[EM] Census re-districting instead of PR for allocating seats to districts.

I haven't been following this discussion closely, but I've long thought that the best way of allocating seats to multi-member districts is to just say that subject to every district having at least one seat we do the allocation after the votes have been cast, based on the numbers of people who

[EM] Approval-Runoff

Mike Ossipoff wrote (9 March 2012): "Kevin: You wrote: I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the finalist positions. If th

[EM] an extra step for IRV (and some other methods?)

I have an idea for adding an extra step to IRV which has the effect of throwing out its compliance with Later-no-Harm in exchange for Minimal Defense, while trying to hang on to Later-no-Help. *Voters strictly rank from the top however many or few candidates they wish. Until one candidate rem

[EM] Two more 3-slot FBC/ABE solutions

Following on from my recent definition of the APPMM criterion/set, I'd like to propose two not bad 3-slot methods that meet the FBC.. Recall that I defined the APPMM criterion thus: *If the number of ballots on which some set S of candidates is voted strictly above all the candidates outside

[EM] suggested improvement on Mutual Majority criterion/set (add-plump proofed MM)

I've decided to bin (i.e.I now withdraw) my suggested "Add-Top Proofed Mutual Majority" as something highly desirable or a real improvement on plain Mutual Majority. I defined it thus: *If the number of ballots on which some set S of candidates is voted strictly above all the candidates out

[EM] TTPBA,TR

Mike, One thing that I like about the tied-at-top methods is that they elect A in the ABE, meaning that one-sided coalition support is sufficient to defeat C, but without giving the election away to B. By the "ABE", do you mean this? 27: A>B 24: B (sincere is B>A) 49: C Of course the ele

[EM] Kristofer: MMPO objections

Forest, I am a bit confused by the first of your two interesting suggestions: 1. Put 50 percent in each of the diagonal positions. (A candidate would beat a clone of itself half of the time.) Err.."50%" of what? Chris Benham Forest Simmons wrote (5 Jan 2012): Kristopher, I agree that

[EM] TTPBA//TR (a 3-slot ABE solution)

I have conferred off-list with Kevin Venzke, and now agree with him that the "Tied at Top Pairwise Disqualification, Top Ratings" method I suggested (20 Nov 2011) almost certainly does fail the FBC, so I withdraw that proposal and instead suggest this simpler method: *Voters submit 3-slot rati

[EM] suggested improvement on Mutual Majority criterion/set (and MTA reviewd)

On 21 Dec 2011 I proposed this criterion: *The winner must come from the smallest set S of candidates about which the following is true: the number of ballots on which all the members (or sole member) is voted strictly above all the non-member candidates is greater than the number of ballots on

[EM] ACF grade voting

Forest, Why are your suggested grade options labelled A, C, F and not A, C, E? You can make the same wonderful argument that 2-slot ballots can work just as well as 3-slot ballots. And why limit the voters to one coin-toss each per candidate? A voter who wishes to give candidate x a grade o

[EM] Who wronged the A-plumpers

Mike, A voting method algorithm stands or falls by its properties, i.e. its criterion compliances and failures. Another school of thought is less concerned about strict pass/fails of criteria and stresses how well the method does in computer simulations at maximising "social utility" and/or

[EM] suggested improvement on Mutual Majority criterion/set

I now see that I erred in how I defined my new suggested variant of the Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) criterion, so disregard what I previously wrote (pasted below this message) starting with "Preliminary definitions"). Instead I now propose this: *The winner must come

[EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT)

Mike, Isn't it possible that that there could be more than one "mutual approval set" that meets the condition you specify? And if yes, what then? Just elect the most top-rated candidate in any of them, or the most top-rated candidate in the largest one? Chris Benham Mike Ossipoff wrote

[EM] voters "specifically" wronged by Mono-add-Plump failure

Mike, If you don't know what the Later-no-Help criterion is, why didn't you simply say so, or even make some attempt to look it up? http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion And I would prefer it if you at least keep your offensive gibes out of the subject line. 49: C 27: A

[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion "failures" you mentioned for MMT

Mike, In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote: MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from. People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know, so far, about its properties, ... That is almost the only thing I did. You di

[EM] Forest: MAMT

In my last post (13 Dec 2011) I wrote: A better method would (instead of "acquiescing majorities") use the set I just defined in my last post. *If there is a solid coalition of candidates S (as measured by the number of ballots on which those candidates are strictly voted above all others)

[EM] Forest: MAMT

Mike, I can see how MAMT tries to meet Mono-add-Plump, but it fails. 49: C 27: A>B 24: B>A MAMT (like all reasonable methods) elects A, but say we add 20 ballots that plump for A. 49: C 27: A>B 24: B>A 20: A (new ballots) (120 ballots, majority threshold 61). Now there are two "minimal su

[EM] suggested improvement on Mutual Majority criterion/set

Back in December 2008 I criticised Marcus Schulze's "beatpath Generalized Majority Criterion" (which says in effect that if any candidate X has a majority-strength beatpath to candidate Y then Y can't win unless Y has a majority-strength beatpath back to X) in part because the concept is

[EM] Oops! Forgot to include Chris's text. Chris MMT reply, complete this time.

Mike, As I pointed out in my last message, I made a mistake with the example I gave. There should have been only 10 B>A votes. 45: C 06: D>A 39: A>B 10: B>A So there are a hundred voters and no what you call "mutual-majority candidate set". But if it weren’t big enough, and if the D voters

[EM] MMT2 meets FBC, fails Mono-Add-Plump, as it should.

Mike, Sorry, there was a typo (20 B>A voters instead of 10) in my demonstration of MMT2's failure of FBC in my last post. So I'll go through it again. MMT2 defines "mutual-majority candidate set" as: A set of candidates who are each voted above bottom by each member of the same majority of

[EM] Chris: MMT criterion compliances.

Mike, ...now it's a matter of whether MMT2 meets FBC and Mono-Add-Plump. MMT2 definition: A "mutual majority" candidate set is a set of candidates who are each rated above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters-- where that set includes at least one top-rated candidate on

[EM] How to vote in IRV

Mike, Similar to the good Approval strategy "approve the candidate A you would vote for in FPP, plus all the candidates you like as much or better than A" as an IRV strategy guide is "vote in first place the candidate A you would vote for in FPP and in second place the candidate B that you wou

[EM] Complete MMT definition

Mike, I think this fails the FBC. Say sincere is: 45: C 06: D>A 39: A>B 20: B>A There is no "mutual majority set" (by your latest definition) so C wins. That is also true if the 6 D>A voters change to D=A or D=A=B or D=A>B or anything else except A>B or A=B or B>A in which case the winner c

[EM] Sorry--One more revision of MMT

Mike, I was a bit confused about this for a while, because your definition of MMT doesn't make clear that a "majority candidate set" may contain only one candidate. Given that this uses 3-slot ballots, isn't it just (interpreting any above-Bottom rating as approval) "Majority Approval//Top

[EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

Forest, I don't understand the algorithm's definition. It seems to be saying that it's MinMax(Margins), only computing X's gross pairwise score against Y by giving X 2 points for every ballot on which X is both top-rated and voted strictly above Y, and otherwise giving X 1 point for every bal

[EM] Approval vs IRV

Mike, Someone said that IRV lets you vote more preferences than Approval does. But what good does that do, if it doesn't count them? The term "count" here can be a bit vague and propagandistic. Also you imply that it is always better to "count" preferences (no matter how) than to not. Als

[EM] Approval vs. IRV

Ted Stern wrote (29 Nov 2011): 47: A 05: AB (sincere is A>B) 41: B 07: BC Approvals: B53, A52, C7 I find this example contrived. * If mass polling is available, many people will be aware of the 52/48 split between A and B ahead of time. * Corruption is a separate issue. With prope

[EM] Approval vs. IRV

Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011): We may compare IRV also to the other commonly used single-winner method TTR. To be brief, one could say that IRV is better than TTR since it has more elimination rounds. IRV's problem in this comparison is that it collects so much information that one can, after

[EM] Approval vs. IRV

Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011): Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV? To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler and cheaper to do than IRV. If we are talking about the classic versio

[EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)

Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the "Approval Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by 49: C (sincere) 27: A>B (sincere) 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A). He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal

[EM] MTA vs. MCA (was "An ABE solution")

Forest Simmons wrote (17 Nov 2011): MTA vs. MCA I like MTA better than MCA because in the case where they differ (two or more candidates with majorities of top preferences) the MCA decision is made only by the voters whose ballots already had the effect of getting the ”finalists” into the f

[EM] An ABE solution

Forest Simmons, responding to questions from Mike Ossipff, wrote (19 Nov 2011): > 4. How does it do by FBC? And by the criteria that bother some > people here about MMPO (Kevin's MMPO bad-example) and MDDTR (Mono-Add-Plump)? I think it satisfies the FBC. Forest's definition of the method

[EM] Reply to Chris regarding the Approval bad-example

49: C 27: A>B 24: B I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a just interventionist mind-reading God should award the election to A. [endquote] Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? Yes. If the method used meets Later-n

[EM] Descending Acquiescing Coalitions versus Nested Acquiescing Coalitions

Forest, This NAC method suggestion of yours fails my Descending Solid Coalitions bad example: 49: C 48: A 03: B>A NAC, like DSC and FPP, elects C while DAC elects the MDT ("Mutual Dominant Third") winner A. DAC goes AC96 (disqualify B), AB51 (disqualify C), A wins. NAC skips AB because t

[EM] MMPO tiebreakers that don't violate FBC.

Mike Ossipoff wrote (15 Nov 2011): By the way, when people object to "random-fill incentive" for MDDTR, maybe they're forgetting that MDDTR is a 3-slot method. And, if MMPO were proposed as a 3-slot method, that would avoid the "random-fill incentive" criticism of it too. Mike, why do

[EM] Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

Mike refers to this scenario: The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here: Sincere preferences: 49: C 27: A>B 24: B>A A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C. Actual votes: The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the co-operativeness and r

[EM] ABucklin doesn't meet Mono-Add-Top or Participation, but meets Mono-Add-Plump. MDDTR and Mono-Add-Plump.

Mike, You continued: (Also it looks like you have some other method in mind [endquote] How so? As I said, I'm referring to MDDTR. Because in the description of your example you referred to information that MDDTR ignores: Say the method is MDDTR, and your favorite candidate is F. F doesn

[EM] ABucklin doesn't meet Mono-Add-Top or Participation, but meets Mono-Add-Plump. MDDTR and Mono-Add-Plump.

Sorry, a small mistake in my first election corrected. Mike Ossipoff wrote (12 Nov 2011): ABucklin and Mono-Add-Top: In the criterion-compliance table that I posted, I said that ABucklin meets Mono-Add-Plump, Mono-Add-Top and Participation. Actually, it only meets Mono-Add-Top. It isn't

[EM] ABucklin doesn't meet Mono-Add-Top or Participation, but meets Mono-Add-Plump. MDDTR and Mono-Add-Plump.

Mike Ossipoff wrote (12 Nov 2011): ABucklin and Mono-Add-Top: In the criterion-compliance table that I posted, I said that ABucklin meets Mono-Add-Plump, Mono-Add-Top and Participation. Actually, it only meets Mono-Add-Top. It isn't possible for a method to both meet Mono-add-Top and fail

[EM] Criterion-compliance table. Method merit order. Polling and proposing methods.

Mike Ossipoff wrote (11 Nov 2011): Let me know if there are errors in the following table: MAP is Mono-Add-Plump. MAT is Mono-Add-Top. ABE means that the method passes in the Approval Bad Example. =

[EM] Approval Bad Example

Mike Ossipoff wrote (9 Nov 2011): Here's the definition of MDD,TR: 3-slot method: Top, Middle, Bottom (unmarked) Disqualify any candidate(s) having a majority pairwise defeat. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate with the most top ratings. [end of MDD,TR definition] This definition

[EM] Approval Bad Example

Jameson, In response to Forest asking if there was a method that satisfies something plus FBC you responded: Yes. 321 voting 321 voting From Electowiki Jump to: navigation <#column-one>, search <#searchInput> 3-level rated ballots.

[EM] MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole) fails Mono-add-Plump

Mike Ossipoff wrote (6 Nov 2011): FBC is essential for public elections. My current favorite is MDD, ER-Bucklin (whole) (where ER-Bucklin(whole) is defined as in the electowicki). It's the Cadillac of FBC methods. Some years ago I also liked this. Is there an FBC-complying method me

[EM] IRV variants

Forest Simmons wrote (5 Nov 2011): Now here’s what I propose for an IRV variant: 1. Use the ranked ballots to find the pairwise win/loss/tie matrix M. This matrix stays the same throughout the process. 2.Initialize a variable U (for Underdog) with the name of the candidate ranked first on

[EM] Tentative replacement for CD

Mike, Your new suggested criterion is failed by anything that meets both of the Plurality and Minimal Defense criteria. 27: A>B 24: B (sincere might be B>A) 49: C Together they say that B must win here, but your suggested criterion says that B can do no better than tie with A, The only 2

[EM] ER-IRV(whole) fails FBC (was "no subject")

Mike Ossipoff wrote (2 Nov 2011): Kevin-- You wrote: ER-IRV(whole) doesn't satisfy FBC. You may need to demote your favorite in order to get a preferable elimination order. [endquote] How? Say that there's a particular candidate whom you need to have win. You can give him a vote by dow

[EM] MMPO//MMPO fails FBC? (was "New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion")

Kevin, Addressing Mike Ossipoff on EM, you recently (26 Oct 2011) wrote: None of them satisfy FBC, but neither does your version of MMPO. Mike's suggested version of MMPO is to resolve ties by eliminating the tied losing candidates and then starting again Can you please show us an example

[EM] Enhanced DMC

s true of these methods if we take a candidate X's highest gross pairwise score as X's approval score. Can you see any problem with that? Chris Benham - Original Message - From: Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm Subject: Enhanced DMC To: election-methods at lists

[EM] Enhanced DMC

Forest, The "D" in DMC used to stand for *Definite*. I like (and I think I'm happy to endorse) this Condorcet method idea, and consider it to be clearly better than regular DMC Could this method give a different winner from the ("Approval Chain Building" ?) method you mentioned in the "C//A

[EM] A variant of DSC

Forest, Your suggested variant of DSC doesn't address DSC's bad failures of Mutual Dominant Third and Minimal Defense. 49: A 48: B 03: C>B The biggest solid coalition is {A}49, so both DSC and your suggestion elect A. But MD says "not A" and MDT says "B". "As near as I can tell, my v

[EM] C//A

Forest Simmons wrote (12 June 2011): I think the following complete description is simpler than anything possible for ranked pairs: 1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1). The voter rates a candidate on a scale from zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits t

[EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

Forest Simmons wrote (31 Dec 2010): Chris, You are right that since Chain Climbing does not satisfy IPDA, neither does the method that takes the parwise victor of it and the Covering Chain winner. I was more thinking out loud than pushing that idea. Do you think that Approval Sorted Pairwi

[EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

Forest Simmons wrote (16 Dec 2010): Chris, Thanks for reminding me of Approval-Sorted Margins. The covering chain method applied to the list obtained by approval sorted margins certainly has a maximal set of nice properties, in that any additional nice property would entail the loss of some

[EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

After pasting below, I fixed up the "MCA instead of DMC" mistake, in accordance with what Forest has since wrote that he meant. The covering chain method is not guaranteed to pick from Banks, but it has a nice property that chain climbing lacks, namely it satisfies independence from pareto dom

[EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

From James Green-Armytage's paper on election strategy: I focus on the nine single-winner voting rules that I consider to be the most widely known, the most widely advocated, and the most broadly representative of single-winner rules in general: these are plurality, runoff, alternative vote, mi

[EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

James Green-Armytage wrote (20 Nov 2010): In addition to the nine methods listed above, I tried some of my analyses with six other Condorcet methods: beatpath, ranked pairs, Smith/Hare, alternative Smith, and two versions of cardinal pairwise. Beatpath and ranked pairs generally seem to perfo

[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Forest wrote (13 Nov. 2010): I'm not a die hard Condorcet supporter. In fact my truly favorite methods are neither Condorcet efficient nor deterministic; hence the title of this thread is intended to connote a deliberate restriction of attention to lesser evil methods that might be acceptable

[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Regarding my example 31: A>B 32: B>C 37: C>A Forest: > > >I've come around to the belief that most Condorcet cycles in > ordinary elections > >are artificial, so chances are that this cycle was created from > the burial of B > >by the C faction. Giving C the win only rewards this manipulation. >

[EM] Re : TACC (KM, CB)

Kevin wrote: > I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes > against the spirit of the Condorcet criterion, > and I hate random-fill incentives. So, you don't like the implicit version. That's fine. I like (and endorse) them both. I prefer them both to Winning Votes. I have no

[EM] TACC (KM, CB)

Chris wrote: BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows voters to indicate an approval threshold so they can rank among unapproved candidates. Kevin responded (10 Nov 2010): I still don't. I don't understand why you should be allowed to vote nonsense rankings and not have t

[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Chris wrote ... / 31: A>B />/ 32: B>C />/ 37: C>A />/ />/ Approvals: B63, A68, C69. A>B>C>A. />/ />/ TACC elects A, but C is positionally the dominant candidate and />/ pairwise beats A. />/ />/ For a Condorcet method with pretension to mathematical elegance, />/ I don't/ /see how that/ /can be

[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

31: A>B 32: B>C 37: C>A Approvals: B63, A68, C69. A>B>C>A. TACC elects A, but C is positionally the dominant candidate and pairwise beats A. For a Condorcet method with pretension to mathematical elegance, I don't see how that can be justified. Chris Benham PS: Could someone pleas

[EM] "Guaranteed Majority criterion" on Electowiki

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance MCA-AR satisfies the Guaranteed majority criterion , a criterion which can only be satisfied by a multi-round (runoff-based) method. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Guaranteed_majority_criterion The *guaranteed m

[EM] MCA on electowiki (re " Later-no-help" and "Favorite Betrayal" criteria)

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance The Later-no-help criterion and the Favorite Betrayal criterion are satisfied by MCA-P They are also met by "MCA-A", "MCA-M" and "MCA-S". I consider it desirable that methods should have Later-no-Harm and La

[EM] MCA on electowiki

Jameson Quinn wrote (18 Oct 2010): I edited Electowiki to essentially replace the Bucklin-ER article with a new, expanded MCA article. In this article, I define 6 MCA variants. I find that as a class, they do surprisingly well on criteria compliance. Please check my work: http://wiki.electorama

[EM] MCA fails Irrelevant Ballots (and therefore Jameson's "mono-add-antiplump")

Jameson Quinn wrote (19 Oct 2010): Indeed, all forms of MCA satisfy mono-add-plump (unless a non-compliant method is used to choose the finalists for the runoff in MCA-IR or MCA-VR). Yes. In fact, they satisfy an slightly stronger criterion, let's call it mono-add-antiplump. You cannot cau

[EM] MCA on electowiki

Jameson Quinn wrote (18 Oct 2010): I edited Electowiki to essentially replace the Bucklin-ER article with a new, expanded MCA article. In this article, I define 6 MCA variants. I find that as a class, they do surprisingly well on criteria compliance. Please check my work: http://wiki.elector

[EM] Schulze ("Approval-Domination prioritised Margins")

On 18 Jan 2009 I proposed a Condorcet method, "Approval-Domination Prioritised Margins": I have an idea for a new defeat-strength measure for the Schulze algorithm (and similar such as Ranked Pairs and River), which I'll call: "Approval-Domination prioritised Margins": *Voters rank from t

[EM] Holy grail: a "condorcet compliant" cardinal method (MCA/Bucklin variant)

Jameson Quinn wrote (5 Sep 2010): Here's my latest Bucklin variant, which, pending the results of the naming poll , I'm calling RMCA (because of the catchy music). (Of course, if it's OK to appropriate the name MCA, the editorial headline writes itself...) Start

[EM] A completely idiotic Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) election

C.Benham wrote: / Score voting <http://rangevoting.org/RangeVoting.html> considers this />>/ election an easy call. It would elect B if all voters gave score X to />>/ their first choice, Y to their second, />>/ and Z to their third, for /any/ X?Y?Z, not al

[EM] A completely idiotic Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) election

Warren Smith posted (24 Aug 2010) a link to page discussing a simple IRV election: 18: A>B>C 24: B>C>A 15: C>A>B Quoting from the page: FAILURE OF THE SNIFF TEST: First of all, without any analysis at all, who do you think ought to win this election? It sure looks to me like B is the "most co

[EM] Thoughts on Burial

Jameson Quinn wrote (23 July 2010): In Australia (IRV), the clear strategy is to vote in a plurality-like way. That is, between two near clones A and B who share a majority, supporters of A, the one with least support from C voters, should betray and vote BAC. In the absence of such a strategy f

[EM] SMD,TR fails the Plurality criterion.

Kevin Venzke has come up with an example that shows that my "Strong Minimal Defense, Top Ratings" (SMD,TR) method fails the Plurality criterion,contrary to what I've claimed. 21: A>C 08: B>A 23: B 11: C Approval scores: A29, B31, C32 Maximum Approval Opposition scores: A11, B32, C31

[EM] The general form of Quick Runoff

Kevin, Quoting myself: Why not order the candidates by DSC (the reverse of the DSC disqualification order)? Wouldn't that version simply dominate (in terms of desirable criterion compliances) the QR you've defined (that uses the FPP order)? Compared to plain DSC it seems to just gain compl

[EM] The general form of Quick Runoff

Juho wrote (23 May 2010): / 1. Rank the candidates. Truncation is allowed. Equal ranking is not />/ planned for (but we could come up with something). />/ 2. Label the candidates A, B, C, ... Z in descending order of first />/ preference count. />/ 3. Let the current leader be A. />/ 4. Whil

[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.

Kristofer, Is it possible to make a two-candidate runoff at all so that the runoff passes mono-raise if the voters vote exactly as before? The top two in the Ranked Pairs order should fill that bill for what its worth. / A better 2-round scheme would be to have all the members of the Smi

[EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)

Forest Simmons wrote (12 May 2010): Here's another proposal. Let M be the matrix whose (i,j) element is the number of ballots on which candidate i is ranked ahead of candidate j. I think that this is what you mean by the "normal gross pairwise matrix" that you mention below. For each candi

[EM] Condorcet How?

I am one of those that thinks that compliance with the Plurality and Minimal Defense criteria is desirable, but note that if the ballots are interpreted as purely relative rankings then examples of failures can be made to "go away" by cloning the offending winner. 49: A1>A2 24: B 27: C>B>A1

[EM] MinMax(AWP)

Forest, 25: A>B 26: B>C 23: C>A 26: C I don't like any method that fails to elect C here, unless like IRV it has the property that a Mutual Dominant Third (MDT) winner can't be successfully buried to elect a non-MDT winner. If these rankings are from sincere 3-slot ratings ballots, then C i

[EM] WMA

Forest Simmons wrote (24 April 2010): I want to thank Markus for keeping me from going too far off track. And the link he gave below to a great message of Chris Benham was valuable for more than showing us that Bucklin violates mono-add-top: Chris also pointed out that WMA (weighted median ap

Re: [EM] Multiwinner Bucklin - proportional, summable (n^3), monotonic (if fully-enough ranked)

Jameson Quinn wrote (28 March 2010): >/ What does "MCV" stand for? />/ / Ooops. I garbled your term, didn't I? It's supposed to be Majority Choice Approval, not Majority Choice Voting. "Majority Choice Approval" was invented and introduced a few years ago by Forest Simmons, and I think h

[EM] Smith, FPP fails Minimal Defense and Clone-Winner (was "Burlington Vermont repeals IRV 52% to 48%")

Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (5 March 2010): i like Ranked Pairs best, too. and if the Smith Set are three candidates, it and Shulze pick the same winner. >/ Bringing Plurality in would be a distraction, since we have no need />/ to go near this method and risk a worse answer. /it's a "wors