Dear Mike,
you wrote (29 Jan 1997):
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-February/001295.html
GMC: Never elect a majority-rejected candidate (a candidate
over whom someone else is ranked by a majority) unless
every candidate in the set from the method is
I wrote:
I know that Mike Ossipoff has said that we should all come together
around a winning votes method without an additional anti-strategy
measure.
But I'd like to hear what some other people think.
Russ wrote:
If the EM community adopts this approach, you will be no further ahead
Hi Juho, and welcome to the list.
Least Additional Votes:
Elect the candidate that wins all others. If there is no such candidate,
elect the one that needs least additional votes to win all others.
I'd like to clarify this, especially the second part. What exactly is an
additional vote in this
James G-A replying to Mike O.
You left out SSD, which, in public elections, where there won't be
pair-ties, will give the same outcome as BeatpathWinner or CSSD--but
whose
definition is much more naturally and obviously motivated and justified.
Assuming no pairwise ties, how does SD
Hello James,
I think your first guess ("A single ballot that lists this candidate as the first choice, with all others tied for last") is enough to do the job.
In the example I gave I was thus thinking of additions like
101: abxc
101: bcxa
101: caxb
100: x
2: x
or
101: abxc
101: bcxa
101:
Dear James Green-Armytage,
sequential dropping (SD) violates monotonicity.
Example (12 July 2000):
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-July/004107.html
Act I:
AB 18
BC 14
CD 12
DE 19
EF 15
FG 16
GA 11
DB 13
GE 17
Dear James Green-Armytage,
sequential dropping (SD) violates monotonicity.
Example (12 July 2000):
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-July/004107.html
Thank you Markus; that's good to know. However, I don't regard
monotonicity to be an extremely
Dear James Green-Armytage,
Thank you Markus; that's good to know. However, I don't regard
monotonicity to be an extremely important criterion.
However, I see the following problem: When someone promotes a
Condorcet method that violates monotonicity, then he cannot use
IRV's violation of this
Marcus,
I understand that what is usually meant by "monotonicity" is what
Woodall calls "Mono-raise".
" Mono-raise: a candidate x should not be harmed if x is raised on some
ballots without changing the orders of the other candidates."
On the other hand, what you refer to here is not
Hi Juho,
Very interesting post; glad you to decided to write. My preliminary
thoughts on three topics...
1. The Smith set.
My attachment to the Smith set stems in part from a desire to satisfy
majority rule to the maximum possible extent. If you are willing to agree
that
Dear Chris,
On the other hand, what you refer to here is not Mono-raise
but is instead what Woodall calls Mono-add-top.
Sorry for the confusion.
With XY z, I mean that candidate X is the winner of the
pairwise comparison XY and that the strength of the pairwise
defeat XY is z.
So when I
However, I see the following problem: When someone promotes a
Condorcet method that violates monotonicity, then he cannot use
IRV's violation of this criterion as an argument against IRV.
Yes, that is true, but I rarely if ever use monotonicity failure as an
argument against IRV. I feel
Russ,
You wrote (Sun. Mar.13):
Since we're discussing names for election methods, I'd like to propose
one: Ranked Approval Voting (RAV).
RAV works as follows:
The voter ranks the approved candidates only. The CW wins if one exists,
otherwise the least approved candidate is eliminated until a CW is
Thank you Markus. What a complex and interesting example! Am I correct
in
thinking that minimax chooses E in this example, ranked pairs chooses D,
and river chooses F?
Oops. Minimax chooses D, not E... is that right? Huh. Maybe that's the
first time I've seen minimax agree with ranked
I'm actually not sure how to best respond to a message such as:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff-freewheeling/message/905
which argues that Approval Voting preserves the spoiler effect. Anyone
want to jump in?
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Dear Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Ted!
Basically, the idea is simply Beatpath: Break each cycle at the weakest
link.
But what should be the weakest link? Why not call it the defeat made by the
candidate with lowest approval? We could call this Total Approval
Marcus,
Of course I accept your apology, and thanks for your quick clarification.
In case it isn't obvious to others, I mistakenly thought DE 19 and
DE 10 etc. referred to ballots,
intead of pairwise comparisons.
So I (not too cleverly) thought that
DE 19 is changed to DE 10
meant throw
Dear James Green-Armytage,
Am I correct in thinking that minimax chooses E in this
example, ranked pairs chooses D, and river chooses F?
Oops. Minimax chooses D, not E... is that right?
MinMax chooses A.
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
On 12 Mar 2005 at 16:10 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
Dear Ted,
Your TAB method is what I used to call Approval Seeded Bubble Sort.
Hi Forest, thanks for the reference check. It figures that if anybody
might have considered it earlier, it would have been you or Jobst ;-).
But in my earlier
Agreed you do not need (n-1)*n/2 pairwise comparisons BUT, seems to me
ROWS went too far:
It will happily and efficiently return the CW if there is one.
It does not know if there is a cycle, though the winner of the n-1
comparisons will, at least, be a cycle member.
Easiest I can
Last posts on Round Robins discussed what happens on sports Round Robins
if there is a tie for first - thinking that their solution might be useful
in voting:
Tournament sponsor BETTER have set up a plan ahead of time - of
which I found some via Yahoo!
What follows explains why I see
On 13 Mar 2005 at 15:08 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
Since we're discussing names for election methods, I'd like to propose
one: Ranked Approval Voting (RAV).
RAV works as follows:
The voter ranks the approved candidates only. The CW wins if one exists,
otherwise the least approved
James,
You wrote:
Dear election methods fans,
In a recent message, I noted that there is no broad consensus among
Condorcet supporters as to which completion methods would be most
appropriate for a few key scenarios. I don't really expect to establish
such a consensus, but I would at least like
James,
You wrote:
Dear election methods fans,
In a recent message, I noted that there is no broad consensus among
Condorcet supporters as to which completion methods would be most
appropriate for a few key scenarios. I don't really expect to establish
such a consensus, but I would at least like
I generally look at gerrymandering as a problem that is to be avoided at
all costs, but I thought I would have a little fun and come up with an
automatic gerrymandering method that might yield bizarre
representative districts but would still be relatively fair. Here's what
I came up with:
1.
Here's the original recursive procedure that I gave for Approval Seeded
Bubble Sort:
1. List the candidates in order of approval, from top to bottom.
2. Percolate the bottom candidate as far as possible up the recursively
sorted list of the other candidates.
How's that for concise?
Jobst is
A lot of Condorcet election methods use randomness to elect
a winner, but in a way that I think voters will find unsatisfactory.
They simply produce a winner as part of a complex algorithm that
uses randomness at various points. MAM is an example of such
an algorithm. A voter might reasonably
Andrew Myers wrote:
A lot of Condorcet election methods use randomness to elect
a winner, but in a way that I think voters will find unsatisfactory.
They simply produce a winner as part of a complex algorithm that
uses randomness at various points. MAM is an example of such
an algorithm.
Actually,
On 14 Mar 2005 at 13:14 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here's the original recursive procedure that I gave for Approval Seeded
Bubble Sort:
1. List the candidates in order of approval, from top to bottom.
2. Percolate the bottom candidate as far as possible up the recursively
sorted list of
James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set because
otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary.
However, it seems to me that majority is just one form of consensus.
Max approval is another form.
Consider (sincere)
52 ABC
48 BCA
Candidate B is the max approval
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2005 19:17:22 -0800 (PST)
From: Alex Small
Subject: RE: [EM] Round Robins
Say we have a round robin tournament
between soccer teams from USC, UCLA, and UCSB. Say that USC beats UCLA
2-1, UCLA beats UCSB 4-1, and UCSB beats USC 2-0.
Who would be declared the winner of
Am I correct in thinking that minimax chooses E in this
example, ranked pairs chooses D, and river chooses F?
Oops. Minimax chooses D, not E... is that right?
MinMax chooses A.
Yes, indeed it does. I'm quite embarrassed. Did I get the others right, at
least?
my best,
James
Eric Gorr wrote:
Andrew Myers wrote:
A lot of Condorcet election methods use randomness to elect
a winner, but in a way that I think voters will find unsatisfactory.
They simply produce a winner as part of a complex algorithm that
uses randomness at various points. MAM is an example of
A question:
What is the best way to demonstrate to IRV fans that Condorcet has less
of a spoiler effect than IRV?
Here's one idea:
[beginning of argument]
Define a spoiler as a non-winning candidate whose deletion from the
ballot would change the winner.
Case 1: There is a
Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
You wrote (Sun. Mar.13):
Since we're discussing names for election methods, I'd like to propose
one: Ranked Approval Voting (RAV).
RAV works as follows:
The voter ranks the approved candidates only. The CW wins if one exists,
otherwise
Dear Dave!
You wrote:
Agreed you do not need (n-1)*n/2 pairwise comparisons BUT, seems to me
ROWS went too far:
It will happily and efficiently return the CW if there is one.
It does not know if there is a cycle, though the winner of the n-1
comparisons will, at least, be a cycle
Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names in
the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to study its
properties, especially its anti-strategy properties.
I agree with Russ that it is perhaps a very nice first public proposal,
Andrew,
I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic. Barring
actual numerical ties, why should the selection of the winner depend in
any way on some random event? Yes, randomness may help thwart strategy,
but so what? Of course strategy is useless if we toss dice to determine
(I again forgot to write down the subject-title, and so I've written it as
close as possible to the original one).
James--
You wrote:
Assuming no pairwise ties, how does SD differ from SSD? Can you give an
example where they differ?
I reply:
I can't find an example in time to include it
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Here's the original recursive procedure that I gave for Approval Seeded
Bubble Sort:
1. List the candidates in order of approval, from top to bottom.
2. Percolate the bottom candidate as far as possible up the recursively
sorted list of the
I'll get to Least Additional Votes after the other issues you brought up:
You wrote:
I guess often also the wish to make election results a linear preference
order is present. This happens although we (in theory) already know that
group preferences can not be presented as a linear preference
I wrote:
Assuming no pairwise ties, how does SD differ from SSD? Can you give an
example where they differ?
Mike, you wrote:
I can't find an example in time to include it in this reply, and I didn't
want to delay this reply while I look for an example.
Markus was good enough to
Kevin wrote:
It is Smith-efficient. When you eliminate just one candidate at a time,
it's not possible to eliminate all Smith members without turning one of
them into a CW in the process.
Whoops. Sincerely sorry about that. My other reasons still apply,
though.
Especially reason (3),
Dear CF,
I appreciate your feedback. Some replies follow.
I recently re-read your paper on CWP. I must confess that I didn't see
much justification for it at first, but I now find it to be well
justified and elegant.
Thank you; I'm glad to hear that.
Unfortunately, there's
Here is my argument that margins methods have a critical strategy
problem. Some of this is a repeat from earlier posts, but there are subtle
and important differences in the argument, especially in my understanding
of how winning votes will work in this example.
Let me introduce
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