, at 15:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> How did we get here?
>>
>&g
gt; If all candidates have same number of first place supporters (and
> other preferences are mixed) and B, C and D supporters don't try to
> create loops, A wins.
>
> Juho Laatu
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum
had lots of troubles with many
> small parties. Eventually it moved to D'Hondt. In the European version
> of the apportionment problem there are typically requirements that
> parties get a minimum percentage of the vote to get any seats.
>
> Regards,
>
> Joe
>
>
> This is, indeed, the position of Robert's Rules of Order, as revised.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
d this.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Wed, 1 Nov 2006 18:16:57 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Dave,
>
> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>>>>>D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
>>>>
>>>>candidate
>>>>
>>>&g
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 19:43:13 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 12:19 AM 10/31/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>This certainly DOES NOT earn a need for special assistance to such a voter.
>>
>>Whatever information may be available, if the voter does not know enough
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 16:22:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hello,
>
> -- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>>Quoting from below:
>> >
>> > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>> > thought to be mo
be so
> important to accomodate this voter as to implement a different election
> method for him? Particulary considering that lots of information should
> have been available on which this voter could have made a decision.
>
> Kevin Venzke
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityco
at the end because as the number of other
> voters increases, the likelihood that our single voter can change
> the result decreases, making the result less accurate.)
>
> These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
> thought to be more than about 2 other voters
ge winner and a
> randomly chosen candidate with a beatpath to the Range winner, to make a
> pretty terrible method (but still better than Range) with a strong
> random element?
>
> Chris Benham
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum
any ridiculously complicated schemes
> whenever all you have to do is expand the definition of the method.
>
> Just a simple observation... in all reality I believe the reweighted
> range voting scheme is superior.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
n by voters
than some of them have any interest in expressing.
>
> Actually, would randomly completing uncompleted ballots create an
> incentive to fully rank all the candidates even in condorcet ?
>
Another way to introduce destructive noise from a combination of voter
response and mac
thods@electorama.com
> Sent: Tue, 17 Oct 2006 9:24 PM
> Subject: Re: [EM] IFNOP Method (was Re: Question about Condorcet methods)
>
> Maybe there is some potential in doing the IRV style "never
> considering all the given opinions" in some better way. I don't have
here but, if so, consider:
If good - brag.
If not good, blame the parties for failing to properly
attend to nominating.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>DO NOT DO any switching such as you describe below.
>>Even if it is far down in a voter's ranking, it is what this
>>voter said about this pair. If this pair is far down in the
>>list, there are many candidates this voter has ranke
nd
> it is something that can make a real difference. Of course, a full system
> of representation by delegable proxy
> ( http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/proxy_representation.htm
> )
> might be more desirable in the long run, but we know that it won't happen
>
On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 20:56:21 +0300 Juho wrote:
> On Oct 15, 2006, at 20:06 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>
>>On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 13:24:48 +0300 Juho wrote:
>>
>>>On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
>>>>Note that many voters will vote th
On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 13:24:48 +0300 Juho wrote:
> On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>
>>Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for
>>which a special form might be possible.
>
>
> Yes, there is space for optimisation. Storing plu
links takes more
> time than I'd like to spend.
>
> Anyway, if anyone knows of a fairly complete list of Condorcet methods on
> the web, along with how they handle circular ties, I'd appreciate it.
> Thanks!
>
> Michael Rouse
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]pe
On Sat, 14 Oct 2006 12:13:12 +0300 Juho wrote:
> On Oct 14, 2006, at 5:30 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>>> Is it compatible with Condorcet? I remain a backer for Condorcet's
>>>> combining capability with tolerable complexity.
>>>
>>> I think
Adding a couple trivial notes:
On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 18:38:43 +0300 Juho wrote:
> On Oct 11, 2006, at 2:58 , David Cary wrote:
>
>
>>--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has
&
On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 18:28:18 +0300 Juho wrote:
> On Oct 9, 2006, at 1:15 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>
>>Is 3ballot worth the pain?
>
>
> I think Rivest proved the concept to work. He obviously also tried to
> make the method as usable as possible. Wether benefits a
On Tue, 10 Oct 2006 16:58:35 -0700 (PDT) David Cary wrote:
> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>>ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has
>>to be tricky - can they verify a voter's actual vote as such
>
- look closer. Execute this routine and the numbers became
instructions, looked at content of the gap between two records, remembered
success vs failure, and those instructions became numbers again,
DWK
On Sun, 8 Oct 2006 17:18:54 -0500 (CDT) Ka-Ping Yee wrote:
> On Sun, 8 Oct 2006, Dave Ketc
or general public validation, and if there are any quirks
> or alleged quirks in its election day performance, there may be no
> audit trail, no recheck procedures, no way to recreate what the
> correct checking should have been.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages
t least one of the parties nominating them.
>
> Cheers,
> Scott Ritchie
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If
>Because it causes the candidate unanimously agreed worst, to get elected.
>That is as bad as it possibly can be.
>
> I think these are objective criteria, not inflamed rhetoric.
> Warren D Smith
> http://RangeVoting.org
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.co
ods and different
> combinations of candidates don't jusfity anything like
> this kind of hyperbolic rhetoric. If the point is to make
> arguments that are logically compelling, such rhetoric
> is not merely unhelpful but extremely counterproductive.
>
> -Ralph Suter
--
e underestimated or trivialized the
> power of
> the DH3 pathology to cause massive destruction.
> Warren D Smith
> http://RangeVoting.org
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no
L power over either
Plurality or Approval.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for
are pretty important, too...
>
> Any recommendations?
>
> Anyone know how to reach someone at Yahoo, to try to get them
> interested in providing more polling methods?
>
> Thanks,
> - Jan
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Hals
ree alerts of new reports:
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Suscríbete gratis para alertas de nuevos reportajes en español:
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What are you trying to say???
Your lonely sentence is true, but I do not see why you say it.
DWK
Paul Kislanko wrote:
> Sentences should have subjects and predicates.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Dave Ketchum
t;dependent on the election method under consideration, the easier it
>>may be for an election method to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
>>
>>The Wikipedia article is notably lacking any references.
>
>
> Many of the election-methods Wikipedia articles leave a lot
rd Asset Voting -- i.e., vote for one only -- is
> really almost as good without the counting complexity. Pick the
> candidate you most trust and vote for him or her, no worry about wasted
votes.)
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Dave Ketchum 108 H
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authorized, but not updatable by others.
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
s,
> - Jan
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Fri, 07 Jul 2006 19:53:45 -0400 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>> Agreed that redistricting should be based only on the decennial
>
> census - what was done in Texas needs forbidding.
>
> Btw, what is your opinion on ha
his means that the districts near the start of the list shall be very
> close to 50/50 while the districts near the end of the list will be
> more unbalanced/safe seats. The net result is that there would be some
> safe seats and some not so safe seats. However, they would be selecte
problem with this is that what if there are more candidates than
> voters, and the voters decided to stop paging through candidates after
> the 3rd - 4th page of candidates.
>
> Maybe an approval system would be better here?
>
> Thanks
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happen without his strategy, he is in trouble UNLESS he can be
sure that there is no possibility of clan leader B existing and changing that
environment.
Further, clan A voters need to know what their strategy is to vote it,
without clan B finding out and responding.
>
> Finally, your co
eptible to strategic voting.
>
> Has anyone ever seen a proposal or analysis of a method similar to this?
>
> Thank you,
>
> Allen Pulsifer
> pulsifer3 /at/ comcast /dot/ net
>
>
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
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