were top ranked by 50% of the
new voters.)
Juho
On 8.8.2011, at 22.40, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> It seems that if a PR method chose slate {X, Y} for a two winner election,
> and only X or Y received
> increased support in the rankings or ratings, then {X, Y} should still be
> c
ne
major claim that could sum it all (at least the claims) in one sentence or
should we start from smaller pieces?
Juho
On 9.8.2011, at 16.14, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> SODA is not strategy free. Even if you make the assumption that candidate
> preferences are honest because dishonesty
to be the utility of each candidate
to the society (and elect the one with highest utility), it is not necessary to
derive those utilities from the utilities of individual voters. We might as
well take a shortcut and derive the society utility from something else, like
the issue agreement values.
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
>> On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>>
>>> But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if
>>> you think that candi
On 27.8.2011, at 17.38, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
>> On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>>
>>> On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@p
".
Use of Condorcet could make a well working two-party system worse (depends on
what one wants). But it could be a perfect solution for some other needs.
Juho
On 22.9.2011, at 19.40, James Gilmour wrote:
> Jameson Quinn > Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2011 2:00 AM
>> If I&#
ice. Majority criterion is a
requirement far more often, but not always. There are also elections where
majority is not a requirement. And there are also elections where it is
sometimes a requirement to elect against the majority opinion.
Juho
On 23.9.2011, at 12.26, Jameson Quinn wrote
On 23.9.2011, at 16.31, James Gilmour wrote:
> Juho > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 12:29 PM
>> I think term "weak CW" should not be used as a general term
>> without referring to in what sense that winner is weak. There
>> are different elections an
> B
10: B > A >>
20: B >> A
40: C >>
Now all candidates have 40 approvals and the situation is unstable.
In general this approach makes strategic voting easier since the (current) vote
counts are known. In some situations results could also improve thanks to the
same i
vote only after them.
- If other voters used (malicious) strategies then I might use my vote to
cancel their strategies.
Juho
On 26.9.2011, at 3.04, Raph Frank wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 10:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> The problems of Approval might remain and even get stronger.
icy implementation - or not), but the statements quoted
> above were specifically about elections per se. That's why
> I'm puzzled.
I think it is incorrect or at least misleading to say that individual votes do
not have any influence. They do, as a group.
Juho
>
> James Gilmour
>
>
>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ld also say that a system where it would be common that one's vote could
decide who the winner is would be a bad system. That system would be a very
unstable.
But I guess the key point is to learn to think in terms of what do WE decide
instead of what do I decide.
Juho
Election-
proval may do better than Condorcet in electing
the Condorcet winner")
Which one is it? Better be exact when talking about these questions (also with
IRV).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
quot; In most cases, the answer would be incalculable, tied up in a
> web of cause and effect that plays out endlessly. We might say it was
> "boundless", or that it hovered somewhere between zero and infinity.
>
> In further reply to Juho, I would offer this indeterminacy as
(One more possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of
me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.)
Juho
On 14.10.2011, at 20.39, Michael Allan wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
>> Yes, there are many additional factors. Alr
If that one example set of votes is "bad enough" for MMPO, then how about this
example for PC(wv)?
49 A
48 B > C
03 C
Juho
P.S. Welcome back
On 14.10.2011, at 22.40, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> > Venzke's MMPO example
>
> > A > B = C
> >1
known. Better "players" tend to bypass them
already early in the game. :-)
Juho
On 14.10.2011, at 23.32, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Hi Juho--
>
> > If that one example set of votes is "bad enough" for MMPO, then how about
> > this example for PC(wv)?
> .
&g
t approval and first place
assumptions and plurality criterion.
Juho
On 15.10.2011, at 5.40, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Juho,
>
> Truthfully my damning MMPO scenario is meant to show a Plurality failure, so
> the
> last-preference rankings that Kristofer lists as equal are meant
-evils problem.
My point is just that if we want to replace plurality in some elections we
should also state what kind of outcome we want. Replacing plurality with
Condorcet (although Condorcet methods are good general purpose single-winner
methods) may not make the system any better (maybe
t are clearly smaller than the leading
ones. The rough philosophy can be said to be to wait with the third parties as
long as they grow as strong (measured as approvals, which is related to but not
the same as first preference support) as the previous leading two parties.
Juho
On 16.10.2011, a
On 17.10.2011, at 1.44, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
> Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think
> I probably
> did:
For a skilled reader like you those two rows below that define the method
should be enough. So I guess you know wha
On 17.10.2011, at 23.33, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>> True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the
>> (large) elections that I have ever participated. ...
>
> You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember if your vote
>
On 18.10.2011, at 5.57, Michael Allan wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
> Thanks for giving me a chance to explain. It's a difficult thesis to
> summarize. Nobody has admitted to being convinced by it yet. At the
> same time, no serious flaws have been found.
Yes, also I have not fo
On 19.10.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
> Firing off quick responses, sorry:
>
> --- En date de : Lun 17.10.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
>>
>>
>> I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe
>> you determin
n become active in politics and become a
candidate and maybe a representative.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
at I agree with the conclusions of the thesis because I don't
know what they are
- 1/N is maybe a better (although not perfect) estimate of the power that one
voter holds than 0
Juho
On 21.10.2011, at 0.48, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>>>> But maybe if you form
d be compared to the previous election.
Good luck with this idea. I think it would be worth trying (and a lot cheaper
than asking some gallup company to do it). If you do it well, people might get
interested also in the used method in addition to the interesting results.
Juho
On 21.10
, so I wanted to demonstrate that explicit approvals are
feasible in practical elections.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
alysis of the method
and the real life impact of voting. Maybe terms "technical outcome" and
"political outcome" could be used (although I note that you used the latter
term in a different meaning few lines before this line). The first term refers
to the method as a formally
On 23.10.2011, at 23.18, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Juho--
>
> Of course there won't be many polling locations Right now, I know of only
> one--my own local poll, which
> might turn out to be the only one. In that case, I'll have no choice but to
> infer about the ent
ry widespread need to rank candidates of different parties in
this kind of elections, but it ok to support also this if the method and the
requirement of simplicity of voting do allow that. From STV point of view the
problem is how to allow better proportionality and voter decisions i
I just wanted to point out that actually one can come from open lists towards
STV, and from STV towards a party based system with multiple candidates and end
up pretty much at the same point.
Juho
On 29.10.2011, at 20.21, James Gilmour wrote:
> Interesting, but not relevant to what Kristo
should just be more dynamic than today, which could mean that new parties may
replace the current major parties when the small parties grow stronger than the
old parties. These requirements reflect what I tried to achieve a while ago.
I'm just wondering if that is also what you want.
Juho
On 1.11.2011, at 0.46, David L Wetzell wrote:
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Juho Laatu
> To: EM list
> Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 20:14:45 +0200
> Subject: Re: [EM] hello from DLW of "A New Kind of Party":long time electoral
> reform enthusias
oly, rather than a (somewhat contested) political
>>> monopoly.
>
> Juho Laatu > Sent: Monday, October 31, 2011 6:15 PM
>> I'm not sure what your targets for the national level are.
>> This sentence however sounds like 1) representatives of minor
>> t
candidates
(and representatives) in each district should be kept quite small.
Juho
On 5.11.2011, at 2.06, capologist wrote:
> In this post I discuss a proportional representation system called
> Interactive Representation (IR). A brief description of the system is
> followed by a discussio
number of parties with representatives,
K1 = 1.5 or 2, S = number of seats, K2 = 1.
Juho
On 6.11.2011, at 9.45, capologist wrote:
>
> On Nov 5, 2011, at 11:35 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com
> wrote:
>
>> With two representatives per district this is
candidates).
Juho
On 6.11.2011, at 11.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>> Since you are building this on the single-seat district tradition,
>> three or four seats and 10 candidates is plenty. I'm used to numbers
>> like 6 seats with 108 candida
ay however work well, just like any other
small numbers.
>
> If the number of seats and candidates do get so large that the Schulze Method
> on the candidate sets becomes computationally difficult, I'm not married to
> that seating process. IRV-style successive elimination of c
candidates are
a good and useful approach as long as one remembers that one talks about a
simplified model.
Juho
On 6.11.2011, at 23.12, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>> From: Jameson Quinn
>> To: EM
>
>> Here's a toy model where the math is easy and you can get some interesting
be measured in many different ways
(including also some majority oriented approaches).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9.11.2011, at 11.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/11/9 Juho Laatu
> Utility example:
> - There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will not
> lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the sum of
> losses will be $10001. The poin
breaking. His public vote could just rank the candidates
in a random order if he doesn't want to use his personal preference order. If
he would give a random order, then we would already be quite close to just
using a random order (lottery) to solve ties.
Juho
Election-Metho
already almost talking about a generic system that can be
parameterized to meet different needs.)
Juho
On 18.11.2011, at 8.20, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
> The poll for favorite multi-winner system ends on Sunday. Please get your
> votes in soon if you would like to participate.
nment those two happen to be the same
method). I guess the choice of the method depends on how strategic you expect
the voters to be (and how efficient you expect the voters to be with their
strategies). Should we elect the correct winner or be strategy resistant?
Juho
Election-Metho
decide, does not sound like a system that voters would like to keep.
In IRV people are (as we have seen) quite ignorant and don't understand that
someone else than the ("fair") IRV winner should have won. The results are a
bit random, but often people just think "better luck
that are either black or women. What other rules would be
useful?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
because it solves
> the spoiler problem and does not create nonmonotonicity and huge
> administrative, technical, auditability and other practical problems.
Both methods have some problems - quite different ones.
I'd like to add simplicity of filling the ballot (without errors) to the
s can be designed to give best possible
winners with sincere votes, or to be as resistant against some chosen set of
strategies as possible. I think margins tries to address the first need, and
winning votes is more natural as part of the other approach.
Juho
On 28.11.2011, at 10.12, Kristofe
to
favour large parties (with lots of first preference support) or not.
Approval is maybe a reasonable algorithm for non-competitive elections where
two rating values are sufficient.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 30.11.2011, at 7.23, C.Benham wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011):
>> I'd like to add that IRV is an algorithm for those that want to favour the
>> large parties.
>
>
> The main thing that favours large parties is legislators elected in
> single-memb
icalness). The title of this mail stream would mean that IRV belongs in the
first category of reforms.
Juho
On 3.12.2011, at 6.49, Brian Olson wrote:
> Just the subject line on this is the most amusing thing I've read on this
> list in a while.
> Well said, sir!
>
> On
some other vulnerabilities less serious, or to 2) make the positive properties
of the method better (e.g. to pick the best winner instead of resorting to some
less good alternative, maybe as a result of optimizing the strategy resistance
of the method too far).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
hod is simple and straight
forward enough. If the method measures the number of required additional votes
to beat all others, then a simple histogram can be used to show how far each
canidate is from that position (or how far ahead the CW is).
Juho
P.S. If you want more information, maybe multi
in schools.
Answer 4: Think that you are still in the school and just rate the candidates
(ratings will be derived from those ratings).
All the arguments are actually based on the fact that rankings can be derived
from ratings. In the case of rankings the voter need not care about the scale
of numbers that one uses (1,2,3 is as good as 1,49,50).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 3.2.2012, at 0.21, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2012/2/2 Juho Laatu
> Attempt 1: It is difficult to write something like "a>b>c" on the ballot
> paper, or to push buttons of the voting machine so that all the candidates
> will be in the correct order.
>
> Answe
d by experts to do otherwise or 2) as the default rule that is in
practice valid in all lagrge elections, where voters make independent decisions
on how to vote, and where their opinions are not fixed but can change all the
time?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
will be
too unhallyi. Minimax operator is thus a good approach.
In summary, there sure are elections/selections where one doesn't want to elect
the Condorcet winner. That logic however applies to all criteria since
different situations have different needs.
When people discuss about weak
nt
available methods against the targets and environment description, and then
pick the best method (and ballot format) (and guidance to the voters on how to
vote).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 5.2.2012, at 5.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 2/4/12 4:01 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>>> so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
>>>
>>>1. do we all agree that every voter
We may want the society to have two (maybe occasionally
changing) main parties, and we want the election method to support this state
of affairs. For example in such cases we can have (targets that point to) a
majority oriented method that does not respect the Condorcet criterion.
Juho
be a very
sensible approach. You can either assume that majority rule is what you want,
or that majority rule is what you must satisfy with in a competitive
environment.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>>> how can Clay build a proof where he claims that "it's a proven mathematical
>>> fact that the Con
two-party system, or a
proportional system, and are the targets different at different levels and in
different bodies.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9.2.2012, at 17.21, David L Wetzell wrote:
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Juho Laatu
> To: EM list
> Cc:
> Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:29:02 +0200
> Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.
> On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:
&g
of COndorcet methods can be kept also in
the 2+ approach. (Same considerations with respect to proportional
representation in the representative bodies.)
Juho
On 9.2.2012, at 18.49, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Feb 8, 2012, at 3:29 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L
On 9.2.2012, at 18.07, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>> if it's not the majority that rule, what's the alternative?
>> I'm not aware of an
On 10.2.2012, at 0.59, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On 2/9/12 5:19 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> Condorcet is a natural extension to the multi-candidate case (still assuming
>> competitive elections). Maybe not the only one though. In another mail I
>> just addressed the
On 10.2.2012, at 2.02, James Gilmour wrote:
>> Juho Laatu > Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:29 PM
>>
>> I think I agree when I say that the first decision (in the
>> USA) is whether to make the current two-party system work
>> better or whether to aim a
On 10.2.2012, at 2.17, James Gilmour wrote:
>> Juho Laatu > Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 8:07 PM
>>
>> As I earlier wrote, I think the US has many options on how to
>> go forward with the reform. The presidential election is
>> maybe the most interesting
t of a third party candidate grows to the level of one of the two old
major parties. Because of its problems it may discourage people to continue the
reform even more than IRV failures do.
Modified PR methods are ok too (as stepping stones). Maybe people that don't
want to follow the PR pa
On 13.2.2012, at 16.28, David L Wetzell wrote:
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Juho Laatu
>>> dlw: But I'd argue that to make our two-party system work better, we need
>>> to provide a constructive role for 3rd parties in it. This wd be
>>
> Let us suppose that so much bad blood exists between Washington and
> Lincoln that their supporters refuse to rank the other candidate and that
> Hitler and Stalin have supporters. Unless one ranks the hundreds of
> also-rans so that one can make certain that Hitler and Stalin are ranke
Here's my one cent on how votes should be recorded and counted. Two simple
procedures that try to outline the basic needs.
Manual approach:
- representatives of multiple interest groups monitor the voting process
- they check that the ballot box is empty and then seal it
- voter fills the paper b
On 8.5.2012, at 8.33, Richard Fobes wrote:
> As I've said on this forum before, some studies should be done to compare
> _how_ _often_ each method fails each criterion. Those numbers would be quite
> useful for comparing criteria in terms of importance. In the meantime, just
> a checkbox with
don't like us"? Could a party lose support (the crucial
1%) if they adopt the latter message? I mean that sincerity may pay off also
this way.
(I know that in Australia people vote in ranked elections as told by the
parties, and in a way that does not necessarily reflect the sincere opin
On 14.5.2012, at 22.03, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> You said:
>
> I note that that would lead to an interesting political system that has
> probably not been tested anywhere in the world yet.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Single winner elections have actually been tested! And wi
hine that demonstrates that something is possible in theory,
but doesn't say much about how well and efficiently this strategy (or program
of a Turing machine) works in some real life environment. Am I correct? Can you
make this type of vulnerability more plausible by changing the numbers, votes
o
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Juho and Kristofer:
>
> Just a few preliminary words before I continue my reply to Kristofer that I
> interrupted a few hours ago:
>
> We all agree that Approval would be much easier to propose and enact than
> would
that
you mentioned. The "need to fully help the Democrat beat the Republican" and
therefore bury as much as on can may be based on not understanding well what
strategies make sense and are likely to improve the outcome.
> why should they stop advising
> lesser-of-2-evils favorite-burial. "The only way to maximally help Dem beat
> Repub is to rank Dem alone in 1st place. Don't spoil it for Nader."
Since that may not make sense as a techincal or as a political strategy. I
refer to the separate mail and the analysis on which tricks work and which ones
do not.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
contrary, as I said before, in Condorcet, if it's a u/a election
> (meaning that there are unacceptable candidates who could win), and if it
> appears as if Compromise is the only acceptable who can beat the
> unacceptable, then your best strategy is to bury your favorite by ranking
> Compromise alone at top.
Could you point out a concrete example with sincere preferences and strategic
votes, so I can check if it is likely to work in a real life election. (The one
example that I analyzed in the other mail didn't seem to be a threat in real
life elections.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 17.5.2012, at 4.39, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to respond.
>
> On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>>> On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Os
emocrat. If the Democrats are in, they
> elect a Republican.
I prefer not to take position on what the U.S. citizens should do with their
political system.
> You seem to be sure that, with Approval, one party would keep winning every
> election year.
No. Use of Approval introduces additional winn
then you ranking Compromise alone at top is
> optimal.
>
> If you want a numerical example, I'll post one when I get a chance, within
> the next few days probably.
I already commented one of your numerical examples in
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030400.html.
But additional ones are welcome, especially concerning the optimality of the
favorite-burial strategy.
Do you agree that with the given numbers the strategy that I commented is not
really a viable strategy? Maybe with some other better chosen numbers?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ximates "maximization of expectation" pretty
well. In Approval I'm waiting for your description on how to do that, i.e. some
words of guidance to regular voters on how to vote.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ch one of A and B will
be more popular. If you want, you may assume that C is not likely to reach 50%
first preference support.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 21.5.2012, at 18.03, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> Drive-by comment.
>
> At 04:05 AM 5/21/2012, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>> You asked if I'd answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of
>>>
; clearly specify it, and then tell what's wrong with it, and why you think so.
I hope the mail was clear enough. Maybe you did not notice that mail since you
did not comment it yet.
> Juho says:
>
> That would make the strategy a working strategy (although not necessarily a
&g
about why you think so.
I'm sorry if it was not clear enough. I can provide further explanations of the
unclear or missing arguments. Just point them out.
> Ok, Juho, get ready. Get your pencil and paper:
>
> Vote for the candidates who are better than what you expect from the election
On 23.5.2012, at 0.38, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Juho says:
>
> Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the
> following one.
>
>
> [example+question starts here]
>
> 26: A > B >> C
> 26: B > A >>
parison to the merit difference between the
sets". Terms "acceptable" and "unacceptable" refer to this definition of "u/a".
> Also terms "compromise"
>
> [endquote]
>
> I refer Juho to a dictionary, if he wants to find out what “compromis
On 25.5.2012, at 0.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Juho says:
>
> It seems that the strategy has a condition that there must be exactly one
> acceptable candidate that is also a potential winner (for he precondition for
> the use of the strategy to be true).
>
> [endquot
I'll add one additional question right away in order not to delay the
discussion by one more round.
On 25.5.2012, at 0.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Juho says:
>
> I assume that the strategy applies at least to all typical winning votes
> based Condorcet methods.
>
&
is the least liked candidate, which makes the strategy trivial (= no
changes to the sincere vote) if the idea is that the Democrat is the candidate
that should be ranked alone at top.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 27.5.2012, at 2.23, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> :-) What did I just say, Juho? I said that what I said is true of all
> Condorcet versions.
Ok. The strategy (of ranking the most winnable acceptable candidate alone at
top if there are winnable unacceptable candidates) is suposed to be
ublic will now notice that they don't offer squat, in
> regards to those things.
This is a problem of all political systems, also when there are multiple
parties. The problem may be one step worse in a two-party system where these
two parties are almost guaranteed to return back t
derable support although he is not
lkely to win. People want to rank him first although that takes a vote away
from their compromise candidate.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ial winners
would raise some concern. People might be "hilarious" after the Republican is
no longer a threat, but maybe confused while any of the three might still win.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Now I have a reasonable definition of Mike Ossipoff's strategy that is supposed
to be valid for all Condorcet methods (and even for all FBC failing methods).
The strategy is "if there are winnable unacceptable candidates and winnable
acceptable candidates, find that winnable acceptable candidate
This mail was just a draft that I sent by mistake. It contains still errors and
is badly formulated, so you an ignore it. I'll send a new one in a day or two.
Sorry about the confusion,
Juho
On 29.5.2012, at 11.30, Juho Laatu wrote:
> Now I have a reasonable definition of Mike Os
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