I would like to mention some other properties of the variation on MacSmith
that I suggested below. For reference first I give a brief description of
the method:
"Random Ballot, Non Strongly Covered"
Ballots are ordinal or cardinal with approval cutoffs or some other way of
indicating approval.
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 23:37:05 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] R.B.MacSmith
Anti-strategic properties:
I did not yet test many anti-strategy criteria, but the main
anti-strategic feature is that, due to the above-mentioned
randomization, in every majority which think
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Kevin continued:
>
> So, a method would satisfy WDSC if the C>A>D>E>B>F>G voters, comprising a
> majority, could deny B the win by voting C=A>D=E>B=F>G. It isn't necessary
> that there be any other way for them to deny B the win.
>
> I re
I'll try again to make the point that non-specialists need specialists to be
very precise in the use of language when talking about election methods. A
very good example is the phrase "sincere preferences." From reading posts on
this list I have come to the conclusion that the phrase has two differ
Dear Mike!
you wrote:
> Here´s the actual definition of SFC:
>
> SFC:
>
> If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
> candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn´t win.
>
> [end of SFC definition]
>
> Which part of that don´t you undestand?
Well, I at least thin
Dear Mike,
I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
> I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC)
> and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
>
> "X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers
> candidate X to candidate Y.
>
> SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the par
Dear Mike,
you wrote (1 March 2005):
> I've posted several different reasons why the use
> of "prefer" doesn't cause a meaning problem for my
> criteria. If you disagree, then you need to address
> those arguments, to tell exactly which part you
> disagree with.
Again: I have no idea why you bel
Kevin said:
Hi,
I assume the definitions at http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/stfree.html
are
correct.
I reply:
Yes. But I intend to update SDSC by adding wording that would answer the
question that you ask later in the message that I´m now replying to.
Also, the Approval strategy articles t
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2005 1:06 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Russ, 1 March, ´05, 1850 GMT
>
> I´d said:
>
> >Markus doesn´t like the mention of preference in a
I´d said:
Markus doesn´t like the mention of preference in a criterion, and implies
that it´s somehow necessarily imprecise. I don´t agree. Here are a few
approaches to the meaning of preference:
I can't read Markus's mind, but I suspect that his objection is not so
much to the definition of "pre
I said, in "No that isn´t SFC either. Endless guessing game?" :
You didn´t stipulate that A is in the sincere Smith set and B isn´t, or that
no one falsifies a preference, or that A is the CW. And there´s nothing in
SFC about the completion of partial individual rankings.
I comment:
When I said
Russ said:
(as a definition of SFC)
SFC: Suppose A >> B. Then partial individual rankings can be completed
in such a manner that no preferences are reversed and candidate B must
be elected with zero probability.
I reply:
You didn´t stipulate that A is in the sincere Smith set and B isn´t, or that
Markus said:
Dear Russ,
I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC)
and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
"X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers
candidate X to candidate Y.
SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual
rankings
Paul & Markus--
I´ve posted several different reasons why the use of "prefer" doesn´t cause
a meaning problem for my criteria. If you disagree, then you need to address
those arguments, to tell exactly which part you disagree with.
Or tell exactly which parts you think are unclear or undefined,
Russ Paielli said:
>Unless there's more to it than you said, I don't see how that even qualifies as a ranked
>method. It seems like Approval with the restriction that only two candidates can be >approved. Am I missing something?Well, it's a ranked method in the sense that it takes ranked ballots
First, Weber´s utilitly expectation-maximization method:
Because Russ used "candidate j" to represent the candidate for whom we´re
considering voting, I used that too in my derivation that I just posted. But
here I´ll let i be the candidate for whom we´re considering voting.
By "vote-expectation
Forest was the first to mention the Better-Than-Expectation strategy for
Approval--the strategy whereby a voter votes for the candidates who are
better than his/her expectation for the election, better than the value of
the election. So the voter using that strategy votes for a candidate if that
Markus,
--- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> As far as I have understood FBC correctly, then it
> is about individual voters and not about coalitions
> of voters.
Ok, I see that this is a problem.
> You wrote (1 March 2005):
> > I have to interpret "result" to mean "the candidate
Dear Alex,
you wrote (1 March 2005):
> That's not entirely true. The famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite (GS)
> Theorem makes reference to preferences. The theorem, crudely
> speaking, says that there's no ranked election method that
> doesn't, from time to time, give voters an incentive to vote
> insi
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (1 March 2005):
> I think, in short, that the "situation" (of odds
> distribution) is not relevant to FBC.
As far as I have understood FBC correctly, then it
is about individual voters and not about coalitions
of voters. However, an individual voter usually only
changes the
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