I am one of those that thinks that compliance with the Plurality and
Minimal Defense criteria is
desirable, but note that if the ballots are interpreted as purely
relative rankings then examples
of failures can be made to "go away" by cloning the offending winner.
49: A1>A2
24: B
27: C>B>A1
On Apr 16, 2010, at 4:42 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Ok I see. A3 has no claim over A1 just from the bullet
vote. So assume
it's A3>C2. In that case according to your
analysis, the A candidates
collectively beat B and C,
Only A3 beats the B and C candidates, not all A candidates,
no "collectiv
Hi Juho,
I don't have much to add except on one point.
--- En date de : Mer 14.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> >> I think I did. For example sincere 49: A>B, 49:
> C>D,
> >> 1: D>B could be one such example. WV elects D,
> and that
> >> could be considered less than perfect performance
> with
> >> sincer
On Apr 14, 2010, at 7:07 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 13.4.10, Juho a écrit :
This time the
election will be arranged using WV. B supporters
note that
they can win by not supporting C any more. C
supporters do
not have the same incentive since they are about
to w
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 13.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> >> This time the
> >> election will be arranged using WV. B supporters
> note that
> >> they can win by not supporting C any more. C
> supporters do
> >> not have the same incentive since they are about
> to win.
> >
> > That's only true if
On Apr 13, 2010, at 4:20 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho a écrit :
De: Juho
Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
À: "Election Methods"
Date: Dimanche 11 avril 2010, 19h57
On A
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Lun 12.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> De: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How? Abd
> À: "Kevin Venzke" , election-meth...@electorama.com
> Date: Lundi 12 avril 2010, 10h30
> At 12:56 PM 4/11/2010, Kevin Venzke
> wro
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> De: Juho
> Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
> À: "Election Methods"
> Date: Dimanche 11 avril 2010, 19h57
> On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kev
At 05:28 PM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
On Apr 12, 2010, at 10:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
One point should be made clear: any candidate who recommends that
voters not vote sincerely is probably shooting himself or herself in
the foot. It isn't a winning strategy, generally, it really looks
bad
On Apr 12, 2010, at 10:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:04 AM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
The end
result is also very unstable if B and C are about equally strong
since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left
wing
and both recommend truncation (=> A may win). So
At 05:04 AM 4/12/2010, Juho wrote:
The end
result is also very unstable if B and C are about equally strong since
then both could claim to be the leading candidate within the left wing
and both recommend truncation (=> A may win). Some supporters of both
of them may truncate for any of the reason
At 12:56 PM 4/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a écrit :
In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark. But in
general,
aiming for the median voter is the most reliable. (That is
assuming you don't know utilities, which I'm really not sure y
On Apr 12, 2010, at 3:57 AM, I wrote:
On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
49 A
5 B
19 B>C
27 C>B
It remains bad. I can't see what criticism would
remain of this, other
than saying that in a real election we might be lucky
enough to have
some A voters vote A>B and accidentally
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i haven't been following closely this example scenario (for some reason
they don't seem compelling to me), but i did see "WV" referred to
several times and missed the definition. i can imagine it might stand
for West Virginia or Working Voter or Winning Votes or
i haven't been following closely this example scenario (for some
reason they don't seem compelling to me), but i did see "WV" referred
to several times and missed the definition. i can imagine it might
stand for West Virginia or Working Voter or Winning Votes or i dunno.
can someone fil
On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
49 A
5 B
19 B>C
27 C>B
It remains bad. I can't see what criticism would
remain of this, other
than saying that in a real election we might be lucky
enough to have
some A voters vote A>B and accidentally give the
election away.
I'm not quite
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> > In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark.
> But in general,
> > aiming for the median voter is the most reliable.
> (That is assuming you
> > don't know utilities, which I'm really not sure you
> showed how to fi
Hi Juho,
I may not have that much more to say either.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> I think I already said most things
> that I had in my mind about the character of winning votes
> and margins. There are however still plenty of details in
> the answers and comments below (maybe
I think I already said most things that I had in my mind about the
character of winning votes and margins. There are however still plenty
of details in the answers and comments below (maybe already too many
for many :-).
On Apr 10, 2010, at 7:20 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En da
At 08:37 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> I can't study the underlying utilities because I don't have
> them. If I
> did I could make them say anything I wanted. I would have
> to come up
> with a general rule anyway, or else give up and sa
At 08:32 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
In a given election yes, it is easy to miss the mark. But in general,
aiming for the median voter is the most reliable. (That is assuming you
don't know utilities, which I'm really not sure you showed how to find.)
To see this, you assume utility is base
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> I can't study the underlying utilities because I don't have
> them. If I
> did I could make them say anything I wanted. I would have
> to come up
> with a general rule anyway, or else give up and say all
> methods are the
> same.
This should
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> > It remains bad.
>
> There is absolutely no way to tell that an outcome is bad
> unless underlying utilities are studied.
>
> This is a classic vote-splitting outcome.
That's why I prefer the version that doesn't look like
At 12:20 PM 4/10/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
To me the only thing that matters is whether there is even one scenario
that could realistically arise and which is bad.
Two problems: what does "realistically" mean? and
What's "bad."
Let me propose an answer. If a good model is built of voter behav
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> > I don't get why people assume that B voters secretly
> do like C. If I
> > vote for a left-wing candidate, that doesn't mean I
> like all left-wing
> > candidates better than all right-wing candidates.
>
> I don't want to make assumptions
On Apr 10, 2010, at 1:55 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibi
On Apr 10, 2010, at 12:39 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in
this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is
a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story beh
At 03:55 AM 4/9/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I'll note here that Bucklin is not cloneproof, and in some cases it
can reward cloning. See
http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-electorama@electorama.com/msg02705.html
. Thus it might pay for voters of some opinion to add lots of
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candi
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> >>> I more or less despise the election of A in
> this
> >> scenario:
> >>>
> >>> 49 A
> >>> 24 B
> >>> 27 C>B
> >>>
> >>> I believe the possibility of this outcome is
> a
> >> disincentive for a candidate
> >>> like C to run.
> >>
> >> Th
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story behind
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
wrote:
> Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
> counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
> the count verifies it; if incorrect, must
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Dave Ketchum a écrit :
> > --- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho
> a écrit :
> >>> I more or less despise the election of A in
> this
> >> scenario:
> >>>
> >>> 49 A
> >>> 24 B
> >>> 27 C>B
> >>>
> >>> I believe the possibility of this outcome is
> a
> >> disi
On Apr 8, 2010, at 8:03 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
There are often v
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> > I more or less despise the election of A in this
> scenario:
> >
> > 49 A
> > 24 B
> > 27 C>B
> >
> > I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
> disincentive for a candidate
> > like C to run.
>
> The story behind these votes seems
Being the "you" that Raph was addressing, I offer what I was proposing.
As the subject indicates, the topic is Condorcet voting. Also,
listing a candidate who is on the ballot, and could be voted for as
such, should be counted as a misdeed - such could be voted for in the
normal manner wit
On Apr 8, 2010, at 11:00 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I more or less despise the election of A in this scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a disincentive for a
candidate
like C to run.
The story behind these votes seems to be that C is ideologically close
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, robert bristow-johnson
a écrit :
> Juho just explained it, so now i know (earlier i had
> wondered if "margins" was a normalized or percentage beat
> strength). i've always thought that the Tideman RP was
> *only* framed in terms of margins. i do not know why
>
On Apr 8, 2010, at 10:30 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i do not know why anyone would back the "winning votes" metric for
beat strength.
I guess the main driver has been that winning votes is more tolerant
than margins against strategic burying in some scenarios. (There are
however al
On Apr 8, 2010, at 2:02 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 8:29 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what "with margins" do
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
wrote:
> Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
> counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption correct
> the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
How do you handle w
On Apr 7, 2010, at 8:29 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what "with margins" does. i'll read below...
vs comparing per winning
On Apr 8, 2010, at 3:29 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what "with margins" does.
There are different approaches to determinin
On Apr 8, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum > wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
How do you ha
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
> counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption correct
> the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
How do you handle write-ins. Are write-ins assumed to be equa
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins,
not sure what "with margins" does. i'll read below...
but amending toward other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can
Thanks - there are so many Condorcet methods that I chose to describe
what I see as a better one, while giving up on getting understood via
naming.
On Apr 7, 2010, at 6:50 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum (7 April 2010):
For RP I see deleting the smallest margins from
the li
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum (7 April 2010):
> For RP I see deleting the smallest margins from
> the list until what remains is not a cycle, but
> does identify a winner.
"Deleting the smallest margins from the list until
what remains is not a cycle" rather sounds like the
Schulze method.
Markus Schulze
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins, but amending toward
other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can rank one or more candidates. Equal ranking
permitted. Counters care only which of any pair of candidate
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> It seems that what Fairvote want is PR-STV.
>
> The hope is presumably, that if they can get voters used to
> ranked ballots and eliminations with IRV, they can then argue
> that moving onto PR-STV is just changing to the multiseat
> version of IRV.
Surely a ma
Terry Bouricius wrote:
2. Why did FairVote first start advocating IRV instead of Condorcet?
FairVote's initial and still leading concern is the promotion of
proportional representation (the majority should elect the majority of
seats, but minorities should be fairly represented at the table).
removed.
Terry Bouricius
- Original Message -
From: "robert bristow-johnson"
To: "election-methods List"
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 12:54 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
> Robert,
>
> Two corrections..
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 4:54 AM, robert bristow-johnson
wrote:
> is that why IRV
> (under whatever name) was first plugged for government elections in
> multiparty environments?
It seems that what Fairvote want is PR-STV.
The hope is presumably, that if they can get voters used to ranked
ballots
On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:42 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
[...]
Since the bill, as passed, actually
used a top-two contingent system (only the top two initial
candidates
would advance), the tally would be
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
[...]
Since the bill, as passed, actually
used a top-two contingent system (only the top two initial candidates
would advance), the tally would be relatively easy.
so the regional venues would report 1st-choi
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Robert,
Two corrections...
always happy to correct my misconceptions.
Bills to use IRV for certain statewide elections have
been introduced in Vermont in every session since 1998, and it was
passed
by the Vermont House and Senate a few
PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:06 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Robert,
>
> are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
it could be. i dunno if i wanna load the video again and figure that
out. i was pointing out that the purpose we adopted IRV in t
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 2:46 AM, robert bristow-johnson
wrote:
> and, i'm not sure who, but someone introduced a measure in the state
> legislature to elected the governor by IRV (there is a perennial Prog
> candidate that doesn't get any traction because Vermont is not all like
> Burlington or Br
Dear Robert,
> Terry Bouricius is also a Burlington resident
> and is known in Burlington for being the primary
> promoter of IRV (i think that's right, ain't it
> Terry?). i didn't see him at the debate, but
> Rep. Mark Larson and someone from League of
> Women Voters were on the pro- IRV side a
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:06 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Robert,
are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
it could be. i dunno if i wanna load the video again and figure that
out. i was pointing out that the purpose we adopted IRV in the first
place was to relieve the split major
Dear Robert,
are you the questioner at 00:42:00 -- 00:44:25?
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Mar 22, 2010, at 6:17 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
here are some interesting videos on IRV in Burlington:
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/instant-runoff-voting-interviews
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/irv-or-down-instant-runoff-
voting-debate
i've seen them. if i had reacted
Hallo,
here are some interesting videos on IRV in Burlington:
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/instant-runoff-voting-interviews
http://www.cctv.org/watch-tv/programs/irv-or-down-instant-runoff-voting-debate
I have the impression that there was no reasonable
debate on IRV. Most anti-IRV argu
On Mar 21, 2010, at 1:30 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 20, 2010, at 5:04 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Here are the proposed statutory rules:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/propstat.pdf
__
Suppose d[V,W] is the number of valid ballots on which candidate V
is strictly
sorry if this is too long
On Mar 21, 2010, at 7:45 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (21 March 2010):
Schulze's advantage is that it's actually being
used and that it provides good results (by the
Minmax standard). Ranked Pairs's (or MAM's,
rather) is that it's easy
Hallo,
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (21 March 2010):
> Schulze's advantage is that it's actually being
> used and that it provides good results (by the
> Minmax standard). Ranked Pairs's (or MAM's,
> rather) is that it's easy to explain.
>
> The question is: which of these qualities are
> more im
Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
of course, I am leaning towards the Schulze method.
This method is by far the most wide-spread Condorcet
method. It is used by about 50 organizations with
about 100,000 eligible members in total. It has also
become very popular among scientists:
http://en.wikipedia.
On Mar 20, 2010, at 5:04 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Here are the proposed statutory rules:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/propstat.pdf
thanks Markus. this is nice. and more concise than the Wikipedia
procedure.
__
Suppose d[V,W] is the number of valid ballots on which candi
Hallo,
of course, I am leaning towards the Schulze method.
This method is by far the most wide-spread Condorcet
method. It is used by about 50 organizations with
about 100,000 eligible members in total. It has also
become very popular among scientists:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 20, 2010, at 12:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting: Besides the N*N matrix,
i dunno why the common layout of the NxN matrix is popularly used. it
should be like a triangle, e.g. for the 2009 Burlington election:
[snip]
It's used to handle equal ran
On Mar 20, 2010, at 12:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting: Besides the N*N matrix,
i dunno why the common layout of the NxN matrix is popularly used.
it should be like a triangle, e.g. for the 2009 Burlington election:
M 4064
K 3477
M 4597 K 4313
W 3664 W 4061
This is some thought about keeping it simple, yet doable.
I will lean toward Ranked Pairs with margins, but amending toward
other types of Condorcet should be doable.
Voting: Voter can rank one or more candidates. Equal ranking
permitted. Counters care only which of any pair of candidate
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